Grammatical Domains Of Ellipsis And Substitution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

There are three main contexts for ellipsis and substitution in English. These are

1. the clause, 
2. the verbal group and 
3. the nominal group.

Ellipsis: Textual Status Of Continuous Information

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 563):

Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. At the same time, the non-ellipsed elements of that structure are given the status of being contrastive in the environment of continuous information. Ellipsis thus assigns differential prominence to the elements of a structure: if they are non-prominent (continuous), they are ellipsed; if they are prominent (contrastive), they are present. The absence of elements through ellipsis is an iconic realisation of lack of prominence.

Ellipsis Vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 561-2):

Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ellipsis, where we presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical — a relationship in wording rather than directly in the meaning.

Comparative Reference Items

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 560):

Comparative reference items function in nominal and adverbial groups; and the comparison is made with reference either to general features of identity, similarity and difference or to particular features of quality and quantity.

Comparative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 560):

In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference — something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

Unmarked Demonstrative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 558):

Like the personals and other demonstratives, the has a specifying function; it signals ‘you know which one(s) I mean’ … but … the merely anounces that the identity is specific; it does not specify it. The information is available elsewhere. It may be in the preceding text (anaphoric); in the following text (cataphoric); or in the air, so to speak … self-specifying; there is only one — or at least only one that makes sense in the context (homophoric).

Personal Reference: Anaphoric Strategies

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… there are two primary anaphoric strategies for tracking a referent as a text unfolds. The speaker or writer can use either (i) a personal reference item (personal pronoun or possessive determiner) or (ii) a specified noun. A ‘specified noun’ is either an inherently specific one — a proper noun — or else a common noun (serving as Thing) modified by a demonstrative determiner as Deictic.

Personal Reference Items & Theme

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… while reference items can occur anywhere, there is an unmarked relationship between referential identifiability and status as Given information, and between Given and Theme. There is therefore a strong tendency for reference items to be thematic.

Personal Reference Items

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

They are either ‘determinative’ or ‘possessive’. If ‘determinative’, they are personal pronouns servingas Thing/Head in the nominal group. If ‘possessive’. they are determiners serving as Deictic in the nominal group and are conflated with either Head or Premodifier.

Co-Reference: Personal Vs Demonstrative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 554):

… there are two types of co-reference: personal reference and demonstrative reference. They differ with respect to the category the referent — either person or proximity.

Co-Reference Vs Comparative Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 553):

All such expressions have in common the fact that they presuppose referents; but they differ with repect to whether what is presupposed is the same referent (co-reference) or another referent of the same class (comparative reference).

Endophoric Reference: Cataphora

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Alternatively, endophoric reference may point ‘forwards’ to the future of the unfolding text, that is, to a referent that is yet to be introduced. … This type of endophoric reference is called cataphora, or cataphoric reference.  Cataphora is quite rare compared with anaphora.  The only exception is structural cataphora, which is common.  Here the reference is resolved within the same nominal group where the reference item appears; a Deictic the or that/those is used to indicate that the Qualifier of the nominal group is to be taken as defining.

Endophoric Reference: Anaphora

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Endophoric reference may point ‘backwards’ to the history of the unfolding text, that is, to a referent that has already been introduced and is thus part of the text’s system of meanings. … This type of endophoric reference is called anaphora, or anaphoric reference, and the element that is pointed to anaphorically is called the antecedent.

Endophoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Endophoric reference means that the identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from within the text itself — or, to be more precise, from the instantial system of meanings created as the text unfolds. As the text unfolds, speakers and listeners build up a system of meanings — this is part of the process of logogenesis… . Once a new meaning is introduced, it becomes part of that system, and if it is the right category of thing, it can be presumed by endophoric reference.

Exophoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 552):

Exophoric reference means that the identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from the environment of the text… . Here the reference links the text to the environment; but it does not contribute to the cohesion of the text, except indirectly when references to one and the same referent are repeated, forming a chain.

Reference: Origins In Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 551):

… it seems likely that reference first evolved as a means of linking ‘outwards’  to some entity in the environment.  So, for example, the concept of ‘he’ probably originated as ‘that man over there’ — a reference to a person in the field of perception shared by speaker and listener.  In other words, we may postulate an imaginary stage in the evolution of language when the basic referential category of person was deictic in the strict sense, ‘to be interpreted by reference to the situation here and now’.  Thus I was ‘the one speaking’; you, ‘the one(s) spoken to’; he, she, it, they were the third party, ‘the other(s) in the situation’.

Anaphoric Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 551):

This is typical of a great many types of discourse: the identity that is presumed can be recovered from the preceding text — or, in effect, from the instantial system of meanings that is built up by speaker and listener as the text unfolds.

Reference: Identifiability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550-1):

The textual status at issue in the system of reference is that of identifiability: does the speaker judge that a given element can be recovered or identified by the listener at the relevant point in the discourse or not? If it is presented as identifiable, then the listener will have to recover the identity from somewhere else. If it is presented as non-identifiable, then the listener will have to establish it as a new element of meaning in the interpretation of the text.

Reference: Terminological Clarification

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550n):

Note that the term ‘reference’ has been used in different ways. For example, in philosophical works on meaning it indicates ideational denotation, as when expressions are said to refer to phenomena. Here we are using the term in the way it has been used in functional work (eg Halliday and Hasan 1976) to indicate the textual cohesive strategy …

Marking Textual Status: Structure Vs Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550):

But whereas Theme and New are parts of textual structures — Theme ^ Rheme in the clause and Given + New in the information unit respectively, the textual statuses that come under the heading of cohesion, reference and ellipsis, are not.  That is, while an element is marked cohesively as identifiable by means of a grammatical item such as the personal pronoun they, or as continuous by means of a grammatical item such as the nominal substitute one, the textual statuses of identifiability and continuity are not structural functions of the clause or of any other grammatical unit.  They can occur freely within Theme or Rheme, and within Given and New (although there are certain unmarked associations).

Marking Textual Status

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 549-50):

By textual statuses, we mean values assigned to elements of discourse that guide speakers and listeners in processing these elements. We have in fact already met two kinds of textual status — thematicity and newsworthiness. … while Theme is the point of departure for integrating the information being presented in the clause, New is the main point to retain from the information presented.

Implicit Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 548, 549):

One question that arises in the interpretation of a text is what to do about conjunction that is left implicit. It often happens, especially with temporal and causal sequences, that the semantic relationship is clearly felt to be present but is unexpressed; …

It is clear that texture is achieved through conjunctive relations of this kind, and there is no reason not to take account of it. On the other hand, the attempt to include it in the analysis leads to a great deal of indeterminacy, both as regards whether a conjunctive relation is present or not and as regards which particular kind of relationship it is. …

It is perhaps as well, therefore, to be cautious in assigning implicit conjunction in the interpretation of a text. It is likely that there will always be other forms of cohesion present, and that these are the main source of our intuition that there is a pattern of conjunctive relationships as well. … 

Moreover, the presence or absence of explicit conjunction is one of the principal variables in English discourse, both as between registers and as between texts in the same register; this variation is obscured if we assume conjunction where it is not expressed. It is important therefore to note those instances where conjunction is being recognised that is implicit; and to characterise the text also without it, to see how much we still feel is being left unaccounted for.

