Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Reversibility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268)

The ['attributive'] clauses are not reversible: there are no ‘receptive’ forms, such as complete nonsense is sounded by your story; while clauses such as a poet is Paula, wise is Sarah, are archaic or literary variants, not systemically agnate forms.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Note that, in the case of ASSIGNMENT, there are ‘receptive’ forms in attributive mode:

the crocodiles	thought	the tourists	edible
Attributor	Process: attributive	Carrier	Attribute

the tourists	were thought	edible	by the crocodiles
Carrier	Process: attributive	Attribute	Attributor

[2] Note the 'Hamlet Factor' of such thematically motivated agnates as:

Blessed	are	the cheesemakers
Attribute	Process: attributive	Carrier

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Interrogative Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The interrogative probe for such [‘attributive’] clauses is what? how? or what…like?, e.g. what is Paula?, how did the minister seem?, what will today’s weather be like?

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Lexical Verb

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268, 269):

The lexical verb in the verbal group realising the [attributive] Process is one of the ‘ascriptive’ classes: see Table 5-14. If the Attribute is realised by a nominal group with a common noun as Head without a pre-modifying adjective, it is usually expressed as if it was a circumstance (with a preposition following the verb, as indicated in the table; for example: he grew old but he grew into a man); Attributes with noun Head are rare with the verbs keep, go and get, where they would be highly ambiguous.

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Indefiniteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The nominal group functioning as Attribute construes a class of thing and is typically indefinite: it has either an adjective or a common noun as Head and, if appropriate, an indefinite article … It cannot be a proper noun or a pronoun since these do not construe classes.  (Thus he is Charles Darwin would be interpreted as ‘identifying’; but if we say he is another Charles Darwin, the clause is ‘attributive’ and the proper name Charles Darwin has been re-construed as the common noun – the name of a class of people that are like Charles Darwin.)

Attributive Mode: Carrier & Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 267):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, an entity has some class ascribed or attributed to it. Structurally, we label this class the Attribute, and the entity to which it is ascribed is the Carrier — the ‘carrier’ of the ‘attribute’. … This type of clause is a resource for characterising entities serving as Carrier; and it is also a central grammatical strategy for assessing by assigning an evaluative Attribute to a Carrier.

Attributive Vs Identifying Mode: Reversibility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 265):

The ‘identifying’ ones are reversible … The ‘attributive’ ones are not reversible …

Blogger Comment:

Note that, in the case of ASSIGNMENT, there is a distinction in VOICE in attributive mode:

the tourists	thought	the crocodiles	approachable
Attributor	Process: attributive	Carrier	Attribute

the crocodiles	were thought	approachable	by the tourists
Carrier	Process: attributive	Attribute	Attributor

Relational Clauses: Principal Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

The English system operates with three main types of relation — ‘intensive’, ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’; and each of these comes in two distinct modes of being — ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’.

Blogger Comment:

Note that the three types of relation are manifestations of the 'fractal types' of expansion and projection:

• intensive: elaboration
• possessive: extension
• circumstantial: enhancement (except matter: projection)  

Identifying Clauses: ‘Exhaustive’ Class Membership

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

Identifying clauses are also used to construe ‘exhaustive’ class membership where a class is identified with its members, as in: The fuels of the body are carbohydrates, fats and proteins.

Relational Clauses & Semiotic Dimensions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

… we can see how the grammar models the realisational relationship between two strata in the form of ‘relational’ clauses of identity. … In this way, the grammar of relational clauses is based on the dimensions of a semiotic system.

Relational Clauses: Instantiation And Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

In her account of ‘relational’ clauses, Davidse (1992, 1996) adopts a semiotic approach, interpreting class–membership by reference to the semiotic relation of instantiation and identity by reference to the semiotic relation of realisation.

Relational Clauses & Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):

There is, however, a deeper sense in which ‘relational’ clauses are ‘nominal’: they construe the same range of relations as those of modification within the nominal group:

the house was old : the old house ::

the house was in Wessex : the house in Wessex ::

the house was Thomas’s : Thomas’s house.

Relational Clauses: No Structurally Present Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):

Such clauses have often been called ‘nominal clauses’, in contrast to ‘verbal clauses’, where there is a Process present in the structure of the clause. But this reflects only the view ‘from below’ and hides the fact that in languages such as Arabic ‘relational’ clauses that are marked for aspect and/or polarity typically have a structurally present Process.

