Wednesday, 31 December 2014

The Range

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 157):
The Range rôle is quite pervasive; it can occur in all types of figure that are construed as self-agentive, and also in certain figures of being that are construed as other-agentive. The Range construes the range or domain of the actualisation of the Process, with reference to taxonomic scope (as in play : play tennis / volley ball), spatial scope (as in climb : climb mountains /hills) etc.

Tuesday, 30 December 2014

The Medium: Obligatory In The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156):
In the grammar therefore the Medium appears as an obligatory element — the only element that has this status in the clause. This does not mean that we will find a nominal reflex of the Medium made explicit in the syntagm of every clause; there are various ways in which the Medium may be present as a cryptotypic feature rather than as an overt form. Nevertheless its presence is required in some guise or other; and this distinguishes the Medium from all other participants in the figure.

Blogger Note:

had been raining
function structure

nominal group
verbal group

But see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 289).

Monday, 29 December 2014

The Nucleus

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156):
Semantically, the nucleus construes the centre of gravity of a figure, the focal point around which the system of figures is organised. When we describe the Medium as “actualising” the Process, we are really saying that the unfolding is constituted by the fusion of the two together — there can be no Process without an element through which this process is translated from the virtual to the actual.

Sunday, 28 December 2014

The Close Bonding Of Medium And Process: Medium And Manner Of Performance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156):
The manner of performance of a process may vary, in which case it is the Medium by which it is typically determined. This may be a major variation in the mode of actualisation, for example ‘open + door, open + account, open + eye’ where the process is respectively mechanical, verbal, or physiological; or simply a minor difference in the means that is employed, e.g. ‘brush + teeth, brush + clothes’. In many cases, the difference in the manner of performance is the basis of a lexically codified taxonomic distinction.

Saturday, 27 December 2014

The Close Bonding Of Medium And Process: Medium As Criterial Of Figure Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 155):
In the taxonomy of figures, the nature of the Medium is more criterial than that of any other participant or circumstance. For instance, if we consider processes such as ‘strew, spill, pour, sprinkle’, it is the Medium, not the Agent, which enables us to differentiate among them (cf. sprinkle + salt, spill/pour + water, coffee; strew + flowers); similarly with ‘bend, straighten, flatten; melt, freeze, evaporate, condense; crack, break, shatter’ and so on.

Friday, 26 December 2014

The Close Bonding Of Medium And Process: Restrictions On Medium

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 155):
Of all the participants, the Medium is the most restricted in terms of the range of phenomena that may function in that rôle. We can see this in relation to the general types of figure: 
type of figure
range of phenomena functioning as Medium
phenomenon (of any kind — but not a metaphenomenon, i.e. not fact)
conscious being
symbol source
phenomenon (of any kind, including metaphenomenon)
[…] In other words, whatever the type of figure, the participant that is most closely bonded with the Process is the one that takes on the generalised rôle of Medium; it is this that is in a relation of mutual expectancy with the Process.

Thursday, 25 December 2014

The Generalised Model Of Participation-In-Process: Causal Origin Of Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 154):
The Medium’s actualisation of the Process may be construed as being brought about by a further participant — the Agent. If the figure is construed with an Agent, it is other-agentive; if it is construed without an Agent, it is self-agentive.

Wednesday, 24 December 2014

The Generalised Model Of Participation-In-Process: The Nucleus

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 154, 155):
Medium and Process form the nucleus of the whole figure — that part of the figure which is essential to the complementarity of unfolding and persisting. […] The model thus construes a nuclear figure consisting of a process unfolding through the medium of a participant. […] It is in the combination of Medium + Process that we find the complementarity between the temporal unfolding (the Process) and the atemporal persistence (the Medium).

Tuesday, 23 December 2014

The Generalised Model Of Participation-In-Process: The Medium

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153-4):
The model that generalises across these various domains of experience is different from any one of these particular submodels. It sets up one central participant that is common to all processes. This is the participant through which the process comes to be actualised. We refer to it as the Medium. […]
The participant functioning as Medium may be affected in various different ways, depending on the particular domain — the 'trace' may be physical, mental, and so on; but the status of Medium generalises across these domains.

