The “Trinocular” Perspective

Halliday (2008: 6):

The boundaries of any grammatical category are likely to be fuzzy […] — such indeterminacy is a general property of the grammar. The grammarian attempts to define each category as accurately as possible, looking at it from three different angles: its systemic environment (contrast with other term or terms in the system, and the relationship of that system to other systems); its meaning (proportionality in semantic terms), and its form. In other words, the grammarian adopts a “trinocular” perspective on the stratal hierarchy so that every category is viewed “from round about”, “from above” and “from below”. And since the views from these different angles often conflict, assigning instances to a particular category involves some degree of compromise, where criteria will depend on the purposes of the description.

The Grammatical System

Halliday (2008: 5,6):

This is the “system” in the sense in which it was formulated and defined by JR Firth (Firth 1957a,b); the system is the paradigmatic relation that “gives value to” the elements of syntagmatic structure. […] It is the system that defines the set of options from which any feature derives its value. […] What characterises the system is the regular proportionality between its terms. The system is closed, so that its terms are mutually defining […]

Construing Experience: Lexis-Grammar Complementarity

Halliday (2008: 3):

It seemed to me that the lexis and the grammar were complementary, at least in their reality-construing, ideational function. In principle, any phenomenon of human experience could be construed either way: either lexically, as specific and open-ended, or grammatically, as generalised and closed; and hence, if some phenomenon showed a high degree of complexity, it might be construed in both ways at once.

Construing Experience [Defined]

Halliday (2008: 2):

I had always been interested in the ways in which the “grammars” of natural languages — that is, the lexicogrammatical resources as a whole — parcelled out the immense task of representing human experience. I referred to this as construing, with construe meaning “construct semiotically, transform into meaning”; so the task of transforming experience into meaning.

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Why A Text Is Meaningful

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):

A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Metaphorical Interpretation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):

What the metaphorical interpretation does is to suggest how an instance in the text may be referred to the system of language as a whole. It is therefore an important link in the total chain of explanations whereby we relate the text to the system.

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Purpose

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):

In the most general terms, the purpose of analysis a text is to explain the impact that it makes: why it means what it does, and why it gives the particular impression that it does.

Metaphorical Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 657):

The important point to make is that a piece of wording that is metaphorical has as it were an additional dimension of meaning: it ‘means’ both metaphorically and congruently. … however far one may choose to go in unpacking ideational metaphor, it is important also to analyse each instance as it is.

Nominalisation: Evolution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 657):

This kind of nominalising metaphor probably evolved first in scientific and technical registers, where it played a dual rôle: it made it possible on the one hand to construct hierarchies of technical terms, and on the other hand to develop an argument step by step, using complex passages ‘packaged’ in nominal form as Themes. It has gradually worked its way through into most other varieties of adult discourse, in much of which, however, it loses its original raison d’être and tends to become merely a mark of prestige and power.

Nominalisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656-7):

Nominalising is the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor. By this device, processes (congruently worded as verbs) and properties (congruently worded as adjectives) are reworded metaphorically as nouns; instead of functioning in the clause, as Process or Attribute, they function as Thing in the nominal group. … What the happens to the original ‘things’? They get displaced by the metaphoric ones, and so are reduced to modifying these…

Spoken Choreographic Complexity Vs Written Crystalline Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656):

In spoken language, the ideational content is loosely strung out, but in clausal patterns that can become highly intricate in movement: the complexity is dynamic — we might think of it in choreographic terms. In written language, the clausal patterns are typically simple; but the ideational content is densely packed in nominal constructions: here the complexity is more static — perhaps crystalline.

How To Measure Lexical Density

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 655):

To measure lexical density, simply divide the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses.

Written Vs Spoken Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 654):

Typically, written language becomes complex by being lexically dense: it packs a large number of lexical items into each clause; whereas spoken language becomes complex by being grammatically intricate: it builds up elaborate clause complexes out of parataxis and hypotaxis.

Realisational Downgradings Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 652):

When the realisation of a whole figure is downgraded through metaphor from clause to nominal group, its elements will of course also be downgraded: the process is nominalised and serves as Thing… ; the other elements of the figure are realised either as downranked groups/phrases serving as Qualifier or Deictic… or, by a further step, as words serving as Classifier, Epithet or Post-Deictic.

Some Possible Realisational Downgradings Of Figures

All Of Figure Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 650):

The incongruent realisation of a figure may retain the clause as the domain of realisation, but downgrade all of the figure as a metaphorical nominal group, creating a new Process.

Part Of Figure Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 650-1):

The incongruent realisation of a figure may retain the clause as the domain of realisation, but downgrade … part of the figure as a metaphorical nominal group.

Figure Realised As Group/Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 651):

The incongruent realisation of the figure may downgrade the domain from clause to group/phrase. Grammatically, this is only possible in an environment of rankshift, as when the congruent clause or metaphorical group/phrase serves as the Head or Postmodifier of a nominal group.

Some Possible Realisational Downgradings Of Sequences

One Figure Of Expansion Sequence Realised As Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646-7):

With expansion, one figure of a sequence may be realised congruently by a clause, while the other is realised incongruently as a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstantial element within that clause; here the relator of the sequence is realised as the minor Process of the phrase. The relator and the minor Process are matched in terms of subtype of expansion.

Projecting Figure Of Sequence Realised As Range

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 647):

With projection, the projecting figure may be realised congruently as a ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause, while the projected figure is realised incongruently as the Range — the Verbiage or the Phenomenon.

Expansion Sequence Realised As Circumstantial Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 647-8):

With expansion, both figures of a sequence may be realised incongruently as Token and Value in a ‘circumstantial relational’ clause; here the relator of the sequence is realised, also incongruently, as the Process element in the clause. The expansion type of the relator is matched by the nature of the circumstantial process. … Alternatively, the ‘circumstantial relational’ clause is ‘attributive’ rather than ‘identifying’, with expanding figure as Attribute and the expanded one as Carrier.