Relational Clauses: Class–Membership And Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

The configuration of Process + ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’ opens up the potential for construing the abstract relationships of class–membership and identity in all domains of experience. Class–membership is construed by attributive clauses and identity by identifying ones. These two ‘relational’ clause types cut across the inner and outer experience of ‘mental’ and ‘material’ clauses …

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Verb Salience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

Verbs in general in ‘relational’ clauses are typically non-salient, whereas verbs in ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses are salient at the accented syllable …

Relational Clauses: Prototypical Configuration

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

This tells us something significant about a prototypical configuration of ‘being’: the experiential ‘weight’ is construed in the two participants, and the process is merely a highly generalised link between these two participants … Thus the verbs that occur most frequently as the Process of a ‘relational’ clause are be and have; and they are typically both unaccented and phonologically reduced … This weak phonological presence of the Process represents iconically its highly generalised grammatical nature. The limiting case of weak presence is absence; and the Process is in fact structurally absent in certain ‘non-finite’ ‘relational’ clauses in English … and in many languages there is no structurally present Process in the ‘unmarked’ type of ‘relational’ clause … Here the ‘relational’ clause is simply a configuration of ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’.

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261-2):

In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else. In other words, a relationship of being is set up between two separate entities. This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants – two ‘be-ers’. In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively).  Thus, while we can have a ‘material’ clause with one participant such as she was walking or she was walking into the room, we cannot have a ‘relational’ clause such as she was, with only one participant; we have to have two: she was in the room. Similarly, a ‘mental’ clause with one participant such as she rejoiced is possible; but the nearest ‘relational’ equivalent must have two participants – she was happy, not she was.

Blogger Comment:

Note that attributive clauses with qualitative Processes, such as this stinks, manifest only one participant, unless the Attribute is interpreted as conflated with the Process; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271).

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

With a ‘mental’ clause, the phenomenon of consciousness can be construed as an idea brought into existence through the process of consciousness and represented grammatically as a separate clause … but this is not possible with ‘relational’ clauses.

Relational & Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses: Acts & Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

In being able to be construed not only with things as participants, but also with acts and facts, ‘relational’ clauses clearly differ from ‘material’ ones; but they resemble ‘mental’ ones in this respect.  However, in a relational clause, these things, acts and facts are not construed as a phenomenon of consciousness; rather, they are construed as one element in a relationship of being. Thus while a thing, act or fact construed as a Phenomenon in a ‘mental’ clause is configured with a Senser, in a ‘relational’ clause, a thing, act or fact construed as a participant is configured with another relational participant that has to come from the same domain of being [material vs semiotic].

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Participanthood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

… while one participant in a ‘mental’ clause, the Senser, is always endowed with consciousness, this is not the case with ‘relational’ clauses.  If anything, the participants in ‘relational’ clauses are more like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause – not only things, but also acts and facts can be construed as participants in a ‘relational’ clause.

Relational Processes: Un/Marked Present Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

In the nature of the unfolding of the process, ‘relational’ clauses thus pattern like ‘mental’ ones rather than like ‘material’ ones; and this is reflected in the unmarked present tense. … The present in present is in fact highly marked and is largely restricted to ‘relational’ clauses of behavioural propensity.

Relational [Static] Vs Material [Dynamic] Construals By Expansion Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

Thus, static location in space [enhancement] is construed relationally – she’s in the dining room, but dynamic motion through space is construed materially – she’s walking into the dining room. Similarly, static possession [extension] is construed relationally – she has a mahogany dining table, but dynamic transfer of possession is construed materially – she’s getting a mahogany dining table; she’s being given a mahogany dining table; and static quality [elaboration] is construed relationally – the bottle’s empty, but dynamic change in quality is construed materially – the bottle’s emptying; she’s emptying the bottle.

Relational Clauses: Nature Of Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

Unlike ‘material’ clauses, but like ‘mental’ ones, ‘relational’ clauses prototypically construe change as unfolding ‘inertly’, without any input of energy — typically as a uniform flow without distinct phases of unfolding (unlike the contrast in material processes between the initial phase and the final phase of the unfolding of a process, the outcome).

Relational Clauses: Viewed From Above

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

As we have seen, ‘material’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the material world and ‘mental’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of our own consciousness. Both this outer experience and this inner experience may be construed by ‘relational’ clauses; but they model this experience as ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’ or ‘sensing’.

