Emanating Vs Impinging Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 245):

This process of sensing may be construed either as flowing from a person’s consciousness [‘like’ type] or as impinging on it [‘please’ type]; but it is not construed as a material act.

Mental Clauses [Characterisation]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 245):

While ‘material’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the material world, ‘mental’ clauses are concerned with our experience of the world of our own consciousness. They are clauses of sensing: a ‘mental’ clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events taking place in our own consciousness.

Process Type Determines Participant Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 244-5):

It is important to recognise … that the functions assumed by the participants in any clause are determined by the type of process that is involved.

Abstract Material Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243-4):

Material clauses do not necessarily represent concrete, physical events; they may represent abstract doings and happenings … But as the process becomes more abstract, so the distinction between Actor and Goal becomes harder to draw. … Even with concrete processes, however, we have to recognise that there are some where the Actor is involuntary, and thus in some respects like a Goal … With more abstract processes, we often find ‘operative’ and ‘receptive’ forms side by side with little difference between them … There is still some difference: if the ‘receptive’ form is used, we can probe for an explicit Actor — we can ask who by?, whereas with the ‘operative’ form we cannot.  And this is what justifies us in still giving a different functional status to the participant in the two cases.

The Case Of A Circumstance Being Inherent In The Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):

There are also, in fact, certain circumstances that are construed as inherent in a process. This happens with ‘enhancing’ clauses construing movement of a participant through space: here a circumstance of Place represents the destination of that movement and may be inherent in the process.  For example:

Did these books and articles put groceries on the table?

They carved its image into stone || and placed it on their temples and palaces.

On The Cline Between Participants And Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):

Scope, Recipient and Client are clearly treated by the grammar as participants; for example, they are all candidates for subjecthood in a ‘receptive’ clause. However, at the same time, they are clearly located some distance towards circumstances on the cline between participants and circumstances, which is reflected in the fact that that, under certain conditions, they may be marked by a preposition [minor Process].

Attribute: Material Vs Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 243):

In a ‘material’ clause, the Attribute is always an optional added specification. In contrast, it is an inherent part of the configuration of a ‘relational’ clause and cannot be left out.

Blogger Comment:

But note that the Attribute is sometimes conflated with the relational process, as in Accuracy matters.

Depictive Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 242):

There is also a non-resultative variant of the Attribute. This is the depictive Attribute serving to specify the state in which the Actor or Goal is when it takes part in the process …

Resultative Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 242):

[The Attribute] enters into ‘material’ clauses in a restricted way. In certain clauses with an ‘elaborating’ outcome, the Attribute may be used to construe the resultant qualitative state of the Actor or Goal after the process has been completed … Such Attributes are called resultative Attributes. They are only marginal participants. While they are unlike cicumstances in that they are not marked by prepositions, they are also unlike true participants in that they cannot serve as Subject. There is in fact a closely related circumstance — the resultative Rôle or ‘product’ …

Scope Vs Goal: Grammatical Distinctions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 242):

… the Scope cannot be probed by do to or do with, whereas the Goal can. Since nothing is being ‘done to’ it, a Scope element can never have a resultative Attribute added within the clause, as a (transformative) Goal can … Similarly, a Scope element can never be configured with a circumstance of Rôle of the ‘product’ type. The Scope cannot be a personal pronoun, and it cannot normally be modified by a possessive [so don’t cross my path!]. Moreover, although generalised Scope–receptive clauses … are quite common, Scope–receptive clauses with specific Actors are rare. Thus while a Goal readily becomes Subject … it is unusual to make a Scope element ‘modally responsible’ in this way …

Scope: Semantic Vs Grammatical Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 241):

Semantically the Scope element is not in any very obvious sense a participant in the process — it is not directly involved in the process by bringing it about, being affected by it or benefiting from it; but grammatically it is treated as a participant. So it can become Subject of the clause …

Light/Vector Verbs & Cognate/Effective Objects

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 241n):

Jespersen (1942: 117) called verbs in such [Process + Scope] constructions ‘light verbs’, and this term is often used in the contemporary literature on English and also on other languages (e.g. Butt, 2003) – another term being ‘vector verb’. The Scope element in examples such as the candidate dances three dances, Waltz, Foxtrot and Quickstep, with an Amateur or Professional partner was traditionally recognised as a ‘cognate object’. Poutsma (1926) had noticed constructions with (in our terms) Process + Scope, characterising the verb realising the Process as having ‘vague meaning’ and calling the Scope an ‘effective object’; he analysed such configurations as ‘intransitive’.

