Modelling The Relation Of Semiotic To Material Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 439):

…this does not mean that, from our standpoint, it does not make sense to model the steps that relate semiotic systems to material ones.  It does; but the relationship has to be modelled in such a way that we can show how people as biological organisms and socio-semiotic persons interact with their material environment.

Different Approaches To Meaning As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 439):

Looked at from the standpoint of a stratal interpretation of language, these different approaches are not so much mutually exclusive alternatives — as they have often been thought to be — as complementary perspectives on meaning: they focus on different aspects of the stratum of semantics — its internal organisation or its interfaces to other systems, linguistic, conceptual or physical.

Stratal Perspectives On Meaning: Extra-Stratal (Relation Between Language And Non-Semiotic Systems)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 438-9):

a theory may focus on how language in general and semantics in particular relate to systems of other kinds, i.e. to non-semiotic systems. We have already discussed the way in which this focus has been built into transcendent approaches to meaning, where meaning is ‘exported’ into the realms of the material world or the mind.

Stratal Perspectives On Meaning: Inter-Stratal: Downwards (Semantics In Relation To Lexicogrammar)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 437-8): 

the interface between semantics and lexicogrammar is internal to language and has received far more attention in studies of meaning from all standpoints than has the interface between semantics and context.  In the logical-philosophical approach, within generative linguistics, interpretive semantics has focussed on the question of how semantic representations can be derived from below, from syntactic ones; and an important aspect of the debate in the late 60s and early 70s was precisely concerned with the directionality of interstratal mappings and the nature of the interstratal boundary One key question that emerged, particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s, was whether syntax is autonomous or not.  In the standard Chomskyan theory it was; but this was rejected by Montague and those who were influenced by his idea of building syntactic and semantic specifications “in tandem” (as in the successive developments of GPSG and HPSG).  Within the rhetorical-ethnographic approach, we have taken the position that not only is lexicogrammar not autonomous, but it is natural in relation to semantics: our approach to the ideation base rests on this theoretical assumption.  This is what explains the further possibility of grammatical metaphor, opened up at the interface between semantics and lexicogrammar.

Stratal Perspectives On Meaning: Inter-Stratal: Upwards (Semantics In Relation To Context)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 437):

the question of how meaning relates upwards to context is foregrounded in rhetorical-ethnographic approaches rather than in logical-philosophical ones. We discussed the contextual perspective on meaning… focussing on the relation between differences in contextual settings of field, tenor and mode, and on registerial variation in meaning.

Stratal Perspectives On Meaning: Inter-Stratal

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 437):

a theory may focus on the stratal interfaces of the semantic stratum — how meaning relates upwards to context (according to our approach) and how it relates downwards to lexicogrammar.

Stratal Perspectives On Meaning: Intra-Stratal (Internal Organisation Of Semantics)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 437):

a theory of meaning may focus on the organisation of meaning itself using some framework for describing sense relations — e.g. the paradigmatic organisation of the meaning potential as in our present work; the dimensions of semantic agnation, as in (classical) componential analysis; the syntagmatic decomposition of senses as in Katz & Fodor’s theory, in interpretive semantics and in generative semantics.

The Theoretical Advantage Of Modelling Knowledge As Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… for us [Fawcett's extralinguistic] “knowledge of the universe” is construed as meaning rather than as knowledge. This meaning is in the first instance created in language; but we have noted that meaning is created in other semiotic systems as well, both other social-semiotic systems and other semiotic systems such as perception. Our account gives language more of a central integrative rôle in the overall system. It is the one semiotic system which is able to construe meanings from semiotic systems in general.

How Fawcett’s Derived Model Differs From Halliday’s Original Model: Extralinguistic Knowledge

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

In Fawcett's model, the semantics is separate from the "knowledge of the universe", with the latter as a "component" outside the linguistic system including "long term memory" and "short term sort of knowledge".

The Theoretical Advantage Of Two System–Structure Cycles

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we [unlike Fawcett] allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

How Fawcett’s Derived Model Differs From Halliday’s Original Model: System–Structure Cycles

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

In Fawcett’s model, there is only one system–structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a “realisational component” to [content] form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically; […] in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones.

Lakoff Compared To SFL

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428):

… while our view that the ideational semantic system construes human experience is similar to what Lakoff calls the position of “experientialist cognition” (the position he has himself espoused, in contrast to what he calls “objectivist cognition”), it differs in that for us construing experience is an intersubjective process. It is both semiotic (the construction of meaning) and social (as in Peter Berger’s “social construction of reality”). It is the intersection of these two perspectives that characterises the social semiotic we are attempting to present in this book.

Jackendoff Compared To SFL

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428):

Jackendoff views information about the projected world in conceptual terms; hence reality construction is seen as a process taking place within the consciousness of the individual. Our own view, that the projected world is a semantic construction, foregrounds the interpersonal perspective: meaning is construed in collaboration. Meanings are exchanged; and the “projected world” is constantly calibrated against the interpersonal negotiation of meaning. … The semantic system (as part of the linguistic system) is shared; it is part of our social being.

Reality Interpretation Is A Semiotic Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 423-4):

We also [like Jackendoff and Lakoff] have emphasised that reality is not something that is given to us; we have to construct an interpretation of it — or, as we prefer to put it, we have to construe our experience.  Interpretation is a semiotic process, and our interpretation takes into account not only the concrete natural world but also the socio-cultural realm that is brought into existence as a semiotic construct …

‘Model Theoretic’ Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 421):

This approach to meaning is objectivist: (extensional) meanings are phenomena existing in the world. There are no meaners construing meanings, and there is no perceptual system mediating between semiotic expressions and their extensions.  Truth is a matter of correspondence, not (as in everyday discourse) a question of consensus among people.

