Macrophenomenon vs Metaphenomenon

Halliday (1994: 249):

Reference As A Means Of Differentiating Macrophenomena And Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102-3):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as "referable" — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don't give me any more of that peanut butter! I can't stand the stuff.). This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants (cf. Webber, 1987, on reference to phenomena other than things). At the same time it allows us to recognise not only participants of the 'simple' type but also the 'larger' elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order. Halliday & Hasan (1976), where reference to macro-phenomena is called extended reference, and reference to meta-phenomena is called reference to facts, cite ambiguities which bring out the difference among elements of these various kinds:

(i) extended reference — to macro-phenomenon:

They broke a Chinese vase.

(i) That was valuable. (phenomenon: thing — the vase)

(ii) That was careless, (macro-phenomenon— the act of their breaking of the vase)

(ii) reference to 'fact' — to meta-phenomenon

It rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water.

(i) It spoilt our calculations. (meta-phenomenon (fact)—the fact that it rained so much upset our predictions)

(ii) It spoilt our calculations. (macro-phenomenon —the act of raining destroyed physical records)

Note how this relates to the shift of perspective from figure to participant: a figure such as 'catch + mouse' becomes referable as a macro-phenomenon (Your cat's caught a mouse — It's never done that before), and by the same token can enter into participant-based construal through the system of modification (Table 2(11)): (cats are) creatures that catch mice.

Metaphenomena And Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 506-7):

Metaphenomena – projections – can be associated only with certain types of process, essentially saying and sensing, plus in certain circumstances being. Macrophenomena – expansions – can enter into material processes. Thus you can say [[ = crushing him like that]] broke his bones. But you cannot say it broke his bones that you crushed him like that, because finite that (‘indirect’) clauses can only be projections, not expansions. (You can on the other hand say it broke his heart that you crushed him like that, because heart-breaking, unlike bone-breaking, is a mental process.)

Complication arises because the names of metaphenomena, nouns such as belief and fact, can sometimes enter into material processes where the metaphenomena by themselves cannot. For example, although we cannot say it destroyed his life that the experiment had failed, we can say the knowledge that the experiment had failed destroyed his life – not the idea as such, but his knowledge of it, was the destroyer. We may also note abstract material processes used metaphorically to construe mental phenomena:

The passage of time, romantic travellers’ tales – of which Marco Polo’s supply the classic example – and wishful thinking, all combined to build up the late medieval belief [[ that Prester John was a mighty, if probably schismatical Christian priest-king ]].

We might also say the fact that the experiment had failed destroyed his life; here fact stands for a state of affairs, rather than for a projected metaphenomenon as in its prototypical sense. In other words, although projections cannot participate in processes other than those of consciousness, the names of projections can, because they can be used to label events or states of affairs. Here we have reached the borderline between expansion and projection; the two come together under conditions of nominalisation, where there is metaphor in the grammar and many of the semantic distinctions expressed in the clause tend to be neutralised.

Act (Macrophenomenon) vs Projection (Metaphenomenon)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 505-6):

(2) Projections: we saw that the boats had been turned. If I say I can see the boats turning, this is an event. A process ‘the boats are turning’ is being treated as a single complex phenomenon – a ‘macrophenomenon’. If I say I can see that the boats are turning, this is a projection. The process ‘the boats are turning’ is being treated as the projection or idea of a phenomenon – a ‘metaphenomenon’, something not just bigger but of a different order of reality. So we can say I can see that the boats have been turned but not I can see the boats having been turned – because you cannot see a past event. You can see the state of affairs resulting from that past event; but the past event itself can only be treated as a projection. In the present, both are possible; but the meaning is slightly different. If the ‘seeing’ is understanding, or what is seen is a report in writing, then again the relationship must be one of projection.

Embedded Clauses: Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 503):

There is one further function of embedded clauses which is related to expansion in that, although there is no Head noun (so the embedded clause itself functions as ‘Head’), the embedded clause is the nominalisation of a process. For example, [[threatening people]] will get you nowhere.  Such a clause is the name of an action, event or other phenomenon.  It represents a ‘macro-phenomenon’ … ; let us call it an act.

An ‘act’ clause may also occur as Postmodifier to a Head noun of the appropriate class, for example the act [[= of threatening people]].  Hence it is reasonable to treat these as elaborations.

Relational & Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses: Acts & Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

In being able to be construed not only with things as participants, but also with acts and facts, ‘relational’ clauses clearly differ from ‘material’ ones; but they resemble ‘mental’ ones in this respect.  However, in a relational clause, these things, acts and facts are not construed as a phenomenon of consciousness; rather, they are construed as one element in a relationship of being. Thus while a thing, act or fact construed as a Phenomenon in a ‘mental’ clause is configured with a Senser, in a ‘relational’ clause, a thing, act or fact construed as a participant is configured with another relational participant that has to come from the same domain of being [material vs semiotic].

