Emotion, Attitude & Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141n):

Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she’s returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of the clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing As Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:

I think that in a sense you’ve had to compromise, haven’t you?

Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.

Metaphenomenon & Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me.  The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project*, namely perception and emotion  That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can ‘react to’ facts.  In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry /worrying.

*Blogger Note:

Consider the following desideratively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:

The fact [[that he had to diet]] made him wish —> he had bought a secret supply of chocolate.

Consider the following cognitively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:

The fact [[that the bailiff was coming on Monday]] made him think —> it might be time to emigrate.

Projection Of Ideas & Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):

While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/imagined/dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying.

Sensing: Cognitive & Desiderative Vs Perceptive & Emotive

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138): 

Cognitive and desiderative processing create ideas … but perceptive processing and emotive processing don’t … they are activated by [pre-projected] facts.

Perceptive & Emotive Sensing Cannot Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138):

In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result as a result of someone seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts, for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]]. 

I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]]. 

We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].

Thus ‘that I am fixed, concrete’ is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing Can Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):

Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):

I just thought —> I’d tell you that I’d appreciate it.

I think —> I’ll give it up.

They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.

Thus the idea ‘I’ll give it up’ is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea ‘me to crawl on my bended knees’ is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):

These can be treated as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon; nor can they accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Prototypicality Vs Borderline Cases & Blends: Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6, 137):

As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying immediately at the borderline of the primary types.  The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends.  One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday 1985: 128-9): “processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing”. […] Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the ‘content’ of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.*

* Except, of course, where sensing is construed as interior saying: he thought to himself.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I’m doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he’s mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawnmower; I’m busy).

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Nature Of Participants — Consciousness & Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness … .  This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material and relational clauses.  While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or meta-phenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house).  Participants in material clauses cannot be meta-phenomenal.  For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house / their ideas / his argument), it is not possible to demolish “meta-things” (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):

Many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it / it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser’s consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser’s consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). neither material nor relational* clauses display this dual directionality.

*Blogger Comment:

Identifying relational processes are bidirectional in their coding, decoding vs encoding, and these are proportional to the bidirectionality of mental processes, emanating vs impinging, respectively:

	Medium	Process	Range
emanating:	Senser	Process: mental	Phenomenon
decoding:	Identified	Process: identifying	Identifier

	Agent	Process	Medium
impinging:	Phenomenon	Process: mental	Senser
encoding:	Identifier	Process: identifying	Identified

Grammatical Realisation Of Figures: Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134):

… doing & happening are realised as material clauses, sensing as mental ones, saying as verbal ones, and being (at, etc.) & having as relational clauses. The different process types are not signalled overtly in the grammar; they are covert or cryptotypic categories and emerge only when we consider their reactances.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133-4):

The complementarity can also be seen in the different kinds of deixis (relation to the here & now) associated with processes on the one hand and participants on the other. A process is made finite — it is pinned down in time, with point of reference in the act of speaking. A participant is made determinate, being held in a location within a referential space. The same distinction also appears in the temporal unfolding of a text, where participants have the potential to persist as discourse referents, but processes are excluded, unless they are turned into honorary participants through the use of grammatical metaphor.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Temporal Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133):

Whatever the mode of occurrence of any figure, it will always unfold in time. This temporal unfolding is construed as an inherent property of the process itself, realised grammatically as tense and aspect; it thus serves to validate the distinction between process and participant. Whereas on the one hand in its manifestation as a process, the figure unfolds in time, in its manifestation as participant, on the other hand, it persists through time — whether or not the participant undergoes any change of state. The limiting case is a creative or destructive process, such as writing or erasing a symbol, through which a participant comes into being or ceases to exist.

Doing & Being As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132): 

Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a ‘quantum of change’. Construed as doing, a change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result.  Consider a causal consequence such as [doing:] ‘he washed it’ —<so>—> [being:] ‘it was clean’. This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.).   Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view.   If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result.   If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor.  The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process.

Doing Vs Being: The Parameter Of Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing requires some input to occur. This will typically come from one of the participants involved, the doer (as with voluntary motion); but the source of energy may also be outside the figure (as with falling). No input of energy is required with a figure of being.

