Time Phased Attribution: Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 272):

In the case of ‘time phase’, in particular ‘inceptive’, the tense may be like that of ‘material’ clauses rather than like that of ‘relational’ ones; … That is, coming into being is construed on the same model as activities as far as time is concerned; but it is still construed as a configuration of being, with Carrier (the scope of European trade) + Process (was becoming) + Attribute (oceanic and worldwide). If the Attribute is an ‘entity’ rather than a ‘quality’, the nominal group realising it may be marked by the preposition into; alongside ‘become’ + nominal group, we thus have ‘turn’, ‘grow’ + into + nominal group…

Phase Of Attribution: Neutral Or Phased

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271-2):

Like other processes, processes of attribution unfold through time. In the unmarked case, the phase of the unfolding is left unspecified (‘neutral’); alternatively, the phase is marked as either (1) ‘time phase’ – ‘inceptive’ (e.g. become, go, grow, turn) or ‘durative’ (e.g. keep, remain) or (2) ‘reality phase’ – ‘apparent’ (e.g. seem, appear), ‘perceptive’ (e.g. look, sound, taste) or realised (e.g. prove, turn out)…

Qualitative Process With Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271n):

The verbs reek, drip and ooze are used in the sense of ‘be [over-]ful’ or ‘have [too] much of’ (shading into the ‘possessive’ area); but they always seem to be configured with a nominal group, introduced by a preposition in the case of drip and reek, and this element can be interpreted as Attribute: it certainly reeks to me of sexual exploitation; … It drips with press agentry; Greenoak’s book drips with bird lore like no other; she oozes self-confidence; … it lacks substance and oozes mediocrity.

Quality Attribution: Qualitative Verbs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Verbs of this kind include  

• matter, count ‘be important’ … 
• suffice ‘be enough’, 
• abound ‘be plentiful; 
• figure ‘make sense’; 
• differ, vary ‘be different, varied’; 
• hurt, ache ‘be painful’; 
• dominate ‘be dominant’, 
• apply ‘be relevant’ … 
• do ‘be acceptable, enough’ … 
• remain ‘be + still’, 
• stink, smell, reek … ‘be smelly’ … 

and a number of verbs of negative appraisal, some of them abstract versions of ‘be + smelly’, for example stink, suck …

Quality Attribution: Qualitative Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Within ‘quality’ attribution, there is a further option: a small number of qualities may be construed as a qualitative Process rather than as a qualitative Attribute. Thus, alongside will it be enough? we have will it suffice?. (Alternatively, we can interpret such clauses as having a conflation of Process and Attribute.)

Common Circumstance Types With Mental Qualitative Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Certain circumstances are common with particular types of attribution. For example, circumstances of Cause, Matter and Angle are common with ‘mental’ qualities as Attribute

• [Cause:] I did get angry with him;
• [Matter:] so I think we have to be a bit sensible about what we are doing;
• [Angle:] it’s all Greek to me;

Qualifier Of Epithet/Head vs Circumstance [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270-1):

These may be difficult to differentiate from circumstantial elements in the transitivity structure of the clause. To differentiate them in analysis, we can apply textual probes: in principle, being an element of the clause, a circumstance is subject to all the different textual statuses brought about by theme, theme predication and theme identification.

Thus with it in so you have to be beautiful with it is a circumstance (of Accompaniment), if we interpret the clause to mean ‘so you and it [silver] have to be beautiful together’, since it can be Theme (so with it you have to be beautiful rather than so it you have to be beautiful with) and predicated Theme (so it is with it that you have to be beautiful rather than so it is it that you have to be beautiful with). 

In contrast, a Qualifier cannot on its own be given a textual status in the clause since it is a constituent of a nominal group, not of the clause; so it can only be thematic together with the rest of the nominal group that it is part of. …

However, there is a considerable degree of indeterminacy in this area …

Adjectives In Verbal Group Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270n):

Note that sequences of ‘verb: be + adjective + verb’ such as be eager to do, be keen to do, be willing to do are interpreted as verbal group complexes, as in she was terribly keen to get out of London. Note that unlike adjectives serving as Epithet/Head in nominal groups functioning as Attribute, these adjectives cannot be expanded with nouns serving as Thing/Head; contrast he is keen : he is a keen fellow, which is fine, with he is keen to finish the job : he is a keen fellow to finish the job, which does not seem possible. Note also the pattern of ellipsis: he is keen to do it, but he isn’t able to [Ø: do it].