Mental Clause Subtypes: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257):

Like all other experiential systems, the system of type of sensing construes experience as indeterminate: the four different types of sensing shade into one another. For example, perception shades into cognition, with I see coming to mean not only ‘I perceive visually’ but also ‘I understand’. And cognition shades into perception with clauses where remember serves as the Process; unlike ‘cognitive’ clauses in general such clauses can be construed with a macrophenomenal Phenomenon …

Macrophenomenal Clauses: Receptive Variant Or…?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

One of the interesting features of ‘macrophenomenal’ clauses is the form of what would seem to be the ‘receptive’ variant: instead of the expected the sand dredger heading for the cruiser was seen by him, where the whole Phenomenon is the Subject, we are much more likely to get the sand dredger was seen (by him) heading for the cruiser, where only the Subject of the non-finite clause serving as Phenomenon is ‘picked out’ to serve as the Subject of the ‘mental’ clause. For example:

Smoke was seen billowing from the police headquarters after an explosion.

This might suggest a different analysis of macrophenomenal clauses: what appears to be the ‘receptive’ variant could be interpreted not as a ‘receptive’ variant of a ‘macrophenomenal’ clause but rather as a clause with a verbal group complex serving as Process, was seen billowing, on the model of the sand dredger was rumoured (said) to be heading for the cruiser. Such constructions could be interpreted as markers of evidentiality – of the nature of the evidence for the information being negotiated.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252n):

A receptive variant such as the sand dredger heading for the cruiser wasn’t spotted by the navy would in fact be ambiguous: it could be a macrophenomenon, but alternatively heading for the cruiser might be an embedded relative clause. These two are significantly different in meaning. The interpretation as embedded relative clause would not be plausible where the non-finite clause occurs after the process of perception. 

Macrophenomenal Mental Clauses: Realisation Of Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

The non-finite clause realising an act is either a present participial one … or an infinitival one without the ‘infinitive marker’ to … The difference between them is a temporal one: the participial clause represents the process as unbounded in time, while the infinitival one represents it as bounded in time.

Macrophenomenal Mental Clauses: Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251-2):

In a ‘macrophenomenal mental’ clause, the Phenomenon is realised by a non-finite clause denoting an act; … An act is a configuration of a process, participants involved in that process and possibly attendant circumstances … Macrophenomenal Phenomena are typically restricted to one subtype of ‘mental’ clause — clauses of perception: the act is seen, heard, tasted or perceived in some other way; but it is not normally thought, felt emotionally, or desired.

Macrophenomenal & Metaphenomenal Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

… the concept of ‘thing’ is extended in ‘mental’ clauses to include macrophenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is an act and metaphenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is a fact.

Phenomenon: Thing, Act, Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

… the set of things that can take on this rôle in the clause is not only not restricted to any particular semantic or grammatical category, it is actually wider that the set of possible participants in a ‘material’ clause. It may be not only a thing but also an act or a fact.

Mental Clauses Of Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 246-7):

There is one further type of ‘mental’ clause: I can feel something on my foot. This is a clause of perception, the can feel as the Process, I as the Senser and something on my foot as the Phenomenon being perceived. Such clauses are similar to emotive and cognitive ‘mental’ clauses in that the Senser is construed as a conscious being. But they also have properties that set them apart from the other subtypes of ‘mental’ clause. For example, while Pat could have said I feel something on my foot with the Process in the simple present, she has used a modulation of readiness instead – can feel. This is quite common with ‘mental’ clauses of perception, as with Can you see those pelicans flying across the lagoon alongside Do you see .... This example also illustrates another feature specific to clauses of perception: what is construed as the phenomenon being perceived can be a thing (such as cockroach); but it can also be an act, realised by a non-finite clause, as in I can feel [[something crawling up my foot]].

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Nature Of Participants — Consciousness & Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness … .  This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material and relational clauses.  While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or meta-phenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house).  Participants in material clauses cannot be meta-phenomenal.  For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house / their ideas / his argument), it is not possible to demolish “meta-things” (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

The Effect Of The Special Subcategories Of Participant & Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as “referable” — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don’t give me any more of that peanut butter! I can’t stand the stuff.) This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants. At the same time, it allows us to recognise not only of the ‘simple’ type but also ‘larger’ elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order.

The Powerful Effect Of Rank-Shifted Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 10):

… clauses that are shifted downwards on the rank scale to serve as if they were groups or phrases. Such down-ranking is known as rank-shift. This has the powerful effect of expanding the resources of grammar by allowing the meaning potential of a higher-ranking unit to enrich that of a unit of a lower rank. … Such rank-shifted clauses construe what we call macro-phenomena.

Macrophenomenon (Expansion) Vs Metaphenomenon (Projection)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 440-1):

[Consider] we saw that the boats had been turned.  If I say I can see the boats turning, this is an event.  A process ‘the boats are turning’ is being treated as a single complex phenomenon — a macrophenomenon … .  If I say I can see that the boats are turning, this is a projection.  The process ‘the boats are turning’ is being treated as the projection or idea of a phenomenon — a metaphenomenon, something not just bigger but of a different order of reality.