Why Express A Process As Scope?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240-1):

… this structure enables us to specify further the number or kind of processes that take place. … The main reason for its prevalence is the greater potential that is open to nouns, in contrast to verbs, for being modified in different ways …

Scope: Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240):

The Scope may be not an entity at all but rather another name for the process; … Consider I play tennis, where tennis is Scope. The game of tennis is clearly not an entity; there is no such thing as tennis other than the act of playing it.

Scope: Entity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240):

The Scope may construe an entity which exists independently of the process but which indicates the domain over which the process takes place. An example is You will be crossing some lonely mountains, so make sure you have enough petrol. … some lonely mountains specifies the range of the tourist’s crossing.

Material Clauses With Scopes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240):

… the Scope is restricted to ‘intransitive’ clauses (with the minor exception of clauses with give). This means that a material clause consisting of ‘nominal group + verbal group + nominal group’ can be either [transitive] Actor + Process + Goal or [intransitive] Actor + Process + Scope.

Material Clauses: 'Scope' [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 293-4):

In contrast the Scope of a ‘material’ clause is not in any way affected by the performance of the process. Rather it either (i) construes the domain over which the process takes place … or (ii) construes the process itself, either in general or specific terms … There is not, in fact, a sharp line between these two; they really lie along a single continuum.

Goal vs Recipient/Client

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 239):

Like the Goal, both Recipient and Client are affected by the process; but while the Goal is the participant that is impacted by the process, the Recipient/Client is the one that benefits from it.

The Realisation Of Recipients And Clients

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 239):

Most typically the Recipient/Client is realised by a nominal group denoting a human being; especially a personal pronoun, and most commonly of all a speech rôle (me, you, us), e.g. me in Mae West’s famous line Peel me a grape! But this is not necessarily so; the Recipient is a plant in did you give the philodendron some water?, and an abstract entity privilege in we... have today been given the rare privilege to be host to the nations of the world on our own soil. Nor, of course, is the ‘benefit’ necessarily beneficial: Claudius is Recipient in Locusta gave Claudius a dose of poison.

The Systemic Environment Of Clients

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 239):

With a Client, the ‘service’ may likewise be construed as the Goal, especially a Goal of the ‘created’ as distinct from the ‘transformed’ type, one that is brought into being by the process – the ‘creative’ type of ‘transitive material’ clause; e.g. a picture, this house in he painted John a picture, built Mary a house. But it is really the process that constitutes the service; hence a Client may also appear in an ‘intransitive’ clause – one that has no Goal, but has either Process + Scope, e.g. played Mary a tune, or else Process only, as in play for me. These last cannot appear without for (play me); in order to show that they are Client it is necessary to add a Scope element in final position (play for me – play a tune for me – play me a tune).

The Transfer Of Possession: Giving Vs Depriving

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 238-9, 239n):

Note that the transfer of possession can alternatively be modelled in the grammar as depriving somebody of something rather than as giving something to somebody; in this model, the original owner is construed either circumstantially as a locative source, as in take/steal/borrow money from a friend, or participantally as the Goal, with the goods being transferred construed circumstantially as Matter, as in rob/deprive him of [‘in respect of’] his money. … 

These two models for construing the experience of transfer of possession are thus grammatically distinct in English. The ‘giving’ model constitutes a distinct type in the grammar of transitivity – the configuration of Actor + Process + Goal + Recipient. In contrast, the ‘depriving’ model is not a distinct one; it is based on a more general pattern of participant + circumstance:

(i) [possession as participant] Actor + Process + Goal + Place (e.g. they took his most cherished belongings from him) or 

(ii) [original owner as participant] Actor + Process + Goal + Matter (e.g. they robbed him of his most cherished belongings).

To account for the relationship between these two lexicogrammatical models in English, we have to move up to the level of semantics.

