Fawcett's Cognitive Model Of An Interactive Mind

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428-9):

Within systemic-functional linguistics, Fawcett (e.g. 1980) has pioneered a "cognitive model of an interactive mind". There are many fundamental similarities with the approach we are taking here, e.g. in construing an experiential system of process configuration within the content plane. However, there are two related differences of particular interest in the context of our present discussion:

(i) in Fawcett's model, there is only one system-structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a "realisation component" to [content] form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically;

(ii) in Fawcett's model, the semantics is separate from the "knowledge of the universe", with the latter as a "component" outside the linguistic system including "long term memory" and "short term sort of knowledge".

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because 'form' in Fawcett's model also includes expression. Fawcett (2010: 35n, 39):

I take a different view, as this book shows, in that I regard the level of meanings within the 'lexicogrammar' as the key level of linguistically-realised meaning, such that it is realised in any one of (1) syntax, (2) intonation or punctuation (depending on the medium of discourse) and (3) items. …

The term "form" is used here in a wider sense than that in "Categories" (or indeed any of Halliday's later writings) because it includes, as well as syntax and grammatical and lexical items, components for intonation or punctuation (depending on whether the medium is speech or writing).

Lakoff's Cognitive Semantics vs A Social Semiotic Perspective

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428):

Thus while our view that the ideational semantic system construes human experience is similar to what Lakoff (1987; 1988) calls the position of "experientialist cognition" (the position he has himself espoused, in contrast with what he calls "objectivist cognition"), it differs in that for us construing experience is an intersubjective process. It is at once both semiotic (the construction of meaning) and social (as in Peter Berger's "social construction of reality": cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966, Wuthnow et al, 1984). It is the intersection of these two perspectives that characterises the social semiotic we are attempting to present in this book (cf. Lemke, 1995; Thibault, 1993).

Jackendoff's Conceptual Semantics vs A Socio-Semiotic Perspective

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428):

Returning to Barwise's contrast between the mind-oriented view of meaning and the world-oriented view, we can note Barwise's general argument against the mind-oriented view:

... representational mental states have meaning in exactly the same way that sentences and texts have meaning, and saying what one means is a complicated matter. This makes attempts to explicate linguistic meaning in terms of mental representations an evasion of the main issue: How do meaningful representations of all kinds, sentences and states, mean what they do? (Barwise, 1988: 38)

We acknowledge this problem, but we believe the solution lies in a socio-semiotic view of meaning such as the one we are presenting here. Jackendoff views information about the projected world in conceptual terms; hence reality construction is seen as a process taking place within the consciousness of the individual. 

Our own view, that the projected world is a semantic construction, foregrounds the interpersonal perspective: meaning is construed in collaboration. Meanings are exchanged; and the "projected world" is constantly calibrated against the interpersonal negotiation of meaning. This means that consensus and conflict take over much of the domain that is usually conceptualised in terms of truth and falsehood (cf. Eggins, 1990). The semantic system (as part of the linguistic system) is shared; it is part of our social being.

Some Limitations Of Jackendoff's Ontology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 427-8):

Jackendoff contrasts his ontology with that of "standard first-order logic", and makes the important point that the ontological classes of logic are vastly under-differentiated from a linguistic point of view — that this type of logic is not an adequate theory of the semantic structure of natural language. Compared to this type of logic, Jackendoffs ontology is much more highly differentiated However, it is not very rich compared to what we believe is needed in an account of the ideation base.

The classes recognised are roughly a list of semantic correlates of word classes at primary or secondary delicacy (such as one finds in traditional grammars). The list is not exhaustive, it does not include any significant paradigmatic organisation (i.e., it contains no organisation showing how types are arranged into a subsumption lattice) and some of the most revealing distinctions of the ideational semantics of English are absent — e.g. the distinction between phenomena and metaphenomena, the recognition of the role played by projection, and the expansion of the system through grammatical metaphor.

These are general observations. Since Jackendoff relies on reference as a source of evidence for the ontological distinctions, he might in fact have taken note of the semantically crucial phenomena of 'extended reference' (the move to 'macro') and reference to fact (the move to 'meta') discussed in Halliday & Hasan (1976).

Jackendoff's Ontology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 427):

Jackendoff takes seriously the relation between conceptual organisation and syntactic organisation; this might be challenged from a classical formalist point of view, but from a functional point of view it is quite natural. In particular, he identifies correspondences between syntactic classes (i.e., categories in generative terms) and conceptual ones. Such correspondence is in fact a major source of evidence for the conceptual ontology. 

In particular, Jackendoff uses wh-items and non-interrogative reference items to support the ontology; he recognises things, amounts, places, directions, manners, events and actions. For instance, both things and places have to be recognised because English has both the forms what did you buy? and where is my coat? 

The ontology is tabulated in Table 10(1) below together with the grammatical evidence for each type. The left-most column provides a rough translation into our ideation base ontology.

The Transcendent Orientation Of Conceptual And Cognitive Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 426):

Jackendoff and a number of others now prefer the second position [semantic structures as subset of conceptual structures]. It is also shared by e.g. Langacker (1987), representing cognitive semantics from the other US coastline:

Meaning is a mental phenomenon that must eventually be described with reference to cognitive processing. I therefore side with Chafe (1970, p. 74-76) by adopting a "conceptual" or "ideational" view of meaning ... I assume it is possible at least in theory (if not yet in practice) to describe in a principled, coherent, and explicit manner the internal structure of such phenomena as thoughts, concepts, perceptions, images and mental experience in general. The term conceptual structure will be applied indiscriminately to any such entity, whether linguistic or nonlinguistic. A semantic structure is then defined as a conceptual structure that functions as the semantic pole of a linguistic expression. Hence semantic structures are regarded as conceptualisations shaped for symbolic purposes according to the dictates of linguistic convention, (pp. 97-8)

From our standpoint, this appears as a transcendent interpretation of meaning: we on the other hand prefer an immanent approach to meaning, where "conceptual organisation" is interpreted as meaning that is created by various semiotic systems, among which language is the primary one.

The Relation Of Conceptual To Semantic Organisation In Conceptual Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 425-6):

Jackendoff (1983) presents a major study of semantics and cognition from a generativist point of view. As part of that study, he presents an ontology of conceptual types that are linguistically motivated. While his purpose is theoretical rather than descriptive, and the ontology is not very extensive, it has become a frame of reference for work in this area.

