Semantic Systems Realised In More Than One Grammatical Domain: Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 666):

Every lexicogrammatical system realises some semantic system. For example, we have seen that the grammatical system of MOOD [clause] realises the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION [proposition/proposal]. Here one lexicogrammatical domain, the clause, corresponds to one semantic domain, the proposition/proposal. In addition, there are semantic systems that are realised by grammatical systems operating in more than one place in the grammar. These semantic domains range over two or more grammatical domains, spanning two or more grammatical units, as in the case of MODALITY noted above.

Metaphorical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 665):

(ii) On the other hand, there are realignments in the realisational relationship between semantic units and grammatical ones. According to Table 10-1, a sequence is realised by a clause complex; the combination of a figure, a proposition/proposal and a message is realised by a clause; and we could add further realisational correspondences: for example, a participant is realised by a nominal group, a process by a verbal group and a circumstance by an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. But once these couplings between the two strata of the content plane have been established, ‘cross-couplings’ become theoretically possible. 

For example, while sequences are realised by clause complexes and figures by clauses, it is theoretically possible that, under certain conditions, sequences would be realised by clauses – that is, as if they were figures. This is the possibility of metaphorical realisation, which has been taken up in English and many other languages, creating a more complex relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar than the one shown in Table 10-1. 

For example, instead of saying we and this common homeland are spiritually and physically united, so we were deeply pained as we saw ..., we can say that spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw .... But the two forms of realisation are not, of course, synonymous, so the effect is one of expanding the meaning potential of the language.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 665):

(i) On the one hand, there are semantic domains that range over more than a single grammatical unit. Thus the semantic domain of modality is realised in more than one place in the grammar; for example, it is realised by ‘mental’ clauses such as I suppose and by ‘relational’ clauses such as it is possible, by verbal groups with finite modal operators such as may and by adverbial groups with modal adverbs such as perhaps. These modal patterns within different grammatical units are not interchangeable synonyms; they have distinct values within the overall semantic system of modality. As we shall see below, while the forms above can all realise ‘low probability’, I think is explicitly subjective, it is possible is explicitly objective, may is implicitly subjective and perhaps is implicitly objective. This means that the semantic system of modality is more extensive than the modal features of any one given grammatical unit would suggest; it is realised not by a single grammatical unit but by a range of units: semantic unit a ↘ grammatical units m, n & o.

Summary Of Semantic Units In Relation To Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 664, 665):

The account that we have outlined is summarised in Table 10-1. The table shows the intersection of two content strata (semantics and lexicogrammar) with the three metafunctions. Within each metafunction there are semantic patterns that are intermediate between (1) the local semantic units that are realised by the clause and the clause complex and (2) the global semantic unit, i.e. the text.

Table 10-1 shows how semantic units are mapped onto grammatical ones. The principle is that of rank-based constituency – semantic unit a ↘ grammatical unit m; the key grammatical unit is the clause, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 10-1. But while this is the foundation on which the relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is based, there are two other principles affecting this relationship, making it more complicated but also extending the meaning potential of language: (i) transgrammatical semantic domains – domains of meaning extending across different grammatical units, and (ii) metaphor – incongruent realisational relations between semantics and lexicogrammar.

Intermediate Ideational Semantic Units: Episodic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 663):

Ideational. Figures combine to form sequences; and these, in turn, may combine to form episodic patterns, as in narratives and other chronologically organised texts or chronological passages within other kinds of text.

Intermediate Interpersonal Semantic Units: Patterns Of Exchange

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661, 663):

Interpersonal. Propositions/proposals combine to form patterns of exchange involving two or more interactants… . At least in some registers such as interviews, classroom discourse and quiz shows, the patterns are regular and predictable enough to appear to be compositional in nature: interpersonal units of exchange consisting of certain sequences of propositions/proposals. But whatever the status is of such exchange patterning, the critical point is that it is interpersonal rather than textual or ideational, and that it is intermediate between propositions/proposals and the whole text.

Intermediate Textual Semantic Units: Information Flow Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661):

Textual. Messages combine to form periodic movements of information… . Such phases of messages help construct the flow of information as the text unfolds and we can refer to them simply as information flow patterns.

Intermediate Semantic Units

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661):

What is intermediate in the semantics between text on the one hand and message, proposition/proposal and figure on the other hand? Messages, propositions/proposals and figures can combine with units of the same metafunctional type to form more extensive semantic patterns in the creation of text. These patterns are distinct for each metafunction.

Semantic Units Realised By The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661, 662):

However, even though we have to leave open the question of whether there is a single semantic compositional scale or more than one, we can say something about the lower region of such a scale or such scales. This is the region where semantic units are realised by lexicogrammatical ones. We have already referred to these semantic units throughout the book, and the principle that emerges here is the familiar metafunctional one. The clause is a multifunctional construct in the grammar, one that realises three different semantic units, one for each metafunction: textual – message, interpersonal – proposition/proposal, and experiential – figure. These relationships are shown in Figure 10-1: the three semantic units deriving from the three metafunctions are all mapped onto the clause, which thus unifies the three metafunctional strands of meaning.

A Single Compositional Scale For Semantics?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 660-1):

The upper bound of the semantic stratum is, as we have said, the text: this is the most extensive unit of meaning. The upper bound of the lexicogrammatical system is the clause: this is the most extensive unit of wording. In the grammar, there is a single, generalised compositional scale – the grammatical rank scale (clause – group/phrase – word – morpheme); and we can specify not only the upper and lower bounds of this scale – the clause and the morpheme, respectively – but also the intermediate units of patterning: group/phrase and word. But in the semantics, it is far from clear whether there is a single compositional scale: such a scale would have to be generalised across all registerial varieties of a language, but we know that texts vary considerably from one register to another. It is quite possible that different registers operate with different compositional scales; for example, one such scale was identified in the organisation of class room discourse by Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) and another in the organisation of certain types of conversation by Cloran (1994). This issue can only be settled after a great deal more research into the semantics of text has been carried out.

Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 660):

A text is thus a unit of meaning – more accurately, a unit in the flow of meaning that is always taking place at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. How does this semantic unit relate to the units and unit complexes of grammar – the clause (clause complex), the groups (group complexes) and so on? The folk view is that a text consists of clauses (or ‘sentences’); but this is a misleading simplification of a more indirect – but much more flexible and powerful – relationship. A text does not ‘consist of’ clauses (clause complexes) – there is no part-whole or ‘constituency’ relationship between a text and a clause (complex) and there is no single rank scale with text and clause as ranks. Rather a text is realised by clauses (clause complexes), the two being located on different strata – semantics (the stratum of meaning) and lexicogrammar (the stratum of wording) respectively.