The Systemic Environment Of Recipients

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 238):

Recipients and Clients occur in systemically different environments. Recipients occur only in ‘transitive transformative’ clauses of the ‘extending’ type; and within that category, they occur with those clauses that denote a transfer of the Actor’s possession of goods – transfer to the Recipient.  Here the Goal represents the ‘goods’ being transferred.

Blogger Comment:

Consider the intransitive instances But I gave generously to you.  Won't you now give to me in return?

'Give' + Scope

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 237n):

And there are clauses with give which, though superficially like transfer of possession, differ from these in that they do not exhibit the contrast between + preposition and – preposition. These are clauses with a nominalised verb as one participant, as in give somebody a kick/punch/kiss/hug. Thus while we can say, he gave the dog a kick, we are much less likely say he gave a kick to the dog. Such clauses are in fact mildly metaphorical variants of clauses where kick, punch, kiss, hug, etc. is a verb serving as the Process: he gave the dog a kick: he kicked the dog. This suggests that the nominalised verb is in fact a Scope rather than a Goal and that what might at first appear to be a Recipient is in fact construed as a Goal (and can thus be probed with do to/with): [Actor:] he [Process:] gave [Goal:] the dog [Scope:] a kick (cf. what he did to the dog was give it a kick but not what he did with the kick was give the dog it) …

Blogger Comments:

i.e.

congruent:

He	gave	the dog	a stick
Actor	Process: material	Recipient	Goal

but

He	gave	the dog	a kick
Actor	Process: material	Goal	Scope

is metaphorical for:

He	kicked	the dog
Actor	Process: material	Goal

So 'give' provides the only means of construing Scope in a transitive clause.

Material Clauses With Recipients

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 238, 238n):

Recipients and Clients occur in systemically different environments … Recipients occur only in ‘transitive transformative’ clauses of the ‘extending’ type; and within that category, they occur with those clauses that denote a transfer of the possession of goods.  Here the Goal represents the ‘goods’ being transferred… 

They are thus the material version of possessive relational clauses. Fawcett (1988) treats them as relational rather than as material. But in our interpretation, they are simply part of a general pattern of agnation between material clauses on the one hand and relational and existential ones on the other: creative material clauses are related to existential clauses and transformative material clauses to relational clauses (more specifically, elaborating transformation — intensive relation, extending transformation — possessive relation, and enhancing transformation — circumstantial relation).

Client vs Behalf

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 237):

Clients tend to be more restricted than Recipients; in I’m doing all this for Mary, for Mary is not a Client but a type of circumstance of Cause (Behalf).

Material Clauses: Recipient & Client

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 237):

The two functions of Recipient and Client resemble one another in that both construe a benefactive rôle; they represent a participant that is benefiting from the performance of the process. The Recipient is the one that goods are given to; the Client is one that services are done for. Either may appear with or without a preposition, depending on its position in the clause … the preposition is to with Recipient, for with Client.

Material Clauses: Scope, Recipient, Client & Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 236):

Of these four participant roles, Scope is the most general across different types of ‘material’ clause … but they are all more restricted than Actor and Goal.

Material Clauses: Inherent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 236): 

The Actor is an inherent participant in both intransitive and transitive material clauses; the Goal is inherent only in transitive clauses. In addition to these two roles, there are a number of other participant roles that may be involved in the process of a ‘material’ clause; these are: Scope, Recipient, Client and (more marginally) Attribute.

Transformative Material Clauses: Outcomes As Expansion Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232-3):

The outcome of the transformation is an (1) elaboration, (2) extension or (3) enhancement of the Actor (‘intransitive’) or Goal (‘transitive’) …

The Systemic Valeur Of The Feature 'Transformative'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):

The ‘transformative’ type of ‘material’ clause covers a much wider range than the ‘creative’ type. As always, it is difficult to find an appropriate term for the grammatical category. We have to understand it in the context of the relevant systemic contrast. Thus ‘transformative’ means that the Actor (‘intransitive’) or Goal (‘transitive’) exists prior to the onset of the unfolding of the process, and is changed in some way or other through the unfolding of the process.