Jackendoff sees semantic organisation as part of conceptual organisation — that part which can be verbalised; this is a position that distinguishes him from a number of other generativists. He identifies two possible positions on the relationship between semantic organisation and conceptual organisation (1983: Section 1.7; interpreted by us in Figure 10-3):

(1) "conceptual structure could be a further level beyond semantic structure, related to it by a rule component, often called pragmatics, that specifies the relation of linguistic meaning to discourse and to extralinguistic setting."

(2) "semantic structures could be simply a subset of conceptual structures — just those conceptual structures that happen to be verbally expressible".

Cognitive Semantics: Lakoff, Langacker, Johnson, Chafe, Talmy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 425):

On the West Coast, a number of linguists have developed a "cognitive" alternative to generative linguistics. Some of them (e.g., Lakoff, Langacker) come from a generative background (Lakoff s starting point was generative semantics), but have made a radical departure from this tradition. They have widened the scope of study relative to the generativist research agenda so as to include metaphor as a prominent feature (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, and other subsequent writings, such as Lakoff, 1987, 1988) and a detailed theoretical model of the relationship of language to cognition and perception (Langacker, 1987). A few have also oriented their work towards discourse (notably Chafe, e.g. 1979; 1987; cf. also Tomlin's, 1987a, discussion of the linguistic reflection of cognitive events). 

This version of cognitive semantics is arguably more closely associated with the rhetorical and ethnographic tradition (perhaps not so much in terms of its roots, but in terms of where it is headed); cognitive anthropology, with its interest in folk taxonomy and more recently in cultural models, provides a meeting point between the two.

Various aspects of the West Coast work in cognitive semantics are relevant to the organisation of the ideation base; for example, the work on metaphorical systems already mentioned, Talmy's (e.g. 1985) work on lexicalisation, and Chafe's (1970) early work on the organisation of meaning.

Conceptual Semantics: Jackendoff

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 424-5, 424n):

On the East Coast, Jackendoff (e.g., 1983), drawing on his earlier work on interpretive semantics (Jackendoff, 1972), has developed a generativist type of cognitive semantics,⁴ which he calls conceptual semantics. This is integrated with a number of aspects of modem generative theory, e.g. the X-bar syntactic subtheory. Jackendoff puts forward a conceptual ontology and suggestions for conceptual structure that we shall return to below. This version of cognitive semantics is arguably the more closely associated with the logical and philosophical tradition (cf. Jackendoff, 1988: 81-2).

 

⁴ Jackendoff calls his approach conceptual semantics and Lakoff calls his cognitive semantics. We use the term cognitive semantics as the generic term for cognitively oriented approaches to semantics.

(Mind-Oriented) Cognitive Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 424):

Cognitive semantics has emerged out of the generative tradition in the last ten to fifteen years. It is a natural development of the general cognitivist research program that began in the 1950s with the birth of cognitive science, Artificial Intelligence, and Chomsky's cognitively oriented linguistics.

Those adopting the cognitive approach to semantics share certain assumptions about semantic organisation as part of conceptual organisation, and tend to reject formal, Montague-style semantics, as indicated by the passages from Jackendoff and Lakoff quoted above. However, they seem to fall into two groupings, which can be conveniently described in terms of the US coastline [east vs west].

The Constructivist View Of Reality In SFL Theory

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 423-4):

We also have emphasised that reality is not something that is given to us; we have to construct an interpretation of it — or, as we prefer to put it, we have to construe our experience. Interpretation is a semiotic process, and our interpretation takes into account not only the concrete natural world but also the socio-cultural realm that is brought into existence as a semiotic construct (see Hasan, 1984a, for discussion, with reference to Whorf).

Blogger Comments:

Strictly speaking, in this view, 'reality' is the interpretation, not what is interpreted, and the 'concrete natural world' is also a semiotic construct: a construal of experience as meaning: perceptual and linguistic.

(World-Oriented) Formal Semantics Viewed From (Mind-Oriented) Cognitive Semantics: Lakoff

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 423):

Writing from a different orientation within cognitive semantics, Lakoff (e.g. 1988) is also very critical of what he calls "objectivist metaphysics" (metaphysical realism). He presents a detailed critique of this position, also noting the problem that arises if meanings are located in the world:

To view meaning as residing only in the relationship between symbols and external reality is to make the implicit claim that neither colour categories, nor any other secondary category, should exist as meaningful cognitive categories. Yet colour categories are real categories of the mind. They are meaningful, they are used in reason, and their meaning must be accounted for. But the mechanism of objectivist cognition cannot be changed to accommodate them without giving up on the symbolic category of meaning. But to do that is to abandon the heart of the objectivist program, (p. 132)

(World-Oriented) Formal Semantics Viewed From (Mind-Oriented) Cognitive Semantics: Jackendoff

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 423):

Jackendoff (1983: Ch. 2), working within cognitive semantics, argues that the account of 'aboutness' in formal semantics is simplistic:

... I will take issue with the naive (and nearly universally accepted) answer that the information language conveys is about the real world, (p. 24) ... If indeed the world as experienced owes so much to mental processes of organisation, it is crucial for a psychological theory to distinguish carefully between the source of environmental input and the world as experienced. For convenience, I will call the former the real world and the latter the projected world (experience world or phenomenal world would also be appropriate), (p. 28) ...  

It should now be clear why we must take issue with the naive position that the information conveyed by language is about the real world. We have conscious access only to the projected world — the world as unconsciously organised by the mind; and we can talk about things only insofar as they have achieved mental representation through these processes of organisation. Hence the information conveyed by language must be about the projected world. We must explain the naive position as a consequence of our being constituted to treat the projected world as reality.

According to this view, the real world plays only an indirect role in language: it serves as one kind of fodder for the organising processes that give rise to the projected world. If this is the case, we must question the centrality to natural language semantics of the notions of truth and reference as traditionally conceived. Truth is generally regarded as a relationship between a certain subset of sentences (the true ones) and the real world; reference is regarded as a relationship between expressions in a language and things in the real world that these expressions refer to. Having rejected the direct connection of the real world to language, we should not take these notions as starting points for a theory of meaning. Thus an approach such as that of Davidson (1970), which attempts to explicate natural language semantics in terms of Tarskian recursive theory of truth, is antithetical to our own inquiry, (pp. 29-30)

The projected world in Jackendoff's account is the result of creative acts of perception: it is constructed as a model of sensory input, but with the significant addition of information from the perceptual system itself.

