The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations in Western Thinking About Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 415-6):

We can identify two main traditions in Western thinking about meaning (see Halliday, 1977):

(i) one oriented towards logic and philosophy, with language seen as a system of rules;

(ii) one oriented towards rhetoric and ethnography, with language seen as resource.

It is typically the logical-philosophical tradition that provides the background for work on knowledge representation and proposals for the knowledge base. Since the 50s, a link has been forged between this tradition and cognitivism under the general rubric of cognitive science. 

However, although it is less often referred to, the rhetorical-ethnographic tradition is equally relevant to work on the modelling and representation of knowledge — for example, in recent times, the work on folk taxonomy carried out by anthropologists and anthropological linguists (often in the framework of ethnoscience) and the work on intellectualisation in the Prague School framework are central to understanding the organisation of the ideation base. 

Our own work here falls mainly within the second tradition — but we have taken account of the first tradition, and the general intellectual environment in which versions of our meaning base are being used also derives primarily from the first tradition. Indeed, the two traditions can in many respects be seen as complementary, as contributing different aspects of the overall picture. Our own foundation, however, is functional.

Mainstream work in psycholinguistics, e.g. Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976), is in general located within the logico-philosophical tradition. Two other distinctive contributions to the study of meaning within linguistics, those of Lamb (1964, 1992) and of Wierzbicka (1980, 1988), derive in more or less equal measure from both the major intellectual movements we have referred to.

The two orientations towards meaning thus differ externally in what disciplines they recognise as models.

Degrees Of Delicacy In The Lexical Zone

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 89, 90):

Within the lexical zone, we have already referred to the differentiation according to the degrees in delicacy; in particular, the 'basic' degree of delicacy stood out as most highly elaborated. There are also grammatical reactances indicating the taxonomic differentiation between the "basic" degree of delicacy and lower degrees of delicacy, at least in cases where the taxonomic relationship is of a particular kind. For example, the less delicate category may be construed by a mass noun whereas the more delicate, basic degree categories may be construed as count nouns: see Table 2(8).

Wierzbicka (1985: 321-2) identifies this phenomenon and shows that it is not arbitrary. Her explanation is in fact that the relationship between e.g. 'furniture' and 'chair, table' as super-category and subcategory is not the normal 'kind of relationship between e.g. 'bird' and 'swallow, magpie', but rather a grouping of different kinds according to similarity in use:

Thus, supercategones such as bird or tree are 'taxonomic', i.e. they belong to hierarchies of kinds (where each 'kind' is identified on the basis of similarity between its members); supercategories such as crockery, cutlery or kitchenware are not taxonomic — they include things of different kinds, grouped on the basis of contiguity and/ or similarity of function, not on the basis of similarity of form.

We take delicacy to include both types of the relationship of supercategory to subcategory — both the "taxonomic" and the "non-taxonomic" ones. However, it would seem that with the relationship between 'furniture' and 'chair', 'table' &c. we are on the borderline between elaboration and extension.