Monday, 22 December 2014

The Particularistic SubModels Of Participation-In-Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153): 
The particularistic model, then, comprises a set of submodels: (i) impacting, (ii) conscious processing, (iii) symbolic processing, (iv) relational ordering.

Sunday, 21 December 2014

The Particularistic Model Of Participation-In-Process: Topology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):
What we find, if we try to take in the picture as a whole, is a kind of focussed model in which the essentially human processes of consciousness, and the prototypically human processes of symbolic action, constitute the experiential centre; while the two other types of figure, that of doing on the one hand and of being on the other, lie on opposite sides of this centre: the one (doing) lying towards the pole of the concrete, with experience construed as ‘this impacts on that’, the other (being) lying towards the pole of the abstract, with the experience construed as ‘this is related to that’.

Saturday, 20 December 2014

Sensing & Saying: Conscious Processing & Symbolic Processing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153): 
The general motif of figures of sensing is ‘conscious processing’; that of figures of saying is ‘symbolic processing’.

Friday, 19 December 2014

The Categorisation Of Experience That Underlies Figures Of Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):
In figures of saying, the Sayer is the symbolic source: prototypically human, but not necessarily so (e.g. the instructions tell you to switch it off first). The Process is symbolic; but here too there is a subtype of figures of saying that imparts a similar sense of action and impact, those where the Sayer ‘does something to’ another participant by means of a verbal process, as in Don’t blame the messenger, Everybody praised her courage. We refer to this participant as the Target; and again, we may note a partial analogy with figures of doing (though only partial — for example, such figures cannot take a resultative Attribute or other representation of the outcome.

Thursday, 18 December 2014

The Categorisation Of Experience That Underlies Figures Of Doing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 152):
The ‘doing’ figure is based prototypically on a schema we might refer to as “action and impact”. There is always an Actor, the participant that performs the Process; and in an example such as the boys were jumping, the Process stops there — that is all there is to it. But in examples such as the boys were throwing stones, or the stones hit the wall, the Actor’s performance of the Process extends beyond, so as to ‘impact’ on another participant — this is the one known as the Goal. In the typical case (the “active voice”, in grammatical terminology), the clause unfolds iconically, reflecting the movement of the impact from Actor to Goal. And […] the latter may then be followed by a representation of the outcome of the impact — a resultative Attribute (he knocked it flat), a circumstance of Rôle (he cut it into cubes), or a circumstance of Location (he threw it into the corner).

Wednesday, 17 December 2014

Why The Phenomenon Of Impinging Sensing Seems To Be Playing A More Active Rôle

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 152):
Why does it give this impression? Partly no doubt because of the agnate form Are you pleased by those colours? where the Phenomenon those colours is brought in indirectly, like an instrument or means. But this is part of a larger syndrome whereby, on the one hand, there are are other related ‘sensing’ figures like How do those colours strike you?, where the verb strike suggests a fairly violent kind of action; and on the other hand the prototypical form of a ‘doing’ figure seems quite analogous to these, as in Were those boys hitting you? (with those boys as Actor, you as Goal).

Tuesday, 16 December 2014

The Categorisation Of Experience That Underlies Figures Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 152):
Sensing is clearly modelled as a process of human consciousness, with the Senser as a human being — so much so that merely coming to occupy that rôle is sufficient to endow the participant in question with human-like consciousness. The Phenomenon, on the other hand, is given a somewhat ambivalent status: in one of its guises (as in [emanating] Do you like those colours?) it seems to be just part of the environment; but in its other guise (as in [impinging] Do those colours please you?) it seems to be playing a more active rôle.

Monday, 15 December 2014

Figures Of Being: Forms Of Participation Involved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151-2):
In the limiting case, there is only one participant, the Existent; but generally there are two participants, the one being related by the process to the other. They may be being related by ascription, as Attribute to Carrier; or by identification, a rather complex relationship involving two pairs of participant rôles: Identifier and Identified, and Token and Value. These latter intersect with each other, so that there are two possible rôle combinations: (i) Identified/Token and Identifier/Value [decoding]; (ii) Identifier/Token and Identified/Value [encoding].

