Qualities Of Enhancement

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of enhancement also resemble those of 'elaboration: identity' and those of extension in that they construe a relation between the thing they are assigned to and another thing. This is brought out by the fact that they are agnate with processes relating participants circumstantially: 

subsequent : be (come) after, 
preceding : be (come) before/precede, 
interior : be within, 
exterior : be outside, 
as in previous occasions : occasions coming before this one, 
interior design : design of what is within a house. 

This relation is typically a temporal or spatial one involving the thing as a discoursal instance rather than the thing as a general experiential class. Consequently, like qualities of extension, qualities of enhancement tend to serve as deictic elements (Post-Deictic) rather than as Epithets; as Post-Deictics, they come before Numeratives in the structure of the nominal group: the preceding/ subsequent two meetings. Here they relate a specific referent, recoverable in the current situation: the subsequent two meetings : the two meetings that followed this one. 

But the spatial qualities can also, being taxonomic, serve to subclassify the thing they are assigned to: interior monologue, external pipes. Here they relate to a general class of thing, inferable from the experiential system: interior monologue : monologue that is within a person, external pipes : pipes that are outside a house.

Qualities Of Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of extension resemble those of 'elaboration: identity' in that they construe a relation between the thing they are assigned to and some other thing. The relation typically obtains between the thing as a discoursal instance rather than the thing as a general experiential class. Thus an alternative solution is a solution that can replace the one we have just been talking about. Consequently, properties of extension tend to serve as deictic elements (Post-Deictic) rather than as Epithets: they indicate how an instance (or instances) of the general class of the thing they are assigned to is selected from that class: we need an additional two volunteers means 'two further instances of the general class of volunteer'. Like other properties serving as Post-Deictic, they may precede the Numerative (additional^two); but they may also follow, with no strong contrast in meaning: we need two additional volunteers.

Qualities Of Elaboration: Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of elaboration, subtype identity are not inherent properties, but rather are comparative. Thus the standard of comparison can always be construed: their car is the same/similar/different : their car is the same as/similar to/different from ours; and they are agnate with processes: their car is/resembles/differs from ours. The line between elaboration: identity and enhancement: manner, comparison is a fuzzy one; and processual agnates such as their car resembles ours are within the domain of enhancement.

Qualities Of Elaboration: Attribution

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 211-2):

The most prototypical qualities are those of elaboration, subtype attribution: they stand in a purely intensive relation to the thing they are assigned to, being construed as inherent qualities. They are typically scalar, but certain types are taxonomic or binary. 

As Epithets (or Classifiers) they are agnate with the Attribute of a figure of being. Many of them can serve as the Attribute of a figure of doing (as in he squashed it flat, she painted it blue) and are related to the outcome of such figures (cf. she heated/widened/enlarged it : it was hot/wide/large). 

The limiting case of qualities of attribution are quantities; they are assigned to a thing as a discoursal instance rather than as a general experiential class. Consequently, they do not serve as Epithets; they have a special role, that of Numerative (as in two/many brave volunteers).

Qualities Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

Qualities of expansion cannot normally be assigned to metathings. They expand the thing they are related to by elaboration, extension or enhancement. These different subtypes display different patterns of agnation, but as Epithet (or Classifier) + Thing configurations they are all agnate with figures of being & having.

Qualities Of Projection vs Depictive and Resultative Attributes

  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

Qualities of projection are unlikely or impossible as the Attribute of figures of doing (thus it is hard to interpret she polished it certain [contrast she polished it clean] and while we can say he drove her mad [caused figure of being] and he drove the car hot [figure of doing with Attribute], we cannot say he drove the car mad).

Blogger Comments:

I certainly can. In this instance, mad is an Attribute that depicts the emotional state of the driver.

Qualities Of Projection As Agnate With Modality and Attitude

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

As we have seen, sensing is agnate with modality and, in the case of emotive sensing, with attitude. Similarly, qualities of projection extend to include modalities and attitudes; when the thing (or metathing) they are assigned to is agnate with the Phenomenon, these qualities are construed as objective, impersonal ones: it is certain/likely/possible that the moon's a balloon. (Contrast: I'm certain the moon's a balloon.) With qualities of usuality, this is the only possible orientation.

Qualities Of Projection As Agnate With Processes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

Qualities of projection are all scalar and they are, as we just noted, agnate with processes of sensing in figures of sensing; they are often realised by participial verb forms used as adjectives. The thing they are assigned to, as Attribute or as Epithet, is agnate either with the Senser (the 'like' type, realised by v-en if verbal in origin: happy, sad, angry, afraid, frightened, certain, sure) or with the Phenomenon (the 'please' type, realised by v-ing if verbal in origin: sad(dening), tragic, irritating, scary, certain). 

