Halliday (1994: 298):
Showing posts with label Inherent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Inherent. Show all posts
Saturday, 8 February 2025
Saturday, 25 June 2022
Inherent Participants
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 517):
At the same time, all processes are interpreted as having something in common, in that typically there is one participant that is inherently associated with the process — without which the process could not take place at all, like birds in birds are flying. That may be the only one, in which case that participant is held accountable (even if involuntarily!) and the process is said to stop there. Alternatively, another participant may be involved; either as an external agent, like children in children are flying kites, or as a goal, like a letter in I'm writing a letter.
Labels:
Clause,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Participant,
Transitivity
Thursday, 6 September 2018
Agent Vs Instrument [Diagnostic: Voice]
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 319):
The line between agent and instrument is not always very sharp. … Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction in the grammar between manner and agency, so that a passive by phrase, if it could not remain unchanged in the corresponding active clause, is interpreted as a participant, not as a circumstance of Manner. This reflects the fact that semantically, whereas the instrument is not usually an inherent element in the process, the agent typically is — although less clearly so when the process is expressed in the passive.
Labels:
Agency,
Agent,
Circumstance,
Clause,
Enhancement,
Expansion,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Manner,
Transitivity
Thursday, 15 March 2018
Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Inherent Participants
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261-2):
In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else. In other words, a relationship of being is set up between two separate entities. This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants – two ‘be-ers’. In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively). Thus, while we can have a ‘material’ clause with one participant such as she was walking or she was walking into the room, we cannot have a ‘relational’ clause such as she was, with only one participant; we have to have two: she was in the room. Similarly, a ‘mental’ clause with one participant such as she rejoiced is possible; but the nearest ‘relational’ equivalent must have two participants – she was happy, not she was.
Blogger Comment:
Note that attributive clauses with qualitative Processes, such as this stinks, manifest only one participant, unless the Attribute is interpreted as conflated with the Process; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271).
Saturday, 20 January 2018
On The Cline Between Participants And Circumstances
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):
Scope, Recipient and Client are clearly treated by the grammar as participants; for example, they are all candidates for subjecthood in a ‘receptive’ clause. However, at the same time, they are clearly located some distance towards circumstances on the cline between participants and circumstances, which is reflected in the fact that that, under certain conditions, they may be marked by a preposition [minor Process].
Labels:
Clause,
Client,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Recipient,
Scope,
Transitivity
Friday, 19 January 2018
Attribute: Material Vs Relational Clause
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):
In a ‘material’ clause, the Attribute is always an optional added specification. In contrast, it is an inherent part of the configuration of a ‘relational’ clause and cannot be left out.
Blogger Comment:
But note that the Attribute is sometimes conflated with the relational process, as in Accuracy matters.
Friday, 29 December 2017
Material Clauses: Inherent Participants
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 236):
The Actor is an inherent participant in both intransitive and transitive material clauses; the Goal is inherent only in transitive clauses. In addition to these two roles, there are a number of other participant roles that may be involved in the process of a ‘material’ clause; these are: Scope, Recipient, Client and (more marginally) Attribute.
Labels:
Actor,
Attribute,
Clause,
Client,
Goal,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Material Processes,
Recipient,
Scope,
Transitivity
Saturday, 23 December 2017
Transformative Material Clauses: Outcomes
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):
In a ‘transformative’ clause, the outcome is the change of some aspect of the Actor (‘intransitive’) or the Goal (‘transitive’). … In the limiting case, the outcome of the final phase is to maintain the conditions of the initial phase …
Unlike ‘creative’ clauses, ‘transformative’ ones can often have a separate element representing the outcome … an Attribute specifying the resultant state of the Goal. Even where the sense of outcome is inherent in the process, the outcome may be indicated by the ‘particle’ of a phrasal verb, as in shut down …
Labels:
Actor,
Attribute,
Clause,
Goal,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Limiting Case,
Material Processes,
Transitivity
Thursday, 7 December 2017
Happening (Intransitive) Vs Doing (Transitive)
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225-6):
[The Actor] brings about the unfolding of the process through time, leading to an outcome that is different from the initial phase of the unfolding. This outcome may be confined to the Actor itself, in which case there is only one participant inherent in the process. Such a ‘material’ clause represents a happening and, using traditional terminology, we can call it intransitive. Alternatively, the unfolding of the process may extend to another participant, the Goal, impacting it in some way: the outcome is registered on the Goal in the first instance, rather than on the Actor. Such a ‘material’ clause represents a doing and we can call it transitive.