How To Tell Transformatives From Creatives [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):

Neither happen to or do to/with can be used [as probes] with creative clauses …

Intransitive Transformative Material Clauses: Probing Actor (Medium)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):

The Actor of an ‘intransitive’ ‘transformative’ clause can be probed by happen to …

Transitive Transformative Material Clauses: Probing Goal (Medium)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):

The Goal of a ‘transitive’ ‘transformative’ clause exists before the process begins to unfold and is transformed in the course of the unfolding. It can be probed by means of do to, do with …

Transformative Material Clauses: Outcomes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 232):

In a ‘transformative’ clause, the outcome is the change of some aspect of the Actor (‘intransitive’) or the Goal (‘transitive’). … In the limiting case, the outcome of the final phase is to maintain the conditions of the initial phase …

Unlike ‘creative’ clauses, ‘transformative’ ones can often have a separate element representing the outcome … an Attribute specifying the resultant state of the Goal. Even where the sense of outcome is inherent in the process, the outcome may be indicated by the ‘particle’ of a phrasal verb, as in shut down …

Intransitive Creative Materials Vs Existentials [Diagnostics]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 231-2):

‘Intransitive’ ‘creative’ clauses have the sense of ‘come into existence’ and shade into clauses of the ‘existential’ process type. One difference is the unmarked present tense: it is present–in–present for material clauses … but the simple present in existential ones. Another difference is the potential for a construction with there as Subject in existential clauses, but not in creative material ones.

Processes Of Destruction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 231):

However, processes of destruction seem to be treated by the grammar as ‘transformative’ rather than as ‘creative’ …

Phase–As–Process As Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 231n):

In hypotactic verbal group complexes, the phase (starting, continuing; trying, succeeding; and so on) is an expansion of the process itself; but [where] the phase is construed as a process in its own right … such examples … shade into metaphorical variants of clauses with phased verbal group complexes;

Phase As Creative Material Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 231):

In the category of ‘creative’ clauses, we can perhaps also include phases of creation, as in Then I started my first novel, where started can be interpreted as ‘began to write’, and I’d better try some more non-fiction, where try can be interpreted as ‘try to write’.

Creative Material Clauses: Outcome

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 231):

In a ‘creative’ clause, the outcome is the coming into existence of the Actor (‘intransitive’) or the Goal (‘transitive’). The outcome is thus this participant itself, and there is no separate element in the clause representing the outcome.

Material Subtypes Differentiated By Outcome Of Medium

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 230n):

… seen from a different perspective from that of the traditional transitive/intransitive model, these two functions, the intransitive Actor and the transitive Goal, are actually one and the same — the Medium. The differentiation of different sub-types of ‘material’ clauses is thus based on the combination of Medium + Process in the first instance. One might have expected that it would be based on Actor + Process instead, as the traditional model would suggest; but it turns out that although they have been favoured by philosophers of language drawing on action theory, distinctions based on Actor + Process such as animacy, potency and volitionality are less central to the system of ‘material’ clauses than distinctions based on Medium + Process. In fact, the grammar of transitivity is more centrally concerned with consciousness rather than with animacy, potency or volitionality.

Material Clause Subtypes Differentiated By Outcome: Creative Vs Transformative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 228, 230):

The nature of the outcome affecting the Actor of an ‘intransitive’ clause and the Goal of a ‘transitive’ one [i.e. the Medium] turns out to be the general criterion for recognising more delicate subtypes of material clauses. The most general contrast is between

(i) ‘creative’ clauses, where the Actor or Goal is construed as being brought into existence as the process unfolds, and

(ii) ‘transformative’ ones, where a pre-existing Actor or Goal is construed as being transformed as the process unfolds.

Outcome Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 228):

The quantum of change represented by a material clause is construed as unfolding through distinct phases, typically over a fairly short interval of time — with at least an initial phase of unfolding and a separate final phase … The final phase of unfolding is the outcome of the process: it represents a change of some feature of one of the participants in the material clause.