Blogger Comments:

It is important to understand (and maintain) the difference between a text as semantic unit, and text as an instance of language. A text as semantic unit is the highest unit on the semantic stratum, and so, realised by the clauses of lexicogrammar. A text as an instance of language is an instance of language as a whole, not just the semantic stratum.

Logogenetic Patterns And Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 659-60):

Through the accumulation of logogenetic patterns and through the resources of cohesion, lexicogrammar makes a considerable contribution to the development of patterns in a text that extend beyond a single grammatical unit such as the clause, or even a complex of units such as the clause complex; and this is, of course, why lexicogrammatical analysis of a text can tell us so much about how it works. The patterns that are developed in this way are, however, patterns of meaning, not patterns of wording; they are patterns at the level of semantics rather than at the level of lexicogrammar. This is so because text is, as we have emphasised, a semantic phenomenon in the first instance; it is meaning unfolding in some particular context of situation. For example, the grammatical system of conjunction gives speakers and writers the resources to mark transitions in the development of a text – i.e., to mark rhetorical relations used to expand the text step by step; and the rhetorical relations that are marked in this way by conjunctions are semantic relations organising the text as a flow of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

A logogenetic pattern is a pattern of instantiation; that is, a pattern of feature selection and realisation statement activation. Different patterns identify different texts, and different patterns of patterns identify difference 'above' the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. A logogenetic pattern thus includes selections from the lexicogrammatical system of cohesion.

The System Of Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 659):

… lexicogrammar has evolved textual resources for creating cohesive links that have the ability to indicate semantic relationships in the unfolding text beyond the domain of grammar. These resources are known collectively as the system of COHESION. Cohesion includes (1) the system of CONJUNCTION for marking textual transitions in the unfolding of text and (2) the systems of REFERENCE, ELLIPSIS & SUBSTITUTION, and LEXICAL COHESION for giving elements different textual statuses in the unfolding of text.

Logogenetic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 659):

… in the course of unfolding of text, lexicogrammatical selections create logogenetic patterns at all ranks. This is patterning in the text that has nothing to do with composition or size: instead of composition (the relationship between a whole and its parts), the patterning is based on instantiation (the relationship between an instance and a generalised instance type). The patterning represents a slight move up this cline from the single instance to a pattern of instances, as in a news report where one projecting verbal clause after another is selected until this emerges as a favourite clause type. The logogenetic patterns that emerge as a text unfolds form a transient system that is specific to that text; but from repeated patterns over many such transient systems may, in turn, emerge a generalised system characteristic of a certain type of text or register.

The Complementarity Of Clause Complexing And Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 655, 657):

These two resources complement one another in the grammatical realisation of transitions in text. The general principle of complementarity is this: clause complexing does relatively more work locally, while conjunction does relatively more work non-locally and even globally. Clause complexing ‘choreographs’ the local development of text by means of univariate structure, indicating both taxis and type of logico-semantic relation. Conjunction can work together with clause complexing, reinforcing local relations, but it tends to take over from clause complexing as the relations become less local and more global. Looked at from the point of view of lexicogrammar, this means that the local organisation tends to be ‘tighter’ whereas the more global organisation tends to be ‘looser’. At the same time, looked at from the point of view of context, the more global organisation is subject to more contextual guidance in the form of generic structure. In this way, grammar and context complement one another in their contributions to the semantic organisation of text. …

However, this pattern of complementarity varies significantly across registers. In particular, in unselfconscious spoken text, clause complexing does relatively more work and conjunction relatively less. Here clause complexes can extend well beyond local relations, reaching a span of up to 20 to 30 clauses. Conversely, in planned written text, clause complexing does relatively less work and conjunction relatively more.

Textual Transitions: Conjunction And Clause Complexing

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 655):

While textual statuses are assigned to components of messages, textual transitions hold between whole messages, or groups of whole messages. Such transitions may, of course, be left to the listener or reader to infer, without the help of any explicit markers; but they may also be marked explicitly by means of textual or logical resources. The textual resource for indicating such transitions is the system of CONJUNCTION. Here the type of relation is indicated, but there is no distinction between paratactic and hypotactic relations. The logical resource combines type of relation with TAXIS in the univariate structure of clause complexing.

Textual Status And Lexical Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 654):

Unlike REFERENCE and ELLIPSIS, the resource of LEXICAL COHESION is, in general, neutral with respect to textual statuses; that is why we have not included it in Table 9-4. A given lexical item can be assigned any of the textual statuses; it is not predisposed to any particular status. Similarly, a given lexical relation is also neutral with respect to textual statuses. However, a particular lexical chain in a text is very likely to show some systematic pattern in relation to textual status.

Textual Statuses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 652):

The systems of THEME, INFORMATION, REFERENCE and ELLIPSIS are all concerned with textual statuses. Speakers assign these statuses to components of messages to help themselves produce texts and to help their listeners interpret them. These textual statuses are independently variable. For example, thematic status may be combined with either given or new, and the same is true of rhematic status. However, there are certain unmarked combinations: in the unmarked case, Theme is Given and New falls within Rheme. The thematic statuses and the favoured combinations are shown in Figure 9-5.

Textual Grammatical Resources Viewed 'From Above'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 650, 652):

Looked at ‘from below’, these textual resources fall into two categories – those that engender grammatical structure (theme and information) and those that do not (conjunction, reference, ellipsis, lexical cohesion). Looked at ‘from above’, these textual resources are concerned either with textual transitions between messages or with textual statuses of components (elements) of these messages. These two classificatory perspectives are intersected in Table 9-19. 

The table indicates that structural and cohesive resources work together in the marking of textual transitions and in the marking of textual statuses. In the latter case, all the resources are indeed textual; but in the former, the structural resources are logical rather than textual – the logical relations of clause complexing. … The table does not include lexical cohesion. This is like reference and ellipsis in that it involves components of messages rather than whole messages; but it often works together with conjunction in the creation of relations in text. We shall thus have occasion to refer to it both in our discussion of textual statuses and in our discussion of textual transitions.

