Manifestations Of The Close Bonding Of Medium And Process As Nucleus [1]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 155):

Of all the participants, the Medium is the most restricted in terms of the range of phenomena that may function in that role. We can see this in relation to the general types of figure:

We can also see this in relation to more delicately specified subtypes such as:

In other words, whatever the type of figure, the participant that is most closely bonded with the Process is the one that takes on the generalised role of Medium; it is this that is in a relation of mutual expectancy with the Process. This is not to say that only horses can neigh, but rather than anything that neighs is thereby endowed with horse-hood.

Blogger Comments:

Clearly, the Medium of a 'shine' figure is not limited to 'heavenly body', but includes artificial light sources and phenomena with reflective surfaces, such as black shoes.

Generalised Model of Figures: Agent

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 154):

The model thus construes a nuclear figure consisting of a process unfolding through the medium of a participant. This then makes it possible to construe a further variable: namely, the causal origin of this unfolding. The Medium's actualisation of the Process may be construed as being brought about by a further participant — the Agent: see Figure 4-10. If the figure is construed with an Agent, it is other-agentive; if it is construed without an Agent, it is self-agentive.

Blogger Comments:

Mythology typically construes the origin of creation as other-agentive, whereas cosmology construes the origin of the universe as self-agentive.

Generalised Model of Figures: Nucleus

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 154, 134):

Medium and Process form the nucleus of the whole figure — that part of the figure which is essential to the complementarity of unfolding and persisting (cf. Figure 4-3 above). The participant functioning as Medium may be affected in various different ways, depending on the particular domain — the 'trace' may b[e] physical, mental, and so on; but the status of Medium generalises across these domains.

Generalised Model of Figures: Medium

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153-4, 155):

The particularistic model, then, comprises a set of submodels: (i) impacting, (ii) conscious processing, (iii) symbolic processing, (iv) relational ordering. The model that generalises across these various domains of experience is different from any one of these particular submodels. It sets up one central participant that is common to all processes. This is the participant through which the process comes to be actualised. We refer to it as the Medium: see Figure 4-9.

Semantically, the Medium is the participant through which the process is actualised. It is in the combination of Medium + Process that we find the complementarity we spoke of earlier between the temporal unfolding (the Process) and the atemporal persistence (the Medium).

Figure Topology

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):

What we find, if we try to take in the picture as a whole, is a kind of focussed model in which the essentially human processes of consciousness [sensing], and the prototypically human processes of symbolic action [saying], constitute the experiential centre; while the two other types of figure, that of doing on the one hand and of being on the other, lie on opposite sides of this centre: the one (doing) lying towards the pole of the concrete, with the experience construed as 'this impacts on that', the other (being) lying towards the pole of the abstract, with the experience construed as 'this is related to that'.

Figures Of Sensing And Saying: General Motifs

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):

But these "impacting" figures of sensing and saying are only submotifs within these two overall types. The general motif of figures of sensing is 'conscious processing'; that of figures of saying is 'symbolic processing'. And in figures of being, where we might characterise the general motif as 'relational ordering', there is no trace of a submotif of impacting at all.

Figures Of Saying: 'Impacting' Submotif

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):

In figures of saying, the Sayer is the symbolic source: prototypically human, but not necessarily so (e.g. the instructions tell you to switch it off first). The Process is symbolic; but here too there is a subtype of figures of saying that imparts a similar sense of action and impact, those where the Sayer 'does something to' another participant by means of a verbal process, as in Don't blame the messenger, Everybody praised her courage. We refer to this participant as the Target; and again we may note a partial analogy with figures of doing (though only partial — for example, such figures cannot take a resultative Attribute or other representation of the outcome).

Figures Of Sensing: 'Impacting' Submotif

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 152):

Sensing is clearly modelled as a process of human consciousness, with the Senser as a human being — so much so that merely coming to occupy that role is sufficient to endow the participant in question with human-like consciousness. The Phenomenon, on the other hand, is given a somewhat ambivalent status: in one of its guises (as in Do you like those colours?) it seems to be just a part of the environment; but in its other guise (as in Do those colours please you?) it seems to be playing a more active role.