From this it follows that when they are agnate with the Senser, they are ascribed to conscious beings (as in an angry child/boss/cat), whereas when they are agnate with the Phenomenon, they can be ascribed not only to things but also to metathings, i.e. to projections (as in it's sad(dening)/tragic/irritating/scary/certain that they ignore world opinion). In the former case, these qualities may be 'transferred' to tokens of the senser's sensing, as in an angry face/look/letter/reaction.

A Very Tentative Classification Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209, 211):

Table 5(4) suggests a very tentative classification.

Qualities Of Projection And Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209-10):

Qualities can be distinguished according to the transphenomenal types of projection and expansion. Qualities of projection and qualities of expansion differ in a number of respects. Most fundamentally, they differ in their patterns of agnation. 

Qualities of projection are agnate with processes in figures of sensing; for example, happy in the happy child (or the child is happy) is agnate with rejoice in the child rejoices. 

In contrast, qualities of expansion display patterns of agnation within figures of being & having, with variation according to subtype. 

This fundamental difference explains other differences; for example, qualities of projection tend to occur in agnate pairs of the 'like' and 'please' type that we find with figures of sensing (e.g. afraid/scary, suspicious/suspect, bored/boring), whereas qualities of expansion do not.

The Semantic Movement In The Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209, 210):

We suggested above that the nominal group is organised as a move along two semantic dimensions: the elements become increasingly stable in time, and increasingly complex in their taxonomy of features. Lexicogrammatically, this corresponds to a move from grammatical items (determiners, determinative adjectives such as usual, same, typical, cardinal and ordinal numerals) to lexical items (adjectives [in general], and nouns); that is, a move from closed systems to open sets. 

The former are taxonomically simple (although they are notoriously difficult to interpret in lexical glosses); they include specific/non-specific; personal/demonstrative; near/far, total/partial &c (see Haliiday, 1976:131-5, for the systems). In contrast, elements at the latter end tend to be construed in complex taxonomies. That is, greater experiential complexity is handled by means of greater taxonomic complexity. 

The semantic movement in the nominal group is summarised in Figure 5-12. Qualities lie at different places along these various dimensions; hence they vary in their potential for taking on roles in different types of figure.

Quality As Depictive Attribute vs Manner Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208-9):

Some qualities may occur as depictive (as opposed to resultative) Attribute in a figure of doing & happening; in such instances the quality is very close to a circumstance of manner, as is shown by agnate pairs such as the following:

As always with such closely agnate expressions, while they are semantically related they are not synonymous; we could even imagine a figure such as he walked in drunk quite soberly. But they make the point that a quality, when attached to the figure as an Attribute (rather than to a participant as in the drunken man walked in/ the man who walked in was drunk), is construed as being more like a circumstance. The fact that manner circumstances are typically realised by adverbs that are simply derived from (and in some cases identical with) adjectives is a further symptom of the way a quality may resemble a circumstance.

Quality As Feature Of The Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

Some qualities can be construed as processes of doing; here for example there is an agnate form I've dried the plate, with 'dry' worded as a verb. In these cases, the quality is not repeated as an Attribute — we do not usually say I've dried the plate dry; it may however reappear in an intensified form, e.g. I've dried it very dry. Very many qualities may be construed as verbs in this way.

The Intermediate Status Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

Thus in its typical construal, as Epithet or as Attribute, a quality is clearly "participant-like"; we might also note that realised as an adjective in superlative form it does appear as a participant (these are the driest, pass me the driest; the smallest will fall through the holes). But there are also environments where a quality resembles a process or a circumstance.

The Attribute Is Not A Prototypical Participant

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207-8):

The Attribute is not a prototypical participant We have already noted that as it stands it cannot function interpersonally as Subject. On the other hand, it can easily be instated as a participant by adding the noun or the noun substitute one(s) to the nominal group which realises it: this is a dry plate, this is a dry one. The fact that the thing can be instated as the Head of a nominal group serving as Attribute illustrates the point already made: the quality does not construe a separate class of thing, it presumes this class from the environment. Thus this is heavy means that it is heavy relatively to whatever class of thing it has been assigned to; compare the truck was very heavy / a very heavy one (i.e. "heavy for a truck') with the chair was very heavy / a very heavy one (i.e. 'heavy for a chair'). Hence it is not possible to re-instate the thing where the Attribute occurs as resultative in a process of doing: we do not say I've wiped it a dry plate or I've wiped the plate a dry one.

Things vs Qualities: Different Kinds Of Role In Participant Structure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207):

We said that both things and qualities are construed as participants. This does not mean that they are different kinds of participant. Rather, it means that within the structure of a participant, they serve different kinds of role.

