The Principle Of Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

This resource, the construal of systematically related lexico-semantic sets, illustrates well the principle of "lexis as most delicate grammar" (Halliday, 1961; Hasan, 1987; Matthiessen, 1991b; Cross, 1993). We have discussed above the principle that categories in the experiential grammar are ordered in delicacy, so that starting from the very general types of process that are construed into figures, we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach the degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. Thus lexis (vocabulary) is part of a unified lexicogrammar; there is no need to postulate a separate "lexicon" as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate.

Construing Things Paradigmatically

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198):

But we also have to recognise that there is a systematic relationship among a set of terms such as bicycle, tandem, scooter, car, van, truck and bus. Here the form of wording gives no clue to any such relationship; all we have is an inventory of different words. Yet these also form some kind of a taxonomic set: they are all wheeled vehicles. We can have taxonomies of things without using the syntagmatic resources of the nominal group, simply by the device of naming — the organising principle is not syntagmatic but paradigmatic.

But there is a difference. The paradigmatic strategy, that of inventing new names, typically construes sets of things which are systemically related but not in a relationship of strict taxonomy. This resource is typically associated with feature networks: that is, networks made up of systems of features, such that each lexical item (as the name of a thing) realises a certain combination of these features selected from different systems within the network — a particular clustering of values of systemic variables.

Construing Things Syntagmatically

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

The expanded form of the nominal group makes explicit the systematic taxonomic relationship which links one thing with another: it is clear that (theoretically at least) a touring bike is a kind of bike, a bicycle wheel is a kind of wheel. It is always possible, of course, to expand in a metaphorical way, as with cart wheel (in turning cart wheels) and Catherine wheel (a kind of firework); these are not, strictly speaking, kinds of wheel, so we have to recognise either that these fall outside the taxonomic organisation or that the taxonomy itself is being extended metaphorically. But this does not affect the general principle at work; indeed, it is the taxonomic principle which makes such divergence possible.

Construing Things Into Strict Taxonomies

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

This syntagmatic resource serves prototypically to construe things into strict taxonomies, based on the principle of hyponymy. Thus a touring bike is a kind of bike, a reinforced touring bike is a kind of touring bike, and so on. Since touring is a Classifier, this means that it is one of a defined set: perhaps touring/racing/mountain/exercise/trail. Epithets do not assign classes, but they specify a particular dimension of taxonomic space: e.g. source European/American/Japanese...'.

One type of classification is meronymic (part-whole), where the thing is classified by the whole of which it forms a part, e.g. bicycle wheel 'wheel (that forms part) of a bicycle'. These are often indeterminate in meaning: if definite, they tend to be strictly meronymic (somebody stole my bicycle wheel), whereas if indefinite, they are often classifying by type (the kids were playing with a bicycle wheel 'wheel for/ from a bicycle').

The Syntagmatic Potential Of The Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

We have referred above to the syntagmatic potential of the nominal group: how the grammar builds up the representation of a thing, expanding outwards by modification. For example:

The expansion proceeds by adding qualities; these qualities, as we have seen, are typically ordered in English from right to left according to the degree of systemicity, with the most systemic (most permanent, least particularised) at the right, the most instantial (least permanent, most particularised) at the left. Broadly speaking these are distributed by the grammar into distinct functions as Classifier, Epithet, Numerative, and Deictic.

Micro Category Of Thing: Nuisances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Nuisances: nuisance, mess, disaster, shambles

General category: 'abstraction'

Particular features: formed as countable (a nuisance) but largely restricted to singular indefinite (forms such as nuisances, the nuisance, your nuisance are rare and outside this category); typically exclamative and/or ascriptive (that's a mess; what a mess), and accompanied by interpersonal Epithets (a horrible shambles, an utter disaster).

