Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (6) Construal As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2, 142n):

Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But, as already noted above, certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). For instance:

Stanley (urgently): Look —

McCann: Don't touch me.

Stanley: Look. Listen a minute.

Anna: Listen. What silence. Is it always as silent?

Deeley: It's quite silent here, yes. Normally. You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Here look, touch, listen are verbs in behavioural clauses rather than mental ones; they are construed as activities controlled by an active Behaver. The difference is suggested quite clearly in the last example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully. 

All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I'm watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance.⁴ 

Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind. As long as the 'phenomenon' is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and material domains of experience. 

There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.)

⁴ Notice also the difference with respect to ability: there is little to choose between I can see birds in the sky and I see birds in the sky, but I can be watching birds in the sky and I am watching birds in the sky are quite distinct — in fact the former would most probably be interpreted as usuality I sometimes watch ...'.

Blogger Comments:

Clearly, the clause Don't touch me is material, not behavioural. The participant me is neither the Range (Behaviour) nor Medium (Behaver) of a behavioural Process, but the Medium (Goal) of a material Process.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (5) Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional. They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in 

I like Mozart's music (the 'like' type) : Mozart's music pleases me (the 'please' type). 

Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience. 

Processes of desideration are not bidirectional; here there is no 'please' type, only the 'like' type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires. 

Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the 'like' type — perception almost exclusively so; 'please' type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Blogger Comments:

The 'like' type is termed 'emanating', the 'please' type 'impinging'.

I want that dessert (emanating) : that dessert tempts me (impinging)

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (4) Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:

I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to. 

There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (3) Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141, 141n):

Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:

I think that in a sense you've had to compromise, haven't you?

'in a sense you've probably had to compromise, haven't you'

Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.³

 

³ Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she's returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of a clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (2) Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by a metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me. The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project, namely perception and emotion. That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can 'react to' facts. In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry/worrying — cf. (8) [agnate ascriptive process] below.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (1) Projection Of Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):

While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/ imagined/ dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying; cf. property (4) [verbal causation].

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138-40):

The grammar thus draws a fairly clear line between cognition & desideration on the one hand and perception & emotion on the other. The former can create worlds of ideas, the latter cannot — at least, according to the theory of consciousness embodied in the grammar of English. Now, this difference with respect to the ability to project is one of a set of properties that collectively serve to differentiate perception, cognition, desideration and emotion as the major subtypes of sensing. These properties are summarised in Table 4(3).

Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):

Here projection turns out to be a major characteristic distinguishing between different types. Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):

I just thought —> I'd tell you that I appreciate it.

I think —> I'll give it up.

They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.

Thus the idea 'I'll give it up' is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea 'me to crawl on my bended knees' is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result of somebody seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts; for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]].

I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]].

We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].

Thus 'that I am fixed, concrete' is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

These features are summarised in Table 4(2).

The Overall Semantic Space Construed By Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137):

Figure 4-5 represents the overall semantic space construed by figures, taking account of some of the areas of indeterminacy.

Behavioural Processes [with caveat]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-7, 136n):

As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying intermediately at the borderline of the primary types. The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends. One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday, 1985: 128-9): "processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing". These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching, listening, pondering, meditating) rather than as passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the 'Behaver' in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing ? — I'm meditating but not I'm believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon);² nor can they accept a 'fact' serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

 

² For the special case of quoting by a behavioural process, as in "You're late again", she frowned, cf. the discussion of saying in Section 4.3.

Blogger Comments:

Caveat: Importantly, this is Matthiessen, not Halliday. For Halliday, behavioural processes do not project. Instead, instances like David was meditating (that) the moon was a balloon are mental clauses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a mental Process. Likewise, instances like "You're late again", she frowned are verbal nexuses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a verbal Process. Importantly, process type depends on the clause in which a verbal group functions, not on the most probable function of a verb (meditating, frowned).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Projection: Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the 'content' of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Participation: Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Unfolding in time: In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I'm doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he's mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawn mower; I'm busy)';

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Nature Of Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Nature of participants: In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness — s/he thought the moon was a balloon but not normally it thought the moon was a balloon. This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material or relational clauses. While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or metaphenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house). Participants in a material process cannot be metaphenomenal. For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house/their ideas/his argument), it is not possible to demolish "metathings" (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):

The grammatical reactances for the figure types include:

Directionality of process: many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it/ it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser's consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser's consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). Neither material nor relational clauses display this dual directionality.