Sequence Of Internal Cause Realised As Intensive Identifying Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 648):

Relations of internal cause — cause in the sense of ‘x so I think/say y’ — are construed metaphorically by verbs of proving such as prove, show, demonstrate, argue, suggest, indicate, imply in ‘intensive identifying relational’ clauses.

Expansion Sequence Realised As Intensive Identifying Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 648):

With expansion, both figures of the sequence may be realised incongruently as Token and Value in an ‘intensive relational’ clause; but the relator is nominalised as the Thing of the nominal group serving as Value, and the expanding figure is embedded as a Qualifier. The nominalised relator is a noun of expansion such as time, place, cause, result, reason.

Projected Figure Of Sequence Realised As Embedded Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):

With projection, the projected figure may be realised metaphorically as an embedded ‘fact’ clause serving as Token.

Relator And Figure Of Expansion Sequence Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):

With expansion, the relator in the sequence may be realised incongruently as a noun serving as the Head or Thing of the nominal group and the figure(s) being related as Modifier.

Figures Of Projection Sequence Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):

With projection, the projecting figure in a sequence may be realised incongruently as a noun of projection serving as the Head/Thing of a nominal group and the projected figure as a downranked clause serving as Qualifier.

Sequence Realised As Clause: Domino Effect

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649-50):

There is always a domino effect: as the realisational domain of the sequence is downgraded, so are the realisational domains of its component parts. At least one of the figures is, in turn, realised metaphorically as a ranking group or phrase, and elements within figures are realised either by downranked groups or phrases or by words.

Why The Downgrading In Ideational Metaphor Is Possible

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

These successive steps in downgrading are possible because both projection and expansion are motifs that are manifested throughout the grammatical system: a sequence of projection can thus be realised not only by the manifestation of projection in the clause nexus, but also by its manifestation in the clause or the group/phrase. The same principle applies to expansion.

The Downgrading Tendency Of Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

… the general tendency for ideational metaphor is to ‘downgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation of a semantic sequence, figure or element — from clause nexus to clause, from clause to group/phrase, and even from group or phrase to word. Such downgrading affects both the unit whose domain of realisation is downgraded, and the units of which it is composed: the downgrading proceeds down the rank scale by a kind of ‘domino effect’.

The Upgrading Tendency Of Interpersonal Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

The general tendency is for interpersonal metaphor to ‘upgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation; for example, while the congruent realisation of modality is a group serving in the clause, the metaphorical realisation is a clause that projects or embeds the clause to which a modal value is assigned. In this way, interpersonal metaphor tends to expand interpersonal systems by adding explicit variants — that is, variants where the subjective or objective orientation is made explicit.

The Strategy That Is Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

… grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience — but which has made modern science possible.

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Figure Realised By Group Or Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 645):

… when a figure is realised metaphorically by a group or phrase, it is deprived of the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it inarguable. It is thus presented as something already established; and any modifications, including interpersonal evaluative ones, have to be taken for granted.

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Sequence Realised By Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 645):

When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, it is given the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it arguable. … a ‘propositionalised’ sequence can be modalised, doubted, argued and negotiated interpersonally in numerous other ways.

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Figure Realised By Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 644):

… a figure, realised metaphorically by a nominal group rather than congruently as a clause, gains access to the textual systems of the nominal group — most significantly, the system of determination.  This means it can be treated textually as a discourse referent.  It is marked either as ‘non-specific’ or as ‘specific’, in which case the identity is presented as recoverable to the addressee.

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Sequence Realised By Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642-3, 644): 

When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, this means not only that it is mapped onto the transitivity patterns of the clause but also that it falls within the domain of Theme + Rheme organisation of the clause and also, by extension, that of the Given + New organisation of the information unit. … There is thus a gain in textual meaning in the shift from the congruent mode of realisation to the metaphoric mode.

… when a sequence is realised by a clause rather than by a clause nexus, it will be structured textually into Theme + Rheme and, since a clause is an information unit in the unmarked case, also into Given + New. This means that the figures that make up the sequence can be given thematic or newsworthy status.

Ideational Metaphor: Textual And Interpersonal Significance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):

The textual and interpersonal effects of ideational metaphor are due to the fact the realignment of ideational patterns […] also means that there is a realignment of the textual and interpersonal environments in which ideational systems operate.

Ideational Metaphor As An Experientialisation Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):

Within the ideational metafunction, the general effect of this realignment in the semantic system is a shift from the logical to the experiential — an experientialisation of experience. Thus logical sequences of figures are reconstrued as experiential configurations of elements.

Ideational Metaphor: Loss Of Ideational Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):

… the tactic patterns of clause complexing (with the distinction between paratactic interdependency and hypotactic dependency) are not available to sequences that are realised metaphorically as clauses, and the configurational patterns of participant rôles are lost or obscured when figures are realised as groups or phrases.

Ideational Metaphor: Expanding And Contracting Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 641-2):

… the metaphorical mode thus makes available a great deal of further ideational potential that is not accessible in the congruent mode. At the same time, the metaphorical mode also denies access to significant aspects of potential that is associated with the congruent mode: there is a loss of ideational meaning.

The Underlying Significance Of Re-Mappings Between Semantics And Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 640):

… the ideational metafunction is a resource for construing our experience of the world that lies around us and inside us. In the congruent mode, the grammar construes sequences (of figures), figures and elements as the basic phenomena of experience… . In the metaphorical mode, the model is enriched through combinations of these categories: in addition to the congruent categories, we now also have metaphorical combinations of categories — sequences construed as figures, figures construed as elements, and so on. These combinations open up new meaning potential.

