Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — 'she addressed him'). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser's involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser's consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).
Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him/ asked of him… . In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.
Here there is a subtle difference between sensing and saying in their grammatical realisation by verbal and mental clauses that project reports. In the verbal case, the Receiver is a grammatical constituent of the verbal clause, as in she told him —> to leave. Being a constituent participant, it can serve as Subject in the verbal clause: he was told (by her) —> to leave. However, although the mental case, e.g. she wanted him to leave, looks similar, it is not, since mental clauses do not have a Receiver. The element him is a constituent of the reported clause: she wanted —> him to leave. Consequently, it cannot serve as Subject in the reporting mental clause; we cannot get He was wanted (by her) to leave. The difference also shows up clearly when the projected clause is in the passive voice; contrast the incongruence of she told the car to be washed with the acceptability of she wanted the car to be washed. The analysis shows the difference: she told the car —> to be washed (where the car gets interpreted as Receiver) : she wanted —> the car to be washed.¹
∞
¹ As always, there are departures from the general principle. For instance, while
she asked/told/persuaded/implored/encouraged/promised/threatened the car to be washed
is incongruent,
she ordered the car to be washed
is perfectly fine, which suggests the mental model of the constituency boundary between the projecting and the projected clause — he ordered —> the car to be washed. This gets support from the fact that the car was ordered to be washed is odd.
Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines. The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. Thus in an example such as the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees, the Symboliser has to be interpreted as if it was a conscious being.
The "Symboliser" of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a 'semiotic thing' such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement (see Halliday, 1985:129-30). Thus alongside examples such as
In the hospital's newsletter, he tells of one patient who stopped a two-week-long bout.
we also find
The British medical Journal The Lancet recently reported a study at Oxford university's John Radcliffe Hospital.
And while the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees requires a metaphorical reading, the thermometer says it is 35 degrees does not. We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.
"Symbolic processing" is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed than locutions from experience that is shared.
Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying). The distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior' is reinforced by the internal organisation of figures of sensing and saying.
Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying on the one hand and figures of doing and being on the other by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself and the level of the content of sensing/saying. As we put it in Chapter 3, the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying, etc.) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in 'Symboliser;' she + Process:' said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).
The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant roles: see Table 4(1).
There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants.To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.
… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time. We can recognise here two complementary perspectives on a figure: composition, and time.Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being "units" means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts. In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.Concomitantly, figures take place in time; but the temporal aspect of a figure is typically construed in association with one particular element, the process. We shall therefore deal with this aspect of figures under the heading of process, in the context of our discussion of elements. For the remainder of this chapter we concentrate on the compositional aspect of figures.
Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain the logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially. For example, projection manifested within a sequence: Brutus said Caesar was ambitious; projection manifested within a simple figure: According to Brutus, Caesar was ambitious. This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.
One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in course of realisation.
One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures (on the reading 'separately': 'Henry went to the movies and Anne went to the movies') or a sequence of elements (on the reading 'together': 'Henry and Anne went to the movies'). This was, of course, an area investigated in terms of transformational grammar with different deep structures posited for the readings 'separately' and 'together'.
It is clear that there are grammatical group complexes which cannot be expanded semantically as sequences of figures; for example, Henry and Anne chatted is not likely to be a grammatical compression of 'Henry chatted and Anne chatted'; rather, it is agnate with Henry chatted with Anne. In such cases the problem of ambiguity does not arise.
The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. Thus instead of Schank conceived of scripts and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a sequence of figures where there are two processes of conception, we get Schank and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a single figure with a sequence of elements (serving as Senser of a single process). Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related: see Figure 3-11.
We have identified two primary types of sequence (ways of relating figures), projection and expansion; and with both of these the figures that are related may be either equal or unequal in status. To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of the expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety.
But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause (Mary could never feel comfortable with him, which was perfectly understandable) or some element within the clause (Mary, who was very sensitive, could never feel comfortable with him).
(in) In addition, one or more of the figures in the clause may be realised by something 'less than' a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example:
as a child, he was very shy 'when he was a child, he was very shy'.
The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course: melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been 'shrunk' by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.
(ii) On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence. This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind (see Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4): an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c) is 'upgraded' to the status of a projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:
I don't suppose || there's very much 'there is probably not'I think || I might have walked out too from all the accounts 'I probably might have'
As we noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory we discussed). In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together. The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.
(i) On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of this particular text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. Here is a very simple example of a sequence which is realised by two clause complexes:
Prepare and cook the potatoes in sea-salted water to which has been added lemon juice. Drain and serve with melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley.
