Reference As A Means Of Differentiating Macrophenomena And Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102-3):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as "referable" — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don't give me any more of that peanut butter! I can't stand the stuff.). This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants (cf. Webber, 1987, on reference to phenomena other than things). At the same time it allows us to recognise not only participants of the 'simple' type but also the 'larger' elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order. Halliday & Hasan (1976), where reference to macro-phenomena is called extended reference, and reference to meta-phenomena is called reference to facts, cite ambiguities which bring out the difference among elements of these various kinds:

(i) extended reference — to macro-phenomenon:

They broke a Chinese vase.

(i) That was valuable. (phenomenon: thing — the vase)

(ii) That was careless, (macro-phenomenon— the act of their breaking of the vase)

(ii) reference to 'fact' — to meta-phenomenon

It rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water.

(i) It spoilt our calculations. (meta-phenomenon (fact)—the fact that it rained so much upset our predictions)

(ii) It spoilt our calculations. (macro-phenomenon —the act of raining destroyed physical records)

Note how this relates to the shift of perspective from figure to participant: a figure such as 'catch + mouse' becomes referable as a macro-phenomenon (Your cat's caught a mouse — It's never done that before), and by the same token can enter into participant-based construal through the system of modification (Table 2(11)): (cats are) creatures that catch mice.