There are other "transphenomenal" motifs, often related to these, which are more specific in their scope; for example, the foregrounding of perceptual space, and of the concrete having extension in space, so that these serve as models for construing more abstract, non-spatial realms; and, more specifically, the spatial construction of the human body as an orientational framework.
The fractal types of projection and expansion are also a primary resource by which the semantic system creates new meanings. The ideation base thus itself embodies, auto-genetically, the principles on which it is organised and enabled to develop further, such that the primary systems of ideational meaning then serve as a grid within which more delicate categories are construed. Here we have foregrounded especially the motif of elaborating, with particular reference to its manifestation in the identifying and ascriptive figures of being. We have tried to show how elaboration makes it possible to "import" extralinguistic experience into the meaning base by actively construing it (as in 'that [thing there] is a circle'); and also to "transport" meanings internally from one region of the ideation base in order to construe new meanings in another (as in 'balance means you hold it on your fingers and it does not go'). The extension of meaning in delicacy — not merely generalising across different types but construing such types into dimensional and open-ended taxonomies — is a function of the elaborating potential, exploiting the basic dimensions of the system itself.
Blogger Comments:
Since SFL Theory assumes that there is no meaning outside semiotic systems, 'extralinguistic experience' can be understood as the construal of the meaningless by perceptual semiotic systems.
Sequences, figures and elements, and their subclasses, constitute different environments within the ideation base. If we construe some phenomenon of experience as a sequence of qualification, we give it a location in the overall ideational system that is quite distinct from the location it would be assigned if it was construed as a figure of circumstantial cause. These two types are thus not particularly close agnates in the system, However, the fractal types constitute an additional order of agnation that is projected onto the ideational system as a whole. We can refer to this as fractal agnation. Because of this, a qualifying sequence and a figure of circumstantial being, such as cause, are agnate: they are both manifestations of the fractal type of enhancement For example, the sequence ebola broke out so 52 people died is agnate with the figure the outbreak of ebola caused 52 deaths even though they are quite far apart in their semantic structure.
Since projection and expansion operate across the various categories of phenomena, we referred to them as transphenomenal categories. As transphenomenal categories, they are meaning types that are in some sense "meta" to the organisation of the ideation base: they are principles of construing our experience of the world that generate identical patterns of semantic organisation which are of variable magnitude and which occur in variable semantic environments. Such patterns therefore constitute fractal types. Projection and expansion are manifested at three levels of organisation: as sequences, as figures and as elements. Table 5(6) presents a partial summary of the cases we have discussed.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 222-3):
Figure 5-14 shows the two motifs manifested in the environments of sequences, figures and elements.
These two motifs together have made it possible for human beings to transform experience into meaning, taking the experience of meaning itself — the "inner" processes of consciousness — as the central figures, and those with the ability to mean — prototypically humans themselves — as the central participants. These then serve as the point of reference for construing "outer" experience, the complementary experiences of the processes of doing and of being.
In addition to setting out the main dimensions and systems of ideational meaning, we have tried with this approach to bring out a small number of very general motifs that run throughout the grammar's construal of experience.The first of these motifs is that of meaning as expansion: the way regions of semantic space are opened up and defined by the three vectors of elaboration, extension and enhancement — elaborating a region that is already as it were staked out, extending the regions boundaries to take in more, and enhancing the region's potential by enrichment from its environment.The second motif is that of meaning by projection: the way new dimensions of semantic space are created by the orders of human consciousness, sensing and saying — by projecting into existence another order of reality, one that is constituted by language itself.
But even within one language, however they are construed grammatically, the status of circumstantial elements is variable. In English, those that are nearer the centre of our helix are more like participants, as shown by the examples above; while those that are on the periphery are more like figures. We can give some examples of agnate pairs of this kind.
It is interesting to note how this two-faced character of circumstances — that they are on the one hand like participants and on the other hand like figures — is reflected in their treatment in languages other than English. In the way they are construed in the grammar, in a language such as Finnish, where what corresponds to the English preposition is often a "case" in the nominal group, they appear to be (relatively to English) closer to participants; while in a language such as Chinese, where what corresponds to the English preposition is typically a class of verb, they appear (again, relatively to English) closer to figures. But they typically seem to have a status that lies somewhere intermediate between the two.