Doing Vs Being: The Parameter Of Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing involves a change over time of occurrence (including maintaining a state in spite of force for change). The change may take place along any one of a number of dimensions: 

• (a) circumstantial: spatial (motion or disposition, concrete or abstract); 
• (b) intensive: qualitative (colour, size, shape, solidity, etc.), quantitative (increase, decrease); 
• (c) possessive (transfer of ownership, loss or accretion of parts); 
• (d) existential (creation or destruction). 

In contrast, being does not depend on change over time. As a figure of being unfolds over time, the only change is that embodied in the temporal unfolding of the process itself. The nature of of the actualisation will be the same at any point of time.

Doing Vs Being: Parameters Of Time & Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing and being do not preclude the involvement of a conscious participant; but they do not require it — and hence do not have the effect of endowing a participant with human-like consciousness. They can be differentiated in terms of two parameters, time and energy, both of which are involved in their actualisation.

Domains Of Experience: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

There is of course a great deal of indeterminacy here, including such borderline cases as those where sensing and saying are construed as forms of action (and therefore cannot project), e.g. watching, listening, chatting, speaking. These properties reflect the borderline location of such processes in the overall semantic space.

Doing Vs Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic [sensing, saying] centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — ‘she addressed him’). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser’s involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser’s consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Addressee

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him / asked of him…. In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.

Interior & Exterior Symbolisers: Senser & Sayer

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130): 

Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines.  The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. … The “Symboliser” of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However, since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a ‘semiotic thing’ such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement. … We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.

Symbolic Processing & Levels Of Projected Content: Ideas & Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

“Symbolic processing” is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast, ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed [than locutions] from experience that is shared. Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying).

Symbolic Processing And Projected Symbolic Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

… the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying etc) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in ‘Symboliser’: she + ‘Process’: said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).

Levels Of Sensing & Saying And Levels Of Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-9):

Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying, on the one hand, and figures of doing and being, on the other, by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second-order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself, and the level of the content of sensing/saying.

Four Primary Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant rôles.

Figures Embody Two Subtheories Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:

(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and
(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants. 

To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.

Figures Are Configurations Of Elemental Phenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being “units” means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts.  In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.

Figures Embody One Quantum Of Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time.

Expansion & Projection As Trans-Phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain their logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans–phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks, but also experientially. […] This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

Semantic Sequences & Grammatical Complexing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in the course of realisation. One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures […] or a sequence of elements […].

The Limiting Case Of Expansion: Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. […] Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related.

Sequence Relations Of Expansion & Projection: Domain Of Relation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause […] or some element within the clause […].

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Or Figure? [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course […]. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been ‘shrunk’ by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Element Realising Figure In Sequence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

In addition, one or more of the figures in the [sequence] may be realised by something ‘less than’ a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor […]. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: as a child, he was very shy ‘when he was a child, he was very shy’.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Complex Realising Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence.  This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind: an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c.) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c.) is ‘upgraded’ to the status of projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don’t suppose || there’s very much                             ‘there is probably not’

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Realised Beyond The Clause Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125):

On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex […]. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of […] text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. […] 

In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly dissociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice.  (This significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)

Sequences (Semantics) And Clause Complexes (Grammar) Evolve Together

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124-5):

… semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory …).  In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together.  The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.

Interactional Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124):

We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logico-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts). In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text.

Text & The Interaction Base: Interpersonally-Oriented Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors. But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition (‘I invite you to accept x, if you want x’; for example: If you’re thirsty, there’s a beer in the fridge) and evidence (‘I think, infer / you should believe x because y’; for example: John’s in Germany because I just talked to him).

Text & The Ideation Base: ‘Macro-Figures’

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as ‘macro-figures’, i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and the discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).

Sequences & Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):

Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text.

Sequences & Text Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in terms of the relations that connect [one] happening with another. Hence sequences can be used to store information about the world in the form of organised text — ‘this is how to change tyres on your car’, ‘this is how to make cauliflower surprise’, etc.. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognisable text type, such as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in most our culturally recognised modes of discourse.

Sequences: Constraints

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Thus sequences are formed by binary logico-semantic relations which may relate either single figures or sequences of figures [i.e. internal nesting]. Certain relations may impose constraints on the phenomena being related; for example, a projecting relation can only obtain when the first figure is one of sensing or saying. But the range of different logico-semantic relations is highly varied, so that constraints tend to be specific to particular subtypes.