How Operative & Receptive Clauses Differ

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 227-8):

The clauses are the same experientially; they both represent a configuration of Actor + Process + Goal. But they differ in how these rôles are mapped onto the interpersonal functions in the modal structure of the clause. In the ‘operative’ variant, the Actor is mapped on to the Subject, so it is given modal responsibility and in the ‘unmarked’ case (in a ‘declarative’ clause) it is also the Theme; and the Goal is mapped on to the Complement, so in the ‘unmarked’ case it falls within the Rheme. However, in the ‘receptive’ variant, it is the Goal that is mapped onto the Subject, so it is assigned modal responsibiity and it is also the Theme in the ‘unmarked’ case; and the Actor has the status of an Adjunct within the Rheme of the clause and, as an Adjunct, it may be left out …

Why ‘Operative’ & ‘Receptive’?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 227n):

It is helpful to make a terminological distinction between the voice contrast of the clause — operative/receptive, and the voice contrast of the verbal group — passive/active.

Clause Voice: Operative Vs Receptive

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 227):

… if there is a Goal of the process, as well as an Actor, the representation may come in either of two forms: either operative (active) … or receptive (passive) … The contrast between ‘operative’ and ‘receptive’ is a contrast in voice open to ‘transitive’ clauses.

Why Ranked Constituency?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 227n):

… the model we use is one of ranked constituency, where the clause and the verb constitute different ranking domains. One of the reasons for preferring the ranked constituency model is precisely the need to differentiate the clause as the domain of transitivity and the verb, or rather verbal group, as the domain of tense and other purely verbal systems.

The Concepts Of In/Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 227):

… in English and in many other languages — perhaps all, these concepts relate more appropriately to the clause than the verb. Transitivity is a system of the clause, affecting not only the verb serving as Process, but also participants and circumstances.

Goal: Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 226):

… another term that has been used for this function is Patient, meaning one that ‘suffers’ or ‘undergoes’ the process. … the relevant concept is more like that of ‘one to which the process is extended’. The concept of extension is in fact the one that is embodied in the classical terminology of ‘transitive’ [‘going through’] and ‘intransitive’ [‘not going through’], from which the term ‘transitivity’ is derived.

Goal (Of Impact)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 226, 226n):

Note that ‘Goal’ refers to the goal of impact — the participant construed as being impacted by the Actor’s performance of the process (this term is also used by Dik, 1978: 37, in his framework of ‘Functional Grammar’: ‘the entity to which the Action is applied by the Agent’). This sense of the goal of impact is distinct from (though obviously ultimately related to) the sense of destination — the destination of a process of motion, as in the goal of a journey.

Happening (Intransitive) Vs Doing (Transitive)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225-6):

[The Actor] brings about the unfolding of the process through time, leading to an outcome that is different from the initial phase of the unfolding. This outcome may be confined to the Actor itself, in which case there is only one participant inherent in the process. Such a ‘material’ clause represents a happening and, using traditional terminology, we can call it intransitive. Alternatively, the unfolding of the process may extend to another participant, the Goal, impacting it in some way: the outcome is registered on the Goal in the first instance, rather than on the Actor. Such a ‘material’ clause represents a doing and we can call it transitive.

The Different Way Material Processes Unfold Through Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225, 225n):

Processes of all types unfold through time; but the way the process unfolds may vary from one process type to another. In particular, processes of the ‘material’ type tend to differ from all other types (with the partial exception of ‘behavioural’ processes …), and this is seen in how present time is reported. The unmarked tense selection is the present–in–present (e.g. is doing) rather than the simple present (e.g. does) … 

The present–in–present serves to narrow down the present from the extended now of habits and ‘general truths’ that is characteristic of the simple present with ‘material’ clauses … 

The narrowing–down effect of the present–in–present is not brought out by the names most commonly used for this tense — the ‘present progressive’, or the ‘present continuous’.

Actor Vs Subject

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225):

… Actor and Subject are distinct in a ‘passive’ — or ‘receptive’ — clause … Here the Actor is not interpersonally ‘charged’ with the rôle of Subject, but is rather given the lower status of Adjunct and can thus be left out … We therefore have to be careful to distinguish the experiential notion of ‘the one doing the deed’ (or ‘the one bringing about the change’) from the interpersonal notion of ‘the one held modally responsible’ (or ‘the one given the status of the nub of the argument’).