(World-Oriented) Formal Semantics Viewed From (Mind-Oriented) Cognitive Science

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 422-3):

It would seem that formal semantics is quite far from the concerns of cognitive science; but formal semantics is often carried out within the broad program that cognitive scientists adopt. Writing from a cognitive standpoint, Johnson-Laird (1983) assesses model-theoretic semantics as follows:

The power of model-theoretic semantics resides in its explicit and rigorous approach to the composition of meanings. ... Some idealisations definitely complicate the 'ecumenical' use of model-theoretic semantics as a guide to psychological semantics. One such idealisation is the mapping of language to model without any reference to the human mind, and this omission gives rise to certain intractable difficulties with the semantics of sentences about beliefs and other such prepositional attitudes. These difficulties are readily resolved within the framework of mental models, (p. 180)

... model-theoretic semantics should specify what is computed in understanding a sentence, and psychological semantics should specify how it is computed, (p. 167)

Johnson-Laird's own psychological approach is one based on mental models.

Formal Semantics: The Model Theoretic Approach To Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 422):

The model theoretic approach to meaning is a transcendent one: meanings are located in the world outside of language. This is seen as a strength by the proponents of the model theoretic approach. Dowty et al (1981) criticise various other theories of meaning for ignoring the "inherent aboutness of language", its relationship to the real world:

Any theory which ignores this central property, it is argued, cannot be an adequate theory of natural language. Examples would be theories which, in effect, give the meaning of a sentence by translating it into another language, such as a system of semantic markers or some son of formal logic, where this language is not further interpreted by specifying its connection to the world. The approach of Katz and his coworkers seems to be of this sort (Katz and Fodor, 1963; Katz & Postal, 1964), as is that of Jackendoff (1972) and of the framework of Generative Semantics (Lakoff, 1972; McCawley, 1973; Postal, 1970).

Formal Semantics: Meaning As Extensional And Intensional

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 422):

In modelling meaning, formal semantics models it as both extensional and intensional: extensional meaning is cast in terms of sets of entities in a model of some world, and intensional meaning is the relation between a linguistic expression and its extension in any possible world. Formal semantics has thus been concerned with how semantic representations can be related to some extra-linguistic world model. Dowty et al (1981: 5) emphasise the relationship between language and the world in their introductory characterisation of truth conditional semantics:

"... truth conditional semantics, in contrast to other approaches mentioned [including Katz & Fodor, Jackendoff, and generative semantics, MAKH & CM], is based squarely on the assumption that the proper business of semantics is to specify how language connects with the world — in other words, to explicate the inherent "aboutness" of language."

This is, of course, an ideational orientation: the focus here is on representational meaning only. One central method has been to build models of the world in set theoretic terms, and to relate these to linguistic expressions — the model theoretic approach.

Formal Semantics As Syntagmatically Organised

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 422):

In its relation to syntax, the formal approach to semantics is compositional, being formulated in terms of syntagmatic organisation: the meaning of larger syntagmatic units such as sentences is built up as functions of smaller units such as nouns and verbs. This semantic composition is in tandem with the syntax, so what becomes important is the nature of the syntactic rules themselves, not just the result of their application. Montague used a form of categorial grammar in formalising the rules of syntax for this purpose.

The World-Oriented Tradition: The Origin Of Formal Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 419):

The development of logic is of interest in itself in the present context as a tradition of 'semiotic design' whereby logical systems were developed out of the resources that have evolved in language. This design of logical systems was earned out to meet certain restricted purposes having to do with reasoning; but once such systems had been developed, philosophers and linguists turned them back on language and used them as systems for representing and theorising meaning. In the present century, when formal semantics was developed for underpinning logical systems, this was then taken as a model for work on the semantics of natural languages.

Important Developments In The Logico-Philosophical Tradition

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 419, 420):

Here we are merely noting some particularly important developments. These are charted in Figure 10-2.

The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations To Meaning Summarised

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 418):

The two different orientations are summarised with the internal differences we have just reviewed in Figure 10-1.

The Semantic Focus Of The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417-8):

…we can note that the two orientations differ in what kind of semantic organisation they focus on. 

In the logico-philosophical orientation scholars have focussed on syntagmatic organisation: they have been concerned with semantic structure — including principles relating to structure such as those of compositionality and semantic decomposition. For example, in their analysis of the senses of "words", they have tended to analyse these as being composed of semantic components, semantic markers, semantic primitives or the like (following Katz & Fodor, 1963, in the generative tradition). 

In the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation scholars have focussed on both paradigmatic and syntagmatic organisation, often foregrounding the paradigmatic: they have been concerned with the semantic system, with the meaning potential — including principles of taxonomy and the metafunctional simultaneity of systems. For example, scholars in "ethnoscience" have studied folk taxonomies of animals, plants, diseases and the like; and systemic-functional scholars have tried to map out semantic systems such as those of speech function and conjunction. Another example is our own work on the ideation base presented here.

The Metafunctional Scope Of The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417):

The two orientations differ in the metafunctional scope of their models of semantics. 

In the logico-philosophical orientation, meaning is closely associated with representation, reference, denotation, extension or 'aboutness', so the metafunctional scope is restricted to the ideational metafunction: semantics means ideational semantics. 

In the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation, meaning is closely associated with rhetorical concerns, so the metafunctional scope involves all three metafunctions: semantics means ideational, interpersonal and textual semantics; it is multifunctional. 

If interpersonal and textual meanings are dealt with by logico-philosophical accounts (they are often outside their scope), they are handled under the heading of pragmatics rather than the heading of semantics. 

For example, speech act theory was developed as a logico-philosophical interpretation of speech function (or rather of its ideational construal) and has come to be included within pragmatics.

The Basic Unit Of Meaning In The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 417):

The approaches differ with respect to what they take as the basic unit of meaning. 