Conjunctive Relations: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 548):

The conjunctive relation of ‘matter’ is very close to some of those of the elaborating kind, and the concessive (‘despite X, nevertheless Y’) overlaps with the adversative (‘X and, conversely, Y’). Such pairs are characterised by differences of emphasis, and some instances can be assigned to one member or the other; but others cannot, and may be interpreted either way. As always, we can try to bring out the most likely interpretation by checking close agnates to examples occurring in the text.

Enhancing Conjunction: Matter

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 547):

Here cohesion is established by reference to the ‘matter’ that has gone before. As noted earlier, many expression of matter are spatial metaphors, involving words like point, ground, field; and these become conjunctive when coupled with reference items. The relation is either (i) positive or (ii) negative.

Enhancing Conjunction: Causal-Conditional

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 546, 547):

In many types of discourse the relation of cause figures very prominently as a cohesive agent. Some cause expressions are general, others relate more specifically to result, reason or purpose. … Conditionals subdivide into (i) positive, (ii) negative and (iii) concessive.

Enhancing Conjunction: Manner

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 546):

Manner conjunctives create cohesion (i) by comparison, (ii) by reference to means. Comparison may be (a) positive (‘is like’), or (b) negative (‘is unlike’). … Expressions of means are however not often conjunctive; those that are are usually also comparative, for example in the same manner, otherwise.

Enhancing Conjunction: Internal Temporal Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 545):

Many temporal conjunctives have an ‘internal’ as well as an ‘external’ interpretation; that is, the time they refer to is the temporal unfolding of the discourse itself, not the temporal sequence of the processes referred to.  In terms of the functional components of semantics, it is interpersonal not experiential time.

Enhancing Conjunction: Spatial Metaphors

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 544-5):

Note however that most apparently spatial cohesion is in terms of metaphorical space, for example, there in there you’re wrong; cf expressions like on those grounds, on that point.  These are actually expressions of Matter.  Many conjunctive expressions of the expanding kind are also in origin spatial metaphors; for example, in the first place, on the other hand (hand involves a double metaphor: ‘part of the body’ — ‘side’ [on my right hand] — ‘side of an argument’).

Enhancing Conjunction: Spatial

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 544):

Place reference may be used conjunctively within a text, with here and there, spatial adverbs such as behind and nearby, and expressions containing a place noun or adverb plus reference item, for example in the same place, anywhere else. Here spatial relations are being used as text-creating devices.

Enhancing Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 544):

The various types of enhancement that create cohesion are (a) spatio-temporal, (b) manner, (c) causal-conditional and (d) matter.

Extending Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 543):

Extension involves either addition or variation.  Addition is either positive and, negative nor or adversative but; … Variation includes replacive instead, subtractive except and alternative or types.

Elaborating Conjunction: Clarification

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 541):

Here the elaborated element is not simply re-stated but reinstated, summarised, made more precise or in some other way clarified for purposes of the discourse.

Elaborating Conjunction: Apposition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 540):

In this type of elaboration some element is re-presented, or re-stated, either (i) by exposition, the ‘i.e.’ relation, or (ii) by example, the ‘e.g.’ relation.

The System Of Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 540):

… the logico-semantic relations that are manifested in the system of conjunction fall into the same three types of expansion we met in our exploration of clause complexing — that is, conjunctions mark relations where one span of text elaborates, extends or enhances another, earlier span of text.

Conjunction: Non-Structural Vs Structural

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 540):

The logico-semantic relation is marked by a conjunction — either by a non-structural one that is used only in this way, that is, only cohesively, such as for example, furthermore, consequently; or by a structural one whose prototypical function is to mark the continuing clause in a paratactic clause nexus. The former serve as conjunctive Adjuncts and are very commonly thematic; the latter are simply analysed as structure markers and are obligatorily thematic as structural Theme.

From Clause Complexing To Conjunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 538-9):

… logico-semantic relations are confined to the internal organisation of each clause complex: the clause complex is the most extensive domain of relational organisation. The cohesive system of conjunction has evolved as a complementary resource for creating and interpreting text. It provides the resources for marking logico-semantic relationships that obtain between text spans of varying extent, ranging from clauses within clause complexes to long spans of a paragraph or more.

The Location Of Cohesive Resources Within Lexicogrammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 538):

… the systems of cohesion operate within either the grammatical zone or the lexical zone of the lexicogrammatical continuum. Conjunction, reference and ellipsis are all grammatical systems, and are thus all manifestations of what we might call grammatical cohesion. The point of origin of each of these systems falls within one or more particular grammatical unit; and terms within these systems are realised either by grammatical items that have some particular place within the structure of that unit or (in the case of ellipsis) by the absence of elements of grammatical structure. For example, the systemic environment of conjunction is that of the clause; and conjunctions serve as conjunctive Adjuncts in the structure of the clause. In contrast, lexical cohesion operates within the lexical zone; and it follows the general principle that lexical items are not defined in terms of particular grammatical environments.

The Extent Of Elements Linked Cohesively

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 537):

We can make a distinction between conjunction and the three other resources of cohesion. As we have seen, conjunction is concerned with rhetorical transitions — transitions between whole ‘messages’, or even message complexes. Conjunction indicates the relations through which such textual transitions are created. In contrast, the other cohesive resources are concerned with textual status — statuses having to do with how ‘components’ of messages are processed as information.

Lexical Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 537):

Most typically, such cohesive relations hold between single lexical items, either words or larger units … ; but also involving wordings having more than one lexical item in them … . Lexical ties are independent of structure and may span long passages of intervening discourse …

Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 536-7):

Ellipsis (including substitution) is a relationship involving a particular form of wording, either a clause or some smaller item; it is usually confined to closely contiguous passages, and is particularly characteristic of question + answer or similar ‘adjacency pairs’ in dialogue.

Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 536):

Reference is a relationship between things, or facts (phenomena, or metaphenomena); it may be established at varying distances, and although it usually serves to relate single elements that have a function within the clause (processes, participants, circumstances), it can give to any passage of text the status of a fact, and so turn it into a clause participant.

Conjunctive Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 536):

Conjunctive relations typically involve contiguous elements up to the size of paragraphs — and possibly beyond, or their equivalent in spoken language; conjunction (in this sense) is a way of setting up the logical relations that characterise clause complexes in the absence of the structural relationships by which such complexes are defined.