Ideational Metaphor: Why Realisational Re-Mappings Are Possible [Transgrammatical Semantic Domains]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 640):

The ‘re-mapping’ is possible because semantic motifs such as cause are manifested repeatedly in the different environments of the grammar so that each environment is a possible domain of realisation for such a motif. These motifs are of the two primary types, expansion and projection…

Ideational Metaphor As Realisational Re-Mappings

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 639):

… grammatical metaphor within the ideational metafunction involves a ‘re-mapping’ between sequences, figures and elements in the semantics and clause nexuses, clauses and groups in the grammar. … In the metaphorical mode, the whole set of mappings seems to be shifted ‘downwards’: a sequence is realised by a clause, a figure is realised by a group, and an element is realised by a word.

Metaphor: Additional Layers Of Meaning And Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 638):

Just like interpersonal metaphor, ideational metaphor introduces additional layers of meaning that are construed by the grammar as additional layers of wording.

Ideational Metaphor: Ontogenesis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):

Unlike interpersonal metaphor, the other type of grammatical metaphor, ideational metaphor, is learned later by children and is not part of the grammar of ordinary, spontaneous conversation that children meet in the home and neighbourhood; rather it is associated with the discourses of education and science, bureaucracy and the law. Children are likely to meet the ideational type of metaphor when they reach the upper levels of primary school; but its full force will only appear when they begin to grapple with the specialised discourses of subject-based secondary education.

The Metaphorical Expansion Of Interpersonal Meaning Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):

The expansion of the interpersonal semantic system through grammatical metaphor provides speakers with additional, powerful resources for enacting social rôles and relations in the complex network of relations that make up the fabric of a community of any kind.

The Interpersonal Metafunction And The Ontogenesis Of Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):

The interpersonal metafunction defines the environment in which children first learn the strategy of grammatical metaphor [a manifestation of a more general principle]. No doubt this is partly because interpersonal metaphors tend to make selections more explicit, as when probability is realised by a ‘mental’ clause projecting the modalised proposition (‘explicit’ orientation), and partly because the interpretation of interpersonal metaphors is often both supported and ‘tested’ immediately in the ongoing dialogic interaction.

Representing Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 634):

Both interpersonal and ideational metaphors can be represented in the same way, by postulating some congruent form and then analysing the two in relation to each other.

Metaphors Of Mood: Commands Realised As Indicative Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 632-3):

In addition to metaphors based on ideational projection, there are other kinds of metaphors of mood as well. One prominent type involves a shift in the realisational domain of commands from ‘imperative’ to ‘indicative’ clauses. The ‘indicative’ clause can be either ‘declarative’ or ‘interrogative’; … The ‘indicative’ realisation of proposals has the effect of blurring the line between proposals directed to the addressee and propositions about how the world ought to be.

Interpersonal Iconicity: Semiotic And Social Distance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 631):

The potential for negotiation in dialogue created by metaphors of mood is directly related to the contextual variables of tenor. These are usually discussed in terms of status, formality and politeness. What they have in common is a very general sense of the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. Here interpersonal metaphor is part of a principle of interpersonal iconicity: metaphorical variants create a greater semiotic distance between meaning and wording, and this enacts a greater social distance between speaker and addressee.

Speech Function And Interpersonal Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 627):

… just like modality, speech function can be represented as a substantive proposition in its own right; and this proposition is a figure of sensing or saying that projects the original (i) proposal or (ii) proposition… .

Imperative Mood And Modulation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 627):

On the one hand, an ‘imperative’ clause imposes an obligation; on the other hand, the imperative tag checks the addressee’s inclination to comply… .

Interpersonal Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):

Interpersonal projection always involves the speaker or addressee as ‘projector’… . It is always implicit unless it is made explicit through grammatical metaphor, by ‘co-opting’ ideational resources to do interpersonal service.

The Metaphoric Strategy In Explicit Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):

The metaphoric strategy is to upgrade the interpersonal assessment from group rank to clause rank — from an adverbial group or prepositional phrase serving within a simple clause to a clause serving within a clause nexus of projection.

The Systemic Effect Of Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):

Systemically, metaphor leads to an expansion of the meaning potential: by creating new patterns of structural realisation, it opens up new systemic domains of meaning.  And it is the pressure to expand the meaning potential that in fact lies behind the development of metaphorical modes of meaning.  Thus in the system of modality, the system of orientation is expanded by the addition of a systemic contrast in manifestation between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’…

The General Effect Of Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):

…the semantic domain of modality is extended through grammatical metaphor to include explicit indications of subjective and objective orientation: a modal proposition or proposal is realised, as if it were a projection sequence, by a nexus of two clauses, rather than by a single clause. Here the modal assessment itself is given the status of a proposition in its own right; but because the projecting clause of the nexus is metaphorical in nature, standing for an interpersonal assessment of modality, it is also, at the same time, a modal Adjunct in the clause realising the proposition/proposal. This is the general effect of grammatical metaphor: it construes additional layers of meaning and wording.

The Apparent Paradox Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 624-5):

The importance of modal features in the grammar of interpersonal exchanges lie in an apparent paradox on which the entire system rests — the fact that we only say we are certain when we are not.

Modality: Why Explicit Forms Are Metaphorical

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 624):

The explicitly subjective and explicitly objective forms of modality are all strictly speaking metaphorical, since all of them represent the modality as being the substantive proposition. Modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal; in its congruent form, it is an adjunct to a proposition rather than a proposition in its own right.

Ability/Potentiality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 621):

This is on the fringe of the modality system.  It has the different orientations of subjective (implicit only) realised by can/can’t, objective implicit by be able to, and objective explicit by it is possible (for …) to.  In the last of these, the typical meaning is ‘potentiality’… .  In the subjective it is closer to inclination; we could recognise a general category of ‘readiness’, having ‘inclination’ and ‘ability’ as subcategories at one end of the scale… .  In any case can in this sense is untypical of the modal operators: it is the only case where the oblique form functions as a simple past…

Modality Variables

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 619ff):

The basic distinction that determines how each type of modality will be realised is the orientation: that is, the distinction between subjective and objective modality, and between the explicit and implicit variants… .  The third variable in modality is the value that is attached to the modal judgement: high, median or low. … The median value is clearly set apart from the two ‘outer’ values by the system of polarity: the median is that in which the negative is freely transferable between the proposition and the modality… .  With the outer values, on the other hand, if the negative is transferred the value switches (either from high to low, or from low to high)… .  This generates a set of 4x4x3x3 = 144 categories of modality. … The actual number of systematic distinctions that are made in this corner of the language runs well into the tens of thousands;

Modulation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):

If the clause is a ‘goods–&–services’ clause (a proposal, which has no real congruent form in the grammar, but by default we can characterise it as imperative), it means either (i) ‘is wanted to’, related to a command, or (ii) ‘wants to’, related to an offer; in other words, some degree of obligation [‘deontic’ modality] or inclination. … Note that modulation refers to the semantic category of proposals; but all modalities are realised as indicative (that is, as if they were propositions).

Modalisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):

If the clause is an ‘information’ clause (a proposition, congruently realised as indicative), this means either (i) ‘either yes or no’, that is, ‘maybe’; or (ii) ‘both yes and no’, that is, ‘sometimes’; in other words, some degree of probability [‘epistemic’ modality] or usuality.

Modality [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):

Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no — the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6):

What happens is that, in order to state explicitly that the probability is subjective, or alternatively, at the other end, to claim explicitly that the probability is objective, the speaker construes the proposition as a projection and encodes the subjectivity (I think), or the objectivity (it is likely), in a projecting clause.  (There are other forms intermediate between the explicit and implicit: subjective in my opinion, objective in all probability, where the modality is expressed as a prepositional phrase, which is a kind of halfway house between clausal and non-clausal status.)

Mental Clause As Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 614):

What’s happened here is that there has been a realignment in the realisational relationship between semantics and grammar. … a modalised proposition is realised as if it was a sequence, by a clause nexus of projection.  The effect is that the modality and the modalised proposition are separated, each being realised by a clause in its own right…

Mental Clause As Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 614):

…the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it were a figure of sensing.  Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.  The reason for regarding this as a metaphorical variant is that the proposition is not, in fact, ‘I think”; the proposition is ‘it is so’.  This is shown clearly by the tag… .  It is the fact that a mental clause is a modal clause and serves as mood Adjunct that explains the tag… the Mood tag picks up the Mood element of the modalised proposition… .

Why Clausal Assessment Can Be Transformed Into Nominal Assessment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613):

The range of assessments assigned to propositions within the domain of the clause and the range of assessments assigned to things within the domain of the nominal group are not, of course, the same. They overlap; but there are kinds of assessment specific to the realm of propositions just as there are other kinds specific to the realm of things. The common foundation is that they are both projections of the speaker’s assessment. This explains why clausal assessment can in fact be transformed into nominal assessment…

Projection As Modal Assessment: Subjective Vs Objective Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 607):

The difference between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ orientation in the ideational manifestation follows from the general difference between a projecting ‘mental’ or ‘verbal’ clause with a Senser or Sayer and a ‘relational’ clause without such a ‘projector’.  When the assessment is explicitly ‘subjective’, the Senser or Sayer has to be the speaker I.  If it is a person other than the speaker, the clause will still be a projecting one; but it will not be agnate with interpersonal assessment.

Projection As Modal Assessment: Explicit Vs Implicit Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 606):

The ideational manifestations make explicit the orientation of the assessment: the logical manifestation is explicitly subjective whereas the experiential manifestation is explicitly objective. In contrast, the interpersonal manifestation leaves the orientation implicit…

Projection As Modal Assessment: Hypotactic Projection And Pre-Projected Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 605-6):

… projection includes both hypotactic projection of ideas or reports and pre-projected facts serving in a ‘mental’ or ‘relational’ clause. A hypotactic projection is always ‘subjective’; the speaker is represented explicitly the Senser or Sayer. A pre-projected fact in a ‘mental’ clause is like hypotactic projection in representing the assessment as ‘subjective’ — the speaker is explicitly represented as the Senser. In contrast, a pre-projected fact in a ‘relational’ clause represents the assessment as ‘objective’.

Interpersonal Manifestations Of Projection: Modal Assessment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 604-5):

Projection can also be manifested interpersonally in the form of a modal Adjunct. … Unlike the logical and experiential manifestations, the interpersonal manifestation does not represent the Sayer or Senser; rather it enacts the speaker’s opinion — an enactment of his or her degree of commitment to the proposition: the proposition is assessed as being projected by someone other than the speaker. This type of assessment is known as ‘evidentiality’: the modal Adjunct is used to indicate the evidential status of the proposition. … evidentiality is related to ‘verbal’ clauses and ‘mental’ clauses of perception.

Projection: Logical And Experiential Manifestations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 604):

When the need arises in discourse to attribute information to some source, this can be done logically by means of a nexus of projection; but it can also be done experientially by means of a circumstance of Angle. … the projecting feature has thus been incorporated into the clause as one element of a transitivity configuration.

Metafunctional Manifestations Of Projection Vs Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):

Like expansion, projection is manifested both logically and experientially within the ideational metafunction; but outside the ideational domain, it is manifested interpersonally rather than textually, thus contrasting with the textual manifestation of expansion. That is, while there are conjunctions marking rhetorical relations of elaboration, extension and enhancement, there are no conjunctions marking relations of quoting or reporting; and while there are interpersonal resources for realising projection, there are no interpersonal Adjuncts or other interpersonal manifestations of expansion.

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Interpersonal Differences

Cohesively & Tactically Related Free Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):

When the domain of manifestation is a cohesive sequence of clauses, or a paratactic nexus of (free) clauses, the two figures related by expansion are enacted interpersonally as propositions or proposals.  This means that each can be negotiated in its own right — accepted or denied, complied with or refused, and so on… .  The same is true of the dominant (a) clause of a hypotactic nexus, since if it is a free clause, it realises a negotiable proposition or proposal.

Dependent Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):

… while the dependent (b) clause supports a proposition or proposal, it does not constitute one itself; and if it is non-finite, it is even further removed from the realm of negotiation.