The Textual Resources Of The Lexicogrammar Of English

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 650):

We have identified the following features as those which combine to make up the textual resources of the lexicogrammar of English:

(A) structural

1 thematic structure: Theme and Rheme
2 information structure and focus: Given and New

(B) cohesive

1 conjunction
2 reference
3 ellipsis (that is, ellipsis and substitution)
4 lexical cohesion

Collocation: Register Variation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 650):

Notice, finally, that collocations are often fairly specifically associated with one or another particular register, or functional variety of the language. This is true, of course, of individual lexical items, many of which we regard as ‘technical’ because they appear exclusively, or almost exclusively, in one kind of text. But it is also noteworthy that perfectly ordinary lexical items often appear in different collocations according to the text variety. For example, hunting, in a story of the English aristocracy, will call up quarry and hounds (or, at another level, shooting and fishing); in an anthropological text, words like gathering, agricultural and pastoral; as well as, in other contexts, bargain, souvenir, fortune and such-like.

Collocation: Types Of Relation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 649):

In general, the semantic basis of many instances of collocation is the relation of enhancement, as with dine + restaurant, table; fry + pan; bake + oven. These are circumstantial relationships (for collocations involving Process + Manner: degree, e.g. love + deeply, want + badly, understand + completely), but as the example with smoke + pipe illustrates, participant + process relationships also form the basis of collocation – the most important ones involving either Process + Range (e.g. play + musical instrument: piano, violin, etc.; grow + old) or Process + Medium (e.g. shell + peas, twinkle + star, polish + shoes); and there are also combinations involving functions in the nominal group, in particular, Epithet + Thing (e.g. strong + tea, heavy + traffic, powerful + argument) and Facet + Thing (e.g. pod + wales, flock + birds, school + fish, herd + cattle, gaggle + geese).

While we can typically find a semantic basis to collocation in this way, the relationship is at the same time a direct association between the words; if pipe is in the text then smoke may well be somewhere around, at least with considerably greater probability than if we just pulled words out of a hat on the basis of their overall frequency in the language. We get ready for it, so to speak; and hence if it does occur it is strongly cohesive (cf. Hoey’s, 2005, notion of lexical priming).

Collocation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 648-9):

At the same time there are other instances of lexical cohesion that do not depend on any general semantic relationship of the types just discussed, but rather on a particular association between the items in question – a tendency to co-occur. This ‘co-occurrence tendency’ is known as collocation. For example,

A little fat man of Bombay
Was smoking one very hot day.
But a bird called a snipe
Flew away with his pipe,
Which vexed the fat man of Bombay.

There is a strong collocational bond between smoke and pipe, which makes the occurrence of pipe in line 4 cohesive. Clearly there is a semantic basis to a collocation of this kind; a pipe is something you smoke, and the words pipe and smoke are typically related as Range to Process in a behavioural process clause. Hence pipe here will be interpreted as ‘the pipe that he was smoking at the time’.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, smoke is not a behavioural Process, if only because pipe is not a Behaviour (the Range of a behavioural Process).

Meronymy vs Hyponymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 648):

There is no very clear line between meronymy and hyponymy, especially with abstract terms; and a given set of items may be co-hyponyms of one term but co-meronyms of another – for example, chair, table, bed are ‘kinds’ (hyponyms) of furniture, but ‘parts’ (meronyms) of furnishings; forward, half-back, back are ‘kinds’ of players but ‘parts’ of a team, and so on. But since either relationship is a source of lexical cohesion it is not necessary to insist on deciding between them.

Meronymy: Examples

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 648):

The occurrence of any pair of items within the set will be cohesive; for example

||| On the left of the park lies the Exhibition Centre [[ which covers a massive 25,000 square metres of column-free space under the one roof]] . ||| Opened in January 1988, || the Centre is designed to hold major international exhibitions. ||| The glassed eastern facade is stepped back in five separate stages [[ that can be partitioned off to form smaller halls]]. ||| The fifth hall is linked by covered walkway to the Convention Centre. ||| 

||| Elfrida had a beautiful little glass scent-bottle. ||| She had used up all the scent long ago; || but she often used to take the little stopper out ||| ... 

||| She knelt down || and looked along the passage into the loveliest garden [[ you ever saw]] . ||| How she longed to get out of that dark hall, || and wander about among those beds of bright flowers and those cool fountains, || ... 

where roof, facade, hall are meronyms of centre, stopper is a meronym of bottle, and flowers and fountains are co-meronyms of garden.

Hyponymy vs Meronymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 647-8):

The general sense of hyponymy is ‘be a kind of’, as in ‘fruit is a kind of food’. There is a similar relation in the extending domain (Kinds of lexical relations playing a role in lexical cohesion). This is meronymy – ‘be a part of’. These two lexical relations are contrasted diagrammatically in Figure 9-4: given a lexical set consisting of either hyponyms, where x, y and z are all ‘kinds of’ a, or meronyms, where p, q and r are all ‘parts of’ b.

 

Hyponymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 646-7):

Repetition and synonymy are both elaborating relations based on identity; one lexical item restates another. There is a second kind of elaborating relationship – attribution. This is based on classification (specific to general): the first lexical item represents a class of thing and the second either (i) a superclass or a subclass or (ii) another class at the same level of classification. For example:

And do you know anything about mediæval literature; have you ever heard of any other kinds of literature in the mediæval period besides Chaucer? 

Most limestone probably originates from organisms that remove calcium carbonate from sea water. The remains of these animals may accumulate to form the limestone directly, or they may be broken and redeposited. 

Noah’s wife and his sons’ wives went to the fields to gather fruit and grain and vegetables. They would need plenty of food for themselves and the animals on the ark. The remains of these animals may accumulate to form the limestone directly, or they may be broken and redeposited.

Thus in the last example, fruit, grain and vegetables are co-hyponyms of food.

Antonymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 646):

A special case of synonymy is its opposite, antonymy. Lexical items which are opposite in meaning, namely antonyms, also function with cohesive effect in a text. For example, woke and asleep in

He fell asleep. What woke him was a loud crash.

Synonymy Without Identity Of Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 646):

The occurrence of a synonym even where there is no particular referential relation is still cohesive; for example, see Text 9-11

Text 9-11: Recreating – narrating (written, monologic): limerick
There was a man of Thessaly
And he was wondrous wise.
He jumped into a hawthorn bush
And scratched out both his eyes.
And when he saw his eyes were out
With all his might and main
He jumped into a quickset hedge
And scratched them in again.

where the quickset hedge is not the same entity as the hawthorn bush but there is still cohesion between the synonyms hedge and bush.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, referential relations are distinct from, and irrelevant to, the functioning of lexical cohesion.

Tracking A Participant Through The Discourse

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 645-6):

In fact we might have (disregarding the scansion, of course) any of the following sequences:

four-&-twenty blackbirds ... the blackbirds began to sing
                     "                     the birds began to sing
                     "                     the creatures began to sing
                     "                     they began to sing

the reference item they being simply the most general of all. Compare ankylosaur ... creature in the following description of a dinosaur:

As an added means of self-defence the ankylosaur had a club on its tail. The creature may have been able to swing the club with great force and aim a savage blow at an enemy.