Relating Types Of Figure To Clause Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134, 136):

We have characterised the distinctions among the different types of figure in semantic terms. Let us now relate them to the grammar of TRANSITIVITY — the ideational grammar of the clause where the semantics of figures is construed. The different semantic types, sensing, saying, doing & happening and being & having are realised in the grammar of transitivity as shown in Figure 4-4. Thus doing & happening are realised as material clauses, sensing as mental ones, saying as verbal ones, and being (at, etc.) & having as relational clauses. The different process types are not signalled overtly in the grammar; they are covert or cryptotypic categories and emerge only when we consider their reactances, shown in italics in Figure 4-4. 

Process/Participant Complementarity: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133-4):

The complementarity can also be seen in the different kinds of deixis (relation to the here & now) associated with processes on the one hand and participants on the other. A process is made finite — it is pinned down in time, with point of reference in the act of speaking. A participant is made determinate, being held in a location within a referential space. This same distinction also appears in the temporal unfolding of a text, where participants have the potential to persist as discourse referents, but processes are excluded, unless they are turned into honorary participants through the use of grammatical metaphor.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Temporal Unfolding/Persistence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133, 134):

Whatever the mode of occurrence of any figure, it will always unfold in time. This temporal unfolding is construed as an inherent property of the process itself, realised grammatically as tense and aspect; it thus serves to validate the distinction between process and participant. Whereas on the one hand in its manifestation as process, the figure unfolds in time, in its manifestation as participant, on the other hand, it persists through time — whether or not the participant undergoes a change of state. The limiting case is a creative or destructive process, such as writing or erasing a symbol, through which a participant comes into being or ceases to exist. Figure 4-3 illustrates this process/participant complementarity.

Doing-&-Happening And Being-&-Having

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133):

Here we should note finally that the category of doing includes events, so the figure is one of 'doing & happening'; while the category of being includes (i) being in some circumstantial relation, and also (ii) having, itself a special case of (i).

Doing and Being As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132-3):

Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a 'quantum of change'. Construed as doing, the change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result. Consider a causal consequence such as 

[doing:] 'he washed it' —<so>—> [being:] 'It was clean'. 

This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.). Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view. If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result. If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor. The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process. See Figure 4-2.

 

This complementarity between doing and being … is not confined to those figures where the 'being' is of the intensive (qualitative/ quantitative) type; we also find pairs such as

(circumstantial) I put it on the shelf/ it's on the shelf 

they covered the floor with a carpet/ the carpet covers the floor.

(possessive) she's given him a new car/ he has a new car 

Doing vs Being: Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing requires some input to occur. This will typically come from one of the participants involved, the doer (as with voluntary motion); but the source of energy may also be outside the figure (as with falling). No input of energy is required with a figure of being.

Doing vs Being: Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing involves a change over time of occurrence (including maintaining a state in spite of force for change). The change may take place along any one of a number of dimensions: 

(a) circumstantial: spatial (motion or disposition, concrete or abstract); 
(b) intensive: qualitative (colour, size, shape, solidity, etc.), quantitative (increase, decrease); 
(c) possessive (transfer of ownership, loss or accretion of parts); 

(d) existential (creation or destruction). 

In contrast, being does not depend on any change over time. As a figure of being unfolds over time, the only change is that embodied in the temporal unfolding of the process itself. The nature of the actualisation will be the same at any point in time.

Doing And Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing and being do not preclude the involvement of a conscious participant; but they do not require it — and hence do not have the effect of endowing a participant with human-like consciousness. They can be differentiated in terms of two parameters, time and energy, both of which are involved in their actualisation.

Borderline Locations In The Semantic Space Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

There is of course a great deal of indeterminacy here, including such borderline cases as those where sensing and saying are construed as forms of action (and therefore cannot project), e.g. watching, listening, chatting, speaking. These properties reflect the borderline location of such processes in the overall semantic space.

Types Of Figure As Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being): see Figure 4-1.

Sensing vs Saying: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — 'she addressed him'). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser's involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser's consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).