Semantic Organisation In The Logico–Philosophical Tradition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417-8):

In the logico-philosophical orientation, scholars have focussed on syntagmatic organisation: they have been concerned with semantic structure — including principles relating to structure such as those of compositionality and semantic decomposition.

Metafunctional Scope Of The Logico–Philosophical Tradition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417):

In the logico-philosophical orientation, meaning is closely associated with representation, reference, denotation, extension or ‘aboutness’, so the metafunctional scope is restricted to the ideational metafunction: semantics means ideational semantics. … If interpersonal and textual meanings are dealt with by logico-philosophical accounts (they are often outside their scope), they are handled under the heading of pragmatics rather than the heading of semantics. For example, speech act theory was developed as a logico-philosophical interpretation of speech function (or rather its ideational construal) and has come to be included in pragmatics.

The Basic Unit Of Meaning In Western Traditions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417):

In the logico-philosophical orientation, the basic unit tends to be determined “from below”, from grammar: since sentences are seen as propositions, the basic unit of semantics is the proposition (as in propositional calculus). In contrast, in the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation, the basic unit tends to be determined “from above”, from context: since language is seen as functioning in context, the basic unit of semantic[s] is the text (see Halliday & Hasan 1976; Halliday 1978). So in the logico-philosophical orientation, semantics means in the first instance propositional semantics, whereas in the other orientation it means text or discourse semantics.

The 'Meaning As Transcendent' Tradition: World-Oriented Vs Mind-Oriented Views

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416-7): 

The modern split within the "transcendent" view is between what Barwise (1988:23) calls the world-oriented tradition and the mind-oriented tradition, which he interprets as public vs. private accounts of meaning… .  The world-oriented tradition [e.g. formal semantics] interprets meaning by reference to (models of) the world; for example, the meaning of a proper noun would be an individual in the world… . The mind-oriented tradition [e.g. cognitive semantics] interprets meaning by reference to the mind; typically semantics is interpreted as that part of the cognitive system that can be “verbalised”.

Meaning Seen As Transcendent

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416):

Many traditional notions of meaning are of the [‘transcendent’] kind — meaning as reference, meaning as idea or concept, meaning as image. These notions have in common that they are ‘external’ conceptions of meaning; instead of accounting for meaning in terms of a stratum within language, they interpret it in terms of some system outside language, either the ‘real’ world or another semiotic system such as that of imagery.

The Location Of Meaning In Western Traditions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416):

… the [two Western] orientations [towards meaning] differ with respect to where they locate meaning in relation to the stratal interpretation of language:

(i) intra-stratal: meaning is seen as immanent — something that is constructed in, and so is part of, language itself. The immanent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the rhetorical–ethnographic orientation, including our approach. 

(ii) extra-stratal: meaning is seen as transcendent — something that lies outside the limits of language.  The transcendent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the logico–philosophical orientation.

Orientations Towards Meaning In Western Traditions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416):

We can identify two main traditions in Western thinking about meaning (see Halliday 1977): 

(i) one oriented towards logic and philosophy, with language seen as a system of rules;

(ii) one oriented towards rhetoric and ethnography, with language seen as resource.

… Our own work here falls mainly within the second tradition — but we have taken account of the first tradition, and the general intellectual environment in which versions of our meaning base are being used also derives primarily from the first tradition. Indeed the two traditions can in many respects be seen as complementary, as contributing different aspects to the overall picture. Our own foundation, however, is functional.

Evolved Vs Designed Semiotic Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 413):

We have already seen that the textual metafunction is a powerful part of the explanation of ideational metaphor: ideational meaning is reconstrued in such a way that it suits textual organisation when meanings are being distributed in text. This is an area where the evolved system of English and designed systems such as logics differ sharply: the latter are not designed to construe textual differences and instead place a high value on canonical forms.

Ideation Base & Text Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 412-3):

It is clear, then, that the ideation base supports the text base: textual information can be stated as patterns over the [ideation] base — partitions, and moves between partitions. At the same time, it is also very clear that the way the ideation base is organised — the various configurations that have evolved — must have been shaped by textual pressure. So, for instance, given that a relationship could be construed either as ‘that boy’s hair is green’ or ‘that boy has green hair’, the preference in English for the construal where the whole is Carrier and the part is Attribute can be understood in textual terms: it means that the whole can serve as Theme.

Transitions Between Textual States: Method Of Development

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 410):

Bateman & Matthiessen (1993) suggest that Rhetorical Structure Theory can be used to model transitions from one textual state to another. These rhetorical transitions constitute the method of development of a text (see Fries, 1981, 1995 for the relationship between Theme and method of development).

Modelling The Guided Transitions Between Different Textual States: Stacks

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 409):

As a discourse develops, focus spaces are stacked one on top of another so that the most recent is always on top of the stack. The stack itself can thus be used [as] a record of progression through discourse time. Now the stack is always manipulated from the top: if a new focus space is to be added to the stack, it is pushed onto the top of the stack; and if an old one is to be removed, it is popped off the top of the stack.

Thematic Spaces & Semogenesis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

The speaker thus selects ‘thematic spaces’ as points of entry into larger regions of the ideational semantic network. From the listener’s point of view, these thematic spaces constitute indications of where to integrate the new information being presented in the text… . If we think of the listener’s processing of a text as being partly a matter of expanding his or her current semantic network with new information, the thematic spaces guide him/her to appropriate expansion points.

Thematic Spaces In An Ideational Semantic Network

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 407):

Thematic spaces in an ideational semantic network can be seen as a model of the systemic understanding of Theme and method of development articulated by Martin, where [Martin’s] “field” corresponds to what has been discussed here in terms of ideational semantic networks in the ideation base.