Qualitative Attributes Realised By Epithets Submodified By Degree: Comparative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270):

Qualitative Attributes are, as noted, realised by nominal groups with Epithet as Head. The Epithet is realised by an adjective (or participial verb form), which is frequently submodified by adverbs of degree such as very, extremely, greatly, including the comparative adverbs as; more, most; less, least; too. The comparatives may be expanded by a standard of comparison introduced by as, than; for. These are either phrases or clauses and are placed after the Head/Thing, in the same position as post-modifying Qualifiers; for example:

I think mum’s more upset than he is.
Nothing gets past those kids. They’re as sharp as old razor blades.
That’s just tiny, too tiny for words.

Structurally such expressions are Submodifiers within the Epithet rather than Qualifiers; but nominal groups with Epithet as Head may also be constructed with Qualifiers:

She’s not very interested in the food.

Qualitative Characterisation Through Entity Attribution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270):

Attribution of the ‘entity’ kind approaches qualitative attribution when the Thing in the nominal group is a very general one such as thing, person or fellow.  Thus in I started it in Paris in late ‘51 with a guy called Harold Humes, who was an absolutely brilliant fellow but rather erratic, the attributive nominal groups an absolutely brilliant fellow (Thing/Head) and rather erratic (Epithet/Head) are both qualitative characterisations;

Metaphorical Variant Of Quality Attribution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268n):

There is a metaphorical variant, where the Attribute is realised by of + a nominal group with a nominalisation as Thing/Head; for example, of crucial importance in: In India now, the question of the minorities and how to satisfy their aspirations is of crucial importance. The congruent version is ... is crucially important.

Entity vs Quality Attribution [Diagnostic: Realisation]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The two kinds of Attribute differ in how they are realised: entity Attributes are realised by nominal groups with Thing as Head, e.g. architect in an architect; quality Attributes are realised by nominal groups with Epithet as Head, e.g. very generous. With the latter, the Thing is thus implicit; the general sense is ‘one’ – that is, the class of the Thing is presumed from the context.

Membership Specification: Entity Or Quality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The class is specified either

• by naming the class itself by reference to the entity that constitutes the class, as in What did your father do? – He was an architect, or 
• by naming a criterion for class-membership by reference to a quality or qualities of the entity that constitutes the class, as in The New Yorker is very generous.

Types Of Intensive Attribution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

Within clauses of intensive attribution, we can distinguish three simultaneous contrasts:

(i) the class denoted by the Attribute may be defined by reference to an entity or to a quality;

(ii) the process of attribution may be neutral or phased; and

(iii) the domain of attribution may be either material or semiotic.

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Reversibility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268)

The ['attributive'] clauses are not reversible: there are no ‘receptive’ forms, such as complete nonsense is sounded by your story; while clauses such as a poet is Paula, wise is Sarah, are archaic or literary variants, not systemically agnate forms.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Note that, in the case of ASSIGNMENT, there are ‘receptive’ forms in attributive mode:

the crocodiles	thought	the tourists	edible
Attributor	Process: attributive	Carrier	Attribute

the tourists	were thought	edible	by the crocodiles
Carrier	Process: attributive	Attribute	Attributor

[2] Note the 'Hamlet Factor' of such thematically motivated agnates as:

Blessed	are	the cheesemakers
Attribute	Process: attributive	Carrier

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Interrogative Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The interrogative probe for such [‘attributive’] clauses is what? how? or what…like?, e.g. what is Paula?, how did the minister seem?, what will today’s weather be like?

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Lexical Verb

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268, 269):

The lexical verb in the verbal group realising the [attributive] Process is one of the ‘ascriptive’ classes: see Table 5-14. If the Attribute is realised by a nominal group with a common noun as Head without a pre-modifying adjective, it is usually expressed as if it was a circumstance (with a preposition following the verb, as indicated in the table; for example: he grew old but he grew into a man); Attributes with noun Head are rare with the verbs keep, go and get, where they would be highly ambiguous.

Distinguishing ‘Attributive’ Clauses From ‘Identifying’ Clauses: Indefiniteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 268):

The nominal group functioning as Attribute construes a class of thing and is typically indefinite: it has either an adjective or a common noun as Head and, if appropriate, an indefinite article … It cannot be a proper noun or a pronoun since these do not construe classes.  (Thus he is Charles Darwin would be interpreted as ‘identifying’; but if we say he is another Charles Darwin, the clause is ‘attributive’ and the proper name Charles Darwin has been re-construed as the common noun – the name of a class of people that are like Charles Darwin.)