Sensing vs Saying: Constituency Boundaries

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130-1, 131n):

Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him/ asked of him… . In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.

Here there is a subtle difference between sensing and saying in their grammatical realisation by verbal and mental clauses that project reports. In the verbal case, the Receiver is a grammatical constituent of the verbal clause, as in she told him —> to leave. Being a constituent participant, it can serve as Subject in the verbal clause: he was told (by her) —> to leave. However, although the mental case, e.g. she wanted him to leave, looks similar, it is not, since mental clauses do not have a Receiver. The element him is a constituent of the reported clause: she wanted —> him to leave. Consequently, it cannot serve as Subject in the reporting mental clause; we cannot get He was wanted (by her) to leave. The difference also shows up clearly when the projected clause is in the passive voice; contrast the incongruence of she told the car to be washed with the acceptability of she wanted the car to be washed. The analysis shows the difference: she told the car —> to be washed (where the car gets interpreted as Receiver) : she wanted —> the car to be washed.¹

∞ 

¹ As always, there are departures from the general principle. For instance, while 

she asked/told/persuaded/implored/encouraged/promised/threatened the car to be washed 

is incongruent, 

she ordered the car to be washed 

is perfectly fine, which suggests the mental model of the constituency boundary between the projecting and the projected clause — he ordered —> the car to be washed. This gets support from the fact that the car was ordered to be washed is odd.

Symboliser: Senser vs Sayer

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines. The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. Thus in an example such as the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees, the Symboliser has to be interpreted as if it was a conscious being.

The "Symboliser" of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a 'semiotic thing' such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement (see Halliday, 1985:129-30). Thus alongside examples such as 

In the hospital's newsletter, he tells of one patient who stopped a two-week-long bout.

we also find

The British medical Journal The Lancet recently reported a study at Oxford university's John Radcliffe Hospital.

And while the thermometer thinks it is 35 degrees requires a metaphorical reading, the thermometer says it is 35 degrees does not. We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.

Interior vs Exterior Symbolic Processing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

"Symbolic processing" is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed than locutions from experience that is shared.

Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying). The distinction between 'interior' and 'exterior' is reinforced by the internal organisation of figures of sensing and saying.

Symbolic Processing: Sensing And Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-9):

Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying on the one hand and figures of doing and being on the other by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself and the level of the content of sensing/saying. As we put it in Chapter 3, the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying, etc.) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in 'Symboliser;' she + Process:' said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).

The Four Primary Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128, 129):

The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant roles: see Table 4(1).

The Configuration Of A Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:

(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and

(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants.

To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.

Two Complementary Perspectives On A Figure: Composition And Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time. We can recognise here two complementary perspectives on a figure: composition, and time.

Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being "units" means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts. In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.

Concomitantly, figures take place in time; but the temporal aspect of a figure is typically construed in association with one particular element, the process. We shall therefore deal with this aspect of figures under the heading of process, in the context of our discussion of elements. For the remainder of this chapter we concentrate on the compositional aspect of figures.

Expansion And Projection As Trans-phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain the logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially. For example, projection manifested within a sequence: Brutus said Caesar was ambitious; projection manifested within a simple figure: According to Brutus, Caesar was ambitious. This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

The Extent To Which Semantics And Grammar Are In Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in course of realisation. 

One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures (on the reading 'separately': 'Henry went to the movies and Anne went to the movies') or a sequence of elements (on the reading 'together': 'Henry and Anne went to the movies'). This was, of course, an area investigated in terms of transformational grammar with different deep structures posited for the readings 'separately' and 'together'. 

It is clear that there are grammatical group complexes which cannot be expanded semantically as sequences of figures; for example, Henry and Anne chatted is not likely to be a grammatical compression of 'Henry chatted and Anne chatted'; rather, it is agnate with Henry chatted with Anne. In such cases the problem of ambiguity does not arise.

A Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. Thus instead of Schank conceived of scripts and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a sequence of figures where there are two processes of conception, we get Schank and Abelson conceived of scripts as a solution to this problem, a single figure with a sequence of elements (serving as Senser of a single process). Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related: see Figure 3-11.

The Domain Of The Relation Between Figures In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

We have identified two primary types of sequence (ways of relating figures), projection and expansion; and with both of these the figures that are related may be either equal or unequal in status. To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of the expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. 