Simple Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):

… when the causal [eg] relation is construed within the Process, it has become propositionalised or proposalised… .  Here it is no longer the cause or the effect that is held up for negotiation but rather the causal relation.  When they are construed as nominal groups, the cause and the effect are not negotiable at all.

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Textual Differences

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Cohesively & Tactically Related Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 601):

While a conjunction group with a structural conjunction such as so or because as Head is obligatorily thematic, there is a choice for conjunction groups with a cohesive conjunction such as consequently as Head.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Hypotactic Nexus

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):

In a hypotactic nexus, there is a further textual contrast that is not open to cohesive sequences and paratactic nexuses: the dependent b clause […] may be either thematic or rhematic within the clause nexus.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Simple Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):

When the domain of manifestation of expansion is a simple clause, the potential textual status of the manifestation […] depends on how it is manifested — (1) as minor Process within a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance […], (2) as Process, or (3) as Thing within a nominal group serving as a participant in a circumstantial relational clause.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Minor Process Within A Prepositional Phrase Serving As A Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):

When it is manifested within a circumstance of Cause [eg], the cause may be given the status of either Theme or Rheme…

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):

When the causal [eg] relation is manifested as Process (either in a hypotactic verbal group complex in a clause of any process type, or as the nuclear process in a circumstantial relational clause), its textual status will most likely be rhematic.  More specifically, it is likely to be (part of) the transition between Theme and New.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Thing Within A Nominal Group Serving As A Participant In A Circumstantial Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):

When the cause [eg] is manifested as Thing in a nominal group serving as a participant, it will have the thematic status assigned to that nominal group as a whole — either thematic or rhematic.  But in addition, it will be within the domain of operation of another textual system — the system of reference.  This means that it is given textual status as a discourse referent — either recoverable (identifiable) or non-recoverable (non-identifiable), and that it can be tracked in the development of the discourse.

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences: Manifestations Of Expansion Down The Rank Scale

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 601):

… this move involves a shift in metafunction … [and] the meaning of expansion changes with the change of metafunctional manifestation.  For example, the manifestation of cause changes from rhetorical relation (textual: consequently) via logico-semantic relation (logical: so, because) to process or minor process or even participant (experiential: cause, through; cause).  This means that the category meaning of ‘cause’ changes …

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences: Scale Of Integration Of Quanta Of Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

At one pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as two distinct quanta of change… . At the other pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as a component part of quantum of change… . Intermediate between these two poles are various manifestations that represent a move from two distinct quanta of change via two interdependent ones to a single one. The scale is thus one of degree of integration of two quanta of change. This scale of integration is based on the rank scale.

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

From an ideational point of view, the difference in meaning relates most directly to the question of what is construed as a quantum of change in the flow of events.

Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

… agnation always embodies both similarity and difference. The similarity is the basis for interpreting the patterns as alike, bringing them together in a paradigm, while the difference is the basis for treating them as variant types rather than as tokens of the same type.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domain: Grammatical Environments Manifesting Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

… the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of

(i) metafunction — textual (conjunction), logical (interdependency; modification) and experiential (circumstantiation; process type: relational), and

(ii) rank — clause and group/phrase [and below]. …

Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system.  This means that for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domain: Expansion Manifested In Experiential Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 594):

On the one hand, expansion is manifested in the augmentation of the clause by circumstances: these circumstantial augmentations cover all three types of expansion, with enhancement being the most highly developed one. On the other hand, expansion is manifested in the relation of a ‘relational’ clause: ‘intensive’ clauses embody elaboration, ‘possessive’ clauses extension, and ‘circumstantial’ clauses enhancement. In the domain of the nominal group, there are also various manifestations of the three types of expansion. Thus the Qualifier may elaborate, extend or enhance the Thing…

Transgrammatical Semantic Domain: Expansion Manifested In Logical Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 594):

… the three subtypes of expansion (elaboration, extension and enhancement) combine with tactic relations to link one clause to another in the formation of clause complexes … [and] … group and phrase complexes. In clause complexes and in group and phrase complexes, expansion is manifested within the logical mode of the ideational metafunction.

Compact Vs Dispersed Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 593):

The grammatical realisation of figuration is ‘compact’, being confined to the transitivity system of the clause.  In contrast, the grammatical realisation of expansion is ‘dispersed’, ranging over more than one grammatical unit. (… compactly realised systems such as configuration [sic] may become dispersed in their realisation through the process of grammatical metaphor.)

Transgrammatical Semantic Domain: Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 593):

For example, the expanding relation of ‘addition’ may be realised

(1) cohesively by a conjunction such as also or

(2) structurally by

(a) an additive paratactic clause complex marked by the structural conjunction and,

(b) a circumstance of accompaniment marked by the preposition with or

(c) an additive paratactic group complex marked by and … . 

These realisational variants are distinct in the grammar, since they constitute different grammatical environments; but they are semantically agnate in that they all have the feature of ‘addition’. … One semantic system, the system of expansion, has thus evolved to bring together patterns of wording within grammatically distinct units, thereby extending its overall meaning potential.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domains: Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 593):

… there are semantic domains that are construed in more than one place in the grammar, by more than one system local to one particular grammatical unit. These semantic domains range over two or more grammatical domains, spanning two or more grammatical units. There are two fundamental semantic domains of this kind — expansion and projection.

Metaphorical Realisation: Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 592-3):

… there are realignments in the realisational relationship between semantic units and grammatical ones. … a sequence is realised by a clause complex; the combination of a figure, a proposition (proposal), and a message is realised by a clause; … a participant is realised by a nominal group, a process by a verbal group and a circumstance by and adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. But once these couplings between the two strata of the content plane have been established, “cross–couplings” become theoretically possible. For example, while sequences are realised by clause complexes and figures by clauses, it is theoretically possible that, under certain conditions, sequences would be realised by clauses — that is, as if they were figures. This is the possibility of metaphorical realisation … . But the two forms of realisation are not, of course, synonymous, so the effect is one of expanding the meaning potential of the language.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domains: Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 592):

… there are semantic domains that range over more than a single grammatical unit.  Thus the semantic domain of modality is construed in more than one place in the grammar; for example, it is construed by clauses such as I suppose and it is possible, by verbal groups with finite modal operators such as may and by adverbial groups and modal adverbs such as perhaps.  These modal patterns within different grammatical units are not interchangeable/synonyms; they have distinct values within the overall semantic system of modality. … This means that the semantic system of modality is more extensive than the modal features of any one given grammatical unit would suggest; it is realised not by a single grammatical unit but by a range of units: semantic unit a ø grammatical units m, n and o.