Why does it give this impression? Partly no doubt because of the agnate form Are you pleased by those colours? where the Phenomenon those colours is brought in indirectly, like an instrument or means. But this is part of a larger syndrome whereby, on the one hand, there are other related 'sensing' figures like How do those colours strike you?, where the verb strike suggests a fairly violent kind of action; and on the other hand, the prototypical form of a 'doing' figure seems quite analogous to these, as in Were those boys hitting you? (with those boys as Actor, you as Goal).

Blogger Comments:

Is it really the case that if we think or say the octopus can obviously see the crab, we are endowing the octopus — or any animal with sensory organs — with human-like consciousness?

Figures Of Doing: Underlying Schema

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 152-3, 152n):

The 'doing' figure is based prototypically on a schema we might refer to as "action and impact". There is always an Actor, the participant that performs the Process; and in an example such as the boys were jumping, the Process stops there — that is all there is to it. But in examples such as the boys were throwing stones, or the stones hit the wall the Actor's performance of the Process extends beyond, so as to 'impact' on another participant — this is the one known as the Goal (see Figure 4-8). 

In the typical case (the "active voice", in grammatical terminology), the clause unfolds iconically, reflecting the movement of the impact from Actor to Goal.⁶ And, as we saw above, the latter may then be followed by representation of the outcome of the impact — a resultative Attribute (he knocked it flat), a circumstance of Role (he cut it into cubes), or a circumstance of Location (he threw it into the corner).

⁶ This iconicity is, however, easily overridden by the textual metafunction, which has its own mode of iconic realisation.

Figures Of Being: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151-2):

In the limiting case, there is only one participant, the Existent; but generally there are two participants, the one being related by the process to the other. They may be being related by ascription, as Attribute to Carrier; or by identification, a rather complex relationship involving two pairs of participant roles: Identifier and Identified, and Token and Value. These latter intersect with each other, so there are two possible role combinations: 

(i) Identified/Token and Identifier/Value ['decoding']; 

(ii) Identifier/Token and Identified/Value ['encoding'].

Figures Of Doing: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here there is one participant, the Actor, that performs the process in question; and this process may then impact upon another participant, the Goal (or may result in bringing the Goal into (material) existence). Other participants that may be present are the Beneficiary, the one that derives "benefit" from the process; and the Scope, the one that defines the domain over which the process extends.

Blogger Comments:

Strictly speaking, 'Beneficiary' is a participant of the generalised model. Its counterparts in the particularistic model, for doing figures, are Client and Recipient.

Figures Of Saying: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here one participant, the Sayer, is involved as the originator of a process of symbolic (semiotic) activity, or "saying". There may be another participant the Receiver, whose role is that of 'decoding' what is said. What is said may itself be construed as a further participant, the Verbiage; or else it may be projected as another figure [locution] within the same sequence. Finally, there may be a participant functioning as Target of the saying process.

Figures Of Sensing: Semantic Characterisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in "inert" conscious processing ("sensing", as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser's conscious processing). Alternatively, the Senser's conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.

The Particularistic Model Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 150-1):

In what we are calling its "particularist" modelling the grammar is categorising experience for us (or we are categorising experience through our grammar) by construing a small number of different types of figure, differentiated according to what kind of process is taking place and what kinds of participant are involved — in what relationships to each other and to the process.

What is the principle on which the grammar categorises experience? In the most general terms, as we have seen, the principle is that all phenomena can be interpreted as falling within a small number of broad experiential domains:

• those happening "inside", within the realm of our own consciousness;
• those happening "outside", in the perceptual world that lies around us;
• those that are not kinds of happening at all, but rather kinds of being and of relating to something else.