The sequence has been grouped into two clause complexes in the grammar. However, this grouping is by no means arbitrary; it serves to indicate the two major phases of the preparation of new potatoes with lemon. In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly disassociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice. (The significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)
We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logical-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts: see Phillips, 1985, 1986; Halliday, 1993a.) In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text: see Figure 3-10…
As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors.
But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences of figures in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition ('I invite you to accept x, if you want x'; for example: If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge) and evidence ('I think, infer/ you should believe x because y'; for example: John's in Germany because I just talked to him).
Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text. For example, the culinary procedure for making cauliflower surprise constitutes one text. Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as 'macro-figures', i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).
Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in terms of the relations that connect happening with another. Hence sequences can be used to store information about the world in the form of organised text— 'this is how to change tyres on your car', 'this is how to make cauliflower surprise', etc.. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognisable text type, such as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in most of our culturally recognised modes of discourse.
Blogger Comments:
In SFL Theory, text type is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. Text types can be identified according to the MODE that they realise (e.g. procedure, proof, explanation, episodic narrative) — MODE being the textual dimension of context: the rôle of language in a situation.
Thus sequences are formed by binary logico-semantic relations which may relate either single figures or sequences of figures. Certain relations may impose constraints on the phenomena being related; for example, a projecting relation can only obtain when the first figure is one of sensing or saying. But the range of different logico-semantic relations is highly varied, so that constraints tend to be specific to particular subtypes.
In the overview, we introduced two distinct types of structure — the relational organisation of sequences, and the configurational organisation of figures. In contrast to figures, sequences are not constructional units. We can specify the range of projecting and expanding relations available for further developing a sequence, but we cannot specify where a sequence has to come to an end — that is, we cannot specify a sequence as a unit whole with a conventional configuration of parts. Thus if we have expanded one figure we can always repeat the operation:A then BA then B then CA then B then C then D …In contrast, a figure is a unit with a finite number of elements:B follows AHence a sequence can be indefinitely complex, whereas a figure cannot.
Finally, the distinction between expansion and projection is less determinate than we have suggested. The logico-semantic relation of condition, which is prototypically construed as a form of enhancement, could also be construed as a kind of projection; and this is also brought out in the grammar. Conditions specify a potential and actualisable but non-actual situation. This potential situation can also be set up through projection:
If the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?Supposing the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?Say the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?
Words such as supposing and assuming are verbs of projection which have come to function as conjunctions in conditional figures; while other words such as imagine and say retain more of their projecting force. Sometimes even variants of the same word have come to differ a little in their location on this cline: for example, suppose and assume seem closer to projection than their corresponding participial variants. This is an uncertain region in which a figure hangs in the air, so to speak, suspended between the hypothetical material plane and the semiotic one.
Blogger Comments:
Cf Imagine if that were true and What if that were true.
Relations of expansion are typically realised in the grammar by conjunctions or conjunctive expressions linking a pair of clauses, either paratactically or hypotactically (e.g. that is, in other words; and, but, or, also, besides; so, yet, then, when, if, because, unless). Some of these may realise more than one category; for example,but may be adversative 'and yet' (extending), or concessive 'and in spite of this' (enhancing);
while may be additive 'and in addition' (extending), or temporal 'and at the same time' (enhancing);
or may be alternative 'or else' (extending: alternatives in the external world, like take it or leave it), or restating 'in other words' (elaborating: alternatives in the world 'internal' to the discourse, like they are reduced to the smallest size, or microminiaturised.).Overlaps in realisation of this kind show that the primary categories we have set up do in fact shade into one another; in particular, extending in some sense occupies a space intermediate between elaborating and enhancing, and shares a fuzzy borderline with each.
The following passage of spontaneous conversation exemplifies the principal categories of expansion (note than it also contains one example of projection):
KEY: parataxis [equal]: 1, 2; hypotaxis [unequal]: 𝛂, 𝛃); elaboration: =; extension: +; enhancement: x. (Taken from Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:430.)
There is no sharp line between a figure and a sequence of figures: a quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed, and the grammar rather sets up a cline from sequence to simple figure. (This is, in fact, a variable across languages; we shall return to this point from a cross-linguistic point of view in Chapter 6.) For example:
From one standpoint the limiting case of expansion would be accumulation in a temporal sequence (hence our general term "sequence" for the product of this construal): 'a happens, then x happens'. This gives value to a as the temporal circumstance of x. From this we could derive a wide range of more complex enhancing relations: variations on the simple temporal sequence (after, before, at the same time, immediately after, &c.) and further circumstances such as cause, condition, concession, and their subcategories.