Information Flow, Exchange & Episodic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 591):

These intermediate patterns are the ones that are very likely to vary from one register to another: there will be variation both in the nature of the patterns and in the degree to which there is a compositional scale between the text and the message/proposition (proposal)/figure.

Sequence Combinations: Episodic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 590):

Figures combine to form sequences; and these in turn may combine to form episodic patterns, as in narratives and other chronologically organised texts or chronological passages within other kinds of text.

Proposition/Proposal Combinations: Exchange Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 589-90):

Propositions/proposals combine to form patterns of exchange involving two or more interactants … .

Message Combinations: Information Flow Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588):

Messages combine to form periodic movements of information… . Such phases of messages help construct the flow of information as the text unfolds and we can refer to them simply as information flow patterns.

More Extensive Semantic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588):

Messages, propositions or proposals, and figures can combine with units of the same metafunctional type to form more extensive semantic patterns in the creation of text. These patterns are distinct for each metafunction.

The Lower Region Of Semantic Compositional Scales

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588):

This is the region where semantic units are realised by lexicogrammatical ones. … The clause is a multifunctional construct in the grammar, one that realises three different semantic units, one for each metafunction: textual — message, interpersonal — proposition or proposal, and experiential — figure. … The three semantic units deriving from the three metafunctions are all mapped onto the clause, which thus unifies the three metafunctional strands of meaning.

Semantic Compositional Scale?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588):

In the grammar, there is a single, generalised compositional scale — the grammatical rank scale … . But in the semantics, it is far from clear whether there is a single compositional scale that is generalised across all registerial varieties of a language.

Upper Bounds Of Meaning And Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 588, 588n):

The upper bound of the semantic stratum is the text: this is the most extensive unit of meaning. The upper bound of the lexicogrammatical system is the clause: this is the most extensive unit of wording. … By saying that they are the upper bounds, we are not ruling out complexes — text complexes and clause complexes … . But complexes are not higher–ranking units but rather expansions of units of a given rank.

The Relation Of Text To Clause: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 587):

A text does not ‘consist of’ clauses (clause complexes) — there is no part–whole or ‘constituency’ relationship between a text and a clause (complex) and there is no single rank scale with text and clause as ranks. Rather, a text is realised by clauses (clause complexes), the two being located on different strata — semantics (the stratum of meaning) and lexicogrammar (the stratum of wording), respectively.

Text: A Unit Of Meaning (Only) At The Instance Pole Of The Cline Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 587):

A text is thus a unit of meaning — more accurately, a unit in the flow of meaning that is always taking place at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Logogenetic Patterns Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 587):

The patterns that are developed in this way are, however, patterns of meaning, not patterns of wording; they are patterns at the level of semantics rather than the level of lexicogrammar. This is so because text is, as we have emphasised, a semantic phenomenon in the first instance; it is meaning unfolding in some particular context of situation. For example, the grammatical system of conjunction gives speakers and writers the resources to mark transitions in the development of a text — that is, to mark rhetorical relations used to expand the text step by step; and the rhetorical relations that are marked in this way are semantic relations organising the text as a flow of meaning.

Cohesion: Marking Textual Transitions And Manipulating Textual Statuses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 586-7):

Cohesion includes

1. the system of conjunction for marking textual transitions in the unfolding text and 
2. the systems of reference, ellipsis and substitution, and lexical cohesion for manipulating textual statuses of elements in the flow of information.

Logogenetic Patterns: Instantial & Registerial Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 586):

The logogenetic patterns that emerge as a text unfolds form a transient system that is specific to that text; but from repeated patterns over many such transient systems may in turn emerge a generalised system characteristic of a certain type of text or register.

Logogenetic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 586):

… in the course of unfolding of text, lexicogrammatical selections create logogenetic patterns at all ranks. This patterning in the text that has nothing to do with composition or size: instead of composition (the relationship between a whole and its parts), the patterning is based on instantiation (the relationship between an instance and a generalised instance type). The patterning represents a slight move up this cline from a single instance to a pattern of instances, as in a news report where one projecting verbal clause after another is selected until this emerges as a favourite clause type.

Lexicogrammatical Resources Beyond The Upper Limit Of Compositional Organisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 586):

… although the grammar does not extend its compositional organisation beyond the rank of clause, the resources of lexicogrammar make two fundamental contributions beyond this upper limit of grammatical units:

(i) the creation of logogenetic patterns and

(ii) the marking of cohesion.

Schematic Organisation And Rhetorical Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 583-4):

This schematic organisation is contextual: it is projected onto the text from the context … in which it operates. At the same time, the text is organised semantically as a complex of rhetorical relations, and it is these relations that are realised by the combination of conjunction and clause complexing.

Textual Transitions: Complementarity Of Conjunction And Taxis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 583):

These two resources complement one another in the grammatical realisation of transitions in text. The general principle of complementarity is this: clause complexing does relatively more work locally, while conjunction does relatively more work non-locally and even globally. Clause complexing ‘choreographs’ the local development of text by means of univariate structure, indicating both taxis and type of logico-semantic relation. Conjunction can work together with clause complexing, reinforcing local relations, but it tends to take over from clause complexing as the relations become less local and more global. Looked at from the point of view of lexicogrammar, this means that local organisation tends to be ‘tighter’, whereas the more global organisation tends to be ‘looser’. At the same time, looked at from the point of view of context, the more global organisation is subject to more contextual guidance in the form of generic structure.