In the logico-philosophical orientation, the basic unit tends to be determined "from below", from grammar: since sentences are seen as encoding propositions, the basic unit of semantics is the proposition (as in propositional calculus).

In contrast, in the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation, the basic unit tends to be determined "from above", from context: since language is seen as functioning in context, the basic unit of semantic is the text (see Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Halliday, 1978a). 

So in the logico-philosophical orientation, semantics means in the first instance propositional semantics, whereas in the other orientation it means text semantics.

The Transcendent View Of Meaning: World-Oriented vs Mind-Oriented

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416-7):

The modern split within the "transcendent" view is between what Barwise (1988: 23) calls the world-oriented tradition and the mind-oriented tradition, which he interprets as public vs. private accounts of meaning:

The world oriented tradition in semantics, from Tarski on, has focussed on the public aspect of meaning by trying to identify the meaning of a sentence or text with its truth conditions, the conditions on the actual world that are needed to insure its truth (Davidson 1967 and Montague 1974).  

The psychological tradition, by contrast, has focussed on the private aspect by trying to identify meaning with an intrinsically meaningful mental representation (Fodor 1975 or Jackendoff 1983 e.g.).

The world-oriented tradition interprets meaning by reference to (models of) the world; for example, the meaning of a proper noun would be an individual in the world, whereas the meaning of an intransitive verb such as run would be a set of individuals (e.g. the set of individuals engaged in the act of running). 

The mind-oriented tradition interprets meaning by reference to the mind; typically semantics is interpreted as that part of the cognitive system that can be "verbalised".

Meaning Seen As Transcendent

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416):

Many traditional notions of meaning are of the second kind — meaning as reference, meaning as idea or concept, meaning as image. These notions have in common that they are 'external' conceptions of meaning; instead of accounting for meaning in terms of a stratum within language, they interpret it in terms of some system outside of language, either the 'real world' or another semiotic system such as that of imagery.

The Location Of Meaning In The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Traditions

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 416):

The two orientations towards meaning thus differ externally in what disciplines they recognise as models. These external differences are associated with internal differences as well.

First, the orientations differ with respect to where they locate meaning in relation to the stratal interpretation of language:

(a) intra-stratal: meaning is seen as immanent — something that is constructed in, and so is part of, language itself. The immanent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation, including our own approach.

(b) extra-stratal: meaning is seen as transcendent — something that lies outside the limits of language. The transcendent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the logico-philosophical orientation.

The Logico-Philosophical vs Rhetorical-Ethnographic Orientations in Western Thinking About Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 415-6):

We can identify two main traditions in Western thinking about meaning (see Halliday, 1977):

(i) one oriented towards logic and philosophy, with language seen as a system of rules;

(ii) one oriented towards rhetoric and ethnography, with language seen as resource.

It is typically the logical-philosophical tradition that provides the background for work on knowledge representation and proposals for the knowledge base. Since the 50s, a link has been forged between this tradition and cognitivism under the general rubric of cognitive science. 

However, although it is less often referred to, the rhetorical-ethnographic tradition is equally relevant to work on the modelling and representation of knowledge — for example, in recent times, the work on folk taxonomy carried out by anthropologists and anthropological linguists (often in the framework of ethnoscience) and the work on intellectualisation in the Prague School framework are central to understanding the organisation of the ideation base. 

Our own work here falls mainly within the second tradition — but we have taken account of the first tradition, and the general intellectual environment in which versions of our meaning base are being used also derives primarily from the first tradition. Indeed, the two traditions can in many respects be seen as complementary, as contributing different aspects of the overall picture. Our own foundation, however, is functional.

Mainstream work in psycholinguistics, e.g. Miller & Johnson-Laird (1976), is in general located within the logico-philosophical tradition. Two other distinctive contributions to the study of meaning within linguistics, those of Lamb (1964, 1992) and of Wierzbicka (1980, 1988), derive in more or less equal measure from both the major intellectual movements we have referred to.

The two orientations towards meaning thus differ externally in what disciplines they recognise as models.

Example Of The Discourse Function Of Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 402-3):

In the second type [of ideational metaphor] to be exemplified, a clause or clause complex is nominalised as a Medium participant in a clause whose Process simply means 'happen' (i.e., existence of a process: happen, occur, take place; begin, continue, stop). The Medium constitutes a thematic quantum of information, as in the following example:

However, Einstein realised that if an observer was travelling alongside a light wave at the same speed as the light wave, the wave would essentially disappear, as no wave peaks or troughs would pass by the observer. But the disappearance of light waves because of the motion of an observer should not happen according to Maxwell, so Einstein concluded that either Maxwell's equations were wrong or that no observer could move at the speed of light.

Here the metaphorical clause makes it possible to summarise the preceding clause complex the wave would essentially disappear, as no wave peaks or troughs would pass by the observer as a thematic nominalised participant, the disappearance of light waves because of the motion of an observer.

The Textual Motivation Of Metaphorical Mental Clauses Of Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 401-2):

Metaphorical mental clauses of perception, such as the fifth day saw them at the summit (cf. Halliday, 1985: 324-5), may serve to create two quanta of information, Senser (Theme) + Phenomenon (New); consider the following example:

Summer finds campers and hikers descending on the mountains in throngs

Here the metaphorical clause summer finds campers and hikers descending on the mountains in throngs is textually motivated in terms of both THEME and INFORMATION. From the point of view of THEME, it provides summer as the unmarked Theme of the clause — one instalment in the method of development. From the point of view of INFORMATION, it groups campers and hikers descending on the mountains in throngs as one quantum of information (the Phenomenon of the metaphorical mental clause); contrast the congruent version, which has the same Theme (marked) but a different culmination of the New: 

In summer, campers and hikers descend on the mountains in throngs.

The Discourse Function Of Ideational Grammatical Metaphors

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 401):

These two clause systems, THEME IDENTIFICATION and THEME PREDICATION, are components of the overall system of THEME in English grammar. They produce structures in which identifying relational processes are used to reconstrue figures as equations (the two together are referred to as "thematic equatives" in Halliday, 1985: 41-4). But ideational grammatical metaphors typically have a discourse function of this kind; they are as it were pressed into service by the textual metafunction, to provide alternative groupings of quanta of information.