How Information In The Text Base Can Be Modelled

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 406-7):

(i) The second-order character of textual information is captured by defining it in terms of the already existing semantic network in the ideation base (the first-order representation…). This is clearly only a first approximation… the textual metafunction may in fact motivate ideational metaphor as a means of ‘carrying’ textual organisation. 

(ii) Textual prominences constituting textual statuses can then be modelled as partitioned textual spaces of the semantic network. … This is also only a first approximation: textual prominence is a matter of degree and we need to think of a textual space not as a clearly bounded region but rather as a central region, the peak of prominence, from which one can move to more peripheral regions, the troughs of non-prominence. Such gradience is necessary not only to deal with degrees of thematicity and newsworthiness but also to handle identifiability by ‘bridging’…

The Text Base As Patterns Stated Over The Ideation Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 403):

The principle of the deployment of ideational metaphor by the textual component also applies to the bases of the semantic stratum.  The text base both sets up information states within figures (presents them as messages organised around quanta of information) and guides the movement from one figure to another. In the former capacity, the text base can be interpreted as patterns stated over the ideation base. That is, the representation of ideational meaning in the ideation base constitutes the first order of representation in terms of which second–order, textual meaning can be specified.

The Typical Discourse Function Of Ideational Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 401):

These two clause systems, theme identification and theme predication, are components of the overall system of theme in English grammar. They produce structures in which identifying relational processes are used to reconstrue figures as equations (the two together are referred to as “thematic equatives” in Halliday 1985: 41-4). But ideational grammatical metaphors typically have a discourse function of this kind; they are as it were pressed into service by the textual metafunction, to provide alternative groupings of quanta of information.

Experiential Metaphor As A Second-Order Resource For Creating A ‘Carrier’ Of Textual Meanings

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 399-400):

What is significant here is that the textual organisation is realised by the second-order resource of grammatical metaphor. That is, the grammar is as it were turned back on itself: it reconstrues itself with a particular effect in the discourse. We can see, then, that experiential grammatical metaphor is a strategy for creating a ‘carrier’ of textual meanings.

Grammatical Metaphor As A Manifestation Of The Second–Order Nature Of The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-9):

One manifestation of the second–order nature of the textual metafunction that is important for our purposes is grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is a ‘second-order’ use of grammatical resources: one grammatical feature or set of features is used as a metaphor for another feature or set of features; and since features are realised by structures, one grammatical structure comes to stand for another.

The Second–Order Nature Of The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398): 

This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of theme and information, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of transitivity, mood, and the rest.

The Second–Order Nature Of The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398): 

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398): 

The textual metafunction differs from the ideational one in a number of fundamental respects — its mode of syntagmatic progression is wave–like, with periodic prominence; it is inherently dynamic in that it organises text as process; and it is a second–order mode of meaning.

Ideational Semantics: Instantiation x Delicacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 392):

Logogenesis: The Relation Of Instantiation To Stratification

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 385-6):

The strata are ordered in symbolic abstraction, but they are not ordered in instantiation time. The process of instantiation can shunt up and down the stratal hierarchy. However, the general tendency in instantiation is one of stratal descent. First systemic features are instantiated (selected) at the highest stratum and their associated realisation statements are also instantiated (executed). Then the instantial specifications at this stratum are realised at the stratum below. 

Within this overall stratal descent, there is interleaving: higher-stratal systems need not be fully instantiated until lower-stratal ones have been instantiated. This means that selections at higher strata can be made in the logogenetic environment of preceding selections at lower strata. This reflects the general theoretical principle that the relationship between two strata is a solidary one, with instantiation proceeding “dialogically”.

Instantial System & Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 385):

An instantial system may fall entirely within the registerial system it instantiates; in other words, the meanings created within it may all have been created before. However, it may also create new meanings — new to the speaker and/or listener. In either case, the instantial system is built up successively by the generation process; but as it is developed, it in turn becomes a resource for further instantiation.

Logogenesis: Instantiation & Instantial System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 385):

Logogenesis — creation of meaning in instantiation, maintained as a changing instantial system.

Instantial System [Definition]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384): 

If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We call this an instantial system.

Logogenesis And Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

A text is generated within the logogenetic time-frame. In fact, generation is a logogenetic process: it creates meaning in the course of instantiation as the text unfolds.

Lexicogrammar Instance: Text As Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

lexicogrammatical selection expressions (features from passes through lexicogrammatical networks), and their manifestations as wordings; particular texts, spoken or written, with their organisation.

Lexicogrammar Subpotential: Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

networks of typological regions of lexicogrammatical space.

Lexicogrammar Potential: Lexicogrammatical System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

networks of ideational, interpersonal and textual wordings; their construction as clauses, groups/phrases, words and morphemes.

Semantics Instance: Text As Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

semantic selection expressions (features from passes through the semantic networks), and their representations as meanings; particular texts with their organisation

Semantics Subpotential: Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

networks of topological regions of semantic space.

Semantics Potential: Semantic System (Meaning Base)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

networks of ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings; their construction as texts, subtexts, parasemes, sequences, figures & elements.

Context Instance: Situation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

instantial values of field, tenor & mode; particular social semiotic situation events, with their organisation.

Context Subpotential: “Subculture” / Situation Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

networks of regions of social-semiotic space

Context Potential: Context Of Culture

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384):

the culture as social-semiotic system: networks of social semiotic features constituting the systems–&–processes of the culture; defined as potential clusters of field, tenor and mode.

The Cline Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 381):

… these [stratally organised and metafunctionally diversified] resources are extended along the cline of instantiation from potential (language in context of culture) via subpotentials (registers in situation types) to instances (texts in contexts of situation).