Sunday, 14 December 2014

Figures Of Doing: Forms Of Participation Involved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):
Here there is one participant, the Actor, who performs the process in question; and this process may then impact upon another participant, the Goal [dispositive] (or may result in bringing the Goal into (material) existence [creative]). Other participants that may be present are the Beneficiary [Recipient or Client], the one that derives “benefit” from the process; and the Scope, the one that defines the domain over which the process extends.

Saturday, 13 December 2014

Figures Of Saying: Forms Of Participation Involved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):
Here one participant, the Sayer, is involved as the originator of a process of symbolic (semiotic) activity, or “saying”. There may be another participant, the Receiver, whose rôle is that of ‘decoding’ what is said. What is said may itself be construed as further participant, the Verbiage; or else it may be projected as another figure [locution] within the same sequence. Finally, there may be a participant functioning as Target of the saying process.

Friday, 12 December 2014

Figures Of Sensing: Forms Of Participation Involved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):
Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in “inert” conscious processing (“sensing”, as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser [impinging] (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser’s conscious processing [emanating]). Alternatively, the Senser’s conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.

Thursday, 11 December 2014

The Particularistic Model: The Principle On Which The Grammar Categorises Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 150-1):
In the most general terms […] the principle is that all phenomena can be interpreted as falling within a small number of broad experiential domains:
those happening “inside”, within the realm of our own consciousness; 
those happening “outside”, in the perceptual world that lies around us; 
those that are not kinds of happening at all, but rather kinds of being and of relating to something else.
We have referred to these as, respectively:
(1) figures of sensing — or, more inclusively, (since ‘languaging’ is treated as a distinct phenomenal realm), (1) figures of sensing and 
(2) figures of saying
(3) figures of doing — or, more explicitly (since the word ‘doing’ might suggest intentionality), figures of doing & happening
(4) figures of being — or more accurately (since ‘having’ is construed as a kind of relative ‘being’), figures of being & having.
Each of these types of figure has its own special character, as revealed by the way it is organised in the lexicogrammar.

Wednesday, 10 December 2014

The Particularistic Model Of Participation-In-Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 150):
In what we are calling its “particularist” modelling, the grammar is categorising experience for us (or we are categorising our experience through our grammar) by construing a small number of different types of figure, differentiated according to what kind of process is taking place and what kinds of participant are involved — in what relationships to each other and to the process.

Tuesday, 9 December 2014

Composition: The Two Models Of Participation-In-Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 149-50):
There are two models of participation-in-process embodied in the semantic system of English —
(i) One is particularistic: it diversifies our experience of participant interaction into four domains — doing, sensing, saying, and being. 
(ii) The other is generalised: it unifies our experience of participant interaction across the different domains.
Thus the system strikes a balance in the construal of figures between unity and diversity — between differentiating one aspect of experience from another and generalising over the whole. These constitute distinct but complementary perspectives.

Monday, 8 December 2014

The Outcome Of Dispositive Doing & Happening: Figures Of Doing Or Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148-9):
If the process is dispositive, the outcome is more variable; it may be either (i) a figure of doing (more specifically, doing [to]/happening), or (ii) a figure of being (more specifically, being [at]/having):
(i) the cat chased the mouse      outcome: ‘the mouse ran’
(ii) the boys mended the roof     outcome: ‘the roof was whole’
John gave his sister a violin      outcome: ‘John’s sister had a violin’
[The being outcomes] may be elaborative (intensive), extending (possessive) or enhancing (circumstantial). …
Notice that in some cases the outcome is embodied in the clause by which the figure is realised; for example in middle variants of the doing & happening type (the outcome of John ran is 'John + run'), and in clause[s] with resultative elements (Attribute, Rôle) such as I'll boil the eggs hard (outcome: 'eggs + be + hard'), Let's appoint Fred timekeeper (outcome: 'Fred + be + timekeeper').

