Facts As Intermediate Between First- And Second-Order Phenomena

Halliday (1994: 271-2):

Embedded Idea As Phenomenon

Halliday (1994: 271):

Facts In Cognitive And Verbal Clauses

Halliday (1994: 268):

Fact In An Impinging Mental Clause

Halliday (1994: 267-8):

Fact In An Emanating Mental Clause

Halliday (1994: 267):

Beneficiary And Range

 Halliday (1994: 165, 167):

Range Of A Mental Process

   Halliday (1994: 148):

The Verb 'Watch'

Halliday (1994: 139):

Senser And Phenomenon

Halliday (1994: 117):

Mental vs Material Clauses: Metaphenomenon

Halliday (1994: 115):

The Nature Of The Move From Folk To Scientific Model

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 586-7, 588):

What is the nature of the move from our everyday construal of the experience of consciousness — our folk theory of Sensers sensing phenomena or projecting ideas — to the way cognitive scientists construe that experience? We can see the essential nature of this move when the folk theory is reconstrued as if it was a scientific one. …

The two modes of construing our experience of consciousness ate compared in grammatical terms in Figure 14-9.

Qualities Of Projection As Agnate With Modality and Attitude

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

As we have seen, sensing is agnate with modality and, in the case of emotive sensing, with attitude. Similarly, qualities of projection extend to include modalities and attitudes; when the thing (or metathing) they are assigned to is agnate with the Phenomenon, these qualities are construed as objective, impersonal ones: it is certain/likely/possible that the moon's a balloon. (Contrast: I'm certain the moon's a balloon.) With qualities of usuality, this is the only possible orientation.

Qualities Of Projection As Agnate With Processes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

Qualities of projection are all scalar and they are, as we just noted, agnate with processes of sensing in figures of sensing; they are often realised by participial verb forms used as adjectives. The thing they are assigned to, as Attribute or as Epithet, is agnate either with the Senser (the 'like' type, realised by v-en if verbal in origin: happy, sad, angry, afraid, frightened, certain, sure) or with the Phenomenon (the 'please' type, realised by v-ing if verbal in origin: sad(dening), tragic, irritating, scary, certain). 

From this it follows that when they are agnate with the Senser, they are ascribed to conscious beings (as in an angry child/boss/cat), whereas when they are agnate with the Phenomenon, they can be ascribed not only to things but also to metathings, i.e. to projections (as in it's sad(dening)/tragic/irritating/scary/certain that they ignore world opinion). In the former case, these qualities may be 'transferred' to tokens of the senser's sensing, as in an angry face/look/letter/reaction.

Figures Of Sensing: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in "inert" conscious processing ("sensing", as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser's conscious processing). Alternatively, the Senser's conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (2) Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by a metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me. The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project, namely perception and emotion. That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can 'react to' facts. In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry/worrying — cf. (8) [agnate ascriptive process] below.

Reference As A Means Of Differentiating Macrophenomena And Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102-3):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as "referable" — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don't give me any more of that peanut butter! I can't stand the stuff.). This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants (cf. Webber, 1987, on reference to phenomena other than things). At the same time it allows us to recognise not only participants of the 'simple' type but also the 'larger' elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order. Halliday & Hasan (1976), where reference to macro-phenomena is called extended reference, and reference to meta-phenomena is called reference to facts, cite ambiguities which bring out the difference among elements of these various kinds:

(i) extended reference — to macro-phenomenon:

They broke a Chinese vase.

(i) That was valuable. (phenomenon: thing — the vase)

(ii) That was careless, (macro-phenomenon— the act of their breaking of the vase)

(ii) reference to 'fact' — to meta-phenomenon

It rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water.

(i) It spoilt our calculations. (meta-phenomenon (fact)—the fact that it rained so much upset our predictions)

(ii) It spoilt our calculations. (macro-phenomenon —the act of raining destroyed physical records)

Note how this relates to the shift of perspective from figure to participant: a figure such as 'catch + mouse' becomes referable as a macro-phenomenon (Your cat's caught a mouse — It's never done that before), and by the same token can enter into participant-based construal through the system of modification (Table 2(11)): (cats are) creatures that catch mice.

Subtypes Of Figures And Participant Role Value Restrictions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 57-8):

As already mentioned, there is a typology of figures based largely on the nature of the particular types of the process, participant, and circumstance roles; the most general part of this is shown in Figure 2-6.

 

Each type of figure has its own set of more delicately specified roles with particular value restrictions. For example, figures of doing have an Actor, which in turn is a participant (rather than some other kind of phenomenon). (Notice that the specification of the filler of the Phenomenon role in a sensing figure is more general than 'participant' — any type of phenomenon can be sensed.)

Embedded Projections Serving As Phenomenon Of Mental Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):

However, it is possible for an idea to be associated with a mental process while not being projected by it, as in they rejoiced that their team had won. When one clause projects another, the two always form a clause nexus; but here, where that their team had won comes readymade as a projection, rather than being turned into one by the process of rejoicing, the idea is embedded as Phenomenon and the whole forms a single clause. This happens particularly when a proposition is an object of emotion: when the fact that ... is a source of pleasure, displeasure, fear, surprise, amusement, interest or some other emotion.

Fact Serving As Range In Cognitive And Verbal Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 544-5):

But even with some cognitive and verbal processes, a projected element may occur which is not projected by that process; for example:

[cognitive]
Just before dress rehearsal, under pressure from the company, he reluctantly accepted [[that such ideas were outmoded]], and dropped them. 

The second category of temple land was particularly important and it was accepted [[that the holders of this land could sub-lease it]]. 

[verbal]
‘That was pretty obvious,’ smiled Sir Cedric, ‘and I admit [[I once had doubts about you]]’. 

With sly winks and discreet sniggering he conveyed [[[that he knew very well || that there was a great deal more than Philip confessed]]]. 

And there will always be ‘borderline cases’, instances where the line is hard to draw.

Fact As Phenomenon In Impinging Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):

In fact, the ‘emotive’ type with a fact clause as Phenomenon is more common in the ‘effective’ variant of agency (the ‘please’ type) than the ‘middle’ one (the ‘like’ type): the Phenomenon is explicitly construed as an Agent bringing about the Medium/Senser’s involvement in the process of emotion.

It did not surprise him very much [[to find [[that the door opened on the latch]] ]], for it was so old and worn that it offered little security. 

She had never reconciled herself to things which hurt her, and sometimes he was frightened [[[that when bad things began to happen || she would have so little habit of optimism to support her ]]]. 

The evidence against him was by no means decisive, but both judge and jury seem to have been influenced by the fact [[that the doctor himself was a morphine addict]].