The Different Assigned Prominences Of Theme Identification vs Predication

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 400n):

Both these systems, THEME IDENTIFICATION and THEME PREDICATION, assign exclusive identity to the identified term of the equation. They differ, however, in the kind of prominence this identity carries with it: 

in THEME IDENTIFICATION, in which the original figure is restructured, the effect is one of second-order (semiotic) prominence, whereas  

in THEME PREDICATION, where the figure is not restructured, but one element within it is explicitly predicated, the effect is that of assigning first-order (natural or inter-subjective) prominence to the predicated element.

Theme Predication

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 400-1):

A related textual system is that of THEME PREDICATION (the so-called "cleft construction" of formal grammar), which similarly employs the identifying type of clause to achieve a particular balance of meaning in the discourse. …

A: It's the grammar where the fun is.

B: Yes it's the grammar which is interesting.

Here 'the thing which is interesting' is identified as grammar rather than lexis; the relationship between the grammar is interesting and it's the grammar which is interesting is shown in Figure 9-16.

Experiential Metaphor Creates A 'Carrier' Of Textual Meanings

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 399-400):

What is significant here [in theme predication] is that the textual organisation is realised by the second-order resource of grammatical metaphor. That is, the grammar is as it were turned back on itself: it reconstrues itself with a particular effect in the discourse, as diagrammed in Figure 9-15.

We can see, then that experiential grammatical metaphor is a strategy for creating a 'carrier' of textual meanings.

Theme Identification And The Textual Motivation Behind Grammatical Metaphor

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 399):

For instance, an identifying clause may be used to represent a non-identifying one, thereby providing an alternative construal of that other clause as a configuration of Identified + Process + Identifier. Thus, the clause you want this may be reconfigured as an identifying clause by nominalising 'the thing that you want', what you want, and identifying it with this, either as what you want is this or as this is what you want … The two versions of the clause are related in Figure 9-14.

The motivation behind the identifying metaphor is actually textual: the alternative configuration in the identifying clause constitutes a textual alternative for distributing information in the clause, in which the message is structured as an equation between two terms. This system is known as THEME IDENTIFICATION.

Grammatical Metaphor As A 'Second-Order' Use Of The Grammatical Resources

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-9):

One manifestation of the second-order nature of the textual metafunction … is grammatical metaphor. Grammatical metaphor is a 'second-order' use of the grammatical resources: one grammatical feature or set of features is used as a metaphor for another feature or set of features; and, since features are realised by structures, one grammatical structure comes to stand for another — with the semantic effects discussed.

The Second-Order, Enabling Nature Of The Textual Metafunction: Context and Content Planes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

This second-order, enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second-order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant roles), and at the levels of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of THEME and INFORMATION, and the various types of cohesion, are second-order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and the rest.

The Textual Metafunction As Enabling

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them:

All the categories under this third heading [mode] are second-order categories, in that they are defined by reference to language and depend for their existence on the prior phenomenon of text. It is in this sense that the textual component in the semantic system was said to have an 'enabling' function vis-à-vis the other two: it is only through the encoding of semiotic interaction as text that the ideational and interpersonal components of meaning can become operational in an environment. (Halliday, 1978b: 145)

The Second-Order Nature Of The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction differs from the ideational one in a number of fundamental respects — 

its mode of syntagmatic progression is wave-like, with periodic prominence; 

it is inherently dynamic in that it organises text as process; and 

it is a second-order mode of meaning. …

The textual metafunction is second-order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by other two metafunctions: the ideational which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality.

Instantial System

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384-5):

If we look at logogenesis from the point of view of the system (rather than from the point of view of each instance), we can see that logogenesis builds up a version of the system that is particular to the text being generated: the speaker/writer uses this changing system as a resource in creating the text; and the listener/reader has to reconstruct something like that system in the process of interpreting the text — with the changing system as a resource for the process of interpretation. We can call this an instantial system (see Matthiessen, 1993c). 

For example, in the course of logogenesis, a recipe is built up as a series of ordered loops through the system of sequences, whereas an encyclopaedic entry may be built up as a systemic taxonomy, developed step by step in delicacy. 

An instantial system may fall entirely within the registerial system it instantiates; in other words, the meanings created within it may all have been created before. However, it may also create new meanings — new to the speaker and/or listener. In either case, the instantial system is built up successively by the generation process; but as it is developed, it in turn becomes a resource for further instantiation.

Logogenesis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 384, 385):

A text is generated within the logogenetic time-frame. In fact, generation is a logogenetic process: it creates meaning in the course of instantiation as the text unfolds — see Figure 9-5.

Stratification x Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 381, 384):

Table 9(2) represents the intersection of instantiation and stratification, providing a schematic map of the overall semiotic space (the table has been adapted from a fuller version presented in Halliday, 1995). We have shown the ideational 'slice' of the overall picture in bold italics. (We have left the phonological cells unspecified … but the cline of instantiation is equally important at this lowest stratum of language.)

Stratification, Metafunction And The Cline Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 381, 383):

Figure 9-4 represents the stratal organisation of the resources, diversified into field, tenor and mode (within context) and into ideational, interpersonal and textual (within the content strata of language). As we have noted, these resources are extended along the cline of instantiation from potential (language in context of culture) via subpotentials (registers in situation types) to instances (texts in contexts of situation). Figure 9-4 shows the stratified resources as being extendable along the cline of instantiation.

Syntax And Morphology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 380n):

Grammar comprises syntax and morphology; there is no strata! boundary between the two, but merely a move down the rank scale: "syntax" is simply the grammar of clauses and groups/phrases and morphology is the grammar of words and morphemes.

Textual Semantics

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378):

The text base is oriented towards the ideation base and the interaction base. It provides the resources for constructing meanings from these two bases as information of a kind that can be shared as text. An ideational figure and an interpersonal move are constructed as information in the form of a message. Such a message is related to the preceding discourse and differentiates informational statuses in terms of thematicity and newsworthiness. From the speaker's point of view, the text base is a resource for developing a text, message by message, and for guiding the listener in his/her interpretation of the text; and from the listener's point of view, it is a resource for constructing such an interpretation.

The Ideational And Interpersonal Aspects Of A Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 378):

A particular domain model within the ideation base correlates with a particular exchange relationship within the interaction base and together they form the ideational and interpersonal aspects of a register. 