But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause (Mary could never feel comfortable with him, which was perfectly understandable) or some element within the clause (Mary, who was very sensitive, could never feel comfortable with him).

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [3]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

(in) In addition, one or more of the figures in the clause may be realised by something 'less than' a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: 

as a child, he was very shy 'when he was a child, he was very shy'. 

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course: melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been 'shrunk' by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [2]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

(ii) On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence. This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind (see Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4): an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c) is 'upgraded' to the status of a projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don't suppose || there's very much 'there is probably not'

I think || I might have walked out too from all the accounts 'I probably might have'

Dissociation Of Sequence And Clause Complex [1]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124-5):

As we noted in Chapter 1, Section 1.5, semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory we discussed). In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together. The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.

(i) On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of this particular text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. Here is a very simple example of a sequence which is realised by two clause complexes:

Prepare and cook the potatoes in sea-salted water to which has been added lemon juice. Drain and serve with melted butter, a few shreds of lemon rind, a squeeze of lemon juice and chopped parsley.

The sequence has been grouped into two clause complexes in the grammar. However, this grouping is by no means arbitrary; it serves to indicate the two major phases of the preparation of new potatoes with lemon. In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly disassociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice. (The significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)

Sequences Of Interactional Moves

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124):

We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logical-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts: see Phillips, 1985, 1986; Halliday, 1993a.) In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text: see Figure 3-10…

Text Organisation And The Interaction Base

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors. 

But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences of figures in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition ('I invite you to accept x, if you want x'; for example: If you're thirsty, there's beer in the fridge) and evidence ('I think, infer/ you should believe x because y'; for example: John's in Germany because I just talked to him).

Sequences As One Principle For Organising Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):

Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text. For example, the culinary procedure for making cauliflower surprise constitutes one text. Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as 'macro-figures', i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).

Sequence And Text Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in terms of the relations that connect happening with another. Hence sequences can be used to store information about the world in the form of organised text— 'this is how to change tyres on your car', 'this is how to make cauliflower surprise', etc.. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognisable text type, such as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in most of our culturally recognised modes of discourse.

 

Blogger Comments:

In SFL Theory, text type is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. Text types can be identified according to the MODE that they realise (e.g. procedure, proof, explanation, episodic narrative) — MODE being the textual dimension of context: the rôle of language in a situation.

Constraints On Logico-Semantic Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Thus sequences are formed by binary logico-semantic relations which may relate either single figures or sequences of figures. Certain relations may impose constraints on the phenomena being related; for example, a projecting relation can only obtain when the first figure is one of sensing or saying. But the range of different logico-semantic relations is highly varied, so that constraints tend to be specific to particular subtypes.

The Relational Character Of Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

In the overview, we introduced two distinct types of structure — the relational organisation of sequences, and the configurational organisation of figures. In contrast to figures, sequences are not constructional units. We can specify the range of projecting and expanding relations available for further developing a sequence, but we cannot specify where a sequence has to come to an end — that is, we cannot specify a sequence as a unit whole with a conventional configuration of parts. Thus if we have expanded one figure we can always repeat the operation:

A then B

A then B then C

A then B then C then D …

In contrast, a figure is a unit with a finite number of elements:

B follows A

Hence a sequence can be indefinitely complex, whereas a figure cannot.

Indeterminacy Between Expansion And Projection: Condition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119):

Finally, the distinction between expansion and projection is less determinate than we have suggested. The logico-semantic relation of condition, which is prototypically construed as a form of enhancement, could also be construed as a kind of projection; and this is also brought out in the grammar. Conditions specify a potential and actualisable but non-actual situation. This potential situation can also be set up through projection:

If the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Supposing the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Say the power supply fails, what's the best thing to do?

Words such as supposing and assuming are verbs of projection which have come to function as conjunctions in conditional figures; while other words such as imagine and say retain more of their projecting force. Sometimes even variants of the same word have come to differ a little in their location on this cline: for example, suppose and assume seem closer to projection than their corresponding participial variants. This is an uncertain region in which a figure hangs in the air, so to speak, suspended between the hypothetical material plane and the semiotic one.