The Realisational Relationship Between Semantics And Lexicogrammar: Metafunctional Unification

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 381):

The grammar unifies the different metafunctional contributions; for example, a figure, a move and a message are unified in their realisation as a clause. It achieves this unification by realising combinations of ideational, interpersonal and textual features in the same wording. For example, the wording well unfortunately they must have missed the train is a realisational unification of a figure (of doing & happening), a move (of giving information, assessed as certain and undesirable) and a message.

The Realisational Relationship Between Semantics And Lexicogrammar: Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 381):

… the ideation base is realised by ideational resources: sequences and figures are realised at clause rank by clause complexes and (simple) clauses respectively; and elements are realised at group/phrase rank. In a similar way, interpersonal meanings are realised by interpersonal features in the lexicogrammar, and textual meanings by textual ones.

Lexicogrammar: Syntax & Morphology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 380n):

In systemic functional theory, lexis is thus interpreted as most delicate or specific grammar. Grammar comprises syntax and morphology; there is no stratal boundary between the two, but merely a move down the rank scale: “syntax” is simply the grammar of clauses and groups/phrases and morphology is the grammar of words and morphemes.

Lexicogrammatical System Networks: Metafunction, Rank & Delicacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 380):

The lexicogrammatical system networks are distributed by metafunction (ideational: experiential & logical — interpersonal — textual) and by rank (clause — group/phrase — word — morpheme) and extend in delicacy from grammar to lexis.

Lexicogrammar [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 380):

Lexicogrammar is the resource for construing meaning as wording. It is organised as a set of system networks representing options in wording. Systemic options may have realisation statements associated with them; these statements specify how the options are realised in wording (structure & grammatical/lexical items).

The Realisational Relationship Between Semantics And Lexicogrammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378-9):

Semantic features are realised by lexicogrammatical ones; we have illustrated this relationship within the ideational metafunction at various points in our discussion (e.g. sequence realised by clause complex; figure of doing realised by material clause).  The realisational relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is one of preselection: semantic features such as 'sequence', 'figure', and 'doing', are realised in lexicogrammar by means of prespecification of lexicogrammatical information, most centrally preselection of lexicogrammatical features.   

For instance, 'doing' is realised by the preselection of the clause feature 'material', which means that the clause that realises a figure of doing is constrained to be a material clause.

The Text Base As Resource For Text Development & Interpretation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378):

From the speaker’s point of view, the text base is a resource for developing a text, message by message, and for guiding the listener in his/her interpretation of the text; and from the listener’s point of view, it is a resource for constructing such an interpretation (for building up an instantial system …).

The Text Base: Messages

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378): 

The text base is oriented towards the ideation base and the interaction base. It provides the resources for constructing meanings from these two bases as information of a kind that can be shared as text. An ideational figure and an interpersonal move are constructed as information in the form of a message. Such a message is related to the preceding discourse and differentiates informational statuses in terms of thematicity and newsworthiness.

Exchange Relationships And Domain Models

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378): 

A particular domain model within the ideation base correlates with a particular exchange relationship within the interaction base and together they form the ideational and interpersonal aspects of a register. An exchange relationship thus has ideational implications: it involves the exchange of some ideational meanings rather than others and it embodies a division of labour between the interactants in an exchange relationship. … An exchange relationship thus gives interpersonal values to meanings within the domain model it is associated with.

The Interaction Base: Exchange Relationship Protocols

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 377-8): 

Midway between potential and instance, sets of such strategies cluster within ranges of tenor values. Such a cluster is the interpersonal analogue of a domain in the ideation base: it is a region within the overall interpersonal space of meaning, selected according to tenor, just as a domain is a region within the overall ideational space of meaning, selected according to field. The options in interpersonal meaning that make up the cluster together enact a tenor relationship … We might call such a cluster an exchange relationship to foreground that it is semantic (i.e. constituted in meaning through exchanges of meaning) and that it is interpersonal (rather than one-sidedly personal). To indicate that it is analogous to a domain model, we might have called it an exchange or interaction “model”; but we have avoided that term because it suggests a construal of something and construal is the ideational mode of meaning — it is more like a protocol than a model.

The Interaction Base: System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 377):

At the potential end of the cline of instantiation, the interpersonal strategies that have the move as their domain are defined by all the options persons have in exchanging meanings with one another, adopting speech rôles of giving/demanding information or goods–&–services and assigning complementary rôles of accepting or giving on demand to the addressee. These constitute all the patterns of interaction within a culture.

The Interaction Base: Moves

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376-7):

The interaction base provides the resources for enacting social rôles and relations as meaning, (prototypically) in dialogue. The interaction base includes the strategies for adopting and assigning speech rôles, for giving and demanding assessments, and the like. The locus of these strategies is a unit of interaction or move. A move is typically mapped onto a figure from the ideation base: a speaker construes a quantum of experience as a figure and enacts this figure as a move in dialogue, either as a proposition or as a proposal. This mapping between figure and move is a central feature of the way we jointly construct and negotiate experience.

The Ideation Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376):

…the ideation base includes both the most general ideational meaning potential and a repertoire of domain models located along the cline of instantiation midway between potential and instance and associated with particular ranges of values within field.

The Meaning Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376):

The semantic system, or “meaning base”, thus consists of the three familiar metafunctional contributions […]: the ideation base, […] the interaction base and the text base.  All three bases are extended along the cline of instantiation from potential to instance.

Different Context Specifications Realised By Different Registers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376):

A given contextual specification of field, tenor and mode is thus realised by “preselecting” a register within the semantic system … This contextual preselection within the semantics narrows down the overall potential to a registerial subpotential; a field specification narrows down the ideational potential from that of the overall ideation base to that of a domain model.

