Quotes, Reports And Facts Are Categories Of Language

Halliday (1994: 272):

Embedded Idea As Phenomenon

Halliday (1994: 271):

Fact In An Impinging Mental Clause

Halliday (1994: 267-8):

Fact In An Emanating Mental Clause

Halliday (1994: 267):

Examples Of Embedded Locutions And Ideas

Halliday (1994: 264):

Projection Of Propositions And Proposals Summarised

Halliday (1994: 260):

Four Types Of Projection Nexus

Halliday (1994: 255-6):

Mental Projections Are Typically Hypotactic

Halliday (1994: 253):

Wording As Two Removes From Experience

Halliday (1994: 252-3):

Logico-Semantic Relations And Interdependency

Halliday (1994: 224-5):

Basic Types Of Clause Complex

Halliday (1994: 220):

Notation For Subtypes Of Expansion And Projection

Halliday (1994: 219):

The Nature Of The Move From Folk To Scientific Model

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 586-7, 588):

What is the nature of the move from our everyday construal of the experience of consciousness — our folk theory of Sensers sensing phenomena or projecting ideas — to the way cognitive scientists construe that experience? We can see the essential nature of this move when the folk theory is reconstrued as if it was a scientific one. …

The two modes of construing our experience of consciousness ate compared in grammatical terms in Figure 14-9.

Projecting Combined With Material Lexical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 586):

This mind-space may enter into material processes of storing, searching, crossing, escaping etc., either as participant or as circumstance, and also into relational processes of "being + Location". It is interesting to note that in these various lexical metaphors the Sensers are still very much present; they are not effaced. In fact, a number of these lexical metaphors constructed on the model of material clauses retain the option of projecting; see Figure 14-8.

The Differentiation Of Inner And Outer Experience

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 584-5):

This 'world view' can be depicted using the conventions of comic strips: see Figure 14-7.

The conventions of comic strips clearly differentiate between figures of sensing and saying on the one hand and figures of being & having and doing & happening on the other: the latter are represented graphically, whereas the former are represented linguistically, in terms of their projected content Comic strips thus codify the higher-order nature of projections and their constitution in language.

The Verbal Externalisation Of Consciousness

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 584):

The everyday grammar's contribution to the construal of sensing is thus both rich and varied. Some features of it are particularly significant to the uncommonsense model of mainstream cognitive science. The grammar separates out consciousness from the rest of our experience in the form of mental processes, capable of projecting ideas; but in addition, consciousness may also be 'externalised' in the form of verbal processes, capable of projecting locutions.

The Grammar's Construal Of Consciousness As Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 579, 580):

Figure 14-5 shows how the proposition construed by the idea clause is projected, as the "content of consciousness", by the Senser involved in the process of sensing. This content is brought into existence by the sensing process, as actualised through the Senser; and it is construed as being of a higher order of semiotic abstraction than the process of sensing itself (i.e. it is always at one further remove from the instantial context).

Why Projected Clauses Are Not Constituents Of Projecting Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 578-9):

In the grammar, the 'idea' is a separate clause that combines with the 'sensing' clause in a clause complex, through the relation of projection; see Figure 14-4 for a structural interpretation.

In our analysis (unlike that of the mainstream grammatical tradition), the projected clause is not a constituent part of the mental or verbal clause by which it is projected. There are numerous reasons for this; some of them are grammatical — for example, 

• it cannot be the focus of theme-predication [we do not say: it is that they're absolutely horrible that I think]; 
• it cannot be the Subject of a passive mental clause [we do not say: they're absolutely horrible is thought by me]; 
• it is presumed by the substitute so, which is also used to presume conditional clauses in clause complexes: I think they're absolutely horrible and my husband thinks so too]. 

But these, in turn, reflect the semantic nature of projection: this is a relationship between two figures, not a device whereby one becomes a participant inside another. We can thus show the difference between these and 'fact' clauses, those where the idea clause is a projection but it is not the accompanying mental clause that is doing the projecting; such readymade projections do function as constituents. An example here is I don't care whether they are devoted or not; compare it's not whether they are devoted or not that I care about.

Figures Of Sensing: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in "inert" conscious processing ("sensing", as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser's conscious processing). Alternatively, the Senser's conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138-40):

The grammar thus draws a fairly clear line between cognition & desideration on the one hand and perception & emotion on the other. The former can create worlds of ideas, the latter cannot — at least, according to the theory of consciousness embodied in the grammar of English. Now, this difference with respect to the ability to project is one of a set of properties that collectively serve to differentiate perception, cognition, desideration and emotion as the major subtypes of sensing. These properties are summarised in Table 4(3).