Blogger Comments:

Cf Imagine if that were true and What if that were true.

Realisations Of Expansion Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118-9):

Relations of expansion are typically realised in the grammar by conjunctions or conjunctive expressions linking a pair of clauses, either paratactically or hypotactically (e.g. that is, in other words; and, but, or, also, besides; so, yet, then, when, if, because, unless). Some of these may realise more than one category; for example, 

but may be adversative 'and yet' (extending), or concessive 'and in spite of this' (enhancing);  

while may be additive 'and in addition' (extending), or temporal 'and at the same time' (enhancing);  

or may be alternative 'or else' (extending: alternatives in the external world, like take it or leave it), or restating 'in other words' (elaborating: alternatives in the world 'internal' to the discourse, like they are reduced to the smallest size, or microminiaturised.). 

Overlaps in realisation of this kind show that the primary categories we have set up do in fact shade into one another; in particular, extending in some sense occupies a space intermediate between elaborating and enhancing, and shares a fuzzy borderline with each.

Examples Of The Principal Categories Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

The following passage of spontaneous conversation exemplifies the principal categories of expansion (note than it also contains one example of projection):

KEY: parataxis [equal]: 1, 2; hypotaxis [unequal]: 𝛂, 𝛃); elaboration: =; extension: +; enhancement: x. (Taken from Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:430.)

The Cline From Sequence To Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

There is no sharp line between a figure and a sequence of figures: a quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed, and the grammar rather sets up a cline from sequence to simple figure. (This is, in fact, a variable across languages; we shall return to this point from a cross-linguistic point of view in Chapter 6.) For example:

Expansion: Limiting Cases

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117-8):

From one standpoint the limiting case of expansion would be accumulation in a temporal sequence (hence our general term "sequence" for the product of this construal): 'a happens, then x happens'. This gives value to a as the temporal circumstance of x. From this we could derive a wide range of more complex enhancing relations: variations on the simple temporal sequence (after, before, at the same time, immediately after, &c.) and further circumstances such as cause, condition, concession, and their subcategories.

We shall not try to enumerate these here; they are familiar as categories at the level of lexicogrammar (see Halliday, 1985: Ch. 7; Matthiessen, I995b: Ch. 3). These are 'enhancements', multiplying one figure by another, as it were. But figures may also be added to one another, making them part of the same story without assigning any kind of logical priority to either: 'x as well as/instead of/in contradistinction to a'. We have referred to these as extensions. And there is the third type of accumulation where the logical relation is that of 'equals': 'x is the same figure as a'. Here at this end the limiting case is a simple repetition; this may be further elaborated in such a way that one figure is reworded as another, or else further clarified or brought out by an example.

Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion can be thought of as construing another dimension of experience, so that superimposed, as it were, on the construal of a figure — a basic fragment of experience in the form of a quantum of change (event, action, behaviour &c.) — is the construal of a nexus between two figures, such that one such fragment is non-randomly (i.e. meaningfully) cumulated with another.

Sequences: Expansion Relations Between Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion is a highly generalised type of relation, whereby one figure is joined logico-semantically to another figure by a relator to form a sequence of the same order of reality. It will be easier to characterise expansion at the next step in delicacy, in terms of its immediate subtypes: elaborate (reiterate), extend (add), and enhance (qualify):

(i) elaboration is a (partial) identity relation between figures: one is identified with another with a difference in perspective (it matters a lot; it plays an important role) or one is included under another as an example (it plays an important role; e.g., it provides the infrastructure). These are clearly related to one another: identity is the limiting case of inclusion and inclusion is partial identity.

(ii) extension is an additive relation between figures: a sequence is made bigger by the addition of another figure. This may involve pure addition ('and': he is too young and he doesn't speak the language) or addition with an adversative feature ('and yet': he speaks the language but he is too young ). As a variant of addition, we also have alternation (he is too young or else he is just immature).

(iii) enhancement is a circumstantial or qualifying relation between figures: it is, in a sense, extension plus a circumstantial feature — 'and' + time ('and then', 'and at the same time', etc.), 'and' + manner ('and in the same way', 'and likewise'), 'and' + cause ('and therefore', etc.), etc.: it is autumn, so the leaves are turning brown.