Registers: Semantic Stratum

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376): 

These are, in the first instance, registerial subsystems of the semantic system. A register is a semantic region within the overall semantic space. It is made up of contributions from all three metafunctions: a domain within the ideation base and similar regions within the interpersonal and textual parts of the overall semantic space.

Contextual Regions Co-Evolve With Registers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376):

Such contextual regions [‘within the overall system of the context of culture’] evolve together with special functional varieties of the language or “registers”.

Contextual Regions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

There are three sets of contextual systems — field, tenor and mode … Recurrent combinations of (ranges of) field, tenor and mode values define regions within the overall system of the context of culture.

The System Of Context [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

Context is the ‘semiotic environment’ of language (and other socio-semiotic systems such as image systems [maps, diagrams, etc]); its systems specify what demands may be placed on language and what rôle it may play in responding to those demands.

Inter–Stratal Realisation: Preselection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/graphological system.

Why Inter–Stratal Realisation Is Stated In Terms Of The Higher Stratum

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

In systemic theory, this relationship is stated in terms of the organisation of the higher stratum — for a simple reason: a higher stratum provides a more comprehensive environment than a lower one (as our stratal figures with [co-tangential] circles suggest).

Context Vs Language

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

The resources are stratified into context and language; language is in turn stratified into semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. … the processes of instantiation are guided by this stratification.

Modelling Domains Of Ideational Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 370):

… in our view, the modelling of specific domains of ideational meaning is an essential component of our theoretical understanding of the nature of human cognition.

Agent: Metathings & ±Abstract Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 361):

… in the overall ideational potential, agents of processes can be metathings as well as things and, within things, abstractions as well as physical objects, tools, animals, persons and natural forces …

Metathings

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 359):

… facts, ideas or locutions.

Procedural Texts

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 356):

… a sequence of operations for arriving at some well–defined end result … it is a macro-operation, consisting of a number of atomic micro–operations. It is dominated by procedures … that lead to some specific goal: the dominant cause is purposive … From an interpersonal point of view, … it is a macro–proposal, consisting of a number of instructions or directions to the reader.

Weather Forecast Texts

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 355):

… put in terms of scale, a weather forecast construes a macro-being — the meteorological state of the environment — consisting of a number of atomic micro–beings which move in and out of existence of their own accord.

Visual Semiotic Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 355):

Many visual semiotic systems are ‘paraphrastic’ [with language] in this sense [ie ‘could be construed as alternative realisations of the same semantic figure or sequence of figures’], although certainly not all.

Construing An Instance Of A Situation Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

In weather forecasting, while the weather itself is not constituted of language, the activity of forecasting is; the entire situation is built up out of black marks on large white pieces of paper towards which is directed the attention of some human consciousness. Out of this is construed a particular context or situation–type; since the semantics is specific to that situation, the reader knows where he is, construes the situation in a particular instantial form (‘oh — so it’s going to rain this afternoon’), and perhaps varies his actions in accordance with this construction.

The Cline From ‘Language In Reflection’ To ‘Language In Action’

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

In situations of the ‘language in action’ kind, where the discourse is a relatively minor component of the total activity, the grammar and the semantics are obviously less constructive of the whole than in a ‘reflection’ context …

Text & Context

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

… text and context are construed together.

The Construction Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 353):

… our metatheoretic position is that the construction of meaning is both a discourse–semantic and a lexicogrammatical process.

Delicacy & Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 353):

In a paradigmatic model such as the present one, both the lexicogrammar and the semantics accommodate variable delicacy: two agnate constructions may be both ‘the same’ and ‘different’ according to the delicacy of focus adopted.

Figures Of Being: Ascribing & Existing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 338): 

Ascribing (‘being’ in the sense of carrying an attribute), like existing, distinguishes a neutral phase ‘be’ and marked phases of becoming, staying or ceasing to be.

Being: Existing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 336): 

Existing includes being in existence, coming into existence (emerging) and staying in exist[ence] (persisting); with or without some external cause.

Logogenesis & Sensitivity To Initial Conditions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 329):

… predicting weather is rather like predicting text: one can make certain predictions about what people are going to say or write with a certain probability of being right — a probability that is significantly greater than chance, but not great enough to be easily used in (for example) parsing programs, because of the great number of variables that play a part in conditioning choices in the text.

System As 'Climate', Instance As 'Weather'

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 328):

The terms climate and weather are related to each other as langue to parole: as the system of language is to its instantiation in text. Weather is the instantiation of climate; climate is the system ‘behind’ the weather. As with language, there is, of course, only one set of phenomena here not two; when we refer to climate we are construing general principles and tendencies that ‘explain’ the multidimensional microvariation that is what we actually have to live with …

Instantiation, Strata & Delicacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327): 

Instantiation is the relation between the system and the instance. When we shift attention along this scale, we are moving between the potential that is embodied in any stratum and the deployment of that potential in instances of the same stratum … this move can be made at any degree of delicacy.

Realisation As Interstratal Relation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327): 

Realisation is the relation of one stratum to other strata … when we shift attention ‘upwards’ into context or ‘downwards’ to lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology, we are moving in realisation. We can do this at any degree of delicacy, from the most general to the most specific; and we can do it at any point along the instantiation scale, from system to text.

Delicacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 325): 

… delicacy is different from instantiation. Delicacy is the degree of detail, or specificity, to which the description is taken.  

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327): 

Delicacy is the relation between the most general features and the most specific.

Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

Since domains are instantiations of the overall semantic potential, any properties associated with types in this potential are also present in the domains.

Registerial Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

On the one hand, registerial domains form families within which there is variation, such as the family of culinary procedures, which encompasses a variety of different kinds of recipes, or the more extended family of procedures for creating artefacts. On the other hand, the variation is multidimensional.