Such instances are typically accompanied by the reference item the. This interaction between lexical cohesion and reference is the principal means for tracking a participant through the discourse. Instead of the creature we might simply have had the personal reference it; and earlier in the same text, we find such examples:

Ankylosaurus – the “fused lizard” – was the largest of the ankylosaurs, but in spite of its size and frightening appearance it fed only on plants.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the source of the notion of 'tracking a participant through the discourse' — which Matthiessen again fails to acknowledge — is not Halliday, but Martin (1992), further elaborated in Martin & Rose (2007). This misunderstanding derives from Martin's confusion of textual reference with ideational denotation (and deixis), and consequently, his confusion of reference with lexical cohesion. Evidence here (Martin 1992) and here (Martin & Rose 2007). In Martin's model, speakers are said to track themselves through a text, and participants are said to be tracked by being omitted.

Synonymy With Identity Of Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 645-6):

Here the range of potentially cohesive items includes synonyms of the same or some higher level of generality: synonyms in the narrower sense, and superordinates. For example, in

Four-&-twenty blackbirds, baked in a pie.
When the pie was opened, the birds began to sing.

we have one instance of repetition (pie ... pie) and one of synonyms (blackbirds ... birds). birds, however, is at a higher level of generality than blackbirds; it is a superordinate term. …

Related to these are examples such as the following, where there is still identity of reference, although not to a participant, and the synonym may not be in the same word class (cheered ... applause; cried ... tears):

Everyone cheered. The leader acknowledged the applause.
I wish I hadn’t cried so much! I shall be punished for it, I suppose, by being drowned in my own tears!

Synonymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 645):

In the second place, lexical cohesion results from the choice of a lexical item that is in some sense synonymous with a preceding one; for example sound with noise, cavalry with horses in

He was just wondering which road to take when he was startled by a noise from behind him. It was the noise of trotting horses. ... He dismounted and led his horse as quickly as he could along the right-hand road. The sound of the cavalry grew rapidly nearer ...

Here again the cohesion need not depend on identity of reference. But once we depart from straightforward repetition, and take account of cohesion between related items, it is useful to distinguish whether the reference is identical or not, because slightly different patterns appear.

Lexical Item: Inflectional And Derivational Variants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644-5):

… in order for a lexical item to be recognised as repeated it need not be in the same morphological shape. For example, dine, dining, diner, dinner are all the same item, and an occurrence of any one constitutes a repetition of any of the others. Inflectional variants always belong together as one item; derivational variants usually do, when they are based on a living derivational process, although these are less predictable. (For example, rational and rationalise are probably still the same lexical item, though the relationship between them has become rather tenuous; but neither now goes with ration — rational is closer to reason, though not close enough to be considered the same item.)

In Landor’s line

I strove with none, for none was worth my strife

there is a strongly felt cohesion between strife and strove, suggesting that strive, strove and strife are one and the same lexical item.

Repetition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644):

The most direct form of lexical cohesion is the repetition of a lexical item; e.g. bear in

Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy

Here the second occurrence of bear harks back to the first. In this instance, there is also the reference item the, signalling that the listener knows which bear is intended; and since there is nothing else to satisfy the the, we conclude that it is the same bear. But this referential link is not necessary to lexical cohesion; if we had Algy met a bear. Bears are bulgy, where bears means ‘all bears’, there would still be lexical cohesion of bears with bear. In this case, however, there would be only one tie; whereas in the example cited first there are two, one referential (the) and one lexical (bear).

The Primary Types Of Lexical Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 643-4):

The primary types of lexical relations are listed in Table 9-17. They derive from either the paradigmatic or the syntagmatic organisation of lexis. (i) The paradigmatic relations are inherent in the organisation of lexis as a resource, as represented in Roget’s Thesaurus. They can be interpreted in terms of elaboration and extension, two of the subtypes of expansion … . (ii) The syntagmatic relations hold between lexical items in a syntagm that tend to occur together, or collocate with one another. Collocates of a lexical item can be found in the entries of certain modern dictionaries based on corpus investigations. Since syntagmatic organisation and paradigmatic organisation represent two different dimensions of patterning, any pair of lexical items can involve both.

⁹ Collocation includes, but is not confined to, relationships that can be interpreted as enhancing.

Lexical Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 642-3):

The types of cohesion we have discussed so far all involve grammatical resources – grammatical items (conjunctions, reference items, substitute items) and grammatical structure (absence or substitution of elements of structure). However, cohesion also operates within the lexical zone of lexicogrammar. Here a speaker or writer creates cohesion in discourse through the choice of lexical items. … lexical cohesion comes about through the selection of items that are related in some way to those that have gone before.

Just as ellipsis and substitution take advantage of the patterns inherent in grammatical structure (ellipting and substituting particular elements of structure such as the Head of a nominal group), so lexical cohesion takes advantage of the patterns inherent in the organisation of lexis. Lexis is organised into a network of lexical relations such as the ‘kind of’ relations obtaining between fish and salmon.

Ellipsis–&–Substitution vs Co-Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 642):

But the most important distinction, which again follows from the different nature of the two types of relationship, is that in ellipsis the typical meaning is not one of co-reference. There is always some significant difference between the second instance and the first (between presuming item and presumed). If we want to refer to the same thing, we use reference; if we want to refer to a different thing, we use ellipsis: Where’s your hat?—I can’t find it.—Take this (one). Each can take on the other meaning, but only by making it explicit: another hat (reference, but different), the same one (substitution, but not different). Thus reference signals ‘the same member’ (unless marked as different by the use of comparison); ellipsis signals ‘another member of the same class’ (unless marked as identical by same, etc.). The difference is most clear-cut in the nominal group, since nouns, especially count nouns, tend to have clearly defined referents; it is much less clear-cut in the verbal group or the clause.

Within the nominal group, ‘another member’ means a new modification of the Thing; Deictic (this one, another one, mine), Numerative (three, the first (one)), or Epithet (the biggest (one), a big one). In the verbal group, it means a new specification of polarity, tense or modality through the Finite element (did, might (do), hasn’t (done)); and there is a slight tendency for ellipsis to be associated with change of polarity and substitution with change of modality. This tendency is more clearly marked with the clause, where ellipsis adds certainty (yes or no, or a missing identity), whereas substitution adds uncertainty (if, maybe, or someone said so); this is why, in a clause where everything is ellipsed except the modality, it is quite usual to use a substitute (possibly so, perhaps so) unless the modality is one of certainty – here we say certainly (elliptical), rather than certainly so:

Have you got a nicorette on you? – Certainly.