We shall not try to enumerate these here; they are familiar as categories at the level of lexicogrammar (see Halliday, 1985: Ch. 7; Matthiessen, I995b: Ch. 3). These are 'enhancements', multiplying one figure by another, as it were. But figures may also be added to one another, making them part of the same story without assigning any kind of logical priority to either: 'x as well as/instead of/in contradistinction to a'. We have referred to these as extensions. And there is the third type of accumulation where the logical relation is that of 'equals': 'x is the same figure as a'. Here at this end the limiting case is a simple repetition; this may be further elaborated in such a way that one figure is reworded as another, or else further clarified or brought out by an example.
Expansion can be thought of as construing another dimension of experience, so that superimposed, as it were, on the construal of a figure — a basic fragment of experience in the form of a quantum of change (event, action, behaviour &c.) — is the construal of a nexus between two figures, such that one such fragment is non-randomly (i.e. meaningfully) cumulated with another.
Expansion is a highly generalised type of relation, whereby one figure is joined logico-semantically to another figure by a relator to form a sequence of the same order of reality. It will be easier to characterise expansion at the next step in delicacy, in terms of its immediate subtypes: elaborate (reiterate), extend (add), and enhance (qualify):
(i) elaboration is a (partial) identity relation between figures: one is identified with another with a difference in perspective (it matters a lot; it plays an important role) or one is included under another as an example (it plays an important role; e.g., it provides the infrastructure). These are clearly related to one another: identity is the limiting case of inclusion and inclusion is partial identity.(ii) extension is an additive relation between figures: a sequence is made bigger by the addition of another figure. This may involve pure addition ('and': he is too young and he doesn't speak the language) or addition with an adversative feature ('and yet': he speaks the language but he is too young ). As a variant of addition, we also have alternation (he is too young or else he is just immature).(iii) enhancement is a circumstantial or qualifying relation between figures: it is, in a sense, extension plus a circumstantial feature — 'and' + time ('and then', 'and at the same time', etc.), 'and' + manner ('and in the same way', 'and likewise'), 'and' + cause ('and therefore', etc.), etc.: it is autumn, so the leaves are turning brown.
To sum up the distinctions discussed so far. In a projecting sequence, a figure of thinking or saying projects another figure as an idea or a locution, either of which may be a proposition or a proposal: see Figure 3-8.
We saw that quoted offers may be realised by modulated indicative clauses. This would seem to be an exception to the generalisation that indicative clauses realise propositions. However, it is a principled one: the type of indicative clause involved is precisely the type that lies closer in the interpersonal clause grammar to imperative clauses — modulated indicative clauses, i.e. those with an imperative modality. As can be expected, this is then also a possible realisation of commands; it is a metaphorical strategy for expanding the meaning potential, typically to vary the tenor between speaker and listener. For example:she told him: "Do the laundry!"; "You should do the laundry."she asked him: "Could you do the laundry?"Commands can be reported in the same way:she told him —> to do the laundry.she told him —> he should do the laundry.she asked him —> whether he could do the laundry.
Quoted offers naturally retain the property of being variously realised in the mood system:declarative: She said: "I can do the laundry."interrogative: She said: "Shall I do the laundry?"imperative: She said: "Let me do the laundry!"However, reported offers can always be realised in the same way as reported commands — as in the case of reported propositions, the distinction in orientation between giving and demanding is realised by the projecting clause; for example:command: she told him —> to do the laundryoffer: she offered (promised; threatened) —> to do the laundryThe category ofreportedprojected proposal is thus realised generally as a perfective non-finite clause when it is reported.
Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative), offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:declarative: I can do the laundry.interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?imperative: Let me do the laundry!Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation (see e.g. Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4).
As was said above, in quoting, where the projected clause retains its mood, the general verb say can be used whatever speech function is being projected. In reporting, on the other hand, the projected clause is no longer specified for mood; its speech function is signalled by the verb in the projecting clause (asked, ordered, etc.). This gives the projected element more of an ideational status (cf. its treatment in traditional grammar as "object" of the projecting verb), and opens up the way to a series of agnate expressions such as (the king ordered) "Execute him!" / that he should be executed / him to be executed/him executed/his execution.
Grammatically the distinction between propositions and proposals is constructed as follows.
When the projection is reported, propositions are realised by finite bound clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by irrealis (infinitival) non-finite bound clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above:
(he said) that he had done the laundry : (she told him) to do the laundry.
