Why Projected Clauses Are Not Constituents Of Projecting Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 578-9):

In the grammar, the 'idea' is a separate clause that combines with the 'sensing' clause in a clause complex, through the relation of projection; see Figure 14-4 for a structural interpretation.

In our analysis (unlike that of the mainstream grammatical tradition), the projected clause is not a constituent part of the mental or verbal clause by which it is projected. There are numerous reasons for this; some of them are grammatical — for example, 

• it cannot be the focus of theme-predication [we do not say: it is that they're absolutely horrible that I think]; 
• it cannot be the Subject of a passive mental clause [we do not say: they're absolutely horrible is thought by me]; 
• it is presumed by the substitute so, which is also used to presume conditional clauses in clause complexes: I think they're absolutely horrible and my husband thinks so too]. 

But these, in turn, reflect the semantic nature of projection: this is a relationship between two figures, not a device whereby one becomes a participant inside another. We can thus show the difference between these and 'fact' clauses, those where the idea clause is a projection but it is not the accompanying mental clause that is doing the projecting; such readymade projections do function as constituents. An example here is I don't care whether they are devoted or not; compare it's not whether they are devoted or not that I care about.

The Neutralisation Of Logical Semantic Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 560-1):

When two figures are linked into a sequence, by some logical-semantic relation, there is a rather wide range of possible semantic relations between the two: the relations of time and of cause and condition are particularly elaborated in this respect, but there are others besides — the manner, the matter, and so on. The distinctions among these relationships, however, may be to a greater or lesser degree neutralised, where one clause is construed as dependent on the other; this happens as the dependent clause moves from finite to non-finite status. 

For example, in they get caught taking bribes the distinction that would be made in the agnate finite clause, among, say 

they get caught if they take bribes, 
they get caught when they take bribes, 
they get caught because they take bribes, 

is simply neutralised — it is not a blend of all three, nor is there any ambiguity involved. An intermediate degree of specificity, with partial neutralisation, can be seen in the non-finite clause with accompanying preposition, as in 

they get caught for taking bribes. 

What happens here is that the fact that there is a connection between the two figures is unequivocally construed by the dependency; but the nature of this connection — what kind of logical relationship is being set up — does not enter the picture.

Elemental Metaphor Syndrome: Sequence ==> Figure

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 252-4):

(II) Sequence ==> Figure

Here the syndrome occurs in a more general environment, that of construing a sequence on the model of a figure — grammatically, the sequence is construed not as a clause complex but as a clause.

They shredded the documents before they departed for the airport ==> (They shredded the documents) before their departure for the airport

They shredded the documents before they departed for the airport ==> Their shredding of the documents preceded their departure for the airport

These examples of a 'sequence ==> figure' metaphor both involved a sequence of the expansion type. However, this type of metaphoric shift also occurs with projection sequences; for example:

The colonel declared his innocence.

— where the congruent form would be a projection, either hypotactic or paratactic:

The colonel declared that he was innocent.

The colonel declared, "I am innocent".

The Motivation For Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 225-6):

The ideation base as we have presented it so far, with its framework of sequences, figures and elements, serves well enough for construing the experience of daily life, and for organising and exchanging commonsense knowledge. But it proves inadequate to meet the semiotic demands of advanced technology and theoretical science. In the construction of scientific knowledge, the system needs to invoke the power of metaphor on a more global scale.

Fractal Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223-4):

Sequences, figures and elements, and their subclasses, constitute different environments within the ideation base. If we construe some phenomenon of experience as a sequence of qualification, we give it a location in the overall ideational system that is quite distinct from the location it would be assigned if it was construed as a figure of circumstantial cause. These two types are thus not particularly close agnates in the system, However, the fractal types constitute an additional order of agnation that is projected onto the ideational system as a whole. We can refer to this as fractal agnation. Because of this, a qualifying sequence and a figure of circumstantial being, such as cause, are agnate: they are both manifestations of the fractal type of enhancement For example, the sequence ebola broke out so 52 people died is agnate with the figure the outbreak of ebola caused 52 deaths even though they are quite far apart in their semantic structure.

Expansion And Projection As Trans-phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain the logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially. For example, projection manifested within a sequence: Brutus said Caesar was ambitious; projection manifested within a simple figure: According to Brutus, Caesar was ambitious. This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

The Extent To Which Semantics And Grammar Are In Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in course of realisation. 

One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures (on the reading 'separately': 'Henry went to the movies and Anne went to the movies') or a sequence of elements (on the reading 'together': 'Henry and Anne went to the movies'). This was, of course, an area investigated in terms of transformational grammar with different deep structures posited for the readings 'separately' and 'together'. 

It is clear that there are grammatical group complexes which cannot be expanded semantically as sequences of figures; for example, Henry and Anne chatted is not likely to be a grammatical compression of 'Henry chatted and Anne chatted'; rather, it is agnate with Henry chatted with Anne. In such cases the problem of ambiguity does not arise.

A Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. Thus instead of Schank conceived of scripts and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a sequence of figures where there are two processes of conception, we get Schank and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a single figure with a sequence of elements (serving as Senser of a single process). Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related: see Figure 3-11.