An exchange relationship thus has ideational implications: it involves the exchange of some ideational meanings rather than others and it embodies a division of labour between the interactants in the exchange relationship. 

For example, in a service encounter in a local shop (cf. Halliday & Hasan, 1985; Ventola, 1987), the customer may demand goods and information about goods within the relevant domain and the server supplies these on demand and demands goods (payment) in return; and this involves the general domain of business transaction and the particular domain of the business (e.g. hardware). 

An exchange relationship thus gives interpersonal values to meanings within the domain model it is associated with. 

For example, as we have seen, the ideation base embodies both congruent and metaphorical construals of experience; and these variants will be selected partly according to differences in interpersonal distance along dimensions such as age and expertise.

Interpersonal Semantics: Exchange Relationship

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 377-8):

Midway between potential and instance, sets of such strategies cluster within ranges of tenor values. Such a cluster is the interpersonal analogue of a domain in the ideation base: it is a region within the overall interpersonal space of meaning, selected according to tenor, just as a domain is a region within the overall ideational space of meaning, selected according to field. 

The options in interpersonal meaning that make up the cluster together enact a tenor relationship, 

such as that between a client and a server (unequal in power, low in familiarity, neutral in affect) where the client initiates demands for goods-&-services and information about them and the server responds, 

such as that between two friends (equal in power, high in familiarity, positive in affect) where the interpersonal options are wide-ranging, or 

such as that between the writer of a weather report and the readers (unequal in expertise, no familiarity, neutral in affect) where the writer gives information and the readers accept. 

We might call such a cluster an exchange relationship to foreground that it is semantic (i.e. constituted in meaning through exchanges of meaning) and that it is interpersonal (rather than one-sidedly personal). 

To indicate that it is analogous to a domain model, we might have called it an exchange or interaction "model"; but we have avoided that term because it suggests a construal of something and construal is the ideational mode of meaning — it is more like a protocol than like a model.

Interpersonal Semantics: System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 377):

The interaction base extends along the cline of instantiation. At the potential end of the cline of instantiation, the interpersonal strategies that have the move as their domain are defined by all the options persons have in exchanging meanings with one another, adopting speech roles of giving/demanding information or goods-&-services and assigning complementary roles of accepting or giving on demand to the addressee. These constitute all the patterns of interaction within a culture.

Interpersonal Semantics: Move

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376-7):

The interaction base provides the resources for enacting social roles and relations as meaning, (prototypically) in dialogue. The interaction base includes the strategies for adopting and assigning speech roles, for giving and demanding assessments, and the like. The locus of these strategies is a unit of interaction or move. A move is typically mapped onto a figure from the ideation base: a speaker construes a quantum of experience as a figure and enacts this figure as a move in dialogue, either as a proposition or as a proposal. This mapping between figure and move is a central feature of the way we jointly construct and negotiate experience.

The Semantic System Or "Meaning Base"

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376, 377):

The semantic system, or "meaning base", thus consists of the three familiar metafunctional contributions: the ideation base, the part of the meaning base that we have focussed on, but also the other two bases, the interaction base and the text base. All three bases are extended along the cline of instantiation from potential to instance. … Table 9(1) summarises those aspects of the three bases to be discussed.

The Realisation Of Context In Registers Of The Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 376):

Such contextual regions evolve together with special functional varieties of the language or "registers". These are, in the first instance, registerial subsystems of the semantic system. A register is a semantic region within the overall semantic space. It is made up of contributions from all three metafunctions: a domain within the ideation base and similar regions within the interpersonal and textual parts of the overall semantic space. Our specifications of the meteorological and culinary domains constitute the ideational aspects of the registers of weather forecasting and recipes.

A given contextual specification of field, tenor and mode is thus realised by "preselecting" a register within the semantic system … . This contextual preselection within the semantics narrows down the overall potential to a registerial subpotential;

Blogger Comments:

Be aware that Martin and his students mistake register for context. That is, they mistake a functional variety of language — a subpotential of the semantic system — for the semiotic environment of language.

Context: The 'Semiotic Environment' Of Sociosemiotic Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

Context is the 'semiotic environment' of language (and other sociosemiotic systems such as image systems [maps, diagrams, etc.]); its systems specify what demands may be placed on language and what role it may play in responding to those demands. There are three sets of contextual systems — field, tenor and mode; … Recurrent combinations of (ranges of) field, tenor and mode values define regions within the overall system of the context of culture.

Inter-Stratal Realisation: Preselection From Above

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

… stratal organisation means that it is crucial to specify the realisational relations between strata — inter-stratal realisation. In systemic theory, this relationship is stated in terms of the organisation of the higher stratum — for a simple reason: a higher stratum provides a more comprehensive environment than a lower one (as our strata! figures with concentric [co-tangential] circles suggest). For instance, a certain semantic feature such as 'probability' may be dispersed in realisation throughout various regions of the grammar (I think; in my opinion; probably; will). 

More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/graphological system. This type of preselection may take different forms between different stratal boundaries, but the principle is quite general.

An Example Of Characterising Registerial Variation In Terms Of Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 355, 356):

Characterised in terms of the general domains of experience construed by figures, weather forecasts fall within being & having. This does not mean that they are completely static — there are phases of being (coming to be, etc.); nor that there is no sense of causation — fronts, weather systems, and pressures can serve as Agent. However, the basic motif is one of states of being without any external causes; put in terms of scale, a weather forecast construes a macro-being — the meteorological state of the environment — consisting of a number of atomic micro-beings which move in and out of existence of their own accord. 

The domain construed in recipes is at another pole of figures — one of doing, where a human acts to impact on the world (within the confines of the kitchen). … A recipe is a kind of procedural text — a sequence of operations for arriving at some well-defined end result …; it is a macro-operation, consisting of a number of atomic micro-operations. It is dominated by procedures (algorithms, figures of doing) that lead to some specific goal: the dominant cause is purposive. An agent or agents try to produce, assemble, repair, etc..

From the interpersonal point of view, the notion of procedure can also be taken as a gloss on the interaction between the writer and the reader, it is a macro-proposal, consisting of a number of instructions or directions to the reader.