When the projection is quoted, propositions are realised by indicative clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by imperative clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above:
(he said) "I have done the laundry" : (she said to him) "do the laundry".
These realisational patterns are summarised below:
Projected proposals are non-actual, or uninstantiated: that is, the occurrence of a projected proposal is always future in relation to the figure that projects it. In contrast, propositions are actual, or instantiated: that is, the occurrence of a proposition is located in actual time (which may be past, present or future).
The interpersonal system for dialogic interaction thus creates a fundamental distinction between 'content' as proposition and 'content' as proposal. This distinction is then reflected in the ideational system of projection: a figure is projected in one or other of these two modes, as a proposition or as a proposal. The two categories combine freely with ideas and locutions:
Blogger Comments:
The table confusingly presents verbally reported locutions as ideas. Instances of genuine reported ideas are:
Information is either given or demanded; in either case it is encoded as a proposition. Similarly, goods & services are either given or demanded, but the linguistic act is a mediating one, specifying the (typically non-linguistic) action that embodies the exchange, as an offer to do or a demand that something should be done. This is a proposal for a deed, one that commits either the speaker (giving) or the addressee (demanding); together with a third type, which is a combination of these two, viz. suggestion: Let's do the laundry.
Interpersonal semantics is centrally concerned with varieties of symbolic exchange. Here, as in other places in the meaning base, the system is organised in such a way that it creates a difference between non-symbolic reality and symbolic reality, between phenomena and metaphenomena. The "commodity" that is being exchanged in interpersonal dialogue is either semiotic or material: it is either one that is construed by language itself — information — or it is one that exists independently of language — goods & services. In the first case, language constitutes the exchange; in the second, it facilitates the exchange of a nonlinguistic commodity. For example:
In general, there is no temporal constraint between the projected and the projecting figures: the projected figure may be past, present or future relative to the projecting one. The dimension affected by projection [is] order of reality, not time. However, there is a major dichotomy between two types of projection which does have temporal implications. To explore it, we have to look briefly at a fundamental interpersonal category, that of mood.
The second consequence is that although the two variables, locution/idea and quoting/reporting, can combine in either of the two possible alignments, there is a natural default condition, which is that locution goes with quoting and idea goes with reporting, as shown in Figure 3-6.
The reason for this is clear where the first-order phenomenon is one of saying (prototypically shared semiosis), the projected figure can be presented as if it was also of the same order: Harriet said + "Shall I feed the cat?" (reversible as "Shall I feed the cat?" + said Harriet).
Where the first-order phenomenon is one of sensing (unshared semiosis), the projected figure has no counterpart on the first-order plane of experience and cannot be naturally presented as if it had; so, Harriet wondered + whether she should feed the cat.
But there is always the possibility of semogenic extension by cross-coupling; so we also find the corresponding marked alignments: locution/report Harriet asked + whether she should feed the cat, and idea/quote Harriet wondered + "Shall I feed the cat?" — the latter being again reversible. See Halliday (1985: Chapter 7) and Nesbitt & Plum (1988).
There are two consequences of this. The first is that, in quoting, the form of wording is still that of the first-order realm of experience: "Shall I feed the cat ?" — taken by itself, there is nothing about this to show it is a projection. In reporting, on the other hand, the form of wording is clearly marked as being of the second order: whether she should feed the cat has lost its first-order semantic features — and hence has to be projected by words that specify its particular speech function: asked/wondered, not said/thought.
But there is another variable intersecting with the above. We pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 that whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. We illustrated this interdependency system with reference to expansion; but it applies also to projection. The projecting and the projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting, as in Harriet said/thought "Shall I feed the cat?". Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting, as in (Harriet asked/wondered) whether she should feed the cat.
We can relate this to the fact that projection is the creating of a second-order reality. In reporting, the status of the two parts is unequal — the projected figure is dependent on the projecting: hence the projected figure is clearly construed as belonging to a different, second-order plane of reality — a reality that is made of meaning, as it were. In quoting, on the other hand, the two have equal status as independent figures; the projected figure is thus projected as if it was still part of the same first-order reality.
Let us look more closely at these two modes of projecting, in both of which the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, the processing that brings the other figure into symbolic existence. Either the projection takes the prototypical form of semiosis: it is presented as verbal, shared, an exchange or joint construction of meanings (e.g. Harriet said 'me feed cat?'); or it is fashioned into a derived semiotic form, unshared, interiorised, and without any meaning being exchanged (e.g. Harriet thought 'me feed cat?'). In the first, the projecting figure is one of saying; the projected is referred to as locution. In the second, the projecting figure is one of sensing; the projected is referred to as idea. Ideas are projections which are sensed, locutions are projections which are said.