Sunday, 7 December 2014

The Outcome Of Creative Doing & Happening: Figures Of Existing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):
If the process is creative, the outcome is that some entity comes into existence: such a figure may be construed as a doing with effectum, as in he baked a cake; but it may simply be a creative happening such as icicles formed. In either case the outcoming figure is one of being (more specifically, existing):
he baked a cake     outcome: ‘there exists a cake’
icicles formed        outcome: ‘there exist icicles’

Saturday, 6 December 2014

Doing & Happening Can Be Subcategorised By The Outcome Of The Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):
As pointed out earlier, doing is a process of change involving time and energy. Such change implies an outcome; the outcome may be of various kinds, but it is always such that it can be construed by another figure. We can therefore examine what kind of figure emerges as the outcome of the one under investigation.

Friday, 5 December 2014

Doing & Happening: Traditional Grammatical Distinctions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):
The subtypes that have generally recognised in the grammar are (1) intransitive/transitive; (2) within intransitive, action/event; and within transitive, effectum/affectum. The first is the distinction between doings that involve only a doer (intransitive: John ran) and those that also involve something ‘done to’ (transitive: Mary threw the ball); realised respectively as Actor + Process, Actor + Process + Goal. The second is that between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and an unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell). […] The third is the distinction between a Goal that ‘exists’ prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house).

Thursday, 4 December 2014

Being & Having: Enhancement Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146-7): 
One participant enhances along a circumstantial dimension of time, space, cause, condition and the like. … Thus enhancing figures may be used to construe arrangements or orderings in space or time, such as chronologies, maps or structures. … Enhancing figures construing temporal and causal ordering play an important rôle in constructing knowledge in a metaphorical mode

Wednesday, 3 December 2014

Elaboration, Extension & The Interpretation Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146):
Elaboration and extension are agnate, one with the other; they offer alternative modes of construal, often with little apparent difference. … But if we technicalise these alternatives, they do constitute significantly different approaches to the interpretation of meaning … in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.

Tuesday, 2 December 2014

Extending Being & Having: A Theory Of Constituency And Composition In Language

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145): 
Extending figures can thus be used to construe meronymic taxonomies. In other words, they are (among other things) a theory of constituency, semantic composition, and other meronymic relations in language; so they can be used to create further relationships of the same kind.

Monday, 1 December 2014

Being & Having: Extension Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):
One participant extends another in a relation of composition, possession, or association. As with elaboration, there is also the intersecting variable of either identity or membership.

Sunday, 30 November 2014

Elaborating Being & Having: A Theory Of The Systemic Organisation Of The Meaning Potential Itself

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):
Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further.

Saturday, 29 November 2014

Being & Having: Elaboration Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):
One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.

Friday, 28 November 2014

Being & Having: Expansion Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 
Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we realise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.

Thursday, 27 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 
Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of ‘understand’ alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.

Wednesday, 26 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Desideration

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143-4): 
Cognition and desideration are different from both [emotion and perception] in that they can project (ie bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing.

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Emotion & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143): 
Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from but does not create projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes.

Monday, 24 November 2014

Different Reifications Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
… when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, ie countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, ie masses, such as anger, fear, frustration. That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil. … In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).

Sunday, 23 November 2014

Scalability Of Emotive Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to a degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.

Saturday, 22 November 2014

Construal Of Emotion As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the ‘like’ type and the ‘please’ type.  Thus I’m afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but is much more productive with emotive ones.  Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible).

Friday, 21 November 2014

Processes Of Perception: Agnate Ascriptive Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142-3): 
Processes of perception are unique among the different types of sensing in that they are agnate to a set of relational processes of ascription, those that ascribe an Attribute in terms of the way in which it presents itself to our senses, as in Madam, you’ll look like a tulip.

Thursday, 20 November 2014

Processes Of Perception & Cognition: Phase Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
The different types of sensing have somewhat different potentials for unfolding in time. With perception and cognition we have various categories of duration, inception, and the like: e.g. (perception) glimpse, sight, spot as well as see; (cognition) discover, realise, remember as well as know. But similar distinctions do not seem to obtain with desiderative and emotive processes.