We have referred to these as, respectively:

(1) figures of sensing — or, more inclusively (since 'languaging' is treated as a distinct phenomenal realm), (1) figures of sensing and

(2) figures of saying;

(3) figures of doing — or, more explicitly (since the word 'doing' might suggest intentionality), figures of doing & happening;

(4) figures of being — or, more accurately (since 'having' is construed as a kind of relative 'being'), figures of being & having.

Each of these types of figure has its own special character, as revealed by the way it is organised in the lexicogrammar. We are not attempting to spell out here the grammatical features by which they are differentiated. But we shall characterise them briefly in semantic terms with reference to the forms of participation involved.

Composition: Two Models Of Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 149-50):

So far we have explored figures in terms of how they categorise experience into particular types or domains, showing how this typology extends in delicacy. The next step is to specify what modes of participant interaction the semantic system of figures engenders. There are two models of participation-in-process embodied in the semantic system of English —

(i) One is particularistic: it diversifies our experience of participant interaction into four domains — doing, sensing, saying and being.

(ii) The other is generalised it unifies our experience of participant interaction across the different domains.

The system thus strikes a balance in the construal of figures between unity and diversity — between differentiating one aspect of experience from another and generalising over the whole. These constitute distinct but complementary perspectives: see Figure 4-7.

Figures Of Doing & Happening Classified By Outcome

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148-9):

We have seen that figures of being, other than the existential, may be elaborative (intensive), extending (possessive) or enhancing (circumstantial). This enables us to recognised further subcategories of doing according to the nature of the figure being brought about: see Table 4(7).

Notice that in some cases the outcome is embodied in the clause by which the figure is realised; for example in middle variants of the doing & happening type (the outcome of John ran is 'John + run'), and in clause with resultative elements (Attribute, Role) such as I'll boil the eggs hard (outcome: 'eggs + be + hard'), Let's appoint Fred timekeeper (outcome: Fred + be + timekeeper').

Doing & Happening Differentiated By Outcome: Creative vs Dispositive

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

As pointed out earlier, doing is a process of change involving time and energy. Such change implies an outcome; the outcome may be of various kinds, but it is always such that it can be construed as another figure. We can therefore examine what kind of figure emerges as the outcome of the one under investigation. 

(1) If the process is creative, the outcome is that some entity comes into existence: such a figure may be construed as a doing with effectum, as in he baked a cake; but it may be simply a creative happening such as icicles formed. In either case the outcoming figure is one of being (more specifically, existing): 

he baked a cake     outcome: 'there exists a cake' 

icicles formed         outcome: 'there exist icicles'

(2) If the process is dispositive, the outcome is more variable; it may be either (i) a figure of doing (more specifically, doing [to]/happening), or (ii) a figure of being (more specifically, being [at]/having):

(i) the cat chased the mouse      outcome: 'the mouse ran' 

(ii) the boys mended the roof     outcome: 'the roof was whole'

    John gave his sister a violin     outcome: 'John's sister had a violin'

Traditional Subtypes Of Doing & Happening

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

The subtypes that have been generally recognised in grammar are 

(1) intransitive/transitive; 

(2) within intransitive, action/event; and 

(3) within transitive, effectum/affectum. 

The first is the distinction between doings that involve only a doer (intransitive: John ran) and those that also involve something 'done to' (transitive: Mary threw the ball, realised respectively as Actor + Process, Actor + Process + Goal. 

The second is that between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and an unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell). 

The third is the distinction between a Goal that 'exists' prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house). 

We shall use this distinction, referred to as dispositive/creative, to explain figures of doing in terms of their outcome in other figures.

Figures Of Doing & Happening

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 147-8):

Throughout the history of the study of language, in all the major traditions, grammarians and philosophers have focussed primarily on figures of doing. Certain subtypes have been fairly well explored: usually those having some special structural feature, such as figures involving transfer of possession ('giving') where there is an additional participant role (Beneficiary, recognised in traditional grammar as indirect or dative object). And figures of doing in their very simplest form (John ran, Mary threw the ball) have remained for more than two millennia as the foundation of the theory of transitivity. But there has been little attempt at a systematic treatment of the total range of material clauses with their intersecting features and subtypes. Here we shall refer to three major distinctions that have traditionally been recognised; and then take one further step … bringing together figures of doing and being.