Registerial Varieties

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

The overall semantic potential is diversified into registerial varieties that emerge as patterns of instantiation.

Semantic Domain: Registerial Variation Corresponding To The Contextual Variable Of Field

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

Register is systematic variation within the overall meaning potential; from this point of view, a domain is a region of registerial variation corresponding to the contextual variable of field — the meaning potential determined by, and determining, ‘what’s going on’.

Semantic Domain: Ideational Region Of Registerial Variation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

… when we model a domain, we are still defining a meaning potential, a semantic space in which meanings are constantly being realigned and new meanings created. In other words, we are describing a register; or, more accurately, a region of registerial variation…

Instantial Variation Constructs Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323):

Instances do not usually repeat each other word for word; there is some variation … It is this variation that constructs the domain. With each instance of the field, the overall meaning potential is instantiated in slightly varying ways; this variation both confirms the earlier patterns and nudges them along some novel path.

The Relation Of Domain Models To The General Model: Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323): 

The relationship which links the domain models with the general model is instantiation. Instantiation relates the system to the instance, at any given stratum. … A domain is located somewhere between the system and the instance. Hence it can be looked at from either end. Seen from the ‘system’ end, a domain is regular and repeated patterning in the way potential is deployed, over the course of time. Seen from the ‘instance’ end, it is generalisation across particular instances of text.

Domain Models & The General Model

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323): 

Domain models are variants of the general model. A particular domain model specifies which of the semantic systems in the overall model are activated in a particular contextual field: the ideational meanings that are “at risk”.  Each field thus has its own semantic profile, which can be seen against the background of the overall semantic potential.

Domain & Domain Model [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323):

… the semantic correlate of a contextual field is a domain. When we model the ideational semantics of a particular field, we create a domain model.

The Disadvantage Of Setting Up A Field-Specific Ideational Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 322):

If the field is defined in relatively broad terms, it may activate most of the general part of the ideation base; but a more restricted field may call on only one particular part of it. In such cases, it may be useful to reduce the whole ideation base to only those parts that are implicated for the particular field; that is, to set up a field-specific ideational semantics. (More generally, this might be a context-specific semantics, including interpersonal and textual as well as ideational meanings). However, the price of this would be to isolate such a field from others to which it is related.

Each Field Selectively Activates Particular Domains Of The Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 322): 

Each field is projected onto one variety of the ideation base: that is, it can be thought of as activating some portion of the total semantic resources. This projection of field onto the ideation base involves both the particular domain and the general types under which this domain is classified.  A given field is thus constituted as a principled selection of types from within the ideation base; this is so to speak its semantic image projected from context.

Field Typology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 322): 

… a full account of field would include a typology of the possible first and second order values that occur in a culture. Such a typology would show how closely various fields are related — how they form families. So, given three different fields, 1, 2, and 3, the typology will show three different ways of deploying the ideation base.

Distinguishing First Order Field And Second Order Field

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321-2):

… field can be characterised as the deployment and organisation of the ideation base. … there are two aspects to this category. In most contexts, there is both a first order field and a second order field — the first order field is the social activity being pursued (eg instructing somebody in how to prepare a dish …) and the second order field is the ‘subject matter’ the activity is concerned with (eg the ingredients and methods of cooking …). … And both these guide the way the ideation base is deployed.

The Covariation Between Context And Language Is Differentiated Metafunctionally

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321):

… the covariation between context and language is not undifferentiated — it is differentiated according to the functional diversification of each of the two strata: the variables of context correlate respectively with the metafunctions of language, field with ideational, tenor with interpersonal, and mode with textual. These pairs are mutually predictive.

Origins Of The Concept Of Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321):

… the notion of functional dialect was worked out by the Prague School in the 1930s … and systemic register theory has its roots in Firth’s work on restricted languages. The concept of register is also recognised in computational linguistics under the heading of sublanguage, particularly in work on machine translation.

How Context And Register Are Related

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321): 

Together, field, tenor and mode define the ‘ecological matrix’ in which particular types of text are processed: there is a systematic relationship between such matrices (particular combinations of field, tenor and mode values) and particular types of text. We can see this clearly with actual instances of text — for example, an individual recipe or weather forecast; but these are instances of general classes, to be characterised in terms of the systemic potential that is instantiated in them. That is, there is a correlation not only between a contextual matrix and a given instance of a recipe but also between that matrix and the linguistic potential that is deployed in recipes in general. The latter correlation is known as a functional variety or register of the general systemic potential.

Mode: The Part Language Plays In Any Given Context

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 320-1): 

… both these contextual variables [field and tenor] are, in some sense, independent of language, even though they are constituted in language and the other semiotic systems of a culture. That is, they concern realities that exist alongside the reality created by language itself, semiotic reality. However, there is a third contextual variable that is specifically concerned with the part language is playing in any given context — the symbolic mode, how the linguistic resources are deployed. This covers both the medium (spoken, written, and various subtypes such as written in order to be spoken) and the rhetorical function — persuasive, didactic, informative, etc.

Field And Tenor As Context Variables

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 320): 

The context encompasses both the field of activity and the subject matter with which it is concerned (‘what’s going on, and what is it about?’) and the tenor of the relationship between the interactants, between speaker and listener, in terms of social rôles in general and those created through language in particular (‘who are taking part?).  The field is thus the culturally recognised repertoires of social practices and concerns, and the tenor the culturally recognised repertoires of rôle relationships and interactive patterns.

Diverse Semiotic Mappings Across Languages

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 319):  

The phenomena of human experience are held in tension by so many intersecting analogical lines that, while all of us have the same brains and live on the surface of the same planet, such diverse ways of semiotic mapping are not only possible but inevitable.