Actor Vs Agent

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 225n):

The ‘Actor’ of a ‘material’ clause (Halliday, 1967/8) is distinct from the ‘Agent’ of an ‘effective’ clause … the two represent different generalisations about the experiential organisation of the clause. There is considerable variation in the use of the terms ‘agent’ and ‘actor’ in linguistics. For example, Dik (1978: 37) uses ‘agent’ (paired with ‘goal’) in a sense that is close to our ‘actor’, whereas Foley & van Valin (1984: 29ff) use ‘actor’ (paired with ‘undergoer’) in a sense that is closer to our ‘agent’.

Material Clauses: Actor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 224-5):

… ‘material’ clauses are clauses of doing–&–happening: a ‘material’ clause construes a quantum of change in the flow of events as taking place through some input of energy. … the source of the energy bringing about the change is typically a participant — the Actor … the ‘logical Subject’ of older terminology. The Actor is the one who does the deed — that is, the one that brings about the change.

Process, Participant And Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 224):

The concepts of process, participant and circumstance are semantic categories which explain in the most general way how phenomena of our experience of the world are construed as linguistic structures.

Transient Processes And Permanent Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 223-4):

Change is thus construed as involving both transience and permanence, and the phenomena of experience are construed either as transient processes or as permanent participants. The border between these two is indeterminate; the lexicogrammar of every language will allow considerable discretion in how phenomena are treated in discourse, and lexicogrammars of different languages draw the borderline in different places. … This is an area of considerable fluidity; but most phenomena are treated as either as process or participant, and have to be reconstrued metaphorically to change their status in the grammar …

Construing Change: Transience And Permanence

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 223):

The contrast [between participants and processes] is also reflected in in the organisation of nominal groups and verbal groups in two ways: while nominal groups have evolved the system of determination for locating referents in a referential space, verbal groups have evolved the system of tense for locating a unique occurrence of a process in time.

Construing Change: Transience And Permanence

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 222-3):

The units that realise the process, participant, and circumstance elements of the clause make distinct contributions to the modelling of a quantum of change. The elements that make up the ‘centre’ of the clause – the process and the participants involved in it – construe complementary facets of the change. These two facets are transience and permanence. Transience means that a phenomenon is construed as unfolding through time by a verbal group serving as the process. Permanence means that a phenomenon is construed as continuous through time, being located in (concrete or abstract) space, by nominal groups serving as participants. Thus participants are construed as being relatively stable through time, and an instance of a participant can take part in many processes … In contrast, processes are ephemeral; every instance is a unique occurrence …

This contrast between participants and processes explains why there are names of individual participants — ‘proper names’, as well as names of classes of participants — ‘common nouns’, but only names of classes of processes: all lexical verbs are ‘common’ verbs.

Processes, Participants And Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 221):

This tripartite interpretation of figures … is what lies behind the grammatical distinction of word classes into verbs, nouns and the rest, a pattern that in some form is probably universal among human languages.

‘The Difference In Status Between Participants And Circumstances’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 221):

One way of looking at the situation is this. The process is the most central element in the configuration. Participants are close to the centre; they are directly involved in the process, bringing about its occurrence or being affected by it in some way … and we can say that the configuration of process + participants constitutes the experiential centre of the clause. Circumstantial elements augment this centre in some way — temporally, spatially, causally and so on; but their status in the configuration is more peripheral and unlike participants they are not directly involved in the process.

Circumstances vs Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 220):

Circumstantial elements are almost always optional augmentations of the clause rather than obligatory components. In contrast, participants are inherent in the process: every experiential type of clause has at least one participant and certain types have up to three participants – the only exception being, as just noted above, clauses of certain meteorological processes without any participants …

The Semantic Figure As Construed By Clause Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 220):

A figure consists, in principle, of three components:

1. a process unfolding through time
2. the participants involved in the process
3. circumstances associated with the process.

These are organised in configurations that provide the models or schemata for construing our experience of what goes on.

Process Type And Instantial & Registerial Variation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 218-9):

Part of the ‘flavour’ of a particular text, and also of the register that it belongs to, lies in its mixture of process types. For example, in enabling contexts, recipes and other procedural texts are almost entirely ‘material’, whereas, in reporting contexts, ‘verbal’ clauses play an important role in news reports and, in sharing contexts, ‘mental’ clauses are a typical motif in casual conversation. The mixture of process types characteristic of a text belonging to a particular register typically changes in the course of unfolding of the text.