In (i) the 'content' of his thinking is the meaning. It remains internal to his consciousness and unrealised, i.e. unworded. In (ii) the 'content' of his saying is the wording. It has been externalised, realised as a wording. We will refer to these in the context of projection as (i) ideas and (ii) locutions. The contrast between these two statuses of projected figures is typically reflected in the shape of balloons in comic strip projections: see Figure 3-5.
We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording: see Figure 3-4.
We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of 'content': see Figure 3-3.
We could say that the world view that is constructed in this way is (quite reasonably, from our point of view) focussed on humans, with human consciousness occupying a privileged place. Thus typically only humans can project into second-order reality. However, since human consciousness is the locus of semiotic activity, it has the power of interpreting as metaphenomenon that which is manifested by some other, non-conscious symbolic source. Thus while "sensing" (that is, semiotic activity that is unmanifested, like thinking) does require a human senser, saying can be ascribed to a nonhuman as well as to a human sayer (cf. he thinks —> the moon is a balloon vs he says/the book says —> the moon is a balloon. Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between the two orders of metaphenomena and the presence of consciousness in the act of projection.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106, 107):
We can explore this distinction through the conventions of comic strips. Expansions are typically represented pictorially by means of consecutive frames — 'x then y', 'x so y', 'x meanwhile y', and so on (the relationship is sometimes spelt out in writing, e.g. Meanwhile... ).
We can even identify the three different kinds of expansion, those of elaborating, extending, and enhancing. When further detail is given in a picture of a magnifying glass, this is elaboration; where two frames are joined to form a continuous picture, this suggests extension; otherwise, consecutive frames display a relation of enhancement But in all cases the representation is pictorial throughout.
In contrast, projections involve two modes: the projecting figure is represented pictorially as the symbol source, but the projected figure is represented linguistically and this second-order reality is typically named within a 'balloon'. … The two types of relation can be shown as in Figure 3-1.
This differentiation is embodied in relations of sequence in the following way. Either a sequential relation expands one figure by adding another one to it, the two still remaining at the same phenomenal level; or the sequential relation projects one of the two figures onto the plane of second-older, semiotic phenomena, so that it enters the realm of metaphenomena (meanings or wordings). This is the distinction between expansion and projection. For example,
expansion: highs will be mid-8Os to mid-90s —> but parts of Texas could reach the 100s;
projection: the forecast predicts —> "parts of Texas could reach the 100s".
Instead of referring to formal logic, let us ask what kind of construal of experience is embodied in semantic sequences.
Throughout the semantic construal of human experience, there is a differentiation between two orders of reality: between the everyday reality of our material existence on the one hand and on the other hand the second-order reality that is brought into existence only by the system of language. This is a contrast between semiotic phenomena, those of meanings and wordings, and the first-order phenomena that constitute our material environment. (Note that the linguistic processes themselves, as apprehended by our senses, are part of the first-order reality; second-order reality is formed of the meanings and the wordings that these processes bring into being.)
Blogger Comments:
To be clear, if meaning is immanent, then both first-order phenomena/reality and second-order phenomena/reality are construals of experience as meaning.
In a restricted register, such as those of weather forecasts and recipes, it may be possible to define sequential relations more precisely; but that is only because these registers are special cases, rather in the same way that the applications of propositional logic are special cases.
One might try to characterise sequences by reference to propositional logic; this would give some indication of what type of knowledge representation system is embodied in this domain of ideational semantics. However, such a characterisation would be likely to distort our understanding of sequences, because sequences cover and organise a considerably larger domain of the ideational semantic space than propositional logic attempts to do.
Both the difference in scope and the difference in 'definability' can be explained in functional terms.
Sequences have evolved in the interpretation of human experience in general; consequently, they have to be flexible and powerful enough to cope with a large amount of variation, and the implicit 'definition' of each relation (i.e., its location in the semantic system along various dimensions) is the evolving distillation of innumerable instances where it is invoked (for a revealing account of how sequences may construe rationality in everyday talk, see Hasan, 1992).
In contrast, the truth-functional connectives of propositional logic have been designed for a very restricted purpose — the kind of deductive reasoning western philosophy came to focus on — and their definitions are fixed by reference to values of "true" and "false" (by means of truth tables).