Enhancing Figures: Use

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 147):

Thus enhancing figures may be used to construe arrangements or orderings in space or time, such as chronologies, maps or structures. For example, the following extract from an account of the structure of skeletal muscles construes locations through enhancing figures:

The fibrous connective tissue proteins within the tendons continue in an irregular arrangement around the muscle to form a sheath known as the epimysium (epi = above; my = muscle). Connective tissue from this outer sheath extends into the body of the muscle, subdividing it into columns, or fascicles (e.g., the "strings" in stringy meat) . Each of these fascicles is thus surrounded by its own connective tissue sheath, known as the porimysium (peri = around).

Enhancing figures construing temporal and causal ordering play an important role in constructing knowledge in a metaphorical mode, as the following example illustrates:

The divergence of impulses from the spinal cord to the ganglia, and the convergence of impulses within the ganglia, usually results in the mass activation of almost all of the postganglionic fibres.

Enhancing Figures Of Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146-7):

One participant enhances another along a circumstantial dimension of time, space, cause, condition and the like. Table 4(6) illustrates the categories of time and cause.

Elaborating & Extending Figures As Alternative Modes Of Construal

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146):

Elaboration and extension are agnate, one with the other; they offer alternative modes of construal, often with very little apparent difference. Thus we may find both

(1)Elaborating 'Man' is +male, + adult & + human ;

'Man' is a male, adult & human being

(2)Extending 'Man' consists of +male, + adult & + human :

'Man' has the features +male, +adult & +human

But if we technicalise these alternatives, they do constitute significantly different approaches to the interpretation of meaning. In this book and elsewhere in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy, and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.

Extending Figures: Use

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145-6):

Extending figures can thus be used to construe meronymic taxonomies. In other words, they are (among other things) a theory of constituency, semantic composition, and other meronymic relations in language; so they can be used to create further relationships of the same kind. For example, the following paragraph establishes a meronymic taxonomy for sentences in Hawaiian:

Sentences are sequences bordered by periods, question marks, or exclamation points. In Hawaiian they can be thought of as simple, verbless, or complex. The most common simple sentence consists of verb phrase ± noun phrase(s). Verb phrases contain verbs as their heads; verbs are defined on the basis of potential occurrence with the particles marking aspect, especially ua (perfective aspect) . Noun phrases contain nouns or substitutes for nouns; these are names of persons or places, or are defined on the basis of potential occurrence after the article ka/ke (definite), or the preposition ma 'at'.

Extending Figures Of Being & Having: Composition, Possession & Association

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145-6):

One participant extends another in a relation of composition, possession or association. As with elaboration, there is also the intersecting variable of identity or membership: see Table 4(5).

Elaborating Figures: Use

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):

Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and, by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further. For example:

The fuels of the body are carbohydrates, fats and proteins. These are taken In the diet. They are found mainly In cereal grains, vegetable oils, meat, fish and dairy products. Carbohydrates are the principal source of energy in most diets. […] Fats make up the second largest source of energy in most diets. […]

Elaborating Figures Of Being & Having: Delicacy, Realisation And Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.

Figures Of Being & Having

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144):

Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz. elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we recognise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.

Blogger Comments:

Strictly speaking, though categorised as enhancement in this context, matter, is actually a relation of projection, not enhancement.

The Orientations Of The Different Types of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143-4):

As always in language, the picture that emerges from a consideration of a multiplicity of properties is far from simple; it is multifaceted. But it is possible to bring out certain salient features of the system of sensing as suggested in Figure 4-6.

Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from, but does not create, projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes. Cognition and desideration are different from both in that they can project (i.e., bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing. Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of 'understand' alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (11) Reification

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

Finally, when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, i.e. countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, i.e. masses, such as anger, fear, frustration.⁵ That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil (cf. Halliday, 1990). Indeed, one can see from Lakoff & Kovecses's (1987) discussion of the cognitive model of anger in American English that a number of the metaphors for anger construe it as concrete mass (e.g. as a fluid contained in the body: He was filled with anger, She couldn't contain her joy, She was brimming with rage). In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf. the unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).

 

⁵ A few processes of cognition are also unbounded, e.g. knowledge, realisation, understanding.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (10) Scalability

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (9) Construal As Attribute Of Ascription

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the 'like' type and the 'please' type. Thus I'm afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but it is much more productive with emotive ones. Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible);

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (8) Agnate Ascriptive Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142-3):

Processes of perception are unique among the different types of sensing in that they are agnate to a set of relational processes of ascription, those which ascribe an Attribute in terms of the way in which it presents itself to our sense[s], as in Madam, you'll look like a tulip.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (7) Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):

The different types of sensing have somewhat different potentials for unfolding in time. With perception and cognition we have various categories of duration, inception, and the like: e.g. (perception) glimpse, sight, spot as well as see; (cognition) discover, realise, remember as well as know. But similar distinctions do not seem to obtain with desiderative and emotive processes.

Blogger Comments:

 long, pine, yearn?

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (6) Construal As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2, 142n):

Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But, as already noted above, certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). For instance:

Stanley (urgently): Look —

McCann: Don't touch me.

Stanley: Look. Listen a minute.

Anna: Listen. What silence. Is it always as silent?

Deeley: It's quite silent here, yes. Normally. You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Here look, touch, listen are verbs in behavioural clauses rather than mental ones; they are construed as activities controlled by an active Behaver. The difference is suggested quite clearly in the last example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully. 

All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I'm watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance.⁴ 

Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind. As long as the 'phenomenon' is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and material domains of experience. 

There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.)

⁴ Notice also the difference with respect to ability: there is little to choose between I can see birds in the sky and I see birds in the sky, but I can be watching birds in the sky and I am watching birds in the sky are quite distinct — in fact the former would most probably be interpreted as usuality I sometimes watch ...'.

Blogger Comments:

Clearly, the clause Don't touch me is material, not behavioural. The participant me is neither the Range (Behaviour) nor Medium (Behaver) of a behavioural Process, but the Medium (Goal) of a material Process.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (5) Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional. They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in 

I like Mozart's music (the 'like' type) : Mozart's music pleases me (the 'please' type). 

Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience. 

Processes of desideration are not bidirectional; here there is no 'please' type, only the 'like' type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires. 

Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the 'like' type — perception almost exclusively so; 'please' type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Blogger Comments:

The 'like' type is termed 'emanating', the 'please' type 'impinging'.

I want that dessert (emanating) : that dessert tempts me (impinging)

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (4) Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:

I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to. 

There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (3) Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141, 141n):

Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:

I think that in a sense you've had to compromise, haven't you?

'in a sense you've probably had to compromise, haven't you'

Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.³

 

³ Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she's returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of a clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (2) Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by a metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me. The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project, namely perception and emotion. That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can 'react to' facts. In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry/worrying — cf. (8) [agnate ascriptive process] below.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (1) Projection Of Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):

While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/ imagined/ dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying; cf. property (4) [verbal causation].

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138-40):

The grammar thus draws a fairly clear line between cognition & desideration on the one hand and perception & emotion on the other. The former can create worlds of ideas, the latter cannot — at least, according to the theory of consciousness embodied in the grammar of English. Now, this difference with respect to the ability to project is one of a set of properties that collectively serve to differentiate perception, cognition, desideration and emotion as the major subtypes of sensing. These properties are summarised in Table 4(3).

Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):

Here projection turns out to be a major characteristic distinguishing between different types. Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):

I just thought —> I'd tell you that I appreciate it.