Looking 'From Below' & 'From Around' [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

Looking … ‘from below’ (how are they realised?) and ‘from around’ (what other systemic variants are possible?) …

Relational Clauses: Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

‘Relational’ clauses serve to characterise and identify.

The Transitivity Environments Of 'Remind'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257n):

As is often the case of with verbs, remind has different senses corresponding to uses in different transitivity environments.

(i) In a ‘mental’ clause, remind may have different senses.

(1) Remind may serve as a causative equivalent of remember, ‘cause somebody to remember’ with the causer in the role of Inducer (if the clause is ‘phenomenal’, the Phenomenon represented on the model of a circumstance of Matter (e.g. [Inducer:] This reminds [Senser:] me [Phenomenon:] of an interesting encounter I had a few years ago with the late Col M.S. Rao, the celebrated physician.) and if the clause is ‘hyperphenomenal’ with a project ‘idea’ clause, remind is configured with only Inducer + Senser (e.g. [Inducer:] The church clock striking the hour reminds [Senser:] me that I must hurry if this is to be ready on time for the printer.). 

(2) Alternatively, remind may have the sense of ‘cause somebody to see a relationship of similarity’ (e.g. They [‘the children’] reminded old Amai of a flock of bright birds gathering together to peck corn.).

(ii) In a ‘verbal’ clause, remind has the sense of ‘tell somebody something so that s/he will remember it’, the ‘verbal’ clause projects a report or quote (e.g. ‘Don’t forget, there was the hope it would pass for a natural death’, Pauling reminded him.). 

(iii) In a hypotactic verbal group complex, remind serves as a causative variant of remember (e.g. Mary reminded John to do it).

Mental Clause Subtypes: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257):

Like all other experiential systems, the system of type of sensing construes experience as indeterminate: the four different types of sensing shade into one another. For example, perception shades into cognition, with I see coming to mean not only ‘I perceive visually’ but also ‘I understand’. And cognition shades into perception with clauses where remember serves as the Process; unlike ‘cognitive’ clauses in general such clauses can be construed with a macrophenomenal Phenomenon …

Mental Clause Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 256):

Within the general class of ‘mental’ clauses, there are four different subtypes of sensing: ‘perceptive’, ‘cognitive’, ‘desiderative’ and ‘emotive’. These are treated by the grammar as distinct types. They differ with respect to phenomenality, directionality, gradability, potentiality and ability to serve as metaphors of modality …

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Probe & Substitute]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):

Mental clauses also differ from material ones with respect to the use of do as a substitute verb. … Mental processes … are not kinds of doing, and cannot be probed or substituted by do.

Mental Process: Present In Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):

The present in present with a mental process is a rather highly conditioned kind of inceptive aspect, as in I feel I’m knowing the city for the first time (‘I’m getting to know’);

Material Process: Simple Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254-5, 255n):

The simple present with a material process is general or habitual – that is, the occurrence of the process is construed as generalised or as habitual, e.g. they build a house for every employee. … 

In addition, there is a registerially restricted use of the simple present tense. In commentary accompanying demonstrations and the like, the simple present is used.

'Marked' Option [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

… this means that it is less frequent and that it carries a special interpretation.

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Tense]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

‘Material’ and ‘mental’ processes also differ with respect to the way that they unfold in time and this is reflected in the grammatical system of TENSE. … In a ‘mental’ clause, the unmarked present tense is the simple present … But in a ‘material’ clause the unmarked present tense is the present in present …

Idea Clauses Vs Fact Clauses [Diagnostic For Clause Constituents]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

Thus while ‘fact’ clauses serve as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause and can therefore be made Subject and be theme–predicated, ‘idea’ clauses are not part of the ‘mental’ clause but are rather combined with the ‘mental’ clause in a clause nexus of projection.

Projecting Representations Of The Content Of Consciousness: Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253, 254):

But there is one further option open to such clauses – an option that sets them apart not only from ‘material’ clauses but also from ‘relational’ ones. This option is the ability to set up another clause ‘outside’ the ‘mental’ clause as the representation of the ‘content’ of consciousness. … Here the ‘mental’ clause projects another clause (or combination of clauses) as a representation of the content of thinking, believing, presuming and so on; the projected clause is called an idea clause.

Facts & Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

Given the semiotic nature of facts, it stands to reason that they cannot serve as participants in ‘material’ clauses. When they do occur in what might appear to be a ‘material’ clauses, these clauses are abstract; and they have to be interpreted either mentally or relationally …

Facts: Status Signals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

The status of the ‘fact’ clause is often signalled by the noun fact itself … or by another ‘fact’ noun such as notion, idea, possibility.