The Possibilities Of Projecting Sequences Summarised

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 116):

To sum up the distinctions discussed so far. In a projecting sequence, a figure of thinking or saying projects another figure as an idea or a locution, either of which may be a proposition or a proposal: see Figure 3-8.

Proposals Metaphorically Realised By Modulated Indicative Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115-6):

We saw that quoted offers may be realised by modulated indicative clauses. This would seem to be an exception to the generalisation that indicative clauses realise propositions. However, it is a principled one: the type of indicative clause involved is precisely the type that lies closer in the interpersonal clause grammar to imperative clauses — modulated indicative clauses, i.e. those with an imperative modality. As can be expected, this is then also a possible realisation of commands; it is a metaphorical strategy for expanding the meaning potential, typically to vary the tenor between speaker and listener. For example:

she told him: "Do the laundry!"; "You should do the laundry."

she asked him: "Could you do the laundry?"

Commands can be reported in the same way:

she told him —> to do the laundry.

she told him —> he should do the laundry.

she asked him —> whether he could do the laundry.

Quoted vs Reported Offers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Quoted offers naturally retain the property of being variously realised in the mood system:

declarative: She said: "I can do the laundry."

interrogative: She said: "Shall I do the laundry?"

imperative: She said: "Let me do the laundry!"

However, reported offers can always be realised in the same way as reported commands — as in the case of reported propositions, the distinction in orientation between giving and demanding is realised by the projecting clause; for example:

command: she told him —> to do the laundry

offer: she offered (promised; threatened) —> to do the laundry

The category of reported projected proposal is thus realised generally as a perfective non-finite clause when it is reported.

Offers: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative), offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:

declarative: I can do the laundry.

interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?

imperative: Let me do the laundry!

Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation (see e.g. Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4).

Reported Projections: Speech Function And Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114-5):

As was said above, in quoting, where the projected clause retains its mood, the general verb say can be used whatever speech function is being projected. In reporting, on the other hand, the projected clause is no longer specified for mood; its speech function is signalled by the verb in the projecting clause (asked, ordered, etc.). This gives the projected element more of an ideational status (cf. its treatment in traditional grammar as "object" of the projecting verb), and opens up the way to a series of agnate expressions such as (the king ordered) "Execute him!" / that he should be executed / him to be executed/him executed/his execution.

Grammatical Realisations Of Projected Propositions vs Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Grammatically the distinction between propositions and proposals is constructed as follows.

When the projection is reported, propositions are realised by finite bound clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by irrealis (infinitival) non-finite bound clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above: 

(he said) that he had done the laundry : (she told him) to do the laundry.

When the projection is quoted, propositions are realised by indicative clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by imperative clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above: 

(he said) "I have done the laundry" : (she said to him) "do the laundry". 

These realisational patterns are summarised below:

Projected Proposals (Non-Actual) vs Projected Propositions (Actual)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Projected proposals are non-actual, or uninstantiated: that is, the occurrence of a projected proposal is always future in relation to the figure that projects it. In contrast, propositions are actual, or instantiated: that is, the occurrence of a proposition is located in actual time (which may be past, present or future).

Projected Propositions vs Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

The interpersonal system for dialogic interaction thus creates a fundamental distinction between 'content' as proposition and 'content' as proposal. This distinction is then reflected in the ideational system of projection: a figure is projected in one or other of these two modes, as a proposition or as a proposal. The two categories combine freely with ideas and locutions:

Blogger Comments:

The table confusingly presents verbally reported locutions as ideas. Instances of genuine reported ideas are:

• he thought —> that he had done the laundry (proposition)
• she wanted him  —> to do the laundry (proposal).

'Proposition ideas' are projected by cognitive mental Processes, whereas 'proposal ideas' are projected by desiderative mental Processes.

Proposition (Information) vs Proposal (Goods-&-Services)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113-4):

Information is either given or demanded; in either case it is encoded as a proposition. Similarly, goods & services are either given or demanded, but the linguistic act is a mediating one, specifying the (typically non-linguistic) action that embodies the exchange, as an offer to do or a demand that something should be done. This is a proposal for a deed, one that commits either the speaker (giving) or the addressee (demanding); together with a third type, which is a combination of these two, viz. suggestion: Let's do the laundry.