Text And Context Are Construed Together Variably

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354):

…text and context are construed together. There is an important variable here, of course, that we have already referred to as the cline from 'language in reflection' to 'language in action'. In situations of the 'language in action' kind, where the discourse is a relatively minor component of the total activity, the grammar and semantics are obviously less constructive of the whole than in a 'reflection' context such as the present one.

Climate And Weather As System And Instance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 328):

The terms climate and weather are related to each other as langue to parole: as the system of language is to its instantiation in text. Weather is the instantiation of climate; climate is the system 'behind' the weather. As with language, there is, of course, only one set of phenomena here not two; when we refer to climate we are construing general principles and tendencies that 'explain' the multidimensional microvariation that is what we actually have to live with …

Realisation vs Instantiation vs Delicacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 327):

It is important perhaps to make quite explicit the distinction among the three concepts of realisation, instantiation, and delicacy, since each of these is a distinct scale of abstraction. It is easiest to describe them in terms of metalanguage dynamics: what we are doing when we move along these different scales. 

(1) Realisation is the relation of one stratum to other strata (in any stratified system, with language as prototypical); when we shift attention from semantics 'upwards' into context or 'downwards' to lexicogrammar and phonology/ graphology, we are moving in realisation. We can do this at any degree of delicacy, from most general to most specific; and we can do it at any point along the instantiation scale, from system to text.  

(2) Instantiation is the relation between the system and the instance. When we shift attention along this scale, we are moving between the potential that is embodied in any stratum and the deployment of that potential in instances on the same stratum. Again, this move can be made at any degree of delicacy.  

(3) Delicacy is the relation between the most general features and the most specific. When we shift attention from, say, 'recreation' to 'hockey' at the level (stratum) of context, or from 'syllable' to long open nasal syllable' to /pã:/ in phonology, we are moving in delicacy. Again, we can do this at any point along the instantiation scale.

Register As Systematic Variation In Patterns Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 324):

… a semantic space in which meanings are constantly being realigned and new meanings created. In other words, we are describing a register; or, more accurately, a region of registerial variation (sometimes called 'diatypic' variation to suggest the analogy with dialectal variation). Register is systematic variation within the overall meaning potential …

The overall semantic potential is diversified into registerial varieties that emerge as patterns of instantiation.

The Cline Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323, 324):

Instantiation relates the system to the instance, at any given stratum; thus, at the semantic stratum, instantiation is as shown in Figure 8-2.

First And Second Order Field

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321, 322):

In most contexts, there is both a first order field and a second order field — the first order field is the social activity being pursued (e.g., instructing somebody in how to prepare a dish, predicting tomorrow's weather, informing somebody about yellow-pages information over the phone) and the second order field is the 'subject matter' the activity is concerned with (e.g., the ingredients and methods of cooking, meteorology, construction businesses, international travel). So for instance, in a context where a telephone operator provides a caller with information there is (i) the social activity of exchanging information as a service and (ii) the area of information, e.g. copying & printing services.

…a full account of field would include a typology of the possible first and second order values that occur in a culture. Such a typology would show how closely various fields are related — how they form families.

Context vs Register

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 321):

Together, field, tenor and mode define the 'ecological matrix' in which particular types of text are processed: there is a systematic relationship between such matrices (particular combinations of field, tenor and mode values) and particular types of text. We can see this clearly with actual instances of text — for example, an individual recipe or weather forecast; but these are instances of general classes, to be characterised in terms of the systemic potential that is instantiated in them. 

That is, there is a correlation not only between a contextual matrix and a given instance of a recipe but also between that matrix and the linguistic potential that is deployed in recipes in general. This latter correlation is known as a functional variety or register of the general systemic potential. 

This much has been known for a long time — the notion of functional dialect was worked out by the Prague School in the 1930s (see e.g. Havranek, 1932, and Vachek, 1964), and systemic register theory has its roots in Firth's (e.g., 1957) work on restricted languages. …

However, we can take one further step, as systemic theory did in the 1970s (see Halliday, 1978a), and recognise that the co-variation between context and language is not undifferentiated — it is differentiated according to the functional diversification of each of the two strata: the variables of context correlate respectively with the metafunctions of the language, field with ideational, tenor with interpersonal, and mode with textual. These pairs are mutually predictive.

Blogger Comments:

This is potentially misleading. A register is the linguistic potential that is correlated with the contextual matrix. That is, a register is not the correlation.

Field, Tenor & Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 320-1):

Just as the semantic system is functionally diversified (into the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions), so the context in which language is 'embedded' is also diversified. The context encompasses both the field of activity and subject matter with which the text is concerned ('what's going on, and what is it about?') and the tenor of the relationship between the interactants, between speaker and listener, in terms of social roles in general and those created through language in particular ('who are taking pan?'). The field is thus the culturally recognised repertoires of social practices and concerns, and the tenor the culturally recognised repertoires of role relationships and interactive patterns.

Now, both these contextual variables are, in some sense, independent of language, even though they are constituted in language and the other semiotic systems of a culture. That is, they concern realities that exist alongside the reality created by language itself, semiotic reality. 

However, there is a third contextual variable that is specifically concerned with the part language is playing in any given context — the symbolic mode, how the linguistic resources are deployed. This covers both the medium (spoken, written, and various subtypes such as written in order to be spoken) and the rhetorical function — persuasive, didactic, informative, etc..

Blogger Comments:

Note that Martin misunderstands field, tenor and mode as dimensions of register, and misunderstands one dimension of mode, rhetorical function, as a dimension of genre. In SFL Theory, varieties of language, whether viewed as register or text type (genre), are modelled as language, not context.

Indeterminacy And Typological Variation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 318-9):

In general, wherever there is indeterminacy within a language, we may expect to find this reflected in typological variation. Let us briefly cite three further examples. 

(1) We saw that in the experiential grammar of the English clause there was a complementarity of perspective between the transitive and the ergative: processes may be construed either as 'one participant is doing something, which may or may not extend to another participant that it is being done to', or as 'one participant is involved in something, which may or may not be brought about by another participant that is the agent of it'. Probably all languages display this transitive/ergative complementarity in their transitivity systems; but at the same time it appears at different depths and in different proportions. 

(2) Secondly, we referred to projection as something that overlaps the 'boundary' between interpersonal and ideational metafunctional space; in English it is typically construed ideationally, though with a close relationship to the interpersonal systems of modality and mood. Other languages locate projection rather differently in relation to this boundary, sometimes foregrounding its interpersonal aspects, for example through a special category of 'reporting' mood. 