Typically, a quality combines with a thing to make up a participant in a figure: a dry plate, where the quality 'dry' is Epithet in the nominal group. The only context in which a quality serves on its own in a participant role is as Attribute; here it stands in intensive relation to a participant, either (i) in a figure of being, where the participant is Medium/Carrier (i.e. its sole function is to have the quality ascribed to it) or (ii) in a figure of doing, where the participant is Medium/Actor or Medium/Goal and quality results from the doing; for example:

being: The plate's dry —I've made the plate dry

doing: I've wiped the plate dry

Note that in the doing figure, where I is Actor, the Attribute could be omitted: I've wiped the plate; in the being figure it cannot, since the process itself is one of ascription and the other participant, if present, is merely the ascriber.

Qualities: Between Things And Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

As a category, qualities lie somewhere along a cline between things and processes, and their status varies considerably among different languages. In English, qualities belong more closely with things, since they contribute primarily to the construction of participants: grammatically, English favours construing a quality as Epithet in a nominal group, and the class of adjective is clearly related to that of noun. (By contrast, in Chinese, where qualities are typically construed clausally, as Attribute, rather than nominally, as Epithet, the adjective is equally clearly related to the verb.) Here English is similar to Latin, where in the traditional grammars a general class "noun" was classified into "noun substantive" and "noun adjective":

Things As The Frame Of Reference Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

Since qualities are assigned to things, they are construed with things as their frame of reference: in the first instance, a quality characterises a thing relative to other things in the same (primary) class. Thus a thick book is not a 'thick thing'; rather, it is a 'thick book' as opposed to a 'slim book': the scale of 'thick' to 'slim' is relative to book and a thick book would be much thicker than a thick envelope. This characteristic is particularly noticeable with scalar qualities, which have received particular attention in semantic studies; but it is also, in principle, a feature of taxonomic adjectives — even those construing complex classes. For example, the criteria for assigning 'wooden' to a 'spoon', a 'house' and a 'carriage' are fairly different in terms of the actual material make-up of these things.

Three Kinds Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

These values may be of three kinds, according to the type of contrast they set up: 

(i) binary, e.g. ('dead'/'alive'); 

(ii) scalar, e.g. ('happy/'sad'); 

(iii) taxonomic, e.g. 'wooden'/'plastic'/'stone'/... . 

Of the three, the most complex, experientially, are the taxonomic qualities; for example, the taxonomy of materials (whether a folk taxonomy or one that is more scientifically informed) is based on a variety of different features, such as (in a folk taxonomy) its appearance, its texture, its range of functions, its relative value in different contexts, and the like. Taxonomic qualities are thus the closest to things; they are often realised as denomina! adjectives, or even as nouns, and they tend to function as Classifier rather than Epithet (i.e. they sort things into classes rather than describing them).

Qualities (vs Things)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205-6):

The discussion of 'facets' illustrates the difference between things and qualities of things; it also illustrates the indeterminacy of the distinction. Let us begin our discussion of qualities by relating them to things.

[Previously] we discussed the complementary contributions made by qualities and things in the construal of participants. We showed that qualities and things differ in two related respects, temporal stability and experiential complexity: things tend to persist through time and to represent intersections of many dimensions, whereas qualities tend to be less stable through time and tend to represent values on single dimensions. Qualities thus construe values on dimensions such as size (e.g., 'big/ small'), weight ('heavy/light'), and shape ('round'/ 'square'/ 'rectangular'/ 'oval'...).

Cohesive Function Of Expansions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205):

As with names of projections, names of expansions often serve a role in creating cohesion in discourse: e.g. Instances such as these ..., Another way of approaching the situation ..., That aspect hadn't occurred to me. Such expressions construe preceding figures and sequences as participants in their turn, and so enable the speaker or writer to make explicit the organisation of the discourse itself.

Expansions As Things: Ambivalence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205):

Since things of these various kinds are the names of semantic relationships, it is not surprising that their status is somewhat ambivalent. Consider an expression such as a volume of poetry: this may be volume as Thing, qualified as being concerned with poetry, e.g. she picked up an old volume of poetry from the shelf, or Facet (extending: amount), e.g. she has just published a new volume of poetry. The latter example shows up the nature of the ambivalence: the quality 'new' is presumably a quality of the poetry (cf. I'd like a strong cup of tea). 

Similarly we have the ambivalent relationship between parts and wholes (the basis of synecdoche), and between symbols and what they represent, regarding which to construe as the participant in particular figure. In general, the uncertainty that arises is whether the expansion is to be construed as an independent thing or as a facet of something other than itself. This uncertainty is sometimes foregrounded under pressure from the textual metafunction: as Theme, for example, do we say the end of that story you're never going to hear! or that story you're never going to hear the end of?