Textual Statuses: Lexical Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 582, 583):

Unlike reference and ellipsis, the resource of lexical cohesion is, in general, neutral with regard to textual statuses; … A given lexical item can be assigned any of the textual statuses; it is not predisposed to any particular status.  Similarly, a given lexical relation is also neutral with respect to textual statuses.  However, a particular lexical chain in a text is very likely to show some systematic pattern in relation to textual status. … Texts also vary in how lexical chains relate to textual status, but this variation usually reflects systematic strategies associated with the registers that the texts belong to. … Lexical chains may thus be foregrounded either as Theme or as New.

The Textual Resources Of The Lexicogrammar Of English

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 579):

(A) structural:

1. thematic structure: Theme and Rheme
2. information structure and focus: Given and New

(B) cohesive:

1. conjunction
2. reference
3. ellipsis (ie ellipsis and substitution)
4. lexical cohesion

Looked at 'from below', these textual resources fall into two categories — those that engender grammatical structure (theme and information) and those that do not (conjunction, reference, ellipsis, lexical cohesion).  Looked at 'from above', these textual resources are concerned either with textual transitions between messages or with textual statuses of components (elements) of these messages.

	structural	cohesive
textual transitions [‘organic’]	(clause complex => logical)	conjunction
textual statuses [‘componential’]	theme; information	reference; ellipsis

Enhancing Lexical Cohesive Relations: Collocation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 576-7, 578):

At the same time there are other instances of lexical cohesion which do not depend on any general semantic relationship of the types just discussed, but rather on a particular association between the items in question — a tendency to co-occur. This ‘co-occurrence tendency’ is known as collocation. … In general, the semantic basis of many instances of collocation is the relation of enhancement …

… collocation is one of the factors on which we build our expectations of what is to come next. … collocations are often fairly specifically associated with one or other particular register, or functional variety of the language. This is true, of course, of individual lexical items, many of which we regard as ‘technical’ because they appear exclusively, or almost exclusively, in one kind of text. But it is also noteworthy that perfectly ordinary lexical items often appear in different collocations according to the text variety.

Extending Lexical Cohesive Relations: Meronymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 575, 576):

The general sense of hyponymy ia ‘be a kind of’ … There is a similar relation in the extending domain. This is meronymy — ‘be a part of’ … There is no very clear line between meronymy and hyponymy, especially with abstract terms; and a given set of items may be co-hyponyms of one term, but co-meronyms of another … But since either relationship is a source of lexical cohesion it is not necessary to insist on deciding between them.

Elaborating Lexical Cohesive Relations: Hyponymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 574):

Repetition and synonymy are both elaborating relations based on identity; one lexical item restates another. There is a second kind of elaborating relationship — attribution. This is based on classification (specific to general): the first lexical item represents a class of thing and the second either (i) a superclass or subclass or (ii) another class at the same level of classification.

Elaborating Lexical Cohesive Relations: Synonymy With Identity Of Reference & Antonymy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 573, 574):

Here the range of potentially cohesive items includes synonyms of the same or higher level generality: synonyms in the narrower sense, and superordinates. …

A special case of synonymy is its opposite, antonymy. Lexical items that are opposite in meaning, namely antonyms, also function with cohesive effect in a text.

Elaborating Lexical Cohesive Relations: Repetition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 571, 572):

The most direct form of lexical cohesion is the repetition of a lexical item; … in order for a lexical item to be recognised as repeated it need not be in the same morphological shape. … Inflexional variants always belong together as one item; derivational variants usually do, when they are based on a living derivational process, although these are less predictable.

Primary Types Of Lexical Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 571):

They derive from either the paradigmatic or syntagmatic organisation of lexis.

• The paradigmatic relations are inherent in the organisation of lexis as a resource … . They can be interpreted in terms of elaboration and extension …

• The syntagmatic relations hold between lexical items in a syntagm that tend to occur together, or collocate with one another. …

Since syntagmatic organisation and paradigmatic organisation represent two different dimensions of patterning, any pair of lexical items can involve both.

Ellipsis Vs Substitution: Polarity And Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 570):

… and there is a slight tendency for ellipsis to be associated with change of polarity and substitution with change of modality. This tendency is more clearly marked with the clause, where ellipsis adds certainty (yes or no, or a missing identity), whereas substitution adds uncertainty (if, maybe, or someone said so); this is why, in a clause where everything is ellipsed except the modality, it is quite usual to a substitute (possibly so, perhaps so) unless the modality is one of certainty — here we say certainly (elliptical) rather than certainly so.

Ellipsis Vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 570):

But the most important distinction … is that in ellipsis the typical meaning is not one of co-reference. There is always some significant difference between the second instance and the first (between presuming item and presumed). … Thus reference signals ‘the same member’ (unless marked as different by the use of comparison); ellipsis signals ‘another member of the same class’ (unless marked as identical by same etc).

Ellipsis Vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 569):

… ellipsis is a relationship at the lexicogrammatical level: the meaning is ‘go back and retrieve the missing words’. Hence the missing words must be grammatically appropriate; and they can be inserted in place. This is not the case with reference, where, since the relationship is a semantic one, there is no grammatical constraint (the class of the reference item need not match that of what it presumes), and one cannot normally insert the presumed element. Reference, for the same reason, can reach back a long way in the text and extend over a long passage, whereas ellipsis is largely limited to the immediately preceding clause.

Elliptical And Substitute Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 567):

The elliptical or substitute clause requires the listener to ‘supply the missing words’; and since they are to be supplied from what has gone before, the effect is cohesive. It is always possible to ‘reconstitute’ the ellipsed item so that it becomes fully explicit. Since ellipsis is a lexicogrammatical resource, what is taken over is the exact wording, subject only to the reversal of speaker–listener deixis (I for you and so on), and change of mood where appropriate.