I think —> I'll give it up.

They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.

Thus the idea 'I'll give it up' is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea 'me to crawl on my bended knees' is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result of somebody seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts; for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]].

I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]].

We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].

Thus 'that I am fixed, concrete' is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

These features are summarised in Table 4(2).

The Overall Semantic Space Construed By Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137):

Figure 4-5 represents the overall semantic space construed by figures, taking account of some of the areas of indeterminacy.

Behavioural Processes [with caveat]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-7, 136n):

As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying intermediately at the borderline of the primary types. The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends. One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday, 1985: 128-9): "processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing". These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching, listening, pondering, meditating) rather than as passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the 'Behaver' in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing ? — I'm meditating but not I'm believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon);² nor can they accept a 'fact' serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

 

² For the special case of quoting by a behavioural process, as in "You're late again", she frowned, cf. the discussion of saying in Section 4.3.

Blogger Comments:

Caveat: Importantly, this is Matthiessen, not Halliday. For Halliday, behavioural processes do not project. Instead, instances like David was meditating (that) the moon was a balloon are mental clauses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a mental Process. Likewise, instances like "You're late again", she frowned are verbal nexuses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a verbal Process. Importantly, process type depends on the clause in which a verbal group functions, not on the most probable function of a verb (meditating, frowned).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Projection: Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the 'content' of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Participation: Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Unfolding in time: In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I'm doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he's mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawn mower; I'm busy)';

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Nature Of Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Nature of participants: In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness — s/he thought the moon was a balloon but not normally it thought the moon was a balloon. This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material or relational clauses. While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or metaphenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house). Participants in a material process cannot be metaphenomenal. For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house/their ideas/his argument), it is not possible to demolish "metathings" (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):

The grammatical reactances for the figure types include:

Directionality of process: many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it/ it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser's consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser's consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). Neither material nor relational clauses display this dual directionality.

Relating Types Of Figure To Clause Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134, 136):

We have characterised the distinctions among the different types of figure in semantic terms. Let us now relate them to the grammar of TRANSITIVITY — the ideational grammar of the clause where the semantics of figures is construed. The different semantic types, sensing, saying, doing & happening and being & having are realised in the grammar of transitivity as shown in Figure 4-4. Thus doing & happening are realised as material clauses, sensing as mental ones, saying as verbal ones, and being (at, etc.) & having as relational clauses. The different process types are not signalled overtly in the grammar; they are covert or cryptotypic categories and emerge only when we consider their reactances, shown in italics in Figure 4-4. 

Process/Participant Complementarity: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133-4):

The complementarity can also be seen in the different kinds of deixis (relation to the here & now) associated with processes on the one hand and participants on the other. A process is made finite — it is pinned down in time, with point of reference in the act of speaking. A participant is made determinate, being held in a location within a referential space. This same distinction also appears in the temporal unfolding of a text, where participants have the potential to persist as discourse referents, but processes are excluded, unless they are turned into honorary participants through the use of grammatical metaphor.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Temporal Unfolding/Persistence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133, 134):

Whatever the mode of occurrence of any figure, it will always unfold in time. This temporal unfolding is construed as an inherent property of the process itself, realised grammatically as tense and aspect; it thus serves to validate the distinction between process and participant. Whereas on the one hand in its manifestation as process, the figure unfolds in time, in its manifestation as participant, on the other hand, it persists through time — whether or not the participant undergoes a change of state. The limiting case is a creative or destructive process, such as writing or erasing a symbol, through which a participant comes into being or ceases to exist. Figure 4-3 illustrates this process/participant complementarity.

Doing-&-Happening And Being-&-Having

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133):

Here we should note finally that the category of doing includes events, so the figure is one of 'doing & happening'; while the category of being includes (i) being in some circumstantial relation, and also (ii) having, itself a special case of (i).