Terms In Systems Represent Fuzzy Sets

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 218n):

Systemic terms are not Aristotelian categories. Rather they are fuzzy categories; they can be thought of as representing fuzzy sets rather than ‘crisp’ ones …

All System Networks Construe A Continuous Semiotic Space

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 218):

Like all system networks, this [process type] network construes a continuous semiotic space.

The Principle Of Systemic Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 217, 218):

The world of our experience is highly indeterminate; and this is precisely how the grammar construes it in the system of process type. Thus, one and the same text may offer alternative models of what would appear to be the same domain of experience, construing for example the domain of emotion both as a process in a ‘mental’ clause … and as a participant in a ‘relational’ one …

Emotion is one of a number of experiential domains that are construed in more than one way by the grammar of transitivity. Such domains are experientially difficult to come to terms with, and the grammar solves the problem by offering complementary models for construing them.

Process Type As Continuous Semiotic Space: Core & Peripheral Areas

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 216):

The regions have core areas and these represent prototypical members of the process types; but the regions are continuous, shading into one another, and these border areas represent the fact that the process types are fuzzy categories.

Process Types: Ordering

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 216):

There is no priority of one kind of process over another. But they are ordered; and what is important is that, in our concrete visual metaphor, they form a circle and not a line. (More accurately still … a sphere … .) That is to say, our model of experience, as interpreted through the grammatical system of transitivity, is one of regions within a continuous space; but the continuity is not between two poles, it is round in a loop.

Material Processes And In/Transitive Verbs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 216):

They have, for example, been the source of the traditional distinction between ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ verbs.

Process Type Variation Across Languages

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 215n):

The minor process types appear to vary more across languages than the major ones. For example, in certain languages (English being one of them), existential clauses appear as a distinct type, but in other languages they may be very close to possessive and/or locative relational clauses.

Existential Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 215):

And on the borderline between the ‘relational’ and the ‘material’ are the processes concerned with existence, the existential, by which phenomena of all kinds are simply recognised to ‘be’ — to exist or to happen …

Verbal Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 215):

On the borderline between ‘mental’ and ‘relational’ are the verbal processes: symbolic relationships constructed in human consciousness and enacted in the form of language, like saying and meaning …

Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 215):

On the borderline between ‘material’ and ‘mental’ are the behavioural processes: those that represent the outer manifestations of inner workings, the acting out of processes of consciousness and physiological states.

Subsidiary Process Types: Behavioural, Verbal & Existential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 215):

Material, mental and relational are the main types of process in the English transitivity system. But we also find further categories at the three boundaries; not so clearly set apart, but nevertheless recognisable in the grammar as intermediate between the different pairs — sharing some features of each, and thus acquiring a character of their own.

Main Process Types Construed By The Transitivity Of English: Relational

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 214):

In addition to material and mental processes — the outer and inner aspects of our experience, a third component has to be supplied, before this can become a coherent theory of experience. We learn to generalise — to relate one fragment of experience to another in some kind of taxonomic relationship: this is the same as that, this is a kind of the other.  Here the grammar recognises processes of a third type, those of identifying and classifying; we call these relational process clauses …

Main Process Types Construed By The Transitivity Of English: Material & Mental

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 214):

There is a basic difference, that we become aware of at a very early age (three to four months), between inner and outer experience: between what we experience as going on ‘out there’, in the world around us, and what we experience as going on inside ourselves, in the world of consciousness (including perception, emotion and imagination). The prototypical form of the ‘outer’ experience is that of actions and events: things happen, and people or other actors do things, or make them happen. The ‘inner’ experience is harder to sort out; but it is partly a kind of replay of the outer, recording it, reacting to it, reflecting on it, and partly a separate awareness of our states of being. The grammar sets up a discontinuity between these two: it distinguishes rather clearly between the outer experience, the processes of the external world, and inner experience, the processes of consciousness. The grammatical categories are those of material process clauses and mental process clauses …

The Clause: Mode Of Action & Mode Of Reflection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 213):

Thus as well as being a mode of action, of giving and demanding goods–&–services and information, the clause is also a mode of reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and flow of events.