Coming back now to the distinction between type (1) circumstances, those realised by adverbial groups, and type (2), those realised by prepositional phrases: as typically happens in language (since grammar abhors determinacy), we find a crossing between the two types.
This happens mainly in one direction: there are prepositional phrases which construe qualities of figures, and hence function as circumstances of Manner; for example in a hurry, without proper care (cf. hurriedly, carelessly). Typically these may also appear as qualities of participants, as in he was in a hurry (realised as Attribute in a clause), a man in a hurry (Qualifier in a nominal group — not Epithet, since English does not like phrases and clauses before the Thing). These usually involve some kind of metaphor, either (as here) grammatical metaphor, where a quality or process is made to look like a participant, or lexical metaphor (metaphor in its traditional sense) as in they left the matter up in the air.
Less commonly, we find a cross-over in the other direction; an example would be the adverb microscopically where this has the sense of 'using a microscope' (we examined the tissue microscopically).
That those in (i) are being construed primarily as participants, whereas those in (ii) are being construed primarily as circumstances, is shown by a variety of other grammatical factors; to give just one example, the question equivalent to (i) is who? or what? (who did you give milk to?, not where did you give milk?), whereas the question equivalent to those in (ii) is how long?, when? (when are we meeting?, not what are we meeting on?). By the same token, in (iii) we have two different elements, one participant and one circumstance, but with hardly any difference between the two:
The grammar does draw a line between the two: participant as nominal group, circumstance as prepositional phrase. But because of the continuous nature of the distinction, we find three kinds of mixed categories:(i) participants that may look like circumstances (being introduced by prepositions);
(ii) circumstances that may look like participants (being introduced without prepositions); and
(iii) pairs where one is circumstance, the other participant, but with very little difference in their meaning.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 218-20):
Table 5(5) combines the two perspectives, showing their relationship both to participants and to figures. We referred to the cline from participants to circumstances as the "degree of involvement" in the actualisation of the process. This degree of involvement ranged from the closest, the Medium, which is part of the nucleus of the figure, to those that appear most remote, circumstances such as Matter (e.g. concerning your request) and Angle (e.g. in my own opinion). Somewhere in the middle was an area of overlap, where participants and circumstances are very closely akin. The two overlap because there are some functions which can be construed either as a form of participant in the process or as a circumstance attendant on it.Table 5(5): Agnation between participants, circumstances and figures
We are now looking at these same circumstantial elements from a complementary standpoint, from the point of view of their own internal composition. As we remarked, a prepositional phrase represents a figure in miniature, with a structure analogous to one component of a figure — closest, perhaps, to Process + Range (so we refer to the participant in the prepositional phrase as a "Minirange"). This means that, shifting our perspective, we can also suggest how the circumstantial elements are related to different figures.
Earlier we tried to suggest how the circumstantial elements were related to participants. There, we were looking at them as oblique "cases", from the point of view of their function in the larger figure. Two points emerged: one, that participants and circumstances taken together formed a cline, rather than being separated by a clear boundary; the second, that some of the circumstantial elements could be 'paired off with participants, being seen as a more oblique manifestation of a similar role. We were able to incorporate these two points in a helical form of presentation in Figure 4-14.
Type (2), those circumstantial elements that are realised by prepositional phrases, are rather more complex, since they include another element — a participant — in their makeup ("macro circumstances"): e.g. the table, my knowledge, peace and quiet in right under the table, without my knowledge, for the sake of peace end quiet.In such cases the element realised by the nominal group is still functioning as a participant in the process — but indirectly, being implicated only through the mediation of a preposition. That this is possible is because the preposition itself constitutes a subsidiary kind of 'process'; one that does not function as Process in the main figure but is nevertheless related systematically to the spectrum of process types — mainly, though not exclusively, to processes of being.
Finally, some adverbial groups are interpersonal in function — the speaker's comment on the figure, like sensibly in sensibly, they didn't argue 'I consider their behaviour sensible' (contrast they didn't argue sensibly 'in a sensible manner'). These lie outside the ideational structure of the clause: they are not serving as qualities in the figure realised by the clause, but rather derive from features within the interaction base.