Micro Category Of Thing: Types Of Enhancement

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Types of enhancement: reason, time, place, way

General category: between 'semiotic object' and 'abstraction'

Particular features: countable, though typically occurring in singular; are names for major circumstantial classes (reason : why; time : when; place : where; way : how); can be qualified by relative clause (without the need for a circumstantial marker did you see the way [that] they glared at us?), varying with clause having corresponding relative adverb (did you see how they glared at us?), and sometimes both together (do you know the reason why they glared at us?).

Micro Category Of Thing: Drinks

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Drinks: coffee, beer, whiskey

General category: 'substance'

Particular features: whereas in general a substance, if counted, means 'a kind of' (these soils are less fertile), the counted form of this category may mean either 'a kind of' (I like this coffee) or 'a measure of' (Would you like a beer? Two coffees please!).

Micro Category Of Thing: Two-Pronged Implements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Two-pronged implements: scissors, pliers, tweezers, tongs, shears, clippers

General category: 'object (material)'

Particular features: inherent plural (hence pronominalised as they: the scissors/ they are in the drawer)', counted as a pair of... (two pairs of shears, not two shears), but not referred to as both (contrast a pair of shoes, both shoes).

Micro Category Of Thing: Musical Instruments

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195-6):

Musical instruments: piano, cello, flute, drum

General category: 'object (material)'

Particular features: represented as general class with definite article (play the flute, study the cello); alternate between Range and Goal (play the piano / shift the piano); performer construed as derivative in -ist or -er (pianist, flautist, drummer).

Micro Category Of Thing: Small Human Collectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Small human collectives: family, household, class (at school)

General category: between 'conscious' and 'institution'.

Particular features: common number (as institution: the class is ~ are writing a report)-, can be Senser (the family seemed to think that... ); pronominalised as it - they, not he/she, but self-referenced as we and addressed either as you or in third person (Do you eat together?/Does ~ do the household eat together?).

Micro Category Of Thing: Domestic Pets

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Domestic pets: cats, dogs

General category: between 'conscious' and 'animal'.

Particular features: alternation between he/she and it; general nouns as 'animal' (she's a stupid creature); individuated by proper names, with attitudinal variants; addressed as if conscious (what do you want?); expanded in talking to children (pussy-cat, puppy-dog).

Micro Category Of Thing: Professional Associates

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Professional associates: doctor, dentist, hairdresser, lawyer, teacher, butcher

General category: 'conscious'.

Particular features: may be "possessed" by clients (my doctor, Jane's music teacher — on model of kin: my daughter, Fred's first cousin); formerly masculine, gender now (redesigned as) common (he/she)', membership very variable: butcher etc. probably leaving this class with change in shopping practices.

The Elaboration Of Things Into Micro Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194-5):

… there is no limit to the differentiation that may be drawn between one class of things and another; each of these very broad categories comprises numerous micro categories within which (as a glance at Roget's Thesaurus quickly reveals) relatively small sets of closely related things are grouped together. We naturally think of these as being semantic groupings, for which we can find general labels by moving a little way up in the taxonomy: parts of the body, household appliances, edible grains, spectator sports, emotional disorders, and so on, and so on. Such groupings are most readily presented as lists of words and word compounds; but they are not simply lexical, they are lexicogrammatical, displaying some characteristic combination of grammatical properties or preferences.

Participants: On A Scale Of Distance From The Human

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194):

… the grammar, in its role as a theory of human experience, categorises those phenomena that it construes as participants by locating them in a spectrum based on a scale of distance from the human — at one end humans themselves, and things most similar to (i.e. categorisable as) humans, at the other end things that are farthest away from being human: concrete substances in the material world and abstract "substances" in the semiotic world. By reference to the grammar of the clause on the one hand, and of the nominal group on the other, certain broad categories are set up such that some things will fall squarely into one category, while others will lie on the borderline, showing certain features of one category and certain features of another, or finding themselves equally at home in both.