There is another important difference between propositional logic and the natural logic of sequences. While there is only a very small handful of truth-functional connectives in propositional logic (conjunction, disjunction [exclusive or non-exclusive], implication), there is a very wide range of sequential relations in language — all the more specific varieties of projecting and expanding. A summary of these is given in Table 3(1).
Sequences might be said to constitute the 'natural logic' equivalent of propositional logic — that is, the evolved system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc. from which propositional logic has been derived by design. Thus we have parallel series such as:
But, as has often been pointed out, the two are not translation equivalents; for example, material implication (p –> q) applies even when the rendering in ordinary language seems odd, and disjunction in logic is either inclusive or exclusive whereas natural disjunction is non-committal. Since propositional logic is a designed system, its relations are codified and defined (typically in truth-functional terms¹). In contrast, sequential relations have evolved. A certain type of relation will have a core — the prototypical representatives of that type; but there will also be more peripheral representatives and 'grey areas' where one type shades into another.
¹ Propositional logic is interpersonally invariable. Unlike natural logic, it is only concerned with statements, or rather — since language is concerned with validity rather than truth — with the philosophical version of what are statements in natural language.
A sequence constitutes a model of how figures can be related. One prominent form of this relationship, which has been foregrounded in various guises in science and logic, is that of cause & effect, whereby experience is given a causal interpretation. But that is only one among many such possible relationships, which taken together can be said to constitute the logic of natural language.
These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as "referable" — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don't give me any more of that peanut butter! I can't stand the stuff.). This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants (cf. Webber, 1987, on reference to phenomena other than things). At the same time it allows us to recognise not only participants of the 'simple' type but also the 'larger' elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order. Halliday & Hasan (1976), where reference to macro-phenomena is called extended reference, and reference to meta-phenomena is called reference to facts, cite ambiguities which bring out the difference among elements of these various kinds:
(i) extended reference — to macro-phenomenon:They broke a Chinese vase.(i) That was valuable. (phenomenon: thing — the vase)(ii) That was careless, (macro-phenomenon— the act of their breaking of the vase)(ii) reference to 'fact' — to meta-phenomenonIt rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water.(i) It spoilt our calculations. (meta-phenomenon (fact)—the fact that it rained so much upset our predictions)(ii) It spoilt our calculations. (macro-phenomenon —the act of raining destroyed physical records)
Note how this relates to the shift of perspective from figure to participant: a figure such as 'catch + mouse' becomes referable as a macro-phenomenon (Your cat's caught a mouse — It's never done that before), and by the same token can enter into participant-based construal through the system of modification (Table 2(11)): (cats are) creatures that catch mice.
The view from grammar brings into relief a number of relevant factors relating to participants and circumstances. There are certain special subcategories of these, in the grammar, which are distinguished by the fact that they embody features of interpersonal or textual meaning:
(1) interpersonal: questioninginterrogative: who, what, when, where, how far, how long, how, why(2) textual: cohesive(i) referring, personal: he, she, it, they; demonstrative: this, that, now, then,, here, there, thus(ii) generalising: lexical items such as person, creature, thing, stuff, affair
These are significant in their own right because they are critical to the construction of discourse: the textual ones provide internal cohesion, while the interpersonal ones construe dialogic speech roles. They have a further significance in that they reveal by reactance the major subclasses within the general classes of participant and circumstance, as shown in Table 2(12).
There are three types of semantic elements serving in figures — processes, participants and circumstances. Broadly speaking, these are constructed in the grammar as follows.(i) Within the ideational component: they are realised by different classes of units:process ➘ verbal groupparticipant ➘ nominal groupcircumstance ➘ adverbial group, prepositional phraseParticipants tend to be inherent elements of a figure; circumstances are typically optional.(ii) Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: participants can serve as Subject; circumstances and processes cannot. Furthermore, participants and circumstances can serve as WH-elements, but processes cannot (if the process is being questioned, a participant element has to be construed as a Range: what...do?)(iii) Relating to the textual metafunction: participants and circumstances can both readily serve as Theme (though their potentials differ); processes only rarely, other than in imperative clauses. Participants and (more restrictedly) circumstances can serve as referables identified by referring expressions, but processes cannot — as with WH-interrogation, they have to be construed as a Range together with the pro-verb do as Process: do it/that (see Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 125).These properties are summarised in Table 2(11).