Attributive Mode: Carrier & Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 267):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, an entity has some class ascribed or attributed to it. Structurally, we label this class the Attribute, and the entity to which it is ascribed is the Carrier — the ‘carrier’ of the ‘attribute’. … This type of clause is a resource for characterising entities serving as Carrier; and it is also a central grammatical strategy for assessing by assigning an evaluative Attribute to a Carrier.

Attributive Vs Identifying Mode: Reversibility

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 265):

The ‘identifying’ ones are reversible … The ‘attributive’ ones are not reversible …

Blogger Comment:

Note that, in the case of ASSIGNMENT, there is a distinction in VOICE in attributive mode:

the tourists	thought	the crocodiles	approachable
Attributor	Process: attributive	Carrier	Attribute

the crocodiles	were thought	approachable	by the tourists
Carrier	Process: attributive	Attribute	Attributor

Relational Clauses: Principal Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

The English system operates with three main types of relation — ‘intensive’, ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’; and each of these comes in two distinct modes of being — ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’.

Blogger Comment:

Note that the three types of relation are manifestations of the 'fractal types' of expansion and projection:

• intensive: elaboration
• possessive: extension
• circumstantial: enhancement (except matter: projection)  

Identifying Clauses: ‘Exhaustive’ Class Membership

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

Identifying clauses are also used to construe ‘exhaustive’ class membership where a class is identified with its members, as in: The fuels of the body are carbohydrates, fats and proteins.

Relational Clauses & Semiotic Dimensions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

… we can see how the grammar models the realisational relationship between two strata in the form of ‘relational’ clauses of identity. … In this way, the grammar of relational clauses is based on the dimensions of a semiotic system.

Relational Clauses: Instantiation And Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 263):

In her account of ‘relational’ clauses, Davidse (1992, 1996) adopts a semiotic approach, interpreting class–membership by reference to the semiotic relation of instantiation and identity by reference to the semiotic relation of realisation.

Relational Clauses & Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):

There is, however, a deeper sense in which ‘relational’ clauses are ‘nominal’: they construe the same range of relations as those of modification within the nominal group:

the house was old : the old house ::

the house was in Wessex : the house in Wessex ::

the house was Thomas’s : Thomas’s house.

Relational Clauses: No Structurally Present Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262n):

Such clauses have often been called ‘nominal clauses’, in contrast to ‘verbal clauses’, where there is a Process present in the structure of the clause. But this reflects only the view ‘from below’ and hides the fact that in languages such as Arabic ‘relational’ clauses that are marked for aspect and/or polarity typically have a structurally present Process.

Relational Clauses: Class–Membership And Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

The configuration of Process + ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’ opens up the potential for construing the abstract relationships of class–membership and identity in all domains of experience. Class–membership is construed by attributive clauses and identity by identifying ones. These two ‘relational’ clause types cut across the inner and outer experience of ‘mental’ and ‘material’ clauses …

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Verb Salience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

Verbs in general in ‘relational’ clauses are typically non-salient, whereas verbs in ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses are salient at the accented syllable …

Relational Clauses: Prototypical Configuration

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 262):

This tells us something significant about a prototypical configuration of ‘being’: the experiential ‘weight’ is construed in the two participants, and the process is merely a highly generalised link between these two participants … Thus the verbs that occur most frequently as the Process of a ‘relational’ clause are be and have; and they are typically both unaccented and phonologically reduced … This weak phonological presence of the Process represents iconically its highly generalised grammatical nature. The limiting case of weak presence is absence; and the Process is in fact structurally absent in certain ‘non-finite’ ‘relational’ clauses in English … and in many languages there is no structurally present Process in the ‘unmarked’ type of ‘relational’ clause … Here the ‘relational’ clause is simply a configuration of ‘Be-er1’ + ‘Be-er2’.

Relational Clauses Vs Material & Mental Clauses: Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261-2):

In ‘relational’ clauses, there are two parts to the ‘being’: something is said to ‘be’ something else. In other words, a relationship of being is set up between two separate entities. This means that in a ‘relational’ clause in English, there are always two inherent participants – two ‘be-ers’. In contrast, the general classes of ‘material’ and ‘mental’ clauses have only one inherent participant (the Actor and the Senser, respectively).  Thus, while we can have a ‘material’ clause with one participant such as she was walking or she was walking into the room, we cannot have a ‘relational’ clause such as she was, with only one participant; we have to have two: she was in the room. Similarly, a ‘mental’ clause with one participant such as she rejoiced is possible; but the nearest ‘relational’ equivalent must have two participants – she was happy, not she was.