Relational Organisation Vs Configurational Organisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

In contrast to figures, sequences are not constructional units.  We can specify the range of projecting and expanding relations available for further developing a sequence, but we cannot specify where a sequence has to come to an end — that is, we cannot specify a sequence as a unit whole with a conventional configuration of parts.  Thus if we have expanded one figure we can always repeat the operation … .  In contrast, a figure is a unit with a finite number of elements … .  Hence a sequence can be indefinitely complex, whereas a figure cannot.

Condition & Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119):

… the distinction between expansion and projection is less determinate than we have suggested.  The logico-semantic relation of condition, which is prototypically construed as a form of enhancement, could also be construed as a kind of projection; and this is also brought out in the grammar. Conditions specify a potential and actualisable but non-actual situation.  This potential situation can also be set up through projection:

If the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do? 

Supposing the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do? 

Say the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do?

Words such as supposing and assuming are verbs of projection which have come to function as conjunctions in conditional figures; while other words such as imagine and say retain more of their projecting force. Sometimes even variants of the same word have come to differ a little in their locations on this cline: for example, suppose and assume seem closer to projection than their corresponding participial variants.  This is an uncertain region in which a figure hangs in the air, so to speak, suspended between the hypothetical material plane and the semiotic one.

Expansion Relations: Lexicogrammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

Relations of expansion are typically realised in the grammar by conjunctions or conjunctive expressions linking a pair of clauses, either paratactically or hypotactically (e.g. that is, in other words; and, but, or, also, besides; so, yet, then, when, if, because, unless).  Some of these may realise more than one category; for example, but may be adversative ‘and yet’ (extending), or concessive ‘and in spite of this’ (enhancing); while may be additive ‘and in addition’ (extending), or temporal ‘and at the same time’ (enhancing); or may be alternative ‘or else’ (extending: alternatives in the external world, like take it or leave it), or restating ‘in other words’ (elaborating: alternatives in the world ‘internal’ to the discourse, like they are reduced to the smallest size, or micro-miniaturised.).  Overlaps of this kind show that the primary categories we have set up do in fact shade into one another; in particular, extending in some sense occupies a space intermediate between elaborating and enhancing, and shares a fuzzy borderline with each.

The Cline From Sequence To Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

There is no sharp line between a figure and a sequence of figures: a quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed, and the grammar rather sets up a cline from sequence to simple figure. […] For example:

1 sequence of 2 figures:   Tarzan pulled the rope; so it broke.
                                          Tarzan made the rope break (by pulling it).
                                          Tarzan broke the rope.
                        1 figure:    The rope broke.

Elaboration Sequences: Repetition As The Other Limiting Case Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

And there is a third type of accumulation where the logical relation is that of ‘equals’: x is the same figure as a. Here at this end the limiting case is a simple repetition; this may be further elaborated in such a way that one figure is reworded as another, or else further clarified or brought out by an example.

Extension Sequences: No Logical Priority

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117-8):

But figures may also be added to one another, making them part of the same story without assigning any kind of logical priority to either: x as well as / instead of / in contradistinction to a’. We have referred to these as extensions.

Enhancement Sequences: Temporality As One Limiting Case Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

From one standpoint the limiting case of expansion would be accumulation in a temporal sequence (hence our general term “sequence” for the product of this construal): ‘a happens, then x happens’. This gives value to a as the temporal circumstance of x. From this we could derive a wide range of more complex enhancing relations: variations on the simple temporal sequence (‘after’, ‘before’, ‘at the same time’, ‘immediately after’, &c.) and further circumstances such as cause, condition, concession and their subcategories. […] These are ‘enhancements’, multiplying one figure by another, as it were.

Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion can be thought of as construing another dimension of experience, so that superimposed, as it were, on the construal of a figure — a basic fragment of experience in the form of a quantum of change (event, action, behaviour &c.) — is the construal of a nexus between two figures, such that one fragment is non-randomly (i.e. meaningfully) cumulated with another.