Ellipsis And Substitution In The Clause: Two Types Related To Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

Specifically, it is related to the question–answer process in dialogue; and this determines that there are two kinds: (a) yes/no ellipsis, and (b) WH- ellipsis. Each of these allows for substitution, though not in all contexts.

Grammatical Domains Of Ellipsis And Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

There are three main contexts for ellipsis and substitution in English. These are

1. the clause, 
2. the verbal group and 
3. the nominal group.

Ellipsis: Textual Status Of Continuous Information

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential prominence to the elements of a structure: if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are ellipsed; if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. The absence of elements through ellipsis is an iconic realisation of lack of prominence.

Ellipsis Vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 561-2):

Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ellipsis, where we presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical — a relationship in wording rather than directly in the meaning.

Comparative Reference Items

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 560):

Comparative reference items function in nominal and adverbial groups; and the comparison is made with reference either to general features of identity, similarity and difference or to particular features of quality and quantity.

Comparative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 560):

In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference — something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

Unmarked Demonstrative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 558):

Like the personals and other demonstratives, the has a specifying function; it signals ‘you know which one(s) I mean’ … but … the merely anounces that the identity is specific; it does not specify it. The information is available elsewhere. It may be in the preceding text (anaphoric); in the following text (cataphoric); or in the air, so to speak … self-specifying; there is only one — or at least only one that makes sense in the context (homophoric).

Personal Reference: Anaphoric Strategies

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… there are two primary anaphoric strategies for tracking a referent as a text unfolds. The speaker or writer can use either (i) a personal reference item (personal pronoun or possessive determiner) or (ii) a specified noun. A ‘specified noun’ is either an inherently specific one — a proper noun — or else a common noun (serving as Thing) modified by a demonstrative determiner as Deictic.

Personal Reference Items & Theme

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… while reference items can occur anywhere, there is an unmarked relationship between referential identifiability and status as Given information, and between Given and Theme. There is therefore a strong tendency for reference items to be thematic.

Personal Reference Items

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

They are either ‘determinative’ or ‘possessive’. If ‘determinative’, they are personal pronouns servingas Thing/Head in the nominal group. If ‘possessive’. they are determiners serving as Deictic in the nominal group and are conflated with either Head or Premodifier.

Co-Reference: Personal Vs Demonstrative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… there are two types of co-reference: personal reference and demonstrative reference. They differ with respect to the category the referent — either person or proximity.

Co-Reference Vs Comparative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 553):

All such expressions have in common the fact that they presuppose referents; but they differ with repect to whether what is presupposed is the same referent (co-reference) or another referent of the same class (comparative reference).

Endophoric Reference: Cataphora

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Alternatively, endophoric reference may point ‘forwards’ to the future of the unfolding text, that is, to a referent that is yet to be introduced. … This type of endophoric reference is called cataphora, or cataphoric reference.  Cataphora is quite rare compared with anaphora.  The only exception is structural cataphora, which is common.  Here the reference is resolved within the same nominal group where the reference item appears; a Deictic the or that/those is used to indicate that the Qualifier of the nominal group is to be taken as defining.

Endophoric Reference: Anaphora

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Endophoric reference may point ‘backwards’ to the history of the unfolding text, that is, to a referent that has already been introduced and is thus part of the text’s system of meanings. … This type of endophoric reference is called anaphora, or anaphoric reference, and the element that is pointed to anaphorically is called the antecedent.

Endophoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Endophoric reference means that the identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from within the text itself — or, to be more precise, from the instantial system of meanings created as the text unfolds. As the text unfolds, speakers and listeners build up a system of meanings — this is part of the process of logogenesis… . Once a new meaning is introduced, it becomes part of that system, and if it is the right category of thing, it can be presumed by endophoric reference.

Exophoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Exophoric reference means that the identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from the environment of the text… . Here the reference links the text to the environment; but it does not contribute to the cohesion of the text, except indirectly when references to one and the same referent are repeated, forming a chain.

Reference: Origins In Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 551):

… it seems likely that reference first evolved as a means of linking ‘outwards’  to some entity in the environment.  So, for example, the concept of ‘he’ probably originated as ‘that man over there’ — a reference to a person in the field of perception shared by speaker and listener.  In other words, we may postulate an imaginary stage in the evolution of language when the basic referential category of person was deictic in the strict sense, ‘to be interpreted by reference to the situation here and now’.  Thus I was ‘the one speaking’; you, ‘the one(s) spoken to’; he, she, it, they were the third party, ‘the other(s) in the situation’.

Anaphoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 551):

This is typical of a great many types of discourse: the identity that is presumed can be recovered from the preceding text — or, in effect, from the instantial system of meanings that is built up by speaker and listener as the text unfolds.

Reference: Identifiability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550-1):

The textual status at issue in the system of reference is that of identifiability: does the speaker judge that a given element can be recovered or identified by the listener at the relevant point in the discourse or not? If it is presented as identifiable, then the listener will have to recover the identity from somewhere else. If it is presented as non-identifiable, then the listener will have to establish it as a new element of meaning in the interpretation of the text.

Reference: Terminological Clarification

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550n):

Note that the term ‘reference’ has been used in different ways. For example, in philosophical works on meaning it indicates ideational denotation, as when expressions are said to refer to phenomena. Here we are using the term in the way it has been used in functional work (eg Halliday and Hasan 1976) to indicate the textual cohesive strategy …

Marking Textual Status: Structure Vs Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550):

But whereas Theme and New are parts of textual structures — Theme ^ Rheme in the clause and Given + New in the information unit respectively, the textual statuses that come under the heading of cohesion, reference and ellipsis, are not.  That is, while an element is marked cohesively as identifiable by means of a grammatical item such as the personal pronoun they, or as continuous by means of a grammatical item such as the nominal substitute one, the textual statuses of identifiability and continuity are not structural functions of the clause or of any other grammatical unit.  They can occur freely within Theme or Rheme, and within Given and New (although there are certain unmarked associations).