Circumstantial elements can be realised grammatically either as adverbial groups or as prepositional phrases. These represent circumstances of two different types.Type (1) are qualities ("simple circumstances") — but construed not as qualities of a particular participant but as qualities of a figure as a whole; for example, steadily, extremely loudly, perfectly in it rained steadily all night, they were shouting extremely loudly, it suits your complexion perfectly. Typically such adverbs are derived in the grammar from adjectives, with the added suffix -ly; a few have special forms, like well (from good), and sometimes the same form is both adjective and adverb, e.g. fast in a fast car, she drives fast.The usual function is as circumstance of Manner, with the meaning 'in such a way', 'to such a degree'; and if the manner of doing determines the quality of the outcome there may be very little difference between a circumstance of this kind and a resultative Attribute: cf. don't chop the parsley too fine/too finely. There are some adverbial expressions realising other types of circumstance, e.g. everywhere (Location: space), recently (Location: time); as well as others which might be interpreted differently because of the nature of the quality itself, e.g. pointlessly 'in a pointless manner' or 'for no good reason' (Cause).Sometimes the Manner element is a quality of the process itself, rather than the manner in which it unfolds, for example he was falsely accused/wrongly dismissed; these tend to be bonded rather closely to the Process element in the clause. (The adverbial form also functions as a quality of a quality, like frostily, superficially in a frostily polite receptionist, what he says is superficially correct; here it is not a circumstantial element but is part of the Epithet in the nominal group.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 217):
From an ideational point of view, the temporality of processes is their salient characteristic. As we saw, there are no semantic or grammatical systems for construing processes into elaborate taxonomies, as there are for construing things. Apart from considerations of time we have also shown that processes can be classified according to their potential for serving in figures of different types.
Obviously, choices made in all these parameters relate to the figure as a whole (at least; they may have implications for longer stretches of discourse). The major process types — the primary categories of sensing, saying, doing & happening, being & having — tend to have inherently different temporal characteristics, affecting all aspects of the way time is construed: in terms of what temporal categories are possible, what the relative probabilities are, and what the different choices mean (note for example the total lack of proportionality in pairs such as I go : I'm going ≠ I know : I'm knowing). Part of the meaning of any fragment of experience is its potentiality for being variably construed in time.
The temporal profile, of unbounded/ bounded, is not an independent option available to processes in general. Boundedness is a feature which may accrue to certain classes of process, typically processes of doing: contrast for example unbounded use with bounded use up (use some salt — but don't use it up!). It is on the borderline of lexis and grammar: the verb is extended by up or some other adverb of the locative-directional class (drink up, eat up, load up, pour out, melt down, fly away). The boundedness is not in fact temporally defined; its degree — and often its exact nature — is specific to the kind of process concerned, and may depend on the total figure and on the context; e.g.But there is a clear proportionality involved, which allows us to treat this as a systemic feature of a significant subset of processes in English.
Temporal staging is explicit and lexicalised, with a basic system of categories as shown in Figure 5-13; for example… but the money kept on not coming throughThe combination of staging with perspective has already been referred to; note in this connection sequences such as
where the move in staging creates an increasing semantic distance between the two perspectives. Staging also extends to other categories that are not strictly temporal, which the grammar however construes as analogous: especially conation (tries to do/ succeeds in doing), and appearance (seems to be/turns out to be).
By comparison with temporal location, temporal perspective (aspect) is relatively backgrounded in English. (Some 20th century grammarians have interpreted the serial location as a kind of aspect, with "present in ..." as continuous, "past in ..." as perfect; but the earlier description as we have presented it here accounts more richly for the semantic patterning.) The temporal perspective takes over, however, when there is no deictic location (the clause is non-finite); in such cases, instead of making reference to 'now' the process is construed as either actualised, as in (on) reaching the gallery, turn left, or visualised, e.g. to reach the gallery, turn left. Sometimes the difference in meaning is very slight (e.g. a way of doing it/the way to do it)', but it is always there.
English foregrounds location in the flow of time (tense), and construes this not only as past/present/future relative to 'now' [they paid me/they pay me/ they will pay me], but also as past/present/future relative to some moment that is relative to now [they are going to pay me (future in present), they've been paying me (present in past in present)], with the possibility of up to five shifts of reference point, as inThey said they'd been going to've been paying me all this time …(present in past in future in past in past). This system is fully grammaticised, and is unusual in that it construes location in time as a logical relation rather than as an experiential taxonomy; it thus becomes a form of serial time reference. The tense categories also combine with time adverbs such as already, just, soon [they'd already paid me, they've just paid me, they soon paid me]. Interestingly, the deictic time reference (that appealing to 'now') can be switched off; either there is no deixis (the clause is non-finite, e.g. not having paid me yet...) or the deixis takes the form of modality (speaker's angle on the process, e.g. they should have paid me).