Enhancements As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204-5):

Things of the enhancing type have already been cited as a micro category. They construe one or other of the general logical semantic relations of cause, manner, time and place. As Facet, they specify some circumstance of an element functioning as Thing: the cause/result/purpose of the breakdown, the manner of the breakdown, the time/occasion of the breakdown, the place/location of the breakdown; cf. also the circumstances of the breakdown. As Thing, they give the logico-semantic relation itself the status of participant; here the usual words are reason, way, time, place, and the phenomenon becomes a figure realised by a qualifying clause: the reason/way/time/place we broke down. These are closest to the borderline with projections: we may have either expansion the reason for which we broke down, or projection (the reason) why we broke down. Those with 'reason' and 'way' often enter into an identifying relation with some other figure; for example, the reason we broke down was that/because the engine overheated.

Extensions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Similarly, those of the extending type may also function in either of these two grammatical roles. As Facet, they specify some quantity (either by container, e.g. a jar of jam, or by division, e.g. a piece of cake), some aggregate (e.g. a crowd of onlookers), some aspect or component (e.g. the other side of the argument, the top of the mountain, the trunk of the tree), or something added or substituted (e.g. an extension of your ideas, the latest addition to the family, an alternative to this proposal). As Thing, again, they are participants, typically concrete objects (e.g. a glass jar, the top [= lid] of the canister, build an extension on the property).

Elaborations As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Those of the elaborating type may function in the nominal group either as Thing or as Facet. As Facet (always constructed with of), they serve to construe the element functioning as Thing in some particular guise or perspective; for example, picture in this will give you a general picture of the situation, kind in a jet cat is a kind of passenger vessel, example in there were no examples of successful integration. As Thing, they are participants in their own right, either 'objects' (e.g. is that picture for sale) or 'abstractions' (e.g. Darwin showed how species first evolved).

Expansions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Certain categories of thing denote an element which is an expansion of something else, either elaborating it ('kind of', 'instance of', or 'symbol of'), extending it ('part of', 'amount of', 'collection of, or 'extension of'), or enhancing it ('time of', 'place of', 'cause of', 'manner of'). The following are some typical examples:

Cohesive Functions Of Projections As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this type have an important role in discourse, because they function anaphorically to refer to (and at the same time to classify) previous sections of text interpreted as projection. For example:

[Graham's] simulated atmosphere evolved in much the same way as the real atmosphere had – the temperature rose, and evaporation and rainfall over the tropical ocean increased closely matching actual records.

Based on these findings, Graham concludes that the increases in sea surface temperatures could well have caused the intensification of the hydrological cycle, explaining the warming.

Projections As Things: Four Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this type fall into four subcategories, defined by their interaction with modality: cases, chance, proofs and needs. Cases represent simple facts; chances represent facts to which some degree of modalisation is attached; proofs are demonstrations of facts. The fourth category, that of needs, are facts accompanied by modulation, that is, where the projection is that of a proposal rather than a proposition.

Projections As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this category are the names of types of projection; in the taxonomy of things, they are semiotic abstractions, some discrete and some non-discrete, and as a grammatical class they are referred to under the heading of fact nouns. They are grammatically distinct because they can function as Thing in a nominal group with a fact clause as Qualifier, e.g. the notion that pigs can fly. Such clauses have the property that they can stand alone as participants in a figure, e.g. that pigs can fly is an intriguing notion.

Projections And Expansions Construed As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 202):

In the various categories of thing we find a manifestation of the same very general semantic principles that we have established before, the principles of projection and expansion. Certain categories of thing have grammatical properties that relate them to one or the other, see Figure 5-9.

Strategies For Assigning Qualities To Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 201-2):

It will be clear that both these strategies, the expansion of word to group and the accumulation of contrasting words, are strategies for assigning qualities to things: we can gloss a slipper, for example, as a soft supporting garment worn by either sex at the lower extremities of the body. In general the qualities involved will come from the same semantic domains in either case; and there is often fluctuation between the two strategies within the language — we sometimes talk of slippers and sometimes of soft shoes. …

And although we have presented the two strategies as discrete, there are of course intermediate modes of construing that form a continuum between the two: noun-compounding (more syntagmatic) and morphological derivation (more paradigmatic). So we find compounds such as pushbike, motorbike; and derivational series like cycle : bicycle, monocycle, tricycle. It is not difficult to invent new categories if we need them such as bikelet or megabike. Note also the morphological strategy for deriving casual terms from formal ones: bicycle > bike (cf. omnibus > bus). 

The sort of strict taxonomy that is typically associated with related series of nominal groups is often a feature of special registers of the language. The limiting cases of such taxonomies are those found in the specialised technical registers of science and technology; these include some which are partially or even wholly designed in a conscious exploitation of the grammatical resources involved. The "things" that are construed in this way include the more abstracts concepts of a scientific theory, the virtual objects that are postulated to explain the more arcane phenomena that impinge on human experience.