Doing and Being As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132-3):

Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a 'quantum of change'. Construed as doing, the change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result. Consider a causal consequence such as 

[doing:] 'he washed it' —<so>—> [being:] 'It was clean'. 

This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.). Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view. If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result. If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor. The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process. See Figure 4-2.

 

This complementarity between doing and being … is not confined to those figures where the 'being' is of the intensive (qualitative/ quantitative) type; we also find pairs such as

(circumstantial) I put it on the shelf/ it's on the shelf 

they covered the floor with a carpet/ the carpet covers the floor.

(possessive) she's given him a new car/ he has a new car 

Doing vs Being: Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing requires some input to occur. This will typically come from one of the participants involved, the doer (as with voluntary motion); but the source of energy may also be outside the figure (as with falling). No input of energy is required with a figure of being.

Doing vs Being: Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing involves a change over time of occurrence (including maintaining a state in spite of force for change). The change may take place along any one of a number of dimensions: 

(a) circumstantial: spatial (motion or disposition, concrete or abstract); 
(b) intensive: qualitative (colour, size, shape, solidity, etc.), quantitative (increase, decrease); 
(c) possessive (transfer of ownership, loss or accretion of parts); 

(d) existential (creation or destruction). 

In contrast, being does not depend on any change over time. As a figure of being unfolds over time, the only change is that embodied in the temporal unfolding of the process itself. The nature of the actualisation will be the same at any point in time.

Doing And Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing and being do not preclude the involvement of a conscious participant; but they do not require it — and hence do not have the effect of endowing a participant with human-like consciousness. They can be differentiated in terms of two parameters, time and energy, both of which are involved in their actualisation.

Borderline Locations In The Semantic Space Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

There is of course a great deal of indeterminacy here, including such borderline cases as those where sensing and saying are construed as forms of action (and therefore cannot project), e.g. watching, listening, chatting, speaking. These properties reflect the borderline location of such processes in the overall semantic space.

Types Of Figure As Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being): see Figure 4-1.

Sensing vs Saying: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — 'she addressed him'). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser's involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser's consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).

Sensing vs Saying: Constituency Boundaries

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130-1, 131n):

Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him/ asked of him… . In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.

Here there is a subtle difference between sensing and saying in their grammatical realisation by verbal and mental clauses that project reports. In the verbal case, the Receiver is a grammatical constituent of the verbal clause, as in she told him —> to leave. Being a constituent participant, it can serve as Subject in the verbal clause: he was told (by her) —> to leave. However, although the mental case, e.g. she wanted him to leave, looks similar, it is not, since mental clauses do not have a Receiver. The element him is a constituent of the reported clause: she wanted —> him to leave. Consequently, it cannot serve as Subject in the reporting mental clause; we cannot get He was wanted (by her) to leave. The difference also shows up clearly when the projected clause is in the passive voice; contrast the incongruence of she told the car to be washed with the acceptability of she wanted the car to be washed. The analysis shows the difference: she told the car —> to be washed (where the car gets interpreted as Receiver) : she wanted —> the car to be washed.¹

∞ 

¹ As always, there are departures from the general principle. For instance, while 

she asked/told/persuaded/implored/encouraged/promised/threatened the car to be washed 

is incongruent, 

she ordered the car to be washed 

is perfectly fine, which suggests the mental model of the constituency boundary between the projecting and the projected clause — he ordered —> the car to be washed. This gets support from the fact that the car was ordered to be washed is odd.

Symboliser: Senser vs Sayer

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines. The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. Thus in an example such as the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees, the Symboliser has to be interpreted as if it was a conscious being.

The "Symboliser" of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a 'semiotic thing' such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement (see Halliday, 1985:129-30). Thus alongside examples such as 

In the hospital's newsletter, he tells of one patient who stopped a two-week-long bout.

we also find

The British medical Journal The Lancet recently reported a study at Oxford university's John Radcliffe Hospital.

And while the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees requires a metaphorical reading, the thermometer says it is 35 degrees does not. We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.