The Domain Of The Relation Between Figures In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

We have identified two primary types of sequence (ways of relating figures), projection and expansion; and with both of these the figures that are related may be either equal or unequal in status. To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of the expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. 

But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause (Mary could never feel comfortable with him, which was perfectly understandable) or some element within the clause (Mary, who was very sensitive, could never feel comfortable with him).

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [3]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

(in) In addition, one or more of the figures in the clause may be realised by something 'less than' a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: 

as a child, he was very shy 'when he was a child, he was very shy'. 

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course: melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been 'shrunk' by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [2]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

(ii) On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence. This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind (see Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4): an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c) is 'upgraded' to the status of a projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don't suppose || there's very much 'there is probably not'

I think || I might have walked out too from all the accounts 'I probably might have'

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [1]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124-5):

As we noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory we discussed). In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together. The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.

(i) On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of this particular text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. Here is a very simple example of a sequence which is realised by two clause complexes:

Prepare and cook the potatoes in sea-salted water to which has been added lemon juice. Drain and serve with melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley.

The sequence has been grouped into two clause complexes in the grammar. However, this grouping is by no means arbitrary; it serves to indicate the two major phases of the preparation of new potatoes with lemon. In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly disassociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice. (The significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)

Sequences Of Interactional Moves

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124):

We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logical-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts: see Phillips, 1985, 1986; Halliday, 1993a.) In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text: see Figure 3-10…

Text Organisation And The Interaction Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors. 

But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences of figures in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition ('I invite you to accept x, if you want x'; for example: If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge) and evidence ('I think, infer/ you should believe x because y'; for example: John's in Germany because I just talked to him).

Sequences As One Principle For Organising Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):

Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text. For example, the culinary procedure for making cauliflower surprise constitutes one text. Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as 'macro-figures', i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).

Sequence And Text Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in terms of the relations that connect happening with another. Hence sequences can be used to store information about the world in the form of organised text— 'this is how to change tyres on your car', 'this is how to make cauliflower surprise', etc.. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognisable text type, such as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in most of our culturally recognised modes of discourse.

 

Blogger Comments:

In SFL Theory, text type is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. Text types can be identified according to the MODE that they realise (e.g. procedure, proof, explanation, episodic narrative) — MODE being the textual dimension of context: the rôle of language in a situation.

Constraints On Logico-Semantic Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Thus sequences are formed by binary logico-semantic relations which may relate either single figures or sequences of figures. Certain relations may impose constraints on the phenomena being related; for example, a projecting relation can only obtain when the first figure is one of sensing or saying. But the range of different logico-semantic relations is highly varied, so that constraints tend to be specific to particular subtypes.

The Relational Character Of Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

In the overview, we introduced two distinct types of structure — the relational organisation of sequences, and the configurational organisation of figures. In contrast to figures, sequences are not constructional units. We can specify the range of projecting and expanding relations available for further developing a sequence, but we cannot specify where a sequence has to come to an end — that is, we cannot specify a sequence as a unit whole with a conventional configuration of parts. Thus if we have expanded one figure we can always repeat the operation:

A then B

A then B then C

A then B then C then D …

In contrast, a figure is a unit with a finite number of elements:

B follows A

Hence a sequence can be indefinitely complex, whereas a figure cannot.

Indeterminacy Between Expansion And Projection: Condition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119):

Finally, the distinction between expansion and projection is less determinate than we have suggested. The logico-semantic relation of condition, which is prototypically construed as a form of enhancement, could also be construed as a kind of projection; and this is also brought out in the grammar. Conditions specify a potential and actualisable but non-actual situation. This potential situation can also be set up through projection:

If the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Supposing the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Say the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Words such as supposing and assuming are verbs of projection which have come to function as conjunctions in conditional figures; while other words such as imagine and say retain more of their projecting force. Sometimes even variants of the same word have come to differ a little in their location on this cline: for example, suppose and assume seem closer to projection than their corresponding participial variants. This is an uncertain region in which a figure hangs in the air, so to speak, suspended between the hypothetical material plane and the semiotic one.

Blogger Comments:

Cf Imagine if that were true and What if that were true.

Realisations Of Expansion Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118-9):

Relations of expansion are typically realised in the grammar by conjunctions or conjunctive expressions linking a pair of clauses, either paratactically or hypotactically (e.g. that is, in other words; and, but, or, also, besides; so, yet, then, when, if, because, unless). Some of these may realise more than one category; for example, 

but may be adversative 'and yet' (extending), or concessive 'and in spite of this' (enhancing);  

while may be additive 'and in addition' (extending), or temporal 'and at the same time' (enhancing);  

or may be alternative 'or else' (extending: alternatives in the external world, like take it or leave it), or restating 'in other words' (elaborating: alternatives in the world 'internal' to the discourse, like they are reduced to the smallest size, or microminiaturised.). 

Overlaps in realisation of this kind show that the primary categories we have set up do in fact shade into one another; in particular, extending in some sense occupies a space intermediate between elaborating and enhancing, and shares a fuzzy borderline with each.