Logogenetic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 535):

… the cohesive selections in a text form logogenetic patterns. In the case of conjunction, such patterns take the form of favoured selections of relations for moving the text forward. In the case of the other types of cohesive resources, such patterns take the form of logogenetic chains — chains of reference, ellipsis and lexical cohesive links, and of interactions among such chains within and across different types of cohesion.

Lexical Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 535):

While conjunction, reference and substitution and ellipsis are cohesive resources within the grammatical zone of lexicogrammar, lexical cohesion operates within the lexis and is achieved through the choice of lexical items.

Substitution & Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 535):

Ellipsis makes it possible to leave out parts of a structure when they can be presumed from what has gone before. Ellipsis indicates continuity, allowing speaker and addressee to focus on what is contrastive.

Reference Vs Substitution & Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 535):

Reference creates cohesion by creating links between elements of meaning — referents; but there is also a resource operating at the level of wording. This takes two forms, substitution and ellipsis; but we shall refer to it simply as ellipsis, since substitution can be interpreted as a systemic variant.

Conjunction Vs Reference

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 534):

While conjunction (including continuity) links whole clauses, reference creates cohesion by creating links between elements.

Cohesion: A Lexicogrammatical Resource Of The Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 532):

… there is a set of lexicogrammatical systems that have evolved specifically as a resource for making it possible to transcend the boundaries of the clause — that is, the domain of the highest-ranking grammatical unit.  These lexicogrammatical systems originate in the textual metafunction and are collectively known as the system of cohesion. … There are four ways by which cohesion is created in English: by

(i) conjunction,
(ii) reference,
(iii) ellipsis [and substitution] and
(iv) lexical organisation.

Logogenesis: The Creation Of Meaning In The Course Of The Unfolding Of Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 530):

It is helpful to have a term for this general phenomenon — that is, the creation of meaning in the course of the unfolding of text. We shall call it logogenesis, with ‘logos’ in its original sense of ‘discourse’. Logogenesis pertains to the entire meaning potential — all the strata and all the metafunctions.

Text As The Process Of Instantiation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 524-5):

The system of language is instantiated as text, the two representing the poles at either end of the cline of instantiation.  System and text are not different phenomena; they are phases of one and the same phenomenon.  When seen up close, this phenomenon appears to us as text; but when we adopt a more distant observer perspective, we can build up a picture of it as system.  System and text form a cline rather than a dichotomy, because between these two poles there is a semiotic region of intermediate patterns (conceived of as instance types — as text types, or as subsystems — as registers).  Text is thus the process of instantiation; and we can characterise it by reference to the system as the selection of systemic options unfolding through time.

Text As An Ongoing Process Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 524):

Text is something that happens in the form of talking or writing, listening or reading. When we analyse it, we analyse the product of this process; and the term ‘text’ is usually taken as referring to the product — especially the product in its written form, since this is most clearly perceptible as an object … . The organisation of text is semantic rather than formal, and much looser than that of grammatical units. The organisation of text has typically been represented in some form of structural notation. But it is important to to be able to think of text dynamically, as an ongoing process of meaning.

Clause Nexus > Verbal Group Nexus > Verbal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 521):

A verbal group nexus is intermediate between a clause nexus and a verbal group: a verbal group construes a single event, and a clause nexus construes two distinct processes; but a verbal group nexus construes a single process consisting of two events.

Hypotactic Projection: Clause Complex Or Verbal Group Complex?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 517):

All of them could be analysed as clause complexes; but there is a case for treating some of them as complexes of the verbal group — perhaps just those that

• are proposals,
• are perfective in aspect,
• and have the same Subject in both halves.

This would exclude

1. propositions, like pretend and claim (she claims to be infallible = she claims that she is infallible);
2. imperfectives, for example she doesn’t like/mind John leaving so early; and
3. ‘causatives’, for example I didn’t mean/expect you to notice, and all ‘indirect commands’ such as who asked you to comment?. It would also exclude those where the projecting process is itself causative, like tempt (‘make want’), decide in she tempted John to stay, what decided them to change their plans?.

All these would thus be interpreted as projecting clause complexes …

Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 516):

It is always, in fact, a relationship between processes — between a mental or verbal process on the one hand, and another process (of any kind) that is mentalised or verbalised (projected) by it. Nevertheless it is not inappropriate on grammatical grounds to treat some projections as verbal group complexes, on the analogy of the types of expansion to which they are sometimes similar in meaning.

Desideration & Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 515):

… a mental process of desideration projects an exchange of the goods–&–services type, that is, a proposal. If the Subject of the projection is the same as that of the mental process clause, the proposal is an offer, as in she wants to do it; if the two are different, then the proposal is a command, as in she wants you to do it. In the first type, the Subject is not repeated, but is carried over from the desiderative clause. (It can then be made explicit by a reflexive, as in she wants to do it herself.)

Enhancing Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Modulation Causative Passive

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 513):

Furthermore, causative have passives; so we can have:

(high) they were made/forced/required to accept
(median) they were got/obliged to accept
(low) they were allowed/permitted to accept

and this enables us to interpret modulation as it occurs within the verbal group:

(high) they are required to accept — they must accept
(median) they are obliged to accept — they should accept
(low) they are allowed to accept — they may accept

Enhancing Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Modulation Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 513):

Only one or two modulations have causative equivalents; for example:

John remembered to do it

causative: Mary reminded John to do it

However, there are a special set that exist only as causatives, where the meaning is simply that of agency: make, cause, force, require, let, allow, permit, etc. These admit of three degrees of modulation:

high: this made (forced, required) them (to) accept our terms
median: this had (got, obliged) them (to) accept our terms
low: this let (allowed, permitted) them (to) accept our terms

Extending Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Potentiality Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 512):

Here there are causative forms as follows:

(1) potential: the patient can see clearly

causative: this enables the patient to see clearly

(2) achieval: John learnt to fly

causative: Mary taught John to fly

Again, these causatives have passives: the patient is enabled to see clearly, John was taught to fly by Mary.

Extending Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Conation Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 512):

There is no causative form of the conative — that is, no word meaning ‘make…try’; this can of course be expressed analytically, for example:

(she) made (him) try to eat (it)

The causative of the reussive has help, and perhaps enable:

reussive: John managed to open the lock

causative: Mary helped John to open the lock

Elaborating Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Time-Phase Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 511-2):

(1) durative: the ball kept rolling

causative: John kept the ball rolling

(2) inceptive: the ball started/stopped rolling

causative: John started/stopped the ball rolling …

Note that these then have passives: the ball was kept/started/stopped (from) rolling (by John).

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 511):

Causatives with make, get/have and let are of the enhancing type. But there are causative forms in all three types of expansion.

