Sunday, 30 November 2014

Elaborating Being & Having: A Theory Of The Systemic Organisation Of The Meaning Potential Itself

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):
Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further.

Saturday, 29 November 2014

Being & Having: Elaboration Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):
One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.

Friday, 28 November 2014

Being & Having: Expansion Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 
Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we realise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.

Thursday, 27 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 
Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of ‘understand’ alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.

Wednesday, 26 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Desideration

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143-4): 
Cognition and desideration are different from both [emotion and perception] in that they can project (ie bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing.

Tuesday, 25 November 2014

Sensing Topology: Emotion & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143): 
Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from but does not create projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes.

Monday, 24 November 2014

Different Reifications Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
… when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, ie countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, ie masses, such as anger, fear, frustration. That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil. … In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).

Sunday, 23 November 2014

Scalability Of Emotive Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to a degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.

Saturday, 22 November 2014

Construal Of Emotion As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):
With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the ‘like’ type and the ‘please’ type.  Thus I’m afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but is much more productive with emotive ones.  Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible).

Friday, 21 November 2014

Processes Of Perception: Agnate Ascriptive Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142-3): 
Processes of perception are unique among the different types of sensing in that they are agnate to a set of relational processes of ascription, those that ascribe an Attribute in terms of the way in which it presents itself to our senses, as in Madam, you’ll look like a tulip.

Thursday, 20 November 2014

Processes Of Perception & Cognition: Phase Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
The different types of sensing have somewhat different potentials for unfolding in time. With perception and cognition we have various categories of duration, inception, and the like: e.g. (perception) glimpse, sight, spot as well as see; (cognition) discover, realise, remember as well as know. But similar distinctions do not seem to obtain with desiderative and emotive processes.

Wednesday, 19 November 2014

Processes Of Cognition Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.

Tuesday, 18 November 2014

Processes Of Perception Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):
All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I’m watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance. Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind.  As long as the ‘phenomenon’ is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and the material domains of experience.

Monday, 17 November 2014

Sensing Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2):
Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). […] The difference is suggested quite clearly in the example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Sunday, 16 November 2014

Processes Of Cognition & Perception: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the ‘like’ type — perception almost exclusively so; ‘please’ type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Saturday, 15 November 2014

Processes Of Desideration: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Processes of desideration are not bi-directional; here there is no ‘please’ type, only the ‘like’ type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires.

Blogger Note:

On the other hand, perhaps verbs such as attracttempt and seduce can serve as desiderative processes of the 'please' type; otherwise, how else to explain the following projection nexus:
The talking snake tempted the naked woman to eat a piece of magic fruit.
The talking snake made the naked woman want to eat a piece of magic fruit. 

Friday, 14 November 2014

Processes Of Emotion: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional.  They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in I like Mozart’s music (the ‘like’ type) : Mozart’s music pleases me (the ‘please’ type) Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience.

Thursday, 13 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing: Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:
I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to.
There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Wednesday, 12 November 2014

Emotion, Attitude & Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141n):
Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she’s returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of the clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Tuesday, 11 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing As Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):
Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:
I think that in a sense you’ve had to compromise, haven’t you?
Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.

Monday, 10 November 2014

Metaphenomenon & Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):
A process of sensing may range over or be caused by metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me.  The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project*, namely perception and emotion  That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can ‘react to’ facts.  In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry /worrying.

*Blogger Note:

Consider the following desideratively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:
The fact [[that he had to diet]] made him wish —> he had bought a secret supply of chocolate.
Consider the following cognitively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:
The fact [[that the bailiff was coming on Monday]] made him think —> it might be time to emigrate.

Sunday, 9 November 2014

Projection Of Ideas & Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):
While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/imagined/dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying.

Saturday, 8 November 2014

Sensing: Cognitive & Desiderative Vs Perceptive & Emotive

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138): 
Cognitive and desiderative processing create ideas … but perceptive processing and emotive processing don’t … they are activated by [pre-projected] facts.

Friday, 7 November 2014

Perceptive & Emotive Sensing Cannot Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138):
In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result as a result of someone seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts, for instance:
It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]]. 
I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]]. 
We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].
Thus ‘that I am fixed, concrete’ is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

Thursday, 6 November 2014

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing Can Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):
Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):
I just thought —> I’d tell you that I’d appreciate it.
I think —> I’ll give it up.
They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.
Thus the idea ‘I’ll give it up’ is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea ‘me to crawl on my bended knees’ is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

Wednesday, 5 November 2014

Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):
These can be treated as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon; nor can they accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Tuesday, 4 November 2014

Prototypicality Vs Borderline Cases & Blends: Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6, 137):
As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying immediately at the borderline of the primary types.  The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends.  One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday 1985: 128-9): “processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing”. […] Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

Monday, 3 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the ‘content’ of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.*
* Except, of course, where sensing is construed as interior saying: he thought to himself.

Sunday, 2 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Saturday, 1 November 2014

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):
In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I’m doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he’s mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawnmower; I’m busy).