(3) Some process types tend to lie on the borderline between major categories, forming mixed and overlapping categories; typical of these are the behavioural and existential processes in English. It is likely that equivalent types of process will be liable to greater typological variation than those that fall squarely within the core categories of material, mental, and relational. …

The phenomena of human experience are held in tension by so many intersecting analogical lines that, while all of us have the same brains and live on the surface of the same planet, such diverse ways of semiotic mapping are not only possible but inevitable.

Increased Elasticity Of Construal Provided By Grammatical Metaphor

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 315-6):

This elasticity of construal is further increased through grammatical metaphor, which also relies on the manifestation of projection & expansion within participants (realised by the different types of modification in nominal groups). We have illustrated the range of options throughout the system at various points, and a schematic example will be enough here:

[i] logical

A happened, so B happened;

A caused B to happen;

[ii] experiential

A happened causing B/ B happened because of A;

A happening caused B happening

A affected B ['cause-happened']

with additional metaphorical variants:

B happened because of the happening of A

the happening of A caused the happening of B

the happening of A was the cause of the happening of B

As we have shown in the context of grammatical metaphor, the choice among alternative construals is made on the basis of both ideational and textual factors. These factors 'conspire' together so that different strategies are favoured in different registers: the congruent form (sequences) in casual speech, the metaphoric form (figures of being & having) in elaborated forms of writing.

Where there is variation of this kind within one language, we may expect to find typological variation across different languages.

Elasticity Of Construal Provided By Projection And Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 315):

One major source of this kind of elasticity is the manifestation of the very general semantic types of projection & expansion throughout the ideation base. In English, as we have shown, we find them manifested both logically as relations and experientially as elements within figures:

[i] logical manifestation:

as relations between figures in the construal of sequences (realised by clause complexes);

as relations between processes in the construal of figures (realised by verbal group complexes);

[ii] experiential manifestation:

as circumstances within figures (realised by prepositional phrases or adverbial groups);

as circumstantial processes within figures of being & having (realised by relational clauses);

as non-nuclear participants within figures, i.e., participants other than Medium — Agent, Beneficiary, Range (realised by nominal groups with or without a preposition).

One Universal Property Of Language

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 299):

… one property of language which is universal is the stratal organisation of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar, with the lexicogrammatical stratum forming a continuum: at one pole are the most "grammatical" features, closed systems of just two or three terms, mutually defining along a single dimension and with very general meanings and contexts of use; at the other pole are the most lexical features, open sets of an indefinite number of items, taxonomically arranged along various dimensions and with highly specific meanings and contexts of use.

Metaphorical Elaboration Is Made Possible By The Fractal Pattern Of Projection/Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 294-5, 296):

The whole metaphorical elaboration is made possible by a fractal pattern that runs through the whole system. We have suggested that the metaphorical elaboration is a token-value relation; but in order for it to be a token-value relation within the semantic system, it has to be natural in the sense that the token and value domains have to be similar enough to allow the token to stand for the value. For instance, a sequence has to be similar enough to a figure to allow it to stand as a metaphorical token for this congruent value. The principle behind this similarity is the fractal pattern of projection/expansion that we met throughout the semantic system of sequences, figures, and elements.

That is, while grammatical metaphor constitutes a move from one "phenomenal domain" to another — from sequence to figure, and from figure to element, this move is made possible because the fractal types engender continuity across these domains: the metaphorical move from one phenomenal domain to another takes place within one and the same transphenomenal domain. For example, the metaphorical shift from he added and smiled to he added with a smile is a shift from the phenomenal domain of sequence to the phenomenal domain of figure (accompanied by the shift from figure and smiled to element with a smile)', but the transphenomenal domain of 'extension' remains constant: the extending sequence he added and smiled is metaphorically agnate with the figure he added with a smile with an extending circumstance. …

Metaphor As Identifying Relations Between Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293, 294, 289):

This diagrammatic sketch is also intended to show that metaphor involves a mapping from one ideational domain to another, construing a value-token relation between the two (cf. Figure 6-16 above). 

For instance, the whole semantic domain of sequences may be mapped onto the domain of figures. The token domain may in turn be the value in a further metaphorical move, such as the move from figures to participants. The metaphorical expansion thus can thus involve multiple planes. …

We also need to take account of local mappings: some more delicate type of figure must be able to be represented by some more delicate type of participant. Thus figures of quality ascription will typically be represented by participants with the quality rather than the process reified as the thing: her speech was brilliant' => 'the brilliance of her speech'.

Metaphorical Elaboration Of The Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293, 294):

These considerations suggest to us that metaphor is best construed as an opening up of a new dimension of the semantic system that allows the whole system to be elaborated by itself along a token-value chain. In other words, what we identified as a simplified way of dealing with grammatical metaphor in the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar in Figure 6-8 we can now recognise as a dimension internal to the semantic system. Figure 6-20 shows this opening up of a metaphorical dimension within the semantic system.

Each 'plane' has the same kind of interface to the textual metafunction. In choosing whether to construe some phenomenon as a sequence of figures or as a sequence reconstrued as a figure, we can thus also compare the implications for the textual presentation of these alternative ideational articulations as quanta of information.

Each plane also has the same realisational potential in the lexicogrammar. Thus if the domain of sequences is construed metaphorically within the domain of figures, the realisational domain in the grammar will automatically be that of the metaphor: it will be the domain of clauses rather than that of clause complexes.

Blogger Comments:

Cf Fig 6-8 (p282):

The Representation Of Metaphor In The System: Requirements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

We have considered how metaphorical examples might be represented as semantic configurations related to congruent configurations, very likely with several intermediate steps. We now have to take one step further and explore how semantic types can be represented as metaphorically related to congruent types within the overall semantic system. Such a representation has to meet the kinds of ideational and textual demands that we have already considered in our representation of examples:

(i) ideational: the representation has to show that metaphor constitutes an expansion of the semantic system. The expansion is an elaborating one, creating chains of token-value relations; and it increases the semantic potential for construing experience.

(ii) textual: the representation has to make it possible to show how metaphorical and congruent variants are given different values in the text base — in the textual semantics.