‘Enhancing’ Hypotactic Verbal Group Complexes: Causative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 509):

Such complexes are involved in the realisation of the transitivity system of agency. … We can always express this agency analytically, by saying John made the ball roll, where made … roll is a hypotactic verbal group complex.  Here, the causative verbal group complex is an alternative realisation of the feature of ‘effective’ agency: an additional participant is introduced into the clause through the expansion of the verbal group realising the Process.

‘Enhancing’ Verbal Group Complexes: Voice

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 508):

Many of the ‘enhancing’ verbal group complexes are simply inappropriate in the passive; they characterise an approach or attitude to the process, and this is likely to apply to an Actor but not to a Goal — it does not make much sense to say she hastened to be reassured, or your word ventures to be doubted.  Others, such as happen and tend, are impersonal and so are indifferent to the selection of voice; for example:

• The house happened to have been built facing the wrong way. …

Since they are all metaphorical, in the sense that the verbal group is representing a circumstance and not some aspect of a process, the functional analysis provides only a partial interpretation; to get the full picture we would need to take account of the congruent form, eg by chance the house had been built facing the wrong way.  There would be no change of rôle in the passive.

‘Extending’ Verbal Group Complexes: Conation & Voice

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 506-7):

Here the relation of active to passive is different, because the conative verb although not constituting a separate happening, does in fact represent a behavioural process, and it retains its behavioural sense when the clause is passive. …

The extending complex is a two-part process, in which the Subject fills a dual participant rôle: Behaver (in the conative component) plus Actor, or some other rôle, in the happening itself.

For the same reason, Adjuncts in the clause may relate semantically to the conative component like hard, quickly in she tried hard to write well, she quickly learnt to tell them apart …

There is no need in the analysis to tie these structurally to the primary verbal group; but it is useful to specify their function, by labelling them as ‘conative Adjunct’.

Verbal Group Complexes: Taxis & Voice

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 505):

If it is a paratactic complex, this process consists of two happenings — two actions, events or whatever. If the verbal group complex is hypotactic, on the other hand, there is only one happening. Thus in a paratactic complex each verbal group has a definite voice, although the voice must be the same in each case; but in a hypotactic complex only the group that expresses the happening, the secondary group, actually embodies a feature of voice. The primary group is active in form, but there is no choice involved. (The exception to this is when the clause is causative.)

Verbal Group Complex Vs Clause Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 505, 505n):

A clause containing a verbal group complex is still a single clause, and represents a single process. It has only one transitivity and voice structure. …

Where there is a shift in transitivity, as in you’ll either kill someone or get killed yourself, the structure is that of a clause nexus, not a verbal group nexus.

Enhancing A Process: Modulation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 503-4):

Here the basic notion is that of ‘be (circumstantial) + do’, for example help to do ‘do being-with (someone)’. … Here the primary verbal group is again not a separate process; but this time it is a circumstantial element in the process expressed by the secondary verbal group.

Conation Vs Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 503):

The other form that has turned into a finite element within the verbal group is the potential form can, in the sense of ‘have the ability to’; it is cognate with know, so ‘know how to do’. This now also a modal form, again of the modulation type — in this case not obligation but readiness (inclination or ability).

Conation Vs Tense And Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 501, 502):

This too has provided the resources for another tense form and another modality. … Originally two verbal groups, it is now either

(i) + done, a secondary tense form ‘past in’ … or

(ii) + to do, a modal form (of the ‘modulation’ type) … .

In other words, ‘possessing’ a process, if combined with past/passive, means past (success); if combined with ‘unreal’, it means (future) obligation.

Conation: Dimensions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 502):

… there are two dimensions … the potential and the actual. The potential means having, or alternatively not having, the ability to succeed. The actual means trying, or not trying; and succeeding, or not succeeding.

Extending A Process: Conation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 501):

Here the basic notion is that of ‘have (possession) + do’; in other words, success. The semantic relation between the primary and the secondary verbal group is one of conation: trying and succeeding. (The verb of the primary verbal group is usually one that can serve in a ‘behavioural’ clause.)

Phase Vs Tense And Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 501):

The two categories of phase are related to modality and tense; but whereas modality and tense are interpreted as subcategorisations of one process (they are grammatical variants within one verbal group), phase is interpreted as a hypotactic relation between two processes: a general one of becoming, that is then elaborated by the specific action, event, mental process or relation that is being phased in or out.

Phase: Commonality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 501):

At the deepest level time-phase and reality-phase are the same thing: both are concerned with the stages of becoming. A process is something that emerges out of imagination into reality, like the rising of the sun. Before dawn, the sun shines only in the future, or only in the imagination — as future turns into present, imagination turns into reality.

Time-Phase: Duration Vs Inception

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 500-1):

The other part of the time-phase system, that has remained as a category of phase, is that of ‘duration/inception’: ‘durative’ going on, contrasting with ‘inceptive/conclusive’, starting and stopping. … Of these, the ‘go on’ term takes the imperfective; starting and stopping take either, with little difference in meaning — except that stop requires imperfective; stop + perfective is now interpreted as a hypotactic clause complex of purpose … .  There is also an inceptive-durative ‘start to go on’ … .

Time-Phase: Original Opposition

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 500):

The time-phase system has split into two.  The original opposition is doing/is to do (meaning, in modern terms, ‘keeps doing’ and ‘will do’) has disappeared, since both have turned into grammatical categories of the verbal group.  The former has evolved into tense, defined along the lines of future/present/past. … The latter … similarly turned into a secondary future; but here there has been a further change: is to has now turned into a modal form, and its function as secondary tense has been taken over by is going to.

Hypotactic Elaborating Verbal Group Complex: Apparent Vs Realised 'Reality-Phase'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 499-500):

The reality-phase, or realisation, system is based on the contrast between ‘apparent’ (seems to be) and ‘realised’ (turns out to be); both are perfective, the first being unreal, the second unreal emerging into real. …

There is a variant of the ‘realised’ which is imperfective … ; this is looking at it from the ‘real’ end, as reality emerging from appearance. We can also relate the passive voice to this general meaning, with its original sense of ‘is (in a state of) having been realised’.

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Elaborating A Process: Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 499):

Here the verb in the primary group is a very general one of the ‘intensive: ascriptive’ class, and it is elaborated by the verb in the secondary verbal group. The semantic relation between the two is one of phase. The basic notion is ‘be (intensive) + do’, using ‘do’ to stand for any process.

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Perfective Vs Imperfective

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 498):

The general principle is that the perfective is ‘unreal’ and the imperfective is ‘real’; they may be opposed in any one of a number of contrasts, as future to present, appearance to reality, starting off to going on, goal to means, intention to action, or proposal to proposition; and sometimes the difference between them is minimal.