Blogger Comments:

Reference: Steve played badly and he was soon eliminated.
Ellipsis: Steve played badly and Ø was soon eliminated.

That is, in these typical uses of reference and ellipsis, the relation in both is one of "co-reference".

Ellipsis–&–Substitution vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 641-2):

We remarked earlier that ellipsis is a relationship at the lexicogrammatical level: the meaning is ‘go back and retrieve the missing words’. Hence the missing words must be grammatically appropriate; and they can be inserted in place. This is not the case with reference, where, since the relationship is a semantic one, there is no grammatical constraint (the class of the reference item need not match that of what it presumes), and one cannot normally insert the presumed element. Reference, for the same reason, can reach back a long way in the text and extend over a long passage, whereas ellipsis is largely limited to the immediately preceding clause.

The Fusion Of A Nominal Substitute With Modifier

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 641):

In some instances the nominal substitute fuses with a Modifier, as in yours, none in the following:

I haven’t finished the crocodile story completely. And then we’ll hear yours [your story], okay? 

But he won’t get any benefit for his early plea of guilty or contrition. – No absolutely none [no benefit].

These can be analysed as elliptical, the elements my, your, no, etc. having a special form when functioning as Head.

The Parallel Developments Of The Verbal And Nominal Substitutes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 641):

Like do in the verbal group, the nominal substitute one is derived by extension from an item in the structure of the full, non-elliptical group – in this case the indefinite numeral one, via its function as Head in a group which is elliptical as in

Anyone for teas or coffees? – Yeah, I’ll have one; I’ll have a coffee. …

The parallel development of the two substitutes, verbal do and nominal one, is as shown in Table 9-15:

Substitution vs Ellipsis In The Nominal Group: Count vs Mass Nouns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 640-1):

There is a nominal substitute one, plural ones, which functions as Head; it can substitute for any count noun (that is, any noun that is selecting for number, singular or plural); for example,

A: But I’ve got a depression quilt at home. – B: You’ve got that one that Marcia gave you. – A: That Marcia gave me from the American. – B: The Amish one, isn’t it?

She’s got she’s got Big Pond which she said which is apparently not a terribly good provider. – No. – Mmm. No. I thought Yahoo was one of the better ones [providers].

I have always had hot water bottles. I think they’re, the last couple disintegrated. I had a nice bright yellow koala shaped one.

There’s reefs around bloody Australia, isn’t there? – Yeah; a Great Barrier one, I believe. – It’s a big one, I think.

With mass nouns, ellipsis is used instead of substitution:

Do you want some more wine? White or red [∅: wine]? – White [∅:wine].

Ellipsis Within The Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 640):

Ellipsis within the nominal group was referred to in Chapter 6, where it was shown that an element other than the Thing could function as Head; for example any in

I’ll ask Jenny about laptops and find out whether we have got any [∅: laptops].

Substitution In The Verbal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 640):

Substitution in the verbal group is by means of the verb do, which can substitute for any verb provided it is active not passive, except be or, in some contexts, have. The verb do will appear in the appropriate non-finite form (do, doing, done). Examples:

Does it hurt? –Not any more. It was doing last night. 

Yeah but I’m doing night shift too. If I have to teach people on night shift as I have done, I do night shift and then I do day shift and get a couple of hours off and then do night shift and day shift.

As we have seen, this do typically substitutes for the whole of the Residue (or, what amounts to the same thing, when the verb is substituted by do, the rest of the Residue is ellipsed). Since there are no demonstrative verbs – we cannot say he thatted, he whatted? – this need is met by combining the verb substitute do with demonstratives that, what (serving as Range in the transitivity structure). For example:

I did cross-eye in the middle of my art. – I can’t do that. – I can.

What did your father do? – He was an architect.

What are you going to do with Blubba? – Oh, I don’t know.

This is one thing I haven’t worked out with this phone whether, cause my old phone used to ring you to let you know you had a message. – Yeah. Does this one not do it?

The form do not functions as a single reference item.

Ellipsis In The Verbal Group (Complex)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 639):

Since the verbal group consists of Finite plus Predicator, it follows automatically that any clausal ellipsis in which the Mood element is present but the Residue omitted will involve ellipsis within the verbal group: the Predicator will be ellipsed together with the rest of the Residue, as in Have a shower! – I can’t [∅: have a shower]. There is no need to repeat the discussion of this phenomenon. The ellipsis may affect only part of the Predicator, as when the Predicator is realised by a verbal group complex and only the first part of the complex is retained together with the infinitive marker to:

Have you do you read very much Kafka? I am trying to [∅: read very much Kafka], yes, ... [Text 125] 

“Can you hop on your hind legs?” asked the furry rabbit. – “I don’t want to [∅: hop on my hind legs],” said the little Rabbit. [Text 28]

Here the rest of the verbal group serving as Predicator is ellipsed together with the remainder of the Residue.

The Cohesiveness Of Ellipsis And Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 639):

The elliptical or substitute clause requires the listener to ‘supply the missing words’; and since they are to be supplied from what has gone before, the effect is cohesive. It is always possible to ‘reconstitute’ the ellipsed item so that it becomes fully explicit. Since ellipsis is a lexicogrammatical resource, what is taken over is the exact wording, subject only to the reversal of speaker-listener deixis (I for you and so on), and change of mood where appropriate.

Clausal Ellipsis Substitution And Unmarked Information Focus

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 639):

Thus clausal ellipsis/substitution occurs typically in a dialogue sequence where in a response turn everything is omitted except the information-bearing element. … A clause consisting of Mood only, such as I will, could equally occur in either the yes/no or the WH- environment; typically, in a yes/no environment, the focus would be on will, which bears the polarity (‘Will you ... ?’ – I will.), whereas in a WH- environment, the focus would be on I, which carries the information (‘Who will ... ?’ – I will.).

WH- Ellipsis And Substitution: Part Of The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 638-9):

Sometimes in a WH- clause, or its response, the Mood element is left in and only the Residue is ellipsed. For example, with WH- Subject:

Has the time come for these local divinities [[to give way to perhaps a [ bigger concept of deity, a bigger concept of religion]]? – Who knows [∅: whether the time has come ...]? 

And Hugo told you that, too. – Who did [∅: tell me that too]?

Similarly if the WH- element is part of the Residue:

||| I think || that’s why my generation is so tediously over-serious. ||| How could we not be [∅: so tediously over-serious]? ||| 

Yes, I think you’d better look at it. – I don’t see any particular reason why I should [∅: look at it].