Metaphenomenon: Environment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

The most common environment for a metaphenomenal Phenomenon is that of a clause of emotion where the Phenomenon is construed as impinging on the Senser’s consciousness.

Facts vs Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252-3, 253n):

A fact is on a higher level of abstraction than an ordinary thing or an act. Ordinary things and acts are both material phenomena; they can be seen, heard and perceived in other ways. Thus while an act is more complex than an ordinary thing, it still exists in the same material realm. In contrast, a fact is not a material phenomenon but rather a semiotic one: it is a proposition (or sometimes a proposal) construed as existing in its own right in the semiotic realm, without being brought into existence by somebody saying it. 

We could say that a fact is an act that has been propositionalised — that has been given existence as a semiotic phenomenon.

Metaphenomenal Mental Clauses: Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

In a ‘metaphenomenal mental’ clause, the Phenomenon is realised by a (typically finite) clause denoting a fact.

Macrophenomenal Clauses: Receptive Variant Or…?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

One of the interesting features of ‘macrophenomenal’ clauses is the form of what would seem to be the ‘receptive’ variant: instead of the expected the sand dredger heading for the cruiser was seen by him, where the whole Phenomenon is the Subject, we are much more likely to get the sand dredger was seen (by him) heading for the cruiser, where only the Subject of the non-finite clause serving as Phenomenon is ‘picked out’ to serve as the Subject of the ‘mental’ clause. For example:

Smoke was seen billowing from the police headquarters after an explosion.

This might suggest a different analysis of macrophenomenal clauses: what appears to be the ‘receptive’ variant could be interpreted not as a ‘receptive’ variant of a ‘macrophenomenal’ clause but rather as a clause with a verbal group complex serving as Process, was seen billowing, on the model of the sand dredger was rumoured (said) to be heading for the cruiser. Such constructions could be interpreted as markers of evidentiality – of the nature of the evidence for the information being negotiated.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252n):

A receptive variant such as the sand dredger heading for the cruiser wasn’t spotted by the navy would in fact be ambiguous: it could be a macrophenomenon, but alternatively heading for the cruiser might be an embedded relative clause. These two are significantly different in meaning. The interpretation as embedded relative clause would not be plausible where the non-finite clause occurs after the process of perception. 

Macrophenomenal Mental Clauses: Realisation Of Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

The non-finite clause realising an act is either a present participial one … or an infinitival one without the ‘infinitive marker’ to … The difference between them is a temporal one: the participial clause represents the process as unbounded in time, while the infinitival one represents it as bounded in time.

Macrophenomenal Mental Clauses: Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251-2):

In a ‘macrophenomenal mental’ clause, the Phenomenon is realised by a non-finite clause denoting an act; … An act is a configuration of a process, participants involved in that process and possibly attendant circumstances … Macrophenomenal Phenomena are typically restricted to one subtype of ‘mental’ clause — clauses of perception: the act is seen, heard, tasted or perceived in some other way; but it is not normally thought, felt emotionally, or desired.

Macrophenomenal & Metaphenomenal Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

… the concept of ‘thing’ is extended in ‘mental’ clauses to include macrophenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is an act and metaphenomenal clauses where the Phenomenon is a fact.

Material Participants Are 'Things' Only

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

In a ‘material’ clause, every participant is a thing; that is, it is a phenomenon of our experience, including of course our inner experience or imagination — some entity (person, creature, institution, object, substance or abstraction).  Any of these ‘things’ may also, of course, be the object of consciousness in a ‘mental’ clause;

Phenomenon: Thing, Act, Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

… the set of things that can take on this rôle in the clause is not only not restricted to any particular semantic or grammatical category, it is actually wider that the set of possible participants in a ‘material’ clause. It may be not only a thing but also an act or a fact.

Phenomenon [Definition]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 251):

… that which is felt, thought, wanted or perceived …

Senser Vs Actor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 250):

While the Senser is construed as being endowed with consciousness in ‘mental’ clauses, there is no trace of this pattern in ‘material’ clauses. In ‘material’ clauses, no participant is required to be human, and the distinction between conscious and non-conscious beings simply plays no part. The Actor of a ‘material’ clause is thus much less constrained than the Senser of a ‘mental’ clause.