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Finiteness And Aspect

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 498):

The primary group (a) may be finite or non-finite … . The secondary group (b c d …) is always non-finite, this being the realisation of its dependent status. … The secondary group may be perfective, with or without to … or imperfective … in aspect. The other non-finite form, the ‘past/passive participle’ … usually stands for the perfective … but in itself it is neutral, and in other contexts it neutralises the distinction … .

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Realising Mood And Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 498):

… it is the primary group that carries the mood of the clause … . It is the secondary group, or last secondary group if there is more than one, that realises the process type of the clause … .

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Modification And Contiguity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 497-8):

The hypotactic sequence is always progressive — a ^ b … a ^ b ^ c … a ^ b ^ c ^ d … . While the groups making up the complex are typically contiguous …, the complex may be discontinuous … .

‘Serial Verb Constructions’ As Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 497n):

The traditional analysis was to treat the primary group as Predicator in its own right and the secondary group together with elements following it in the clause as an embedded non-finite clause serving as Complement, and this type of analysis was taken over in modern formal approaches, at least initially. … we can note that while the traditional analysis is forced on us if our only model of structural organisation is that of constituency, the analysis we present here becomes possible once we recognise tactic interdependency structures.  It allows us to show the analogy, and agnation, between sequences of verbs, and sequences of clauses, with areas of indeterminacy between the two.  It enables us to shed light on so-called ‘serial verb constructions’ in a range of languages, interpreting the findings that have emerged, particularly in the last 15 years or so.  Further it enables us to show how categories of the simple verbal group have evolved from verbal group complexes.  And it also makes it possible to avoid one of the major drawbacks of the traditional analysis: the secondary verbal group plus the elements following it do not in fact behave as Complements.  For example, if they were Complements, the wh-interrogative should be what is she trying? [eg]; but it is not: it is what is she trying to do?.

Hypotactic Verbal Group Complex: Clause Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 497):

Like a paratactic verbal group complex and a simple verbal group, a hypotactic verbal group complex … serves only one set of functions in the clause (and only in the clause, since it cannot be embedded on its own): it is the Process in the experiential transitivity structure, and the Finte (…) Predicator in the interpersonal modal structure.

Hypotactic Adverbial Group Or Prepositional Phrase Complex: Enhancement

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 496-7):

With prepositional phrases and adverbial groups of place and time there is also a hypotactic relation of enhancement, with the special semantic feature of ‘narrowing’, as in tomorrow before lunch.

Hypotactic Adverbial Group Or Prepositional Phrase Complex: Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 496):

The hypotactic extension of adverbial groups or prepositional phrases is essentially the same as that for nominal groups … .

Hypotactic Adverbial Group Or Prepositional Phrase Complex: Elaboration

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 495):

Here the hypotactic complex construes a path through time and space, including abstract space.

Hypotactic Adverbial Group Or Prepositional Phrase Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 495):

As with parataxis, adverbial groups and prepositional phrases can be linked hypotactically: the tactic relationship is based on identity in function rather than difference in internal structure. Hypotaxis is used to construe spatial and temporal paths and to construe gradual narrowing of the specification of a location.

Hypotactic Nominal Group Complex: Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 494):

In exactly the same way as with elaboration, a nominal group may be extended hypotactically by a prepositional phrase, the preposition having the same sense as when used to introduce a non-finite extending clause — (1) addition (positive) … (2) variation, replacement … (3) variation, subtraction … .

Hypotactic Nominal Group Complex: Elaboration By Prepositional Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 494):

There is the same contrast between embedding and hypotaxis with a phrase as there is with a clause. … [in hypotaxis] the secondary [ranking] element is … not a defining [embedded] one.

Hypotactic Nominal Group Complex: Dominant Vs Dependent Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 493-4):

In a hypotactic nominal group complex, the dominant element can, in principle, serve the same function as the whole complex, but dependent elements cannot. … While the dominant element has to be a nominal group, dependent elements can be adverbial groups or prepositional phrases.

Hypotactic Group/Phrase Complex Type And Logico-Semantic Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 493):

Hypotactic verbal group complexes involve either expansion or projection, but hypotactic nominal group complexes and hypotactic adverbial group/prepositional phrase complex are based only on expansion.

Group And Phrase Complexes: Paratactic Enhancement

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 492):

Here the semantic relationship involves a circumstantial relationship; this was not recognised in traditional accounts. … enhancing relationships are essentially between figures as a whole, and only rarely can they be interpreted as holding between particular elements of a figure. Examples are typically instances of time or cause.

Nominal Group Complex: Paratactic Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 491):

An extending nominal group complex may be reinforced by a circumstantial Adjunct of Manner such as both, jointly, separately, individually, respectively … . These indicate how the element realised by the nominal group complex takes part in the process of the clause — either jointly or separately.

Group And Phrase Complexes: Paratactic Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 491):

This is the traditional category of ‘co-ordination’. Here the semantic relationship is one of ‘and, or, nor, but, but not’ … .

Group Complex Elaboration: Elaborating Vs Embedded Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 490):

It is important to distinguish between an elaborating group and an embedded group occurring as Qualifier; … . The former is related to a non-defining relative; … and is marked by tone concord … . The latter is related to a defining relative clause;

Group And Phrase Complexes: Paratactic Elaboration

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 489):

This is the traditional category of ‘apposition’. As with clauses, appositional group or phrase complexes are characterised by tone concord, signalling the semantic relationship of elaboration. The elaborating group or phrase may restate or particularise; restatements include naming, explanatory glossing and shifts in perspective: a number of the themes of elaborating clause complexes are replayed on a smaller scale.

Group And Phrase Complexes: Parataxis And Logico-Semantic Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 489):

Groups and phrases can be linked paratactically by apposition and co-ordination. As with paratactic clauses the former are elaborating in function, the latter extending. Instances of the enhancing type are less common, since the meanings are too specific to be readily expressed as a relationship between units smaller than clauses; but they do occur. There are no paratactic group or phrase complexes linked by projection, except for nominal group complexes such as the examiner’s assessment, ‘a brilliant work’, seems hard to justify, which lie on the borderline of elaborating parataxis.

Group And Phrase Complexes: What Can Form Nexuses?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 487-8):

Group and phrase complexes are formed out of series of nexuses just as clause complexes are formed out of series of clause nexuses. Groups and phrases form nexuses in the same way that clauses do, by a combination of parataxis or hypotaxis with some type of logico-semantic relation; … Only elements having the same function can be linked in this way. Typically this will mean members of the same class: verbal group with verbal group, nominal group with nominal group and so on. But it also includes other combinations, especially: adverbial group with prepositional phrase, since these share the same circumstantial functions in the clause; and nominal group with prepositional phrase, as Attribute.