Typological Variation Reflects Indeterminacy Within A Language: Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 318-9):

Some process types tend to lie on the borderline between major categories, forming mixed and overlapping categories; typical of these are the behavioural and existential proceses in English. It is likely that equivalent types of process will be liable to greater typological variation than those that fall squarely within the core categories of material, mental, and relational.

Typological Variation Reflects Indeterminacy Within A Language: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 318):

… we referred to projection as something that overlaps the ‘boundary’ between interpersonal and ideational metafunctional space; in English it is typically construed ideationally, though with a close relationship to the interpersonal systems of modality and mood. Other languages locate projection rather differently in relation to this boundary, sometimes foregrounding its interpersonal aspects, for example through a special category of ‘reporting’ mood.

Typological Variation Reflects Indeterminacy Within A Language: Transitivity Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 318):

We saw that in the experiential grammar of the English clause there was a complementarity of perspective between the transitive and the ergative: processes may be construed either as ‘one participant is doing something, which may or may not extend to another participant that is being done to’, or as ‘one participant is involved in something, which may or may not be brought about by another participant that is the agent of it’. Probably all languages display this transitive/ergative complementarity in their transitivity systems; but at the same time it appears at different depths and in different proportions.

Metafunctional Motivations For Alternative Construals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 316):

As we have shown in the context of grammatical metaphor, the choice among alternative construals is made on the basis of both ideational and textual factors. These factors ‘conspire’ together so that different strategies are favoured in different registers: the congruent form (sequences) in casual speech, the metaphoric form (figures of being & having) in elaborated forms of writing.

Another Source Of The Elasticity Of Construal: Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 315-6):

The elasticity of construal is further increased through grammatical metaphor, which also relies on the manifestation of projection & expansion within participants (realised by the different types of modification in nominal groups). We have illustrated the range of options throughout the system at various points, and a schematic example will be enough here:

[i] logical

A happened, so B happened;

A caused B to happen;

[ii] experiential

A happened causing B / B happened because of A

A happening caused B happening

A affected B [‘cause-happened’]

with additional metaphorical variants:

B happened because of the happening of A

the happening of A caused the happening of B

the happening of A was the cause of the happening of B

One Source Of The Elasticity Of Construal: Projection & Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 315):

One major source of this kind of elasticity [construing phenomena as sequence or figure] is the manifestation of the very general semantic types of projection and expansion throughout the ideation base. In English, as we have shown, we find them manifested both logically as relations and experientially as elements within figures: 

[i] logical manifestation:

as relations between figures in the construal of sequences (realised by clause complexes);

as relations between processes in the construal of figures (realised by verbal group complexes);

[ii] experiential manifestation:

as circumstances within figures (realised by prepositional phrases or adverbial groups); 

as circumstantial processes within figures of being & having (realised by relational clauses); 

as non-nuclear participants within figures, i.e., participants other than Medium — Agent, Beneficiary, Range (realised by nominal groups with or without a preposition).

The Realisation Of Processes As Completed Vs Non-Completed

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 307):

Given that a process takes place in time, there will be some sense in which it has a beginning, a middle and an end. These may be observable as distinct constituents, if it is a process having duration; even if it is instantaneous, however, they represent possible facets, points of view from which it can be considered. In English, the meaning of a process typically includes it completion: if I ‘cut’ a piece of string, I cut it in two. To construe a process as non-completed, English uses conative or inceptive phase: ‘try to cut it’, ‘start to cut it’.

Choices In Marking Time: English vs Chinese

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 304):

So whereas in English, each process in a figure (provided the figure is arguable — grammatically, one where the clause is finite) must be located somewhere in the construction of tense, in Chinese the process may be simply left as neutral, without being assigned to either category of aspect.

Two Ways Of Construing Time Grammatically: English & Chinese

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 304):

As in English, the process is the category of experience that is located in time. In English, time is construed grammatically as tense: as a flow, with a more or less extended ‘present’ forming a moving but impermeable barrier between ‘past’ and ‘future’; and each instance of a process is located somewhere in the flow. In Chinese, time is construed grammatically as aspect: and specifically as an opposition of unfolding versus culminating; and each instance of a process may be given a value in this opposition, either ‘significant as unfolding — in its own right’ or as ‘significant as culminating — perhaps by virtue of its consequences’.

A Universal Property Of Language: The Stratification Of Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 299): 

… one property of language which is universal is the stratal organisation of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar, with the lexicogrammatical stratum forming a continuum: at one pole are the most “grammatical” features, closed systems of just two or three terms, mutually defining along a single dimension and with very general meanings and contexts of use; at the other pole are the most lexical features, open sets of an indefinite number of items, taxonomically arranged along various dimensions and with highly specific meanings and contexts of use.

The Metaphorical Elaboration Of The Semantic System Is Made Possible By The Fractal Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 294-5):

The whole metaphorical elaboration [of the semantic system] is made possible by a fractal pattern that runs through the whole system. We have suggested that the metaphorical elaboration is a token–value relation; but in order for it to be a token–value relation within the semantic system, it has to be natural in the sense that the token and the value domains have to be similar enough to allow for the token to stand for the value. The principle behind this similarity is the fractal pattern of projection/expansion … 

That is, while grammatical metaphor constitutes a move from one “phenomenal domain” to another … this move is made possible because fractal types engender continuity across these domains: the metaphorical move from one phenomenal domain to another takes place within the one and the same transphenomenal domain.

Metaphor: Realisational Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 294):

Thus if the domain of sequences is construed metaphorically within the domain of figures, the realisational domain in the grammar will automatically be that of metaphor: it will be the domain of clauses rather than that of clause complexes.

Metaphor & Communicative Rôles

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

The proliferation of ideational meaning through metaphor thus also means that a person gains access to a wider repertoire of communicative rôles.