The Mood element may be represented by negative polarity alone:

Yes, Dad, but we mustn’t even lean on this guitar today. – Why [∅: must we] not [∅: lean on this guitar today]?

WH- Ellipsis And Substitution: The Whole Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 638):

In a WH- sequence the entire clause is usually omitted except for the WH- element itself, or the item that is the response to the WH- element:

I desperately, desperately need them. – What? – The scissors.

What have you read? – [∅: I have read] Lord of the Flies. 

Well I prefer Lord of the Flies. – Why [∅: do you prefer Lord of the Flies]? – Because I don’t think I understood Pincher Martin.

The substitute not may appear in a WH- negative:

The kind of approach to reality and to ideas which the book offers us, is it a realistic book? – No, I don’t think so. – Why [∅: do you] not [∅: think so]?

Substitution is less likely in the positive, except in the expressions how so?, why so?.

Yes/No Substitution: The Residue

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 637-8):

With a declarative response, if there is a change of Subject only, we may have substitute so, nor, neither in initial position ( = ‘and so’, ‘and not’) followed by the Mood element.

... but I heard some water in it. – I did too. – So did I. 

I love them. – So did I. – Me, too. 

||| This drags down the bibliophiles’ score; || and so does the disgraced Nixon, || ranked at 23 in Siena. ||| 

I didn’t want to see it all. – No, neither did I.

The order is Finite ^ Subject (to get the Subject under unmarked focus). If the Subject is unchanged, so that the focus is on the Finite, the order is Subject ^ Finite:

S04: At their age you were an orphan. You didn’t have to. – S05: Not quite. – S04: You were. – S05: Oh yes. So I was.

The negative has various forms:

They’ve never replied. – So they haven’t/Nor they have/Neither they have [∅: replied].

Not infrequently, the Residue is substituted by the verbal substitute do, as in:

They say an apple a day keeps the doctor away. – It should do [∅: keep the doctor away], if you aim it straight.

If the focus is on the Residue (and hence falls on do), the substitute form do so may be used (as an alternative to ellipsis):

||| Tempting as it may be, || we shouldn’t embrace every popular issue [[ that comes along]]. ||| When we do so || we use precious limited resources || where other players with superior resources are already doing an adequate job. |||

Yes/No Ellipsis: Part Of The Clause: Residue

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 637):

As an alternative to the ellipsis of the whole clause, there may be ellipsis of just one part of it, the Residue. For example:

||| Mum, you’re not enjoying your dinner, are you? ||| – ||| I am [∅: enjoying my dinner]. ||| 

||| I’ve had a headache. ||| – ||| Have you [∅: had a headache]? ||| 

||| Could you put your issue of Rapale literacy in the numeracy study. ||| – ||| Oh I suppose || I could [∅: put my issue of Rapale literacy in the numeracy study]. |||

Negative Clause Substitution vs Positive Clause Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 637):

In addition, the substitute not is used when the answer is qualified by a negative in some way:

||| Is that [[ what it really is about]] , a cock and a fox? ||| – ||| No, not really. |||

where a positive clause is simply presupposed by ellipsis:

||| Did you feel || that you were taking a risk || in being so open about [[ what you were doing]] ? ||| – ||| Oh, sure, in some ways. |||

Yes/No Substitution: The Whole Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 637):

Corresponding in meaning to yes and no are the clause substitutes so and not. (Etymologically the word yes contains the substitute so; it is a fusion of (earlier forms of) aye and so.) In certain contexts these substitute forms are used: (i) following if – if so, if not; (ii) as a reported clause – he said so, he said not; (iii) in the context of modality – perhaps so, perhaps not. Examples:

||| Better than The Rainbow? ||| – ||| I think || so [∅: that it is better than The Rainbow], yes, || because I think || it shows Lawrence as a man more Lawrence in his life. ||| 

||| Well, do I have to do more in the afternoon? ||| – ||| No, [∅: you] probably [∅: do] not [∅: have to do more in the afternoon]. ||| Just do half an hour now. |||

The general principle is that a substitute is required if the clause is projected, as a report; with modality (perhaps) and hypothesis (if) being interpreted as kinds of projection, along the lines of:

he said so–I thought so–I think so–it may be so–perhaps so–let us say so–if so

Yes/No Ellipsis: The Whole Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 636-7):

In a yes/no question-answer sequence the answer may involve ellipsis of the whole clause, e.g.

||| You mean || you were interested in him as a man in private life. ||| – ||| Yes, yes. [∅: I was interested in him as a man in private life.] |||

||| Have you been interviewed by Bedford yet? ||| – ||| No. [∅: I haven’t been interviewed by Bedford yet.] |||

||| ... and the value deal is three large pizzas delivered from $22.95. ||| Would you like to try that? – ||| Ah no thanks. [∅: I would not like to try that.] |||

The first clause in such a pair is not necessarily a question; it may have any speech function, e.g.

||| I think || it is it must be very tough indeed. ||| – ||| Yes. [∅: It is very tough.] |||

||| You feel || it must be English. ||| – ||| Yes [∅: I feel it must be English]; || because I am English, || I feel || that I must study English literature || – that’s why. ||| 

||| I mean || that should mean [[ that an autobiography is your ideal]] . ||| – ||| Yes [∅: an autobiography is my ideal]; || but it also is a very good novel || I think. |||

Here yes and no serve as mood Adjuncts of polarity and the rest of the clause is elided.

Ellipsis And Substitution In The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 636):

Ellipsis in the clause is related to mood. Specifically, it is related to the question-answer process in dialogue; and this determines that there are two kinds: (a) yes/no ellipsis, and (b) WH- ellipsis. Each of these also allows for substitution, though not in all contexts.

Grammatical Domains Of Ellipsis And Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635-6):

There are three main contexts for ELLIPSIS and SUBSTITUTION in English. These are (1) the clause, (2) the verbal group and (3) the nominal group: see Table 9-14.

Ellipsis And Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Ellipsis and substitution are variants of the same type of cohesive relation. There are some grammatical environments in which only ellipsis is possible, some in which only substitution is possible, and some, such as I preferred the other [one], which allow for either.

Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Sometimes an explicit indication may be given that something is omitted, by the use of a substitute form; for instance one in the following examples:

||| He ran out on his wife and children, || became a merchant seaman, || was washed off a deck of a cargo ship || and miraculously picked up, not his own ship but another one, way out in the middle of nowhere. |||

||| ... so my decision was [[ that I should do three separate books, one on each generation]] . ||| – ||| What happened to the middle one? |||

||| ... if I am totally incapable of doing anything || or go into a stroke again || (the last one I had was on my right) || if I got a really whopping one || and could neither see || nor speak || – I would ask to be taken away. |||

The substitute is phonologically non-salient and serves as a place-holding device, showing where something has been omitted and what its grammatical function would be; thus one functions as Head in the nominal group and replaces the Thing (with which the Head is typically conflated).

Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential prominence to the elements of a structure: if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are ellipsed; if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. The absence of elements through ellipsis is an iconic realisation of lack of prominence.

Reference vs Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Reference is a relationship in meaning. When a reference item is used anaphorically, it sets up a semantic relationship with something mentioned in the preceding text; and this enables the reference item to be interpreted, as either identical with the referent or in some way contrasting with it.

Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ELLIPSIS, where we presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical – a relationship in the wording rather than directly in the meaning.

Cataphoric Comparative Reference Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 634):

Like personals and demonstratives, comparative reference items can also be used cataphorically, within the nominal group; for example much more smoothly than a live horse, where the reference point for the more lies in what follows.

Comparative Reference Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 633):

Any expression such as the same, another, similar, different, as big, bigger, less big, and related adverbs such as likewise, differently, equally, presumes some standard of reference in the preceding text. For example, such, other, more in (a), (b) and (c):

(a) ||| Two men were killed by lethal injection in Texas this year, || even though they were 17 || when they committed their offences, || and another 65 juveniles are on death row across the country. ||| “Such executions are rare world-wide,” || the report says. ||| 

(b) ||| Zoo visitors were shaken by the episode. ||| “I am not bringing them back. || These are my grandkids. || It is not safe,” || said Sandra Edwards, || who was visiting the zoo with her grandchildren || when she heard the shots || and saw youths fighting. ||| Nakisha Johnson, 17, said || she saw one young man open fire || after a feud between youths became violent. ||| She said || the children who were wounded were caught in the middle of the two groups of youths. ||| “He was just shooting at the people he was fighting” || but struck the children bystanders, || Johnson said. ||| Other witnesses said || the shooting occurred || when a bottle was thrown from one group of youths to another. ||| 

(c) ||| Survey results, combined with feedback [[ gathered by leaders from all the Services during field and fleet visits]] , have convinced us || that long-term retention is not well served by the Redux retirement plan. ||| Our men and women deserve a retirement system [[ that more appropriately rewards their service]] . |||

Comparative Reference Items

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 632-3):

Comparative reference items function in nominal and adverbial groups; and the comparison is made with reference either to general features of identity, similarity and difference or to particular features of quality and quantity: see Table 9-12.

⁷ Also as SubModifier in adverbial group or nominal group.

Comparative Reference (vs Co-Reference)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 632):

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference – something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

Locative And Temporal Demonstratives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 631):

The locative demonstratives here and there are also used as reference items; here may be cataphoric, as in (g), or anaphoric and ‘near’ as in (h); there is anaphoric but not ‘near’, as in (j), where it means ‘in what you said’:

(g) ||| “So here’s a question for you. ||| How old did you say you were?” ||| … 

(h) ||| “I think you ought to tell me || who you are, first.” |||
“Why?” || said the Caterpillar. |||
Here was another puzzling question; ... ||| 

(j) “Suppose he never commits the crime?” || said Alice. |||
“That would be all the better, wouldn’t it?” || the Queen said, ... |||
Alice felt there was no denying that. ||| “Of course it would be all the better,” || she said: || “but it wouldn’t be all the better [[ his being punished]] .” |||
“You’re wrong there, at any rate,” || said the Queen. |||

The temporal demonstratives now and then also function as cohesive items, but conjunctively rather than referentially.

The Marked Demonstratives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 631):

Thus the is an unmarked demonstrative, while this and that are both ‘marked’ terms – neither includes the other. Their basic deictic senses are ‘near’ and ‘remote’ from the point of view of the speaker. But they are also used to refer within the text. The ‘near’ term this typically refers either anaphorically, to something that has been mentioned immediately before … or is in some way or other being treated as ‘near’  … or else cataphorically …

The ‘remote’ term that refers anaphorically to something that has been mentioned by the previous speaker … or is being treated as more remote or from the listener’s point of view…

Demonstrative 'The'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 630-1):

Consider the following examples:

(a) The sun was shining on the sea.
(b) This is the house that Jack built.
(c) Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy. The bulge was Algy.

In (a) we know which ‘sun’ and which ‘sea’ are being referred to even if we are not standing on the beach with the sun above our heads; there is only one sun, and for practical purposes only one sea. There may be other seas in different parts of the globe, and even other suns in the heavens; but they are irrelevant. In (b) we know which ‘house’ is being referred to, because we are told – it is the one built by Jack; and notice that the information comes after the occurrence of the the. In (c) we know which bear – the one that Algy met; and we know which bulge – the one displayed by the bear; but in this case the information had already been given before the the occurred. Only in (c), therefore, is the anaphoric.

Like the personals, and the other demonstratives, the has a specifying function; it signals ‘you know which one(s) I mean’. But there is an important difference. The other items not only signal that the identity is known, or knowable; they state explicitly how the identity is to be established. …

In other words, the merely announces that the identity is specific; it does not specify it. The information is available elsewhere. It may be in the preceding text (anaphoric), like (c) above; in the following text (cataphoric), like (b); or in the air, so to speak, like (a). Type (a) are self-specifying; there is only one – or at least only one that makes sense in the context, as in Have you fed the cat? (homophoric).

Demonstratives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 630):

In some languages, as pointed out earlier, there is a close correspondence of demonstratives and personals, such that there are three demonstratives rather than two, and the direction of reference is near me (this), near you (that) and not near either of us (yon). This pattern was once widespread in English and can still be found in some rural varieties of Northern English and Scots. In modern standard English yon no longer exists, although we still sometimes find the word yonder from the related series here, there and yonder; but another development has taken place in the meantime.

Given just two demonstratives, this and that, it is usual for that to be more inclusive; it tends to become the unmarked member of the pair. This happened in English; and in the process a new demonstrative evolved which took over and extended the ‘unmarked’ feature of that – leaving this and that once more fairly evenly matched. This is the so-called ‘definite article’ the. The word the is still really a demonstrative, although a demonstrative of a rather particular kind.