Facts Vs Quotes & Reports

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 482):

Whereas any clause that is projected by another clause, verbal or mental, is either a quote (paratactic) or a report (hypotactic, or embedded if the process is a noun), any clause that has the status of ‘projected’ but without any projecting process is a fact and is embedded, either as a nominalisation serving as Head or as Postmodifier to a ‘fact’ noun serving as Head. This includes some of those functioning in mental clauses … and all projections functioning in relational clauses (since a relational process cannot project). It also includes ‘impersonal’ projections such as it is said…, it is believed…, it seems…, where the ‘process’ is not really a process at all, but simply a way of turning a fact into a clause.

Idea As Phenomenon

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 482):

However, it is possible for an idea to be associated with a mental process while not being projected by it, as in they rejoiced that their team had won. When one clause projects another, the two always form a clause nexus; but here, where that their team had won comes ready-made as a projection, rather than being turned into one by the process of rejoicing, the idea is embedded as Phenomenon and the whole forms a single clause. This happens particularly when a proposition is an object of emotion …

Projected Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 482):

Parallel to projected information (propositions) is the projection of goods-&-services (proposals), which similarly may be paratactic, hypotactic, or embedded as Qualifier to a noun; and again the phenomenon may be verbal (locution, projected by the processes offer, command, suggest/suggestion, etc) or mental (idea, projected by intend/intention wish, hope, etc). The difference in the mental processes is that propositions are projected by cognitive processes whereas proposals are projected by desiderative ones.

Projection Within Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 481):

Both verbal and mental acts have names, such as statement, query, belief, doubt; and these also serve to project, with the projected clause embedded as Postmodifier: the belief that the sky might fall on their heads.

Projection, Taxis And Content Strata: Inverting The Natural Association

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 481):

I can choose to report a verbal act, presenting a locution as a meaning; and I can choose to quote a mental act, presenting an idea as a wording.

Mental Projection, Taxis And Content Strata

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 480-1):

Fred thinks something; this is a mental event. To represent it, I use a ‘mental’ clause Fred thought, plus a report of his mental act (that) it had stopped. The two have unequal status (hypotactic), because one is a wording while the other is a meaning. That is to say, my locution Fred thought is a lexicogrammatical phenomenon, but Fred’s idea ‘that it had stopped’ is a semantic one.

Verbal Projection, Taxis And Content Strata

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 480):

Jill says something; this is a verbal event. To represent it, I use a ‘verbal’ clause Jill said, plus a quote of her verbal act ‘It’s raining’. The two have equal status (paratactic), because both are wordings. That is to say, both my locution Jill said and Jill’s locution it’s raining are lexicogrammatical phenomena.

Facts And Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 480):

A fact is thus analogous, as a form of projection, to what we call an ‘act’ as a form of expansion. Each represents the least prototypical form of its own general category; and hence the least differentiated. Whereas there is a clear distinction between expansion and projection in their finite clausal forms … there is only a minimal distinction, and perhaps even blending, between (projection: fact) she liked the snow falling (that the snow was falling) and (expansion: act) she watched the snow falling (as the snow was falling). Seeing that facts and acts come so close together in this way, we can understand how it is that the same scale of interdependency types (parataxis/hypotaxis/rank-shift) is associated with both these logical-semantic relations.

What Kind Of Projection Is A Fact?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 480):

It is still a meaning, a semantic abstraction, not some third type differing both from meanings and from wordings (indeed there is no third level to which it could belong). But it is not a meaning created in anybody’s consciousness, nor is it emitted by any signal source; it is simply got up so as to function as a participant in some other process — typically a relational process, but sometimes also a mental or verbal one.

Facts: Impersonal Projection Of Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 480):

As with propositions, there is an impersonal form of expression, it is required/expected that you wait in line; these are the imperative (proposal) equivalents of it is said/thought that… with propositions.  They have an important function as ‘objective modulations’ whereby the speaker disclaims responsibility for making the rules.

Fact Nouns: Nouns Of Modulation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 478):

… needs (nouns of modulation) relate to proposals, which are inherently modulated — eg ‘it is necessary for…to…’.  These again have no corresponding mental process verbs; they differ from nouns like order (the name of a verbal process) and insistence (the name of a mental process) in the same way that fact differs from thought and statement — they do not imply a Sayer or a Senser.  Like a proposition, a proposal may either be embedded as Qualifier to one of these nouns … or may function on its own as a nominalisation …

Mental Clause With Embedded Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 475):

A fact, as already pointed out, is an impersonal projection. However, it is possible for a fact to enter into a ‘mental’ process clause without being projected by it. In this case it functions as a Phenomenon within the mental process clause. For example:

The fact [[that he rides in such exalted company]] will not deter Scott.

Existential Clause With Embedded Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 475):

Another minor but significant environment in which fact clauses occur is that of ‘existential’ clauses (an environment favoured by evidence):

There is evidence [[that the Russians were just as surprised as anyone else…]]

Personal Attributive Clause With Embedded Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 474-5):

… we also need to take note of ‘attributive’ clauses where the Carrier is realised by a nominal group denoting a person and the Attribute is a nominal group with an embedded fact clause, either ‘possessive’ with a noun as Head (eg idea, notion, inkling [[that…]]) or ‘intensive’ with an adjective as Head of the nominal group (eg sure, certain, aware, cognizant, oblivious (of the fact) [[that…]]; … These ‘personal’ ‘attributive’ clauses are closely agnate with projecting ‘mental’ clauses: they have no idea ~ they don’t know, I’m not sure ~ I don’t know.

Fact Clause As Token: Realisation Of Value

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 474):

In an ‘identifying’ clause, the fact clause serving as Token is identified with a Value realised by a nominal group with a noun as Head that typically belongs to the class of fact nouns; this fact noun may itself be qualified by an embedded fact clause. The Value is an interpretation of the fact clause, identifying it as a specific fact, reason, problem, lesson, difficulty, etc.

Fact Clause As Carrier: Realisation Of Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 474, 474n):

In an ‘attributive’ clause, the Attribute ascribed to the fact clause serving as Carrier is realised by a nominal group with an adjective or noun as Head belonging to one of a small number of classes. … Several of the types are similar to classes of interpersonal Adjunct and two of them can also be related to types of sensing in ‘mental’ clauses. …

The ‘attributive’ clause may have an agnate ‘mental’ clause of the ‘please’ type: it is surprising that… ~ it surprises me that…; the equivalent of the Senser in the ‘mental’ clause is a circumstance of Angle.