Blogger Comment:

Note that attributive clauses with qualitative Processes, such as this stinks, manifest only one participant, unless the Attribute is interpreted as conflated with the Process; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271).

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

With a ‘mental’ clause, the phenomenon of consciousness can be construed as an idea brought into existence through the process of consciousness and represented grammatically as a separate clause … but this is not possible with ‘relational’ clauses.

Relational & Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses: Acts & Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

In being able to be construed not only with things as participants, but also with acts and facts, ‘relational’ clauses clearly differ from ‘material’ ones; but they resemble ‘mental’ ones in this respect.  However, in a relational clause, these things, acts and facts are not construed as a phenomenon of consciousness; rather, they are construed as one element in a relationship of being. Thus while a thing, act or fact construed as a Phenomenon in a ‘mental’ clause is configured with a Senser, in a ‘relational’ clause, a thing, act or fact construed as a participant is configured with another relational participant that has to come from the same domain of being [material vs semiotic].

Relational Clauses Vs Mental Clauses: Participanthood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 261):

… while one participant in a ‘mental’ clause, the Senser, is always endowed with consciousness, this is not the case with ‘relational’ clauses.  If anything, the participants in ‘relational’ clauses are more like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause – not only things, but also acts and facts can be construed as participants in a ‘relational’ clause.

Relational Processes: Un/Marked Present Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

In the nature of the unfolding of the process, ‘relational’ clauses thus pattern like ‘mental’ ones rather than like ‘material’ ones; and this is reflected in the unmarked present tense. … The present in present is in fact highly marked and is largely restricted to ‘relational’ clauses of behavioural propensity.

Relational [Static] Vs Material [Dynamic] Construals By Expansion Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

Thus, static location in space [enhancement] is construed relationally – she’s in the dining room, but dynamic motion through space is construed materially – she’s walking into the dining room. Similarly, static possession [extension] is construed relationally – she has a mahogany dining table, but dynamic transfer of possession is construed materially – she’s getting a mahogany dining table; she’s being given a mahogany dining table; and static quality [elaboration] is construed relationally – the bottle’s empty, but dynamic change in quality is construed materially – the bottle’s emptying; she’s emptying the bottle.

Relational Clauses: Nature Of Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 260):

Unlike ‘material’ clauses, but like ‘mental’ ones, ‘relational’ clauses prototypically construe change as unfolding ‘inertly’, without any input of energy — typically as a uniform flow without distinct phases of unfolding (unlike the contrast in material processes between the initial phase and the final phase of the unfolding of a process, the outcome).

Relational Clauses: Viewed From Above

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

As we have seen, ‘material’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the material world and ‘mental’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of our own consciousness. Both this outer experience and this inner experience may be construed by ‘relational’ clauses; but they model this experience as ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’ or ‘sensing’.

Looking 'From Below' & 'From Around' [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

Looking … ‘from below’ (how are they realised?) and ‘from around’ (what other systemic variants are possible?) …

Relational Clauses: Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 259):

‘Relational’ clauses serve to characterise and identify.

The Transitivity Environments Of 'Remind'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257n):

As is often the case of with verbs, remind has different senses corresponding to uses in different transitivity environments.

(i) In a ‘mental’ clause, remind may have different senses.

(1) Remind may serve as a causative equivalent of remember, ‘cause somebody to remember’ with the causer in the role of Inducer (if the clause is ‘phenomenal’, the Phenomenon represented on the model of a circumstance of Matter (e.g. [Inducer:] This reminds [Senser:] me [Phenomenon:] of an interesting encounter I had a few years ago with the late Col M.S. Rao, the celebrated physician.) and if the clause is ‘hyperphenomenal’ with a project ‘idea’ clause, remind is configured with only Inducer + Senser (e.g. [Inducer:] The church clock striking the hour reminds [Senser:] me that I must hurry if this is to be ready on time for the printer.). 

(2) Alternatively, remind may have the sense of ‘cause somebody to see a relationship of similarity’ (e.g. They [‘the children’] reminded old Amai of a flock of bright birds gathering together to peck corn.).