Labels:
Clause,
Doing,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Material Processes,
Transitivity
Sunday, 26 November 2017
Circumstances vs Participants
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 220):
Circumstantial elements are almost always optional augmentations of the clause rather than obligatory components. In contrast, participants are inherent in the process: every experiential type of clause has at least one participant and certain types have up to three participants – the only exception being, as just noted above, clauses of certain meteorological processes without any participants …
Labels:
Circumstance,
Clause,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Transitivity
Monday, 8 May 2017
Inherently Given Elements
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 118):
There are a number of elements in language that are inherently ‘given’ in the sense that they are not interpretable except by reference to some previous mention or some feature of the situation: anaphoric elements (those that refer to things mentioned before) and deictic elements (those that are interpreted by reference to the ‘here-&-now’ of the discourse). Typically these items do not carry information focus; if they do, they are contrastive. So when we say that, for any information unit, the unmarked structure is that with the focus on the final element, this excludes any items that are inherently given.
Labels:
Cohesion,
Deictic,
Discourse,
Information,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Reference,
Textual,
Unmarked
Tuesday, 18 April 2017
Theme Summary
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 111-2):
(i) Initial position in the English clause is meaningful in the construction of the clause as message; specifically, it has a thematic function.
(ii) Certain textual elements that orient the clause within the discourse, rhetorically and logically, are inherently thematic.
(iii) Certain other elements, textual and interpersonal, that set up a semantic relation with what precedes, or express the speaker’s angle or intended listener, are characteristically thematic; this includes finite operators, which signal one type of question.
(iv) These inherently and characteristically thematic elements lie outside the experiential structure of the clause; they have no status as participant, circumstance or process.
(v) Until one of these latter appears, the clause lacks an anchorage in the realm of experience; and this is what completes the thematic grounding of the message.
Labels:
Clause,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Textual,
Theme
Monday, 17 April 2017
Non-Topical Themes And The Markedness Of Topical Theme
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 111):
We could set up a paradigm as follows, showing the effect of different initial selections in the clause:
- no non-topical Theme,
- with inherently thematic non-topical Theme,
- with characteristically thematic non-topical Theme;
it will be seen that the marked topical Theme becomes as it were more and more marked at each step.
Thursday, 13 April 2017
Continuatives, Conjunctions And The Quantum Of Thematicity
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 110):
By the same token, however, since these items are thematic by default, when one of them is present it does not take up the full thematic potential of the clause in which it occurs. What follows it will also have thematic status, almost if not quite as prominently as when nothing else precedes. We can demonstrate this by reference to the concept of ‘marked (topical) Theme’. On the one hand, after a continuative or a conjunction it is still possible to introduce a marked type of topical Theme, either in contrast or as a setting ... On the other hand, such marked Themes appear to be slightly less frequent when there is some inherently thematic item in the clause, suggesting that some of the ‘quantum of thematicity’ has already been taken up.
Labels:
Clause,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Marked,
Quantum Of Thematicity,
Textual,
Theme
Wednesday, 12 April 2017
Inherently Thematic: Continuatives & Conjunctions
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 109):
Those that are inherently thematic are the (textual) continuatives and conjunctions. As the language evolved, they have, as it were, migrated to the front of the clause and stayed there. Essentially they constitute a setting for the clause (continuative), or else they locate it in a specific logical-semantic relationship to another clause in the neighbourhood (conjunction). In either case, their thematic status comes as part of a package, along with their particular discursive force.
Labels:
Clause,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Phylogenesis,
Textual,
Theme
Tuesday, 11 April 2017
The Thematic Function Of Textual And Interpersonal Themes
Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 109):
Why do these items favour thematic position in the clause – or, to put the question more meaningfully, why are they associated with thematic function, either characteristically or, in some cases [continuatives and conjunctions], inherently? In the most general sense, they are all natural Themes: if the speaker, or writer, is making explicit the way the clause relates to the surrounding discourse (textual), or projecting his/her own angle on the value of what the clause is saying (interpersonal), it is natural to set up such expressions as the point of departure. The message begins with ‘let me tell you how this fits in’, and/or ‘let me tell you what I think about this’.
Labels:
Clause,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Textual,
Theme
Wednesday, 13 August 2014
The Three Types Of Element Constructed Within The Grammar — Ideational Metafunction
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99):
Within the ideational component, they are realised by different classes of units:
- process ( verbal group,
- participant ( nominal group,
- circumstance ( adverbial group; prepositional phrase.
Participants tend to be inherent elements of a figure; circumstances are typically optional.
Labels:
Adverbial,
Element,
Group,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Lexicogrammar,
Nominal,
Phrase,
Semantics,
Verbal
Thursday, 26 June 2014
Circumstances
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 54):
Circumstances are typically less closely associated with the process and are usually not inherent in it. They specify the spatial or temporal location of the process, its extent in space or time (distance or duration), its cause, the manner of its occurrence, and so on.
Labels:
Circumstance,
Figure,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Semantics
Tuesday, 24 June 2014
Participants
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 54):
Participants are inherent in the process; they bring about its occurrence or mediate it. There are a number of specific ways in which a participant may take part in a process, it may sense it, it may receive it, it may be affected by it, it may say it, and so on. The different configurations of participants are the bases for a typology of process types.
Labels:
Figure,
Ideational,
Inherent,
Semantics
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