Fact Clause As Head Of Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 473n):

Strictly speaking the embedded ‘fact’ clause functions as Head of a nominal group which in turn functions as an element in the ranking clause. This analysis shows how clauses serving as Head are agnate with clauses serving as Postmodifier in nominal groups with a fact noun as Head: that Cæsar was ambitious is obvious : the fact that Cæsar was ambitious is obvious. But since a fact clause functioning as Head takes up the whole nominal group we can just as well leave out that stage in the structural analysis and show it as directly embedded into the clause …

Typical Environment For A Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 472, 473, 474):

Other than impersonals such as it is said, it is rumoured, it seems, the typical environment for a fact is a ‘relational’ process clause of the ‘intensive’ type, either ‘attributive’ or ‘identifying’ … Here the fact is an embedded clause standing as a nominalisation on its own, functioning as the realisation of an element in the relational process clause … Since it is embedded, there is always an agnate version where the fact clause serves as Qualifier of a noun of the ‘fact’ class, for example the fact that Cæsar was ambitious.

Impersonal Projection Of Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 472):

While there is no participant doing the projecting — no Sayer or Senser — a fact may be projected impersonally, either by a relational process (‘it is the case that…’) or by an impersonal mental or verbal process, as in:

[i] relational:

it is/may be/is not (the case) that …

it happens (to be the case) that …

it has been shown/can be proved (to be the case) that …

it happened/came about that …

[ii] mental: impersonal

it seems/appears/is thought (to be the case) that …

[iii] verbal: impersonal

it is said/rumoured (to be the case) that …

Here the it is not a participant in the projecting process but is simply a Subject placeholder; hence the fact clause can occupy its position at the front: that Cæsar was ambitious is certainly the case/is widely held/is generally believed, etc.

Fact Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 471):

A fact clause serving as Head in a nominal group without a fact noun can be related to the first class of fact noun — that of ‘cases’, since such a fact clause is always agnate with an expanded nominal group with fact as Head. Whether the nominal group has a fact noun as Head or not, the fact clause is embedded. Because there is no projecting process involved, to which it could be paratactically or hypotactically related, a fact can appear on in embedded form: either as Qualifier to a ‘fact’ noun, or as a nominalisation on its own.

Fact Nouns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 470-1):

There are four subclasses of fact noun: (1) cases, (2) chances, (3) proofs and (4) needs.  The first three go with embedded propositions whereas the last goes with embedded proposals … .  The first three differ in terms of the modality of the subtype of modalisation:

(1) cases (nouns of simple fact) relate to ordinary non-modalised propositions ‘it is the case that …’

(2) chances (nouns of modality) relate to modalised propositions ‘it may be (the case) that …’

(3) proofs (nouns of indication) relate to propositions with indications, which are equivalent to caused modalities, ‘this proves/implies (ie makes it certain/probable) that …’

Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 470):

There is one other type of projection, where the projected clause is not being projected by a verbal or mental process with Sayer or Senser, or by a verbal or mental process noun in a metaphorical nominal group, but comes as it were ready packaged in projected form.  We refer to this type as a fact. … Consider That Cæsar was dead was obvious to all.  Here that Cæsar was dead is certainly a projection; but there is no process of saying or thinking which projects it.  Its status is simply that of a fact; and it can indeed function as Qualifier to the noun fact, for example the fact that Cæsar was dead was obvious to all.

Level Of Projection, Projected Mood & Projecting Environment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 470):

Thus verbal processes, and mental: cognitive processes, project in the indicative mode (propositions), while verbal processes, and mental: desiderative processes, project in the imperative mode (proposals). The projecting environment may be a verbal or mental process clause, or a (metaphorical) nominal group with a verbal or mental process noun (locution or idea) as its Head.

Locutions & Ideas Embedded As Qualifiers: Nouns Of Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 468-9, 470):

Nouns that project belong to clearly belong to clearly defined classes, verbal process nouns (locutions) and mental process nouns (ideas); they correspond rather closely to, and in many instances are derived from, the verbs used in the projecting clause, especially the reporting ones. …

… the noun is the name of a locution or an idea, and the clause that it projects serves to define it in exactly the same way that a ‘restrictive’ relative clause defines the noun that is expanded by it.  Hence any noun that belongs to a projecting class may be defined (restricted) in either of these two ways, either by projection (eg the thought [[that she might one day be queen]]) or by expansion (eg the thought [[that came into her mind]]).  This leads to ambiguities such as the report [[that he was submitting]] …

Free Indirect Speech: Intonational Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 466):

The intonation pattern of free indirect speech is still further anomalous, since it follows that of quoting and not that of reporting: the projected clause takes the intonation that it would have had if quoted (that is, identical with its unprojected form), and the projecting clause follows it as a ‘tail’. This is because the projected clause still has the status of an independent speech act.

Free Indirect Speech [Prototypical Pattern*]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 465-6):

Strictly speaking it is not so much intermediate [between direct and indirect speech] as a blend: it has some features of each of the other two types. The structure is paratactic, so the projected clause has the form of an independent clause retaining the mood of the quoted form; but it is a report and not a quote, so time and person are shifted. This is another example of the semogenic principle whereby the system fills up a slot it has created for itself. … To accommodate free indirect speech in our account, we thus need to [dissociate] the quote vs report variable from the parataxis vs hypotaxis one … Free indirect speech can be projected both verbally and mentally, and includes both propositions and proposals — everything, in fact, that can be both quoted and reported (thus excluding minor speech functions since they can only be quoted).

—

* 'Free indirect speech' encompasses a range of different feature combinations; it is a projection 'space' rather than a single invariant pattern.  The account given here represents it in its prototypical form.

The Clause Substitute 'So'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 464):

This is why so, which is a clause substitute, has the general sense of ‘non-real’, by contrast with what is ‘real’. Besides projection, where it signifies what is asserted or postulated, it is used in two other contexts: hypothetical, as opposed to actual, and possible, as opposed to certain.

Reports, Quotes & Cohesion: Verbal Vs Mental

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 464):

In ‘verbal’ process clauses, therefore, he said that simply attests his production of the wording, whereas he said so raises the issue of whether what he said is in fact the case.  With ‘mental’ process clauses the picture is more complex, since the reference form that tends to be associated with certainty and the substitute so with uncertainty; the principle is actually the same, but it is operating in a different environment.  The principle is that a substitute does not refer; it simply harks back.  It thus has the general semantic property of implying, and so excluding, possible alternatives; cf the nominal substitute one as in a big one, meaning ‘there are also small ones, and I don’t mean those’.

Reports, Quotes & Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 464):

There are different ways of referring back to what is quoted and what is reported.  Typically a reference item, usually that, is used to pick up a quoted passage, while a substitute, so/not, is used with a report. … This is because the act of quoting implies a prior referent, some actual occasion that can then be referred back to, whereas in reporting there is nothing but the reported text.  This explains the difference in meaning between I don’t believe that ‘I do not accept that assertion as valid’ and I don’t believe so ‘in my opinion such is not the case’.