There are four types of figure — doing & happening, sensing, saying, being & having. Broadly speaking, these are constructed in the grammar as follows:(i) Within the ideational metafunction, each is realised congruently by one particular transitivity type: doing & happening ➘ material, sensing ➘ mental, saying ➘ verbal, and being & having ➘ relational. These have various reactances, such as the number and nature of participants and the unmarked present tense selection (see Table 2(10)).(ii) Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: in any given register there may be typical correspondences between the type of figure and the speech function; e.g. in procedural registers, material clauses are typically imperative, relational ones indicative.(iii) Relating to the textual metafunction: different types of figure are presumed in different ways and have different potential for textual prominence; e.g. only material clauses are substituted by the pro-verb do (to/with).
The semantic categories are themselves construed by means of realisation; they are constructed within the grammar and the lexis of a language. If we model the ideation base as a semantic space, we are foregrounding one aspect of the construction of meaning in language, namely the way in which lexicogrammar construes our experience of the world in the guise of multidimensional matrices or grids. This is an important feature of language as a semiotic system, an inevitable consequence of the principle of arbitrariness: since the forms of expression are arbitrary, they impose discontinuity on the content. We have to decide about any given instance whether it is singular or plural, temporal or causal, possible, probable or certain; whether it is a bus or a van, smiling or grinning, cloudy, misty or foggy. But the semantic categories themselves (seen from above, as it were) are much more fluid and indeterminate than their realisations in wording imply. The notion of semantic space allows us to adopt a complementary standpoint from which we can view these phenomena topologically, bringing out the inherently elastic quality of the dimensions involved, and gaining a deeper insight into the semogenic processes by which the meaning potential is ongoingly remoulded in the history of the system, of the user, and of the text.
Children are able to construe the semantic system because they start in situations with a material setting that is shared — cf. above, and see Hasan (1985b: 25 ff.) on Malinowski's contribution to this insight. As they build up their ideation base, they can begin to construe categories internal to the system out of existing ideational values; and they can begin to move into the abstract domains of a purely symbolic world, where the significations of semantic categories are abstract categories in social and socio-semiotic systems. But precisely because these abstract categories are construed as meanings, they can still be built up, negotiated and validated in collaboration with other members of the meaning group. The move from the realm of concrete phenomena to the various realms of abstract phenomena is made possible through the homogenising power of meaning.
We saw in the examples of how categories are first developed that young children will typically construe concrete phenomena that are part of the field of visual perception they share with their interactants. In other words, they are construing into linguistic meanings their experience of the material world as it is construed in the categories from another semiotic system, viz. (visual) perception. These extra-linguistic categories are construed as the signification of the semantic categories of the ideation base — always in some particular situation when the child first engages with them. To construe experience of concrete phenomena as meaning is thus to construe some signification which lies outside the ideation base as a value which is internal to the ideation base system. Part of the power of categorisation is that extra-linguistic phenomena that are quite varied in signification can be construed as alike in value.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, the 'material world' is meaning construed by semiotic systems.
[2] To be clear, concrete phenomena are meaning, in this instance: meanings of perceptual systems.
[3] To be clear, on Edelman's model of brain function, relations between perceptual meanings become organised into systems that he (unfortunately) terms 'conceptual'. That is, some of the work of relating perceptions is already done before language reconstrues them.
A phenomenon of experience is construed as a category in the ideation base by being given a location in the three semantic networks described in the preceding section. This taxonomic, meronymic and eco-functional location is the category's value (valeur) in relation to the other categories within the ideation base. By being assigned a value internal to the ideational system, a semantic category is also being related to categories that lie beyond semantics itself. On the one hand it is being related to categories within systems that lie outside language but which the semantic system interfaces with; on the other hand it is being related to the grammatical categories in terms of which it is realised. Figure 2-18 shows these three strata! angles on the process of construal.
Blogger Comments:
Importantly, these are categories of perceptual semiotic systems. SFL Theory makes the assumption of immanence: all meaning is within semiotic systems.
Construing a category thus includes locating it not only taxonomically and meronymically but also eco-functionally, as in the case of 'conscious being' just referred to. We noted above in connection with the cat example how the fact that a participant serves a participant role in a figure can be viewed either from the perspective of the figure or from the perspective of the participant (i.e. as a property of the participant). If cats kill mice, the ideation base accommodates the view from the angle of the figure: 'cats kill mice'; but it also accommodates the view from the angle of the participant: 'animals that kill mice'. Here the figure in which cats participate as actors has been construed as if it was a property, so that the category of cats might be construed within the system of the ideation base by means of the definition 'cats are animals that kill mice'. (In formal systems of representation, this can be expressed by means of lambda abstraction.)