Cataphoric Demonstrative Reference Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629):

endophoric: cataphoric

||| Rather, I think || we will be stronger and more effective || if we stick to those issues of governmental structure and process, broadly defined, that have formed the core of our agenda for years. |||

Anaphoric Demonstrative Reference Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629):

endophoric: anaphoric

||| Though Amnesty has long criticised the widespread US use of the death penalty, || it found || there has now been another worrying development in this process.||| 

||| The way that Icelandic expresses the phrase “I dreamed something last night” is “It dreamed me”. ||| Though that’s also modern Icelandic, || this is a mediæval idea. ||| 

||| During the European scramble for Africa, Nigeria fell to the British. ||| It wasn’t one nation at that point; || it was a large number of independent political entities. ||| The British brought this rather complex association into being as one nation || and ruled it until 1960 || when Nigeria achieved independence. ||| 

||| They have to be given instruction of course || and learn to read the signals; || then they’ll take a driving test || and there are track circuits as on all electrified lines || so that once a train gets into a section || no other train can move on to that section || and run into it || but that’s just standard equipment. |||

Exophoric Demonstrative Reference Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629):

exophoric

||| Here, I’ll help with this one. ||| 

||| Yes, Dad, but we mustn’t even lean on this guitar today. ||| 

||| We could move that table. ||| 

||| It wouldn’t matter to him really; || he’s half deaf after all these years working at this place. ||| 

||| I’ve been eating like this for the last ten years || and nothing happens. ||| 

||| What is that? ||| Hmm, Hungarian pastry. |||

Demonstrative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 628-9):

Personal reference items create co-reference in terms of the category of person. As we noted above, there is another related, but distinct, co-referential strategy – that of demonstrative reference. Here the reference item is a demonstrative, this/that, these/those. Demonstratives (see Table 9-11) may also be either exophoric or anaphoric; in origin they were probably the same as third-person forms, but they retain a stronger deictic flavour than the personals, and have evolved certain distinct anaphoric functions of their own.

Tracking A Referent

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 627):

That is, there are two primary anaphoric strategies for tracking a referent as a text unfolds. The speaker or writer can use either (i) a personal reference item (personal pronoun or possessive determiner) or (ii) a specified noun. A ‘specified noun’ is either an inherently specific one – a proper noun – or else a common noun (serving as Thing) modified by a demonstrative determiner as Deictic. For example: he vs. the Rabbit or his vs. the Rabbit’s (or of the Rabbit). The term ‘pronoun’ suggests that a pronoun stands for a noun; and the term ‘pronominalisation’ suggests that something is turned into a pronoun. But both terms are misleading: the unmarked anaphoric strategy is to use the pronoun, and the lexical variant or a proper name is used only if there is a good reason to vary from the unmarked strategy. 

Good reasons include (i) the need to indicate the beginning of a new rhetorical stage in the unfolding text and (ii) the need to further elaborate the reference when there are alternative antecedents around in the discourse.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, cohesive reference is not concerned with "tracking referents". This error ultimately derives from Martin's (1992) misunderstanding of reference as 'participant identification', and especially its further elaboration in Martin & Rose (2007). For evidence that these are misunderstandings, see the clarifying critiques here (English Text) and here (Working With Discourse).

The textual function of reference is to create cohesion in the text by presuming information that is recoverable from elsewhere in the text itself. Speakers do not need to "keep track" of referents, since they already know who they are talking about, and if speakers wanted to "track" referents for listeners, there are far more efficient ways of doing so than deploying potentially ambiguous reference items.

[2] To be clear, it is only the determiner of a nominal group that serves as a reference item, forming a cohesive tie with its referent, and proper nouns do not serve as reference items. Proper nouns only 'reference' in the sense of ideational denotation (wording realising meaning). Martin's relabelling of reference (IDENTIFICATION) routinely confuses textual reference with ideational denotation (and DEIXIS); evidence here.

As previously suggested, serious scholars seeking a theoretically (and internally) consistent understanding of cohesive reference are strongly urged to consult the original model in Cohesion In English (Halliday & Hasan 1976), and/or either of the first two editions of An Introduction To Functional Grammar (Halliday 1985; 1994).

Reference Chains

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 627):

For a somewhat more extended example, we can refer to a narrative for children about a Velveteen Rabbit. After this Velveteen Rabbit has been introduced, there are anaphoric references to this rabbit, forming a reference chain that runs throughout the narrative. The chain running through the extract consists of the following items:

[a velveteen rabbit] – he – his (coat) – his (ears) – he – his (paws) – him – the Velveteen Rabbit – he – he – him – ... – the Rabbit – he – him

Several of these reference items occur within the Theme (thematic references underlined): while reference items can occur anywhere, there is an unmarked relationship between referential identifiability and status as Given information, and between Given and Theme. There is therefore a strong tendency for reference items to be thematic. Most of the anaphoric references involve simply a personal pronoun or a possessive determiner; there are only two references with demonstrative the as Deictic and the lexical noun rabbit as Thing. This is the typical pattern in extended reference chains.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the unacknowledged source of the term 'reference chain' is Martin (1992: 140), which is, itself, his relabelling of Hasan's original notion of an identity chain (Halliday & Hasan 1989 [1985]: 84ff). However, this is subtly inconsistent with the notion of cohesive reference, and can lead to confusing reference with lexical cohesion. To explain:

As Halliday & Hasan (1976: 329, 330) point out:

The basic concept that is employed in analysing the cohesion of a text is that of a tie… [which]… includes not only the cohesive element itself but also that which is presupposed by it. A tie is best interpreted as a relation between these two elements. …

The presupposed item may itself be cohesive, presupposing another item that is still further back; in this way there may be a whole chain of presuppositions before the original target item is reached…:

The last word ended in a long bleat, so like a sheep that Alice quite started (1). She looked at the Queen, who seemed to have suddenly wrapped herself up in wool (2). Alice rubbed her eyes, and looked again (3). She couldn't make out what had happened at all (4). Was she in a shop (5)? And was that really — was it really a sheep that was sitting on the other side of the counter (6)? Rub as she would, she could make nothing more of it (7).

…the she in (5) has as the target of its presupposition another instance of she, that in (4); and in order to resolve it we have to follow this through to the occurrence of Alice in (3). We shall call this type a mediated tie.

In short, cohesive reference is a relation between reference item and referent, and this relation may be mediated by intervening reference items. It is not a chain of nominal groups, as misinterpreted in Martin's (1992) relabelling of reference as IDENTIFICATION.

Because Matthiessen tries to accommodate Martin's misunderstandings ('reference chain', 'tracking') in his rewriting of Halliday's exposition of reference, it is strongly recommended that serious scholars who want a theoretically consistent understanding of it should consult Halliday & Hasan (1976), and Halliday (1985, 1994).