Reported Imperatives: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 463):

… the imperative is a somewhat indeterminate category, having some features of a finite and some features of a non-finite clause. Similarly, the category of a reported imperative (‘indirect command’) is not very clearly defined. But non-finite clauses with to, following a verb such as tell or order, can be interpreted as reported proposals. They similarly display properties of ‘indirect speech’ …

Reported Interrogatives: Shift In Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 463):

If the reported clause is interrogative it typically shifts into the declarative; the declarative is the unmarked mood, and is used in all clauses that do not select for mood independently, including all dependent clauses. A yes/no interrogative becomes declarative, introduced by if or whether; a WH- interrogative becomes declarative with the WH- element remaining at the front.

Reported Propositions: Shift In Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 462):

… a reported proposition typically takes on a set of related features collectively known as ‘indirect speech’. What happens is that all deictic elements are shifted away from reference to the speech situation: personals away from first and second person (speaker and listener) to third, and demonstratives away from near (here-&-now) to remote.

Quoting & Reporting In News Registers

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 462, 465):

There is thus a cline from the reporter’s own voice via reported voices to quoted ones.  The quoted material is closest to the reporter’s news source whereas the reported material is already, at least potentially, at some distance from what was actually said. … Quoting and reporting are thus two distinct modes of projection, representing two degress of remove from the original source.

Quoting Vs Reporting

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 462):

In quoting, the projected element has independent status; it is thus more immediate and lifelike, and this effect is enhanced by the orientation of the deixis, which is that of drama not that of narrative. Quoting is particularly associated with certain narrative registers, fictional and personal; it is used not only for sayings but also for thoughts, including not only first-person thoughts … but also third-person thoughts projected by an omniscient narrator … . Reporting, on the other hand, presents the projected element as dependent. It still gives some indication of mood, but in a form which precludes it from functioning as a move in an exchange. And the speaker makes no claim to be abiding by the wording.

‘Mental’ Reporting Of Proposals Vs Propositions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 461):

With the ‘mental’ reporting of ideas, there is an important distinction between propositions and proposals, deriving from their fundamental nature as different forms of semiotic exchange. Whereas propositions, which are exchanges of information, are projected mentally by processes of cognition — thinking, knowing, understanding, wondering, etc — proposals, which are exchanges of goods-&-services, are projected mentally by processes of desire … . Thus, while propositions are thought, proposals are hoped.

‘Verbal’ Reporting Of Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 460):

The parallel between quoting and reporting is not so close with proposals as with propositions, because reported proposals merge gradually into causatives without any clear line in between. Thus not only are there many verbs used in quoting which are not used in reporting … but also there are many verbs used to report that are not used to quote, verbs expressing a wide variety of rhetorical processes such as persuade, forbid, undertake, encourage, recommend …

Reporting Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 458):

Like propositions, proposals can also be reported: projected hypotactically (1) by ‘verbal’ clauses as ‘indirect speech’ or (2) by ‘mental’ clauses as ‘indirect thought’. The former involves indirect commands, offers and suggestions; the latter desired (ideas of) states of affair. One central feature they share is the mode of projected proposal: it is ‘irrealis’, or non-actualised, and the projecting clause represents the verbal or mental force of actualisation.

Quoting Thoughts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 456, 457):

Here a thought is represented as if it was a wording, for example I thought 'I'll just inquire' … The implication is ‘I said to myself…’; and this expression is often used, recognising the fact that one can think in words. Only certain mental process verbs are regularly used to quote in this way, such as think, wonder, reflect, surmise.

Verbs Used In Quoting & Reporting Propositions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 455-6):

Verbs used in reporting statements and questions are often the same as those used in quoting; … but there is one significant difference.  In quoting, the independent status of the proposition, including its mood, is preserved; hence the speech function is as explicit as in the ‘original’.  In reporting, on the other hand, the speech function is, or may be, obscured, and is therefore made explicit in the reporting verb.  Three things follow.  (1) In quoting, the word say can project sayings of every mood, whereas in reporting we find say, ask, and tell … (2) Many semantically complex verbs for elaborated speech functions are used only in reporting, for example insinuate … These verbs are seldom used to quote; there is too much experiential distance between them and the actual speech event.  (3) On the other hand, many verbs that assign interpersonal and/or behavioural features to the speech event, and are used to quote, especially in narrative contexts, are never used to report because they do not contain the feature ‘say’.

Quoting Sounds

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 455):

While minor clauses can be quoted, they cannot be reported; that is, the quoting clause nexus He said “Ah!” has no reporting agnate.  Similarly, while non-linguistic sounds can be quoted (often with go as the Process, as in she went (sound of a sigh)), they cannot be reported.

Reporting Speech

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 453, 454):

It is possible to ‘report’ a saying by representing it as a meaning. This is the ‘reported speech’, or ‘indirect speech’, of traditional Western grammars; … But the principle behind this hypotactic representation of a verbal event is that it is not, in fact, being presented as true to the wording; the speaker is reporting the gist of what was said, and the wording may be quite different from the original … This is not to suggest, of course, that when a speaker uses the paratactic, ‘direct’ form he is always repeating the exact words; far from it. But the idealised function of the paratactic structure is to represent the wording; whereas with hypotaxis the idealised function is to represent the sense, or gist.

Projection: Recombination Of Associated Variables

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 453):

These two represent the basic patterns of projection — quoting speech and reporting thought … . But, by the familiar semogenic process of recombination of associated variables (more simply known as filling up the holes), other forms have come to exist alongside — reporting speech and quoting thought.

Quoting Vs Reporting: Dialogic Features Of Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 453):

And while paratactic projection can represent any dialogic features of what was said, hypotactic projection cannot; for example, vocative elements and minor speech functions can be quoted but not reported.

Mental Projection Of Ideas: Why Reporting (Hypotaxis) Is Typical

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 452):

When something is projected as a meaning, we are not representing ‘the very words’, because there are no words. If we want to argue about whether or not the experts held this opinion, we have no observed event as a point of reference. Hence in combination with the tactic system the basic pattern for projecting meanings is not parataxis, which treats the projection as a free-standing event, but hypotaxis, which makes it dependent on the mental process clause.

Construing Levels Of Projection (Viewed ‘From Above’ And ‘From Below’)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 451, 452):

Something that is projected as a meaning is still a phenomenon of language — it is what was referred to above as a ‘metaphenomenon’; but it is presented at a different level — semantic, not lexicogrammatical. When something is projected as meaning it has already been ‘processed’ by the linguistic system — it is a phenomenon of experience that has been construed as meaning; but processed only once, not twice as in the case of wording, where a phenomenon of experience is construed first as meaning and then in turn as wording. … A wording is, as it were, twice cooked. … We are unconsciously aware [sic] that when something has the status of a wording it lies not at one but at two removes from experience; it has undergone two steps in the realisation process. … We have described the process ‘from above’, from the point of view of how experience is first construed as meaning (‘semanticised’) and then as wording (‘grammaticalised’). But looked at ‘from below’, a wording is closer to expression than a meaning is … .