There is a general semogenic strategy at work here. We referred to 'sequences', 'figures' and 'elements' as three orders of complexity in Section 2.1. The shift in perspective means that configurations of meanings that are of a particular order of complexity can be accessed through selection not only in their normal environment (within phenomena of the next higher order of complexity) but also within phenomena of lower orders of complexity. Through this semogenic strategy of opening up the possible domains of selection, a great deal of experiential complexity can be imported into the construal of a participant.
The network of selection is inter-axial in that it relates syntagmatic specifications to paradigmatic ones; it 'cuts across' the paradigmatic organisation of the ideation base, establishing correspondences between paradigmatic types through the syntagmatic functions associated with them, as we have just illustrated by reference to Figures 1-12 and 2-6. We can trace one further example from sequence via figure to element: see Figure 2-17.
Selections are bidirectional. We have already seen that functions associated with paradigmatic types constitute 'structural properties' by which these types are distinguished and that selections provide further information about these 'properties'.
Thus Figure 1-12 above illustrates how a figure of spearing is characterised by reference to the function of Means, which selects for the thing 'spear'. Conversely, semantic types which are selected are characterised by the functional environment within which they are selected. Thus the weapon 'spear' is characterised by its potential for serving as Means in a figure of spearing. Similarly, part of the meaning of a 'conscious being' is that it has the potential for serving in the Senser role of a figure of sensing.
Taxonomic elaboration and meronymic extension form complementary networks of relations that together make up the paradigmatic organisation of the ideation base. They define, as we have noted, options in delicacy of categorisation and in delicacy of focus. The third type of network involved in the organisation of the ideation base which we identified above serves to relate paradigmatic organisation and syntagmatic organisation. Specifically, it relates syntagmatic functions or roles associated with paradigmatic types to the paradigmatic types that can serve in these functions. For example, the syntagmatic function 'Senser' is associated with the paradigmatic type 'sensing', and it is related to the paradigmatic type 'conscious being', since only participants of this subtype can serve as Sensers.
Figure 2-6 above shows this relation, together with a set of other such relations. We shall refer to such network relations as eco-functional selection in order to indicate that they specify the syntagmatic environment of semantic types by showing them as selections for syntagmatic functions. Such selections have been referred to as "pre-selections", but in order to avoid any connotations of temporal sequence, we prefer the term "selection" for such relations in the ideation base.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 92):
While the choice of 'level' in hyponymic elaboration is the choice in delicacy of categorisation, the choice of level in a meronymic taxonomy is the choice in delicacy of focus. The focus is typically on the whole (i.e., the most inclusive region within the meronymy) even if a specific part is particularly important (cf. Langacker, 1984).
The examples of meronymies given above come from the region of 'participant' within the ideation base. It is not clear to what extent, or in what sense, meronymic taxonomies extend beyond that region. We can certainly recognise that processes have phases — 'begin to do, keep doing, stop doing'; but it is not immediately clear that these form a process meronymy analogous to the parts of a participant. Although we might reconstrue he began to dance metaphorically as the beginning of his dance on the model of 'the beginning of the book', this is a metaphorical reification of the process 'dance' and we have to be cautious in interpreting the implications for the congruent process 'dance'. If we probe a little further, we can see that process phase is concerned with the occurrence of a process in time — its temporal unfolding: 'begin to do' means 'begin to be actualised (to occur) as doing in time'. In contrast, participant meronymy is not tied to the existence of a participant in referential space.
And this is in fact how we shall model them — as local meronymic taxonomies, applicable to some particular region of the hyponymic taxonomy, and not as one global meronymy superimposed on our taxonomy. There would seem to be far too many discontinuities to create a global meronymy; meronymies tend to occur only where there are contiguous parts of an independent whole. Thus while concrete objects are regularly construed meronymically (with the human body as both a representative example and a model for other meronymies), substances are not; substances are extended through measure ('unit of') rather than through part ('part of'). Similarly, taxonomies tend to be more extended meronymically for concrete regions than for abstract ones (although even things in an abstract region can have parts, e.g. aspect of an idea). Thus there is a generalised set of categories such as part, element, component, aspect; and also a generalised set 'facets' of spatial or temporal orientation, top, bottom, side, front, back, middle, centre; beginning, middle, end. There are more specific variants for parts of particular concrete things, such as facade, roof, wall [of a building]; ceiling, floor, wall [of a room]; slope, peak [of a mountain]; limb, trunk, root, bark [of a tree]; skin, core, pips [of an apple]; crust, crumb [of bread]; preface, epilogue [of a book].