Interpersonal Semantics: Semiotic vs Material Commodities of Exchange

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113):

Interpersonal semantics is centrally concerned with varieties of symbolic exchange. Here, as in other places in the meaning base, the system is organised in such a way that it creates a difference between non-symbolic reality and symbolic reality, between phenomena and metaphenomena. The "commodity" that is being exchanged in interpersonal dialogue is either semiotic or material: it is either one that is construed by language itself — information — or it is one that exists independently of language — goods & services. In the first case, language constitutes the exchange; in the second, it facilitates the exchange of a nonlinguistic commodity. For example:

No Temporal Constraints On Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

In general, there is no temporal constraint between the projected and the projecting figures: the projected figure may be past, present or future relative to the projecting one. The dimension affected by projection [is] order of reality, not time. However, there is a major dichotomy between two types of projection which does have temporal implications. To explore it, we have to look briefly at a fundamental interpersonal category, that of mood.

Default Alignments: Quoted Locutions And Reported Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111-2):

The second consequence is that although the two variables, locution/idea and quoting/reporting, can combine in either of the two possible alignments, there is a natural default condition, which is that locution goes with quoting and idea goes with reporting, as shown in Figure 3-6. 

The reason for this is clear where the first-order phenomenon is one of saying (prototypically shared semiosis), the projected figure can be presented as if it was also of the same order: Harriet said + "Shall I feed the cat?" (reversible as "Shall I feed the cat?" + said Harriet). 

Where the first-order phenomenon is one of sensing (unshared semiosis), the projected figure has no counterpart on the first-order plane of experience and cannot be naturally presented as if it had; so, Harriet wondered + whether she should feed the cat. 

But there is always the possibility of semogenic extension by cross-coupling; so we also find the corresponding marked alignments: locution/report Harriet asked + whether she should feed the cat, and idea/quote Harriet wondered + "Shall I feed the cat?" — the latter being again reversible. See Halliday (1985: Chapter 7) and Nesbitt & Plum (1988).

Quoting vs Reporting: Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

There are two consequences of this. The first is that, in quoting, the form of wording is still that of the first-order realm of experience: "Shall I feed the cat ?" — taken by itself, there is nothing about this to show it is a projection. In reporting, on the other hand, the form of wording is clearly marked as being of the second order: whether she should feed the cat has lost its first-order semantic features — and hence has to be projected by words that specify its particular speech function: asked/wondered, not said/thought.

Equal vs Unequal Semantic Weight: Quoting vs Reporting

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

But there is another variable intersecting with the above. We pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 that whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. We illustrated this interdependency system with reference to expansion; but it applies also to projection. The projecting and the projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting, as in Harriet said/thought "Shall I feed the cat?". Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting, as in (Harriet asked/wondered) whether she should feed the cat. 

We can relate this to the fact that projection is the creating of a second-order reality. In reporting, the status of the two parts is unequal — the projected figure is dependent on the projecting: hence the projected figure is clearly construed as belonging to a different, second-order plane of reality — a reality that is made of meaning, as it were. In quoting, on the other hand, the two have equal status as independent figures; the projected figure is thus projected as if it was still part of the same first-order reality.

Symbolic Processing: Sensing vs Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 110-1):

Let us look more closely at these two modes of projecting, in both of which the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, the processing that brings the other figure into symbolic existence. Either the projection takes the prototypical form of semiosis: it is presented as verbal, shared, an exchange or joint construction of meanings (e.g. Harriet said 'me feed cat?'); or it is fashioned into a derived semiotic form, unshared, interiorised, and without any meaning being exchanged (e.g. Harriet thought 'me feed cat?'). In the first, the projecting figure is one of saying; the projected is referred to as locution. In the second, the projecting figure is one of sensing; the projected is referred to as idea. Ideas are projections which are sensed, locutions are projections which are said.

Thinking Ideas (Meanings) vs Saying Locutions (Wordings)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 109, 110):

In (i) the 'content' of his thinking is the meaning. It remains internal to his consciousness and unrealised, i.e. unworded. In (ii) the 'content' of his saying is the wording. It has been externalised, realised as a wording. We will refer to these in the context of projection as (i) ideas and (ii) locutions. The contrast between these two statuses of projected figures is typically reflected in the shape of balloons in comic strip projections: see Figure 3-5.