Each of these variables differs from all the others; but at the same time, each is related to all the others, so that there are certain patterns of association among them. For example, a process that is unbounded (e.g. travel) is more likely than one that is bounded (e.g. arrive) to be put under temporal focus (e.g. while travelling is more likely than while arriving); a process located in the future is more likely to be beginning than ending (e.g. it will start warming up is more common than it will finish warming up). Some combinations may be more or less excluded: for example, a process that is beginning can vary in its perspective (e.g. the sun started to shine/started shining), whereas one that is ending is always actualised (e.g. the sun stopped shining; but not the sun stopped to shine). Thus, in any given language,
(i) one or other parameter may be given prominence,(ii) two or more parameters may be combined into a single semantic system,(iii) any parameter may be construed either more grammatically or more lexically, and(iv) a number of features that are not strictly temporal may be incorporated into the picture, both ideational ones like attempting/succeeding and interpersonal ones like the speaker's angle on the process — judgement of its likelihood, desirability, and so on.
In transforming experience of time into meaning, human communities have evolved a number of basic parameters. We can identify four of these that are relevant in the present context:(1) the temporal staging of a process: it may be beginning, taking place or ending.(underlying concept: a process occupies a certain measure of time)(2) the temporal perspective on a process: we may frame it in or out of temporal focus. This takes many different guises in different languages, and even within the same language; such as(a) in focus: ongoing, out of focus: terminated;(b) in focus: significant in itself, out of focus: significant for what follows;(c) in focus: actualised, out of focus: visualised.(It is the last of these that is relevant to English.)(underlying concept: a process relates to the flow of experience as a whole, including other processes)(3) the temporal profile of a process: it is either unbounded or bounded.(underlying concept: a process has the potential for being extended in time)(4) the temporal location of a process: it can be related to 'now' as past, present or future.(underlying concept: a process takes place within a linear flow or current of time) …
When these parameters are grammaticised, they are referred to respectively as
(1) phase,(2) aspect,(3) aktionsart,(4) tense.
It is not easy to construe experience of time, and different languages vary considerably in the way they do it: there are differences from one language to another, and differences within the same language over the course of time. Like everything else we are exploring here, the grammar's model of time has been evolving unconsciously in the context of human survival; it is part of the selective and collective wisdom that the species has accumulated in the understanding of its relationship to its environment and in the interaction of its members one with another. And again like everything else in the construal of experience it is the product of continual compromise, whereby divergent and often conflicting aspects of experience are adjusted and accommodated in such a way that all of them have some place in the total picture.
Blogger Comments:
This wording construes time as transcendent of semiotic systems, which is inconsistent with the epistemological assumption of SFL Theory that all meaning is immanent of semiotic systems. On this assumption, time is meaning construed of experience, not "pre-existing" meaning that is modelled by languages.
Thus from the point of view of the figure, a process is the central element, forming a nucleus around which participants and circumstantial elements are organised into a meaningful pattern.From the point of view of its own internal organisation, a process is the construal of 'eventing' — a phenomenon perceived as having extension in time.
While participants are located in referential space, processes are located in time. The verbal group realising a process constructs a "moment" in time beginning with the 'now' (the time of speaking) leading up to a categorisation of the Event; this is analogous to the way the nominal group, realising a participant, constructs a "body" in space beginning with the 'here' and leading up to a categorisation of the Thing. But while the Thing is enmeshed in an elaborate taxonomy of things, the Event is taxonomically rather simple and its complexity lies in the construal of time itself. Hence the verbal group is lexically sparse — typically the Event is the only lexicalised part; whereas nominal groups can be lexically extremely dense.
The key to the construal of experience is the perception of change; the grammar construes a quantum of change as a figure (typically one clause) and sorts out figures in the first instance into those of consciousness (sensing and saying), those of the material world (doing & happening) and those of logical relations (being & having). The central element of a figure is the process; 'things' are construed as entities participating in processes, having different roles, of which one is 'that participant in which the process is actualised' (if there is 'flying', there has to be something that flies or is flown: birds fly, people fly kites); hence the grammatical nucleus of the clause is the configuration of Process with Medium.