'Conscious Being'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 250):

‘Conscious being’ typically means a person or persons; but as the following examples illustrate, a human collective (the British public, the whole house, the world) can also be construed as conscious:

I think the British public doesn’t dislike force provided that it’s short, sharp and rewarding.

Surely you don’t want the whole house to know of this occurrence?

The judging must come from one’s own experience, one’s own conscience, and understanding. What the world thought didn’t matter.

It can even be a product of human consciousness:

The film imagines that the FBI imported a free-lance black operative to terrorise the town’s mayor into revealing the murderers’ names.

Time As Senser

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 250n):

There is one type of ‘mental’ clause of perception where the Senser is a period of time and the Process is either see or find, as in Summer finds campers and hikers descending on the mountains in throngs; Ten minutes later saw us speeding through London. These are metaphorical constructions where a circumstance of Time has been construed as if it were a Senser.

Other Possible Realisations Of Senser

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 249n):

In languages with case marking, the Senser — or certain types of Senser — may be in the dative case, as in Hindi and Telugu, setting it formally apart from the Actor.  In some languages, the Senser is realised by a nominal group denoting a certain body part, as in Akan (cf English it breaks my heart, it blows my mind).

Endowing With Consciousness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 249):

Which particular creatures we choose to endow with consciousness when we talk about them may vary according to who we are, what we are doing or how we are feeling at the time; different registers show different preferences. Pets, domestic animals and other higher animals are often treated as conscious; the owner says of the cat she doesn’t like milk, whereas someone who is not a cat lover, or who has been annoyed by that particular specimen, is more likely to refer to the animal as it. But any entity, animate or not, can be treated as conscious; and since mental process clauses have this property, that only something that is being credited with consciousness can function in them as the one who feels, thinks, wants or perceives, one only has to put something into that role in order to turn it into a conscious being.

Blogger Comment:

 e.g. Heliotropic plants must know where the sun is.

Senser: Significant Feature

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 249):

In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always one participant who is human; this is the Senser, introduced above: the one that ‘senses’ – feels, thinks, wants or perceives, for example, Mary in Mary liked the gift. More accurately, we should say human-like; the significant feature of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.

Properties Differentiating Material And Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 248):

The category of ‘mental process clauses’ turns out to be grammatically distinct from that of material process clauses on the basis of a number of properties; these are set out in Table 5-7 …

Distinguishing *Grammatical* Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 248):

Obviously clauses construing doing and clauses construing sensing are different in meaning, but that is not enough to make them constitute distinct grammatical categories. There are indefinitely many ways of drawing lines on purely semantic grounds, for example, by invoking contextual considerations ‘from above’, as we do when we describe the semantic strategies specific to a particular situation type; but the question we are concerned with here is which of these have systematic repercussions in the grammar.

Grammatical Labels

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 247):

It might be argued … that since grammatical and semantic categories are not in one-to-one correspondence, then if we use grammatical terms that are semantic in import (as nearly all grammatical terms are) we cannot expect them to be appropriate for all instances. The reasoning is quite valid; grammatical labels are very rarely appropriate for all instances of a category — they are chosen to reflect its central or ‘core’ signification ( … ‘prototype’ …). These core areas are the central region for each process type … and the non-core areas lie on the borders between the different process types, shading into one another as the colours of a colour spectrum.

Mental Clauses Of Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 246-7):

There is one further type of ‘mental’ clause: I can feel something on my foot. This is a clause of perception, the can feel as the Process, I as the Senser and something on my foot as the Phenomenon being perceived. Such clauses are similar to emotive and cognitive ‘mental’ clauses in that the Senser is construed as a conscious being. But they also have properties that set them apart from the other subtypes of ‘mental’ clause. For example, while Pat could have said I feel something on my foot with the Process in the simple present, she has used a modulation of readiness instead – can feel. This is quite common with ‘mental’ clauses of perception, as with Can you see those pelicans flying across the lagoon alongside Do you see .... This example also illustrates another feature specific to clauses of perception: what is construed as the phenomenon being perceived can be a thing (such as cockroach); but it can also be an act, realised by a non-finite clause, as in I can feel [[something crawling up my foot]].

Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 246):

… the relationship between the ‘mental’ clause and the ‘idea’ clause is one of projection: the ‘mental’ clause projects another clause or set of clauses, giving them the status of ideas or the content of consciousness.

Mental Clauses Of Cognition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 246):

They are able to set up another clause or set of clauses as the content of thinking — as the ideas created by cognition.