Facts As Intermediate Between First- And Second-Order Phenomena

Halliday (1994: 271-2):

Embedded Projections

Halliday (1994: 263):

Transferred Epithet

Halliday (1994: 195):

Logical Structure Of Measure Expression

Halliday (1994: 195):

Substitute As Thing/Head

Halliday (1994: 194):

Common Nouns

Halliday (1994: 189-90):

Personal Pronouns & Proper Names

Halliday (1994: 189):

Thing: Proper Names

Halliday (1994: 189):

Thing: Personal Pronouns

 Halliday (1994: 189):

Compound Nouns

Halliday (1994: 185):

Nominal Group: Thing

Halliday (1994: 180):

Mental vs Material Clauses: Metaphenomenon

Halliday (1994: 115):

The Secondary Motif Of Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 268):

The "secondary motif" is that whereby a 'thing' (congruently construed as a noun functioning as Thing in a nominal group) is metaphorised on the model of some quality — qualifying, possessive or classifying. This represents a shift one step 'backwards' along the logical–experiential scale. It is thus contrary to the prevailing general tendency, since something that is congruently a participant on its own terms is now treated as existing only by virtue of some other participant.

This type of shift occurs only in syndromes, where the process is reconstrued as a participant; and as a corollary, the participants in that process become its 'qualities'. For example, Griffith's energy balance approach to strength and fracture, where the participants strength and fracture and energy balance have become 'qualities' expanding the metaphoric 'thing' approach — compare the more congruent Griffith approached strength and fracture in terms of (the concept of) energy balance.

Why Metaphoric Shift Is Towards Thing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 265):

Participants are realised by nominal groups, which allow more or less indefinite expansion (through the univariate structure of modification). This expansion is the grammar's way of constructing taxonomies of things: grouping them into classes, assigning properties to them, quantifying them and then uniquely identifying any individual thing, or any number, set or class of things, in relation to the 'here-&-now' of the speech event. 

The expansion involves open sets of things and qualities, realised by lexical items; but it can also capture a circumstance, realised by a prepositional phrase, or an entire figure, realised by a clause, and put it to use as a quality in describing or identifying such a thing or set of things, e.g. this unique 20-piece handprinted china dinner service with optional accessories never before offered for sale at such a bargain price.

Qualities are attached to things, and so contribute to this overall expansion. They also have possibilities of expansion of their own, by submodification (at least for intensity, but sometimes along other lines as well: very long, longest; dark blue, red hot). … 

This grammatical potential for taxonomising is complemented by the lexical potential of the nominal group for construing feature networks. So by construing any phenomenon of experience as a thing, we give it the maximum potential for semantic elaboration.

Participants vs Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213):

While participants are located in referential space, processes are located in time. The verbal group realising a process constructs a "moment" in time beginning with the 'now' (the time of speaking) leading up to a categorisation of the Event; this is analogous to the way the nominal group, realising a participant, constructs a "body" in space beginning with the 'here' and leading up to a categorisation of the Thing. But while the Thing is enmeshed in an elaborate taxonomy of things, the Event is taxonomically rather simple and its complexity lies in the construal of time itself. Hence the verbal group is lexically sparse — typically the Event is the only lexicalised part; whereas nominal groups can be lexically extremely dense.

The Attribute Is Not A Prototypical Participant

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207-8):

The Attribute is not a prototypical participant We have already noted that as it stands it cannot function interpersonally as Subject. On the other hand, it can easily be instated as a participant by adding the noun or the noun substitute one(s) to the nominal group which realises it: this is a dry plate, this is a dry one. The fact that the thing can be instated as the Head of a nominal group serving as Attribute illustrates the point already made: the quality does not construe a separate class of thing, it presumes this class from the environment. Thus this is heavy means that it is heavy relatively to whatever class of thing it has been assigned to; compare the truck was very heavy / a very heavy one (i.e. "heavy for a truck') with the chair was very heavy / a very heavy one (i.e. 'heavy for a chair'). Hence it is not possible to re-instate the thing where the Attribute occurs as resultative in a process of doing: we do not say I've wiped it a dry plate or I've wiped the plate a dry one.

Things vs Qualities: Different Kinds Of Role In Participant Structure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207):

We said that both things and qualities are construed as participants. This does not mean that they are different kinds of participant. Rather, it means that within the structure of a participant, they serve different kinds of role.

Typically, a quality combines with a thing to make up a participant in a figure: a dry plate, where the quality 'dry' is Epithet in the nominal group. The only context in which a quality serves on its own in a participant role is as Attribute; here it stands in intensive relation to a participant, either (i) in a figure of being, where the participant is Medium/Carrier (i.e. its sole function is to have the quality ascribed to it) or (ii) in a figure of doing, where the participant is Medium/Actor or Medium/Goal and quality results from the doing; for example:

being: The plate's dry —I've made the plate dry

doing: I've wiped the plate dry

Note that in the doing figure, where I is Actor, the Attribute could be omitted: I've wiped the plate; in the being figure it cannot, since the process itself is one of ascription and the other participant, if present, is merely the ascriber.

Qualities: Between Things And Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

As a category, qualities lie somewhere along a cline between things and processes, and their status varies considerably among different languages. In English, qualities belong more closely with things, since they contribute primarily to the construction of participants: grammatically, English favours construing a quality as Epithet in a nominal group, and the class of adjective is clearly related to that of noun. (By contrast, in Chinese, where qualities are typically construed clausally, as Attribute, rather than nominally, as Epithet, the adjective is equally clearly related to the verb.) Here English is similar to Latin, where in the traditional grammars a general class "noun" was classified into "noun substantive" and "noun adjective":

Things As The Frame Of Reference Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

Since qualities are assigned to things, they are construed with things as their frame of reference: in the first instance, a quality characterises a thing relative to other things in the same (primary) class. Thus a thick book is not a 'thick thing'; rather, it is a 'thick book' as opposed to a 'slim book': the scale of 'thick' to 'slim' is relative to book and a thick book would be much thicker than a thick envelope. This characteristic is particularly noticeable with scalar qualities, which have received particular attention in semantic studies; but it is also, in principle, a feature of taxonomic adjectives — even those construing complex classes. For example, the criteria for assigning 'wooden' to a 'spoon', a 'house' and a 'carriage' are fairly different in terms of the actual material make-up of these things.

Qualities (vs Things)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205-6):

The discussion of 'facets' illustrates the difference between things and qualities of things; it also illustrates the indeterminacy of the distinction. Let us begin our discussion of qualities by relating them to things.

[Previously] we discussed the complementary contributions made by qualities and things in the construal of participants. We showed that qualities and things differ in two related respects, temporal stability and experiential complexity: things tend to persist through time and to represent intersections of many dimensions, whereas qualities tend to be less stable through time and tend to represent values on single dimensions. Qualities thus construe values on dimensions such as size (e.g., 'big/ small'), weight ('heavy/light'), and shape ('round'/ 'square'/ 'rectangular'/ 'oval'...).