(ii) In a ‘verbal’ clause, remind has the sense of ‘tell somebody something so that s/he will remember it’, the ‘verbal’ clause projects a report or quote (e.g. ‘Don’t forget, there was the hope it would pass for a natural death’, Pauling reminded him.). 

(iii) In a hypotactic verbal group complex, remind serves as a causative variant of remember (e.g. Mary reminded John to do it).

Mental Clause Subtypes: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 257):

Like all other experiential systems, the system of type of sensing construes experience as indeterminate: the four different types of sensing shade into one another. For example, perception shades into cognition, with I see coming to mean not only ‘I perceive visually’ but also ‘I understand’. And cognition shades into perception with clauses where remember serves as the Process; unlike ‘cognitive’ clauses in general such clauses can be construed with a macrophenomenal Phenomenon …

Mental Clause Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 256):

Within the general class of ‘mental’ clauses, there are four different subtypes of sensing: ‘perceptive’, ‘cognitive’, ‘desiderative’ and ‘emotive’. These are treated by the grammar as distinct types. They differ with respect to phenomenality, directionality, gradability, potentiality and ability to serve as metaphors of modality …

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Probe & Substitute]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):

Mental clauses also differ from material ones with respect to the use of do as a substitute verb. … Mental processes … are not kinds of doing, and cannot be probed or substituted by do.

Mental Process: Present In Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 255):

The present in present with a mental process is a rather highly conditioned kind of inceptive aspect, as in I feel I’m knowing the city for the first time (‘I’m getting to know’);

Material Process: Simple Present Tense (Marked)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254-5, 255n):

The simple present with a material process is general or habitual – that is, the occurrence of the process is construed as generalised or as habitual, e.g. they build a house for every employee. … 

In addition, there is a registerially restricted use of the simple present tense. In commentary accompanying demonstrations and the like, the simple present is used.

'Marked' Option [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

… this means that it is less frequent and that it carries a special interpretation.

Mental Clauses Vs Material Clauses [Diagnostic: Tense]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

‘Material’ and ‘mental’ processes also differ with respect to the way that they unfold in time and this is reflected in the grammatical system of TENSE. … In a ‘mental’ clause, the unmarked present tense is the simple present … But in a ‘material’ clause the unmarked present tense is the present in present …

Idea Clauses Vs Fact Clauses [Diagnostic For Clause Constituents]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 254):

Thus while ‘fact’ clauses serve as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause and can therefore be made Subject and be theme–predicated, ‘idea’ clauses are not part of the ‘mental’ clause but are rather combined with the ‘mental’ clause in a clause nexus of projection.

Projecting Representations Of The Content Of Consciousness: Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253, 254):

But there is one further option open to such clauses – an option that sets them apart not only from ‘material’ clauses but also from ‘relational’ ones. This option is the ability to set up another clause ‘outside’ the ‘mental’ clause as the representation of the ‘content’ of consciousness. … Here the ‘mental’ clause projects another clause (or combination of clauses) as a representation of the content of thinking, believing, presuming and so on; the projected clause is called an idea clause.

Facts & Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

Given the semiotic nature of facts, it stands to reason that they cannot serve as participants in ‘material’ clauses. When they do occur in what might appear to be a ‘material’ clauses, these clauses are abstract; and they have to be interpreted either mentally or relationally …

Facts: Status Signals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

The status of the ‘fact’ clause is often signalled by the noun fact itself … or by another ‘fact’ noun such as notion, idea, possibility.

Metaphenomenon: Environment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 253):

The most common environment for a metaphenomenal Phenomenon is that of a clause of emotion where the Phenomenon is construed as impinging on the Senser’s consciousness.

Facts vs Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252-3, 253n):

A fact is on a higher level of abstraction than an ordinary thing or an act. Ordinary things and acts are both material phenomena; they can be seen, heard and perceived in other ways. Thus while an act is more complex than an ordinary thing, it still exists in the same material realm. In contrast, a fact is not a material phenomenon but rather a semiotic one: it is a proposition (or sometimes a proposal) construed as existing in its own right in the semiotic realm, without being brought into existence by somebody saying it. 

We could say that a fact is an act that has been propositionalised — that has been given existence as a semiotic phenomenon.

Metaphenomenal Mental Clauses: Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 252):

In a ‘metaphenomenal mental’ clause, the Phenomenon is realised by a (typically finite) clause denoting a fact.