Interior vs Exterior Symbolic Processing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

"Symbolic processing" is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed than locutions from experience that is shared.

Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying). The distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior' is reinforced by the internal organisation of figures of sensing and saying.

Symbolic Processing: Sensing And Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-9):

Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying on the one hand and figures of doing and being on the other by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself and the level of the content of sensing/saying. As we put it in Chapter 3, the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying, etc.) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in 'Symboliser;' she + Process:' said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).

The Four Primary Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128, 129):

The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant roles: see Table 4(1).

The Configuration Of A Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:

(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and

(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants.

To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.

Two Complementary Perspectives On A Figure: Composition And Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time. We can recognise here two complementary perspectives on a figure: composition, and time.

Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being "units" means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts. In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.

Concomitantly, figures take place in time; but the temporal aspect of a figure is typically construed in association with one particular element, the process. We shall therefore deal with this aspect of figures under the heading of process, in the context of our discussion of elements. For the remainder of this chapter we concentrate on the compositional aspect of figures.

Expansion And Projection As Trans-phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain the logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially. For example, projection manifested within a sequence: Brutus said Caesar was ambitious; projection manifested within a simple figure: According to Brutus, Caesar was ambitious. This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

The Extent To Which Semantics And Grammar Are In Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in course of realisation. 

One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures (on the reading 'separately': 'Henry went to the movies and Anne went to the movies') or a sequence of elements (on the reading 'together': 'Henry and Anne went to the movies'). This was, of course, an area investigated in terms of transformational grammar with different deep structures posited for the readings 'separately' and 'together'. 

It is clear that there are grammatical group complexes which cannot be expanded semantically as sequences of figures; for example, Henry and Anne chatted is not likely to be a grammatical compression of 'Henry chatted and Anne chatted'; rather, it is agnate with Henry chatted with Anne. In such cases the problem of ambiguity does not arise.

A Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. Thus instead of Schank conceived of scripts and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a sequence of figures where there are two processes of conception, we get Schank and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a single figure with a sequence of elements (serving as Senser of a single process). Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related: see Figure 3-11.

The Domain Of The Relation Between Figures In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

We have identified two primary types of sequence (ways of relating figures), projection and expansion; and with both of these the figures that are related may be either equal or unequal in status. To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of the expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. 

But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause (Mary could never feel comfortable with him, which was perfectly understandable) or some element within the clause (Mary, who was very sensitive, could never feel comfortable with him).

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [3]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

(in) In addition, one or more of the figures in the clause may be realised by something 'less than' a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: 

as a child, he was very shy 'when he was a child, he was very shy'. 

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course: melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been 'shrunk' by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [2]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

(ii) On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence. This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind (see Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4): an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c) is 'upgraded' to the status of a projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don't suppose || there's very much 'there is probably not'

I think || I might have walked out too from all the accounts 'I probably might have'

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [1]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124-5):

As we noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory we discussed). In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together. The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.

(i) On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of this particular text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. Here is a very simple example of a sequence which is realised by two clause complexes:

Prepare and cook the potatoes in sea-salted water to which has been added lemon juice. Drain and serve with melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley.

The sequence has been grouped into two clause complexes in the grammar. However, this grouping is by no means arbitrary; it serves to indicate the two major phases of the preparation of new potatoes with lemon. In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly disassociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice. (The significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)

Sequences Of Interactional Moves

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124):

We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logical-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts: see Phillips, 1985, 1986; Halliday, 1993a.) In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text: see Figure 3-10…

Text Organisation And The Interaction Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors. 

But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences of figures in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition ('I invite you to accept x, if you want x'; for example: If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge) and evidence ('I think, infer/ you should believe x because y'; for example: John's in Germany because I just talked to him).

Sequences As One Principle For Organising Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):

Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text. For example, the culinary procedure for making cauliflower surprise constitutes one text. Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as 'macro-figures', i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).