Enhancement Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

enhancement is a circumstantial or qualifying relation between figures: it is, in a sense, extension plus a circumstantial feature — ‘and’ + time (‘and then’, ‘and at the same time’, etc.), ‘and’ + manner (‘and in the same way’, ‘and likewise’), ‘and’ + cause (‘and therefore’, etc.), etc.: it is autumn, so the leaves are turning brown.

Extension Sequences: Addition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

extension is an additive relation between figures: a sequence is made bigger by the addition of another figure. This may involve pure addition (‘and’: he is too young and he doesn’t speak the language) or addition with an adversative feature (‘and yet’: he speaks the language but he is too young). As a variant of addition, we also have alternation (he is too young or else he is just immature).

Elaboration Sequences: Identity & Inclusion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

elaboration is a (partial) identity relation between figures: one is identified with another with a difference in perspective (it matters a lot; it plays an important rôle) or one is included under another as an example (it plays an important rôle; e.g., it provides the infrastructure).  These are clearly related to one another: identity is the limiting case of inclusion and inclusion is partial identity.

Expansion Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion is a highly generalised type of relation, whereby one figure is joined logico-semantically to another figure by a relator to form a sequence of the same order of reality. […] immediate subtypes: elaborate (reiterate), extend (add) and enhance (qualify).

Proposals Realised As Modulated Indicative Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115-6):

We saw that quoted offers may be realised by modulated indicative clauses. This would seem to be an exception to the generalisation that indicative clauses realise propositions. However, it is a principled one: the type of indicative clause involved is precisely the type that lies closer in the interpersonal clause grammar to imperative clauses — modulated indicative clauses, i.e. those with an imperative modality. As can be expected, this is then also a possible realisation of commands; it is a metaphorical strategy for expanding the meaning potential, typically to vary the tenor between speaker and listener.

Reported Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

However, reported offers can always be realised in the same way as reported commands — as in the case of reported propositions, the distinction in orientation between giving and demanding is realised by the projecting clause; for example:

command: she told him —> to do the laundry

offer: she offered (promised; threatened) —> to do the laundry

The category of reported proposal is thus realised generally as a perfective non-finite clause when it is reported.

Quoted Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Quoted offers naturally retain the property of being variously realised in the mood system:

declarative: She said: “I can do the laundry.”

interrogative: She said: “Shall I do the laundry?”

imperative: She said: “Let me do the laundry!”

Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

There is thus a parallel between reported propositions/proposals and quoted ones. But with offers (proposals: giving goods–&–services) there is a difference in respect of realisation. Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative) offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:

declarative: I can do the laundry.

interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?

imperative: Let me do the laundry!

Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation.

Quoting Vs Reporting: Speech Function & Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114-5):

… in quoting, where the projected clause retains its mood, the general verb say can be used whatever speech function is being projected. In reporting, on the other hand, the projected clause is no longer specified for mood; its speech function is signalled by the verb in the projecting clause (asked, ordered, etc.). This gives the projected element more of an ideational status (c.f. its treatment in traditional grammar as “object” of the projecting verb), and opens up the way to a series of agnate expressions such as (the king ordered) “Execute him!” / that he should be executed / him to be executed / him executed / his execution.

Quoted Proposition Vs Quoted Proposal: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

When the projection is quoted, propositions are realised by indicative clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by imperative clauses:

(he said) “I have done the laundry” : (she said to him) “do the laundry”.

Reported Proposition Vs Reported Proposal: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Grammatically the distinction between propositions and proposals is constructed as follows. When the projection is reported, propositions are realised by finite bound clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by irrealis (infinitival) non-finite bound clauses: 

(he said) that he had done the laundry : (she told him) to do the laundry.

Projected Proposals Vs Projected Propositions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114): 

The interpersonal system for dialogic interaction thus creates a fundamental distinction between ‘content’ as proposition and ‘content’ as proposal. This distinction is then reflected in the ideational system of projection: a figure is projected in one or other of these two modes, as a proposition or as a proposal. The two categories combine freely with ideas and locutions. Projected proposals are non-actual, or uninstantiated: that is, the occurrence of a projected proposal is always future in relation to the figure that projects it. In contrast, propositions are actual, or instantiated: that is, the occurrence of a proposition is located in actual time (which may be past, present or future).