Projected Content: Meaning (Idea) vs Wording (Locution)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 109, 110):

We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording: see Figure 3-4.

Projected Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108-9):

We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of 'content': see Figure 3-3.

Conscious And Non-Conscious Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106-7, 108):

We could say that the world view that is constructed in this way is (quite reasonably, from our point of view) focussed on humans, with human consciousness occupying a privileged place. Thus typically only humans can project into second-order reality. However, since human consciousness is the locus of semiotic activity, it has the power of interpreting as metaphenomenon that which is manifested by some other, non-conscious symbolic source. Thus while "sensing" (that is, semiotic activity that is unmanifested, like thinking) does require a human senser, saying can be ascribed to a nonhuman as well as to a human sayer (cf. he thinks —> the moon is a balloon vs he says/the book says —> the moon is a balloon. Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between the two orders of metaphenomena and the presence of consciousness in the act of projection.

Expansion vs Projection In Comic Strip Conventions

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106, 107):

We can explore this distinction through the conventions of comic strips. Expansions are typically represented pictorially by means of consecutive frames — 'x then y', 'x so y', 'x meanwhile y', and so on (the relationship is sometimes spelt out in writing, e.g. Meanwhile... ). 

We can even identify the three different kinds of expansion, those of elaborating, extending, and enhancing. When further detail is given in a picture of a magnifying glass, this is elaboration; where two frames are joined to form a continuous picture, this suggests extension; otherwise, consecutive frames display a relation of enhancement But in all cases the representation is pictorial throughout. 

In contrast, projections involve two modes: the projecting figure is represented pictorially as the symbol source, but the projected figure is represented linguistically and this second-order reality is typically named within a 'balloon'. … The two types of relation can be shown as in Figure 3-1.

Expansion vs Projection In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

This differentiation is embodied in relations of sequence in the following way. Either a sequential relation expands one figure by adding another one to it, the two still remaining at the same phenomenal level; or the sequential relation projects one of the two figures onto the plane of second-older, semiotic phenomena, so that it enters the realm of metaphenomena (meanings or wordings). This is the distinction between expansion and projection. For example, 

expansion: highs will be mid-8Os to mid-90s —> but parts of Texas could reach the 100s; 

projection: the forecast predicts —> "parts of Texas could reach the 100s".

Two Orders Of Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

Instead of referring to formal logic, let us ask what kind of construal of experience is embodied in semantic sequences. 

Throughout the semantic construal of human experience, there is a differentiation between two orders of reality: between the everyday reality of our material existence on the one hand and on the other hand the second-order reality that is brought into existence only by the system of language. This is a contrast between semiotic phenomena, those of meanings and wordings, and the first-order phenomena that constitute our material environment. (Note that the linguistic processes themselves, as apprehended by our senses, are part of the first-order reality; second-order reality is formed of the meanings and the wordings that these processes bring into being.)

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, if meaning is immanent, then both first-order phenomena/reality and second-order phenomena/reality are construals of experience as meaning.

Characterising Sequences By Reference To Propositional Logic?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105-6):

In a restricted register, such as those of weather forecasts and recipes, it may be possible to define sequential relations more precisely; but that is only because these registers are special cases, rather in the same way that the applications of propositional logic are special cases.

One might try to characterise sequences by reference to propositional logic; this would give some indication of what type of knowledge representation system is embodied in this domain of ideational semantics. However, such a characterisation would be likely to distort our understanding of sequences, because sequences cover and organise a considerably larger domain of the ideational semantic space than propositional logic attempts to do.

Why Natural Logic Differs From Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105):

Both the difference in scope and the difference in 'definability' can be explained in functional terms. 

Sequences have evolved in the interpretation of human experience in general; consequently, they have to be flexible and powerful enough to cope with a large amount of variation, and the implicit 'definition' of each relation (i.e., its location in the semantic system along various dimensions) is the evolving distillation of innumerable instances where it is invoked (for a revealing account of how sequences may construe rationality in everyday talk, see Hasan, 1992). 

In contrast, the truth-functional connectives of propositional logic have been designed for a very restricted purpose — the kind of deductive reasoning western philosophy came to focus on — and their definitions are fixed by reference to values of "true" and "false" (by means of truth tables).