The Directionality Of Metaphor Within Experiential Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293): 

… the general tendency in the metaphorical move away from the congruent is away from the logical towards the experiential; and within the experiential towards the domain of participants in figures of being & having.

Metaphorical Elaboration Of The Semantic System: Multiplanar Mappings Of Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

… metaphor involves a mapping from one ideational domain to another, construing a token–value relation between the two. For instance, the whole semantic domain of sequences may be mapped onto the domain of figures. The token domain may in turn be the value in a further metaphorical move, such as the move from figures to participants. The metaphorical expansion thus can involve multiple planes.

Metaphorical Elaboration Of The Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293): 

… metaphor is best construed as an opening up of a new dimension of the semantic system that allows the whole system to be elaborated by itself along a token–value chain. In other words, what we identified as a simplified way of dealing with grammatical metaphor in the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar … we can now recognise as a dimension internal to the semantic system.

Representing Semantic Types As Metaphorically Related To Congruent Types Within The Overall Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

Such a representation has to meet the kinds of ideational and textual demands that we have already considered in our representation of examples:

(i) ideational: the representation has to show that metaphor constitutes an expansion of the semantic system. The expansion is an elaborating one, creating chains of token–value relations; and it increases the semantic potential for construing experience. 

(ii) textual: the representation has to make it possible to show how metaphorical and congruent variants are given different values in the text base — in the textual semantics.

The Metaphorical Dimension In Grammar As Cline

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 291):

… the metaphorical dimension in grammar is in reality a cline. There are often numerous intermediate steps between the “most congruent” and the “most metaphorical” wordings; indeed it is the scale of metaphoricity that is reasonably clearly defined, not its end points. Given two agnate wordings that are positioned along this scale, we seldom have any difficulty in locating them relative to each other: we know which of the two is the more metaphorical one. But we [would be] hard put to it to specify a point at either end where we feel we could go no further.

Grammatical Metaphor: A Junction Of Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 290):

For most types of metaphor, it is important to take account of the fact that the metaphor represents more than one construction of goings-on; the metaphor adds a further perspective on the phenomenon being represented, without displacing the perspective that is congruent. […] The grammatical metaphor will typically show features of the congruent perspective as well as features of the metaphorical one.

Metaphorical Chains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 288-9):

It is the fact that metaphor multiplies meanings within the semantic system that opens up the possibility of metaphorical chains, with one congruent starting–point and another highly metaphorical end-point (A’’’ stands for A’’ stands for A’ stands for A … The semantic system is being expanded along the dimension of the metaphorical token–value relation; but the expansion is still within the semantic system itself.

Metaphor As A Correspondence Between Two Semantic Configurations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 288):

The correspondence that is construed through grammatical metaphor is an elaborating relationship: an identity is set up between two patterns … In this identity, the metaphorical term is the ‘Token’ and the congruent term is the ‘Value’ … The identity holds between the two configurations as a whole; but … the components of the configurations are also mapped one onto another …

The metaphorical relation is thus similar to inter-stratal realisation in that it construes a token–value type of relation. Here, however, the relation is intra-stratal: the identity holds between different meanings, not between meanings and wordings. The metaphor consists in relating different semantic domains of experience …

What Distinguishes A Grammatical Metaphor From A Technical Term

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 286):

Almost all technical terms start out as grammatical metaphors; but they are grammatical metaphors which can no longer be unpacked. When a wording becomes technicalised, a new meaning has been construed — almost always, in our present-day construction of knowledge, a new thing (participating entity); and the junction with any more congruent agnates is (more or less quickly) dissolved.

Why Experiential Metaphors Originally Evolved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 285):

… this provides an important insight into why experiential metaphors evolve in the first place, namely in order to get the texture right …

From Congruent To Metaphorical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 280):

The system then comes to be expanded through shift in rank and class. Sequences come to be realised not only by clause complexes but also by clauses, and figures come to be realised not only by clauses but also by groups/phrases. They are pushed downward in complexity and rank relative to their congruent realisations in the grammar.

Congruent Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 278):

Categories in the ideation base are realised by those categories in the ideational grammar with which they have co-evolved. These are the congruent realisations that developed first in the language, are learnt first by children and tend to occur first in a text.

Spatial Metaphor Provides An Interface To Other Semiotic Modes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 278): 

We noted above that the deployment of spatial metaphor in the construction of economic ‘knowledge’ serves, among other things, as an interface to another form of semiotic — that of using space symbolically in a diagrammatic representation of quantities. The same kind of principle of cross-over between semiotic modes applies to the construal of meaning in linguistics. We have relied in our own discussion on metaphors of abstract space for construing meaning — most centrally, metaphors of semantic networks and semantic space. These metaphors allow us to cross over to diagrams of symbolic space, viz. system networks (as a kind of acyclic directed graph) and topological representations. The system networks can, in turn, be restated algebraically, as in the various computational implementations of systemic accounts.

The Semogenic Power Of Metaphor: The Proliferation Of Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 277):

In the construction of meaning in economics, economic things such as prices, salaries, yields, financing are quantities. At the same time, they are also elastic bodies that grow and shrink; and also ‘mountaineers’, climbing up and down slopes. This at one level an impossible conjunction: things cannot be both quantities and mobile elastic bodies — but the semantic system of English makes this possible through lexicogrammatical metaphor. This proliferation of perspectives is part of the semogenic power of metaphor.

Grammatical Metaphor: A System Property Of Construing Meaning In Lexicogrammatical Terms

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 274):

But the general phenomenon of metaphor, as an inherent property of language as a stratified semiotic, is a feature of the system as a whole — of the construal of meaning in lexicogrammatical terms.