Propositions & Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113-4):

Information is either given or demanded; in either case it is encoded as a proposition. Similarly, goods and services are either given or demanded, but the linguistic act is a mediating one, specifying the (typically non-linguistic) action that embodies the exchange, as an offer to do or a demand that something should be done. This is a proposal for a deed, one that commits either the speaker (giving) or the addressee (demanding); together with a third type, which is a combination of these two, viz. suggestion: Let’s do the laundry.

Interpersonal Semantics & Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113):

Interpersonal semantics is centrally concerned with varieties of symbolic exchange. Here, as in other places in the meaning base, the system is organised in such a way that it creates a difference between non-symbolic reality and symbolic reality, between phenomena and metaphenomena. The “commodity” that is being exchanged in interpersonal dialogue is either semiotic or material: it is either one that is construed by language itself — information — or it is one that exists independently of language — goods & services. In the first case, language constitutes the exchange; in the second, it facilitates the exchange of a non-linguistic commodity.

Projecting & Projected Figures: Temporal Implications

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

In general, there is no temporal constraint between the projected and projecting figures: the projected figure may be past, present or future relative to the projecting one. The dimension affected by projection [is] order of reality, not time. However, there is a major dichotomy between two types of projection which does have temporal implications. To explore it, we have to look briefly at a fundamental interpersonal category, that of mood.

Projections Of Ideas And AI & Computational Linguistics: Hearer Modelling & Interpersonal Distance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

The projection of ideas has also played an important rôle in hearer modelling in AI and computational linguistics. From a systemic-functional point of view, hearer modelling corresponds to one aspect of the interaction base: the interactants in a dialogue have to be able to assess and model the way their experiences diverge. This is one measure of overall interpersonal distance between them. In hearer modelling, this tends to be construed ideationally by means of cognitive projection, where the projected idea is represented as a separate partition or space within overall knowledge: ‘the speaker believes —> the hearer knows —> …’. Such models may involve long projecting sequences (often called “nested beliefs”) …

Projections Of Ideas And Intensional (& Epistemic) Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

Projections of ideas have played a special rôle in the extension of standard logic within intensional logic (or more restrictedly for knowing and believing, within epistemic logic) to allow for reasoning in this domain. One of the features of the projection of ideas that has received special attention in logically-oriented approaches to meaning is its “referential opacity”.   If a speaker knows that Henry is the king, and construes someone else’s belief as Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man, the referring expression Henry cannot be replaced by the king although the speaker knows they have the same referent: ‘Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man’ cannot be inferred from ‘Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man’ since the identity of Henry and the king has not been established in the projected world of Thomas’s consciousness.

Why Quoting Locutions & Reporting Ideas Are The Natural Default Condition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111-2):

… although the two variables, locution/idea and quoting/reporting, can combine in either of the two possible alignments, there is a natural default condition, which is that locution goes with quoting and idea goes with reporting. The reason for this is clear: 

where the first-order phenomenon is one of saying (prototypically shared semiosis), the projected figure can be presented as if it was also of the same order: Harriet said + “Shall I feed the cat?” (reversible as “Shall I feed the cat?” + said Harriet). 

Where the first-order phenomenon is one of sensing (unshared semiosis), the projected figure has no counterpart on the first-order plane of experience and cannot be naturally presented as if it had; so, Harriet wondered + whether she should feed the cat. 

But there is always the possibility of semogenic extension by cross-coupling; so we also find corresponding marked alignments: locution/report Harriet asked + whether she should feed the cat, and idea/quote Harriet wondered + “Shall I feed the cat?” — the latter being again reversible.

Reporting: Wording Marking Second-Order Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

… in quoting, the form of wording is still that of the first-order realm of experience: “Shall I feed the cat?” — taken by itself, there is nothing about this to show it is a projection. In reporting, on the other hand, the form of wording is clearly marked as being of the second-order: whether she should feed the cat has lost its first-order semantic features — and hence has to be projected by words that specify its particular speech function: asked/wondered not said/thought.

Quoting Vs Reporting And The Creation Of A Second-Order Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

In reporting, the status of the two parts is unequal — the projected figure is dependent on the projecting: hence the projected figure is clearly construed as belonging to a different, second-order plane of reality — a reality that is made up of meaning, as it were. In quoting, on the other hand, the two have equal status as independent figures; the projected figure is thus projected as if it was part of the same first-order reality.