Wednesday, 19 November 2014

Processes Of Cognition Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.

Tuesday, 18 November 2014

Processes Of Perception Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I’m watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance. Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind.  As long as the ‘phenomenon’ is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and the material domains of experience.

Monday, 17 November 2014

Sensing Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2):
Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). […] The difference is suggested quite clearly in the example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Sunday, 16 November 2014

Processes Of Cognition & Perception: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the ‘like’ type — perception almost exclusively so; ‘please’ type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Saturday, 15 November 2014

Processes Of Desideration: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Processes of desideration are not bi-directional; here there is no ‘please’ type, only the ‘like’ type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires.

Blogger Note:

On the other hand, perhaps verbs such as attracttempt and seduce can serve as desiderative processes of the 'please' type; otherwise, how else to explain the following projection nexus:
The talking snake tempted the naked woman to eat a piece of magic fruit.
The talking snake made the naked woman want to eat a piece of magic fruit. 

Friday, 14 November 2014

Processes Of Emotion: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional.  They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in I like Mozart’s music (the ‘like’ type) : Mozart’s music pleases me (the ‘please’ type) Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience.

Thursday, 13 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing: Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:
I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to.
There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Wednesday, 12 November 2014

Emotion, Attitude & Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141n):
Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she’s returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of the clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Tuesday, 11 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing As Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:
I think that in a sense you’ve had to compromise, haven’t you?
Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.

Monday, 10 November 2014

Metaphenomenon & Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):
A process of sensing may range over or be caused by metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me.  The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project*, namely perception and emotion  That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can ‘react to’ facts.  In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry /worrying.

*Blogger Note:

Consider the following desideratively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:
The fact [[that he had to diet]] made him wish —> he had bought a secret supply of chocolate.
Consider the following cognitively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:
The fact [[that the bailiff was coming on Monday]] made him think —> it might be time to emigrate.

Sunday, 9 November 2014

Projection Of Ideas & Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):
While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/imagined/dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying.

Saturday, 8 November 2014

Sensing: Cognitive & Desiderative Vs Perceptive & Emotive

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138): 
Cognitive and desiderative processing create ideas … but perceptive processing and emotive processing don’t … they are activated by [pre-projected] facts.

Friday, 7 November 2014

Perceptive & Emotive Sensing Cannot Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138):
In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result as a result of someone seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts, for instance:
It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]]. 
I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]]. 
We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].
Thus ‘that I am fixed, concrete’ is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

Thursday, 6 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing Can Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):
Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):
I just thought —> I’d tell you that I’d appreciate it.
I think —> I’ll give it up.
They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.
Thus the idea ‘I’ll give it up’ is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea ‘me to crawl on my bended knees’ is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

Wednesday, 5 November 2014

Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):
These can be treated as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon; nor can they accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Tuesday, 4 November 2014

Prototypicality Vs Borderline Cases & Blends: Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6, 137):
As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying immediately at the borderline of the primary types.  The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends.  One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday 1985: 128-9): “processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing”. […] Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

Monday, 3 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the ‘content’ of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.*
* Except, of course, where sensing is construed as interior saying: he thought to himself.

Sunday, 2 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Saturday, 1 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I’m doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he’s mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawnmower; I’m busy).

Friday, 31 October 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Nature Of Participants — Consciousness & Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness … .  This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material and relational clauses.  While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or meta-phenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house).  Participants in material clauses cannot be meta-phenomenal.  For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house / their ideas / his argument), it is not possible to demolish “meta-things” (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Thursday, 30 October 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):
Many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it / it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser’s consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser’s consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). neither material nor relational* clauses display this dual directionality.

*Blogger Comment:

Identifying relational processes are bidirectional in their coding, decoding vs encoding, and these are proportional to the bidirectionality of mental processes, emanating vs impinging, respectively:

Process: mental
Process: identifying

Process: mental
Process: identifying