Semantic Weight: Quoting Vs Reporting

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

… whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. … The projecting and projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting … . Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting ….

Sensed Ideas Vs Said Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 110-1):

Let us look more closely at these two modes of projecting, in both of which the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, the processing that brings the other figure into symbolic existence. Either the projection takes the prototypical form of semiosis: it is presented as verbal, shared, an exchange or joint construction of meanings; or it is fashioned into a derived semiotic form, unshared, interiorised, and without any meaning being exchanged. In the first, the projecting figure is one of saying; the projected is referred to as locution. In the second, the projecting figure is one of sensing; the projected is referred to as idea. Ideas are projections which are sensed, locutions are projections which are said.

Second-Order Experience: Meaning & Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):

We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of ‘content’. We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording. […] We will refer to these [i.e. meaning and wording] in the context of projection as ideas and locutions.

Non-Human Sayers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106-7): 

… typically only humans can project into second-order reality. However, since human consciousness is the locus of semiotic activity, it has the power of interpreting as metaphenomenon that which is manifested by some other, non-conscious symbolic source. Thus while “sensing” (that is semiotic activity that is unmanifested, like thinking) does require a human senser, saying can be ascribed to a non-human as well as to a human sayer …

The Differentiation Of Two Orders Of Reality Embodied In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

This differentiation is embodied in relations of sequence in the following way. Either a sequential relation expands one figure by adding another one to it, the two still remaining on the same phenomenal level; or the sequential relation projects one of the two figures onto the plane of second-order, semiotic phenomena, so that it enters the realm of metaphenomena (meanings or wordings).

Language & Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

Note that the linguistic processes themselves, as apprehended by our senses, are part of the first-order reality; second-order reality is formed of the meanings and wordings that these processes bring into being.

Construing Material Vs Semiotic Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106): 

Throughout the semantic construal of human experience, there is a differentiation between two orders of reality: between the everyday reality of our material existence on the one hand and on the other hand the second-order reality that is brought into existence only by the system of language. This is a contrast between semiotic phenomena, those of meanings and wordings, and the first-order phenomena that constitute our material environment.

Why Natural Logic & Propositional Logic Differ

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105):

Both the difference in scope and the difference in ‘definability’ can be explained in functional terms. Sequences have evolved in the interpretation of human experience in general; consequently, they have to be flexible and powerful enough to cope with a large amount of variation, and the implicit ‘definition’ of each relation (i.e., its location in the semantic system along various dimensions) is the evolving distillation of innumerable instances where it is invoked […]. In contrast, the truth-functional connectives of propositional logic have been designed for a restricted purpose — the kind of deductive reasoning western philosophy came to focus on — and their definitions are fixed by reference to values of “true” and “false” (by means of truth tables.

Propositional Logic Vs Natural Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104n, 105n): 

Propositional logic is interpersonally invariable. Unlike natural logic, it is only concerned with statements, or rather — since language is concerned with validity rather than truth — with the philosophical version of what are statements in natural language. […]

Projecting figures of the ‘think’ type — ‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘want’ — have been represented outside standard logic within intensional logic.

Evolved Natural Logic Vs Designed Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104):

Sequences might be said to constitute the  ‘natural logic’ equivalent of propositional logic — that is, the evolved system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc from which propositional logic has been derived by design. […] Since propositional logic is a designed system, its relations are codified and defined (typically in truth-functional terms). In contrast, sequential relations have evolved. A certain type of relation will have a core — the prototypical representatives of that type; but there will also be peripheral representatives and ‘grey areas’ where one type shades into another. There is another important difference between propositional logic and natural logic of sequences. While there is only a very small handful of truth-functional connectives in propositional logic (conjunction, disjunction [exclusive or non-exclusive], implication), there is a very wide range of sequential relations in language — all the more specific varieties of projecting and expanding.

Sequence Models The Logical Relations Between Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104):

A sequence constitutes a model of how figures can be related. One prominent form of this relationship, which has been foregrounded in various guises in science and logic, is that of cause & effect, whereby experience is given causal interpretation. But that is only one among many such possible relationships, which taken together can be said to constitute the logic of natural language.