The Dual Nature Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193-4):

The general picture we are suggesting, then, is that it is in the category of thing that the grammar captures to the greatest measure the complexity of the elemental phenomena of human experience. Put together with the different types of figure, which construe the complexity of goings-on upon the broad foundational categories of doing, sensing, saying and being, the different types of participant we have sketched in here foreground the dual nature of experience as being at once both material and semiotic — a world that is constituted out of the interaction between entities and meanings. On each of these dimensions there is a progression from things that are most like to things that are least like ourselves. The grammar imposes a categorisation that is compromising, fluid, indeterminate and constantly in process of change, along with changes in the human condition and in the interaction of humans with their environment. Yet it is also strong enough to bear and carry forward this wealth of often conflicting experience, and transmit it over and over again from one generation of human beings to the next

Ordering Of Things According To Different Criteria

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194):

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Semiotic Objects And Semiotic Abstractions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Discrete semiotic abstractions: intermediate between semiotic objects and (non-discrete) semiotic abstractions. These include non-personalised 'facts' and 'cases', mental entities like 'thoughts' and 'fears', and speech functions 'questions' and 'orders'; they are bounded, cannot function as Sayer but can accept a projection as Qualifier (e.g., the order to retreat, her anxiety that she might be disqualified).

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Conscious Beings And Institutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Human collectives: intermediate between conscious beings and institutions. These can function as Senser in figures of sensing of all kinds, including those embodying desideration; but they accept either singular or plural pronouns, and if singular pronominalise with it (e.g. the family says it is united / the family say they are united).

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Animals And Material Objects

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Natural forces (tides, hurricanes, etc.); instruments (as extended body parts); powered artefacts (locomotives, industrial machines, etc.): intermediate between animals and material objects. These are typically active (including effective action, moving other objects), but non-volitional; hence when the Actor is of this category, the process does not admit phases that construe intentionality (e.g. the hammer tried to force the lock).

Simple Thing: Semiotic Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192-3):

abstraction (semiotic)

typifying role: scope-defining participant in figure of sensing or saying [Range in mental process, e.g. find out more information; in verbal process, e.g. tell the truth]; also participant in figures of being & having [e.g. possessed Attribute, have you any evidence].

pronoun it; general noun: some attitudinally loaded ones such as nonsense [non-attitudinal ones for some, e.g. idea, fact]; number category: mass.

unbounded semiotic substance; may be qualified by projection [as Thing + Qualifier in nominal group, e.g. the knowledge that they had failed]', no material existence.

Simple Thing: Semiotic Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

object (semiotic)

typifying role: scope-defining participant in figure of saying [Range in verbal process, e.g. read the notice, tell me a story]; also active participant [Sayer, e.g. the book says.,., the regulations require... ].

pronoun it/them, they; general noun (none); number category: count (singular/plural).

may also exist as material object, e.g. book, clock; has potential for being symbol source [hence Sayer in projecting clause].

Simple Thing: Institution

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

institution

typifying roles: active participant in figure of saying [Sayer, e.g. the ministry announced...], of doing [Actor, e.g. the school is closing down]; also of sensing, typically thinking and intending [Senser, e.g. the class decided that...]. 

pronoun it ~ they; general noun people, place, set-up etc.; number category: count (singular).²

has potential for voluntary action, typically semiotic with authority of a collective [verbal process of ordering, mental process of deciding or judging]; also material [material processes, middle and effective].

² Institutions of course do appear in the plural — although relatively infrequently: the plural pronoun they typically refers to a single institution.

Simple Thing: Material Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191-2):

abstraction (material)

typifying role: as Phenomenon in figure of sensing [e.g. estimate the depth], as participant in figure of being [Carrier in ascriptive figure, e.g. the colours were too bright; Value in identifying figure, e.g. the score was 2-1].

pronoun it; general noun: none; number category: mass.

has no extension in space and is unbounded; typically some parameter of a material quality or process.

Simple Thing: Substance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

substance

typifying role: thing as part of circumstance [Range in prepositional phrase, especially Location, e.g. on the ground], rather than having direct role as participant in figure.

pronoun it; general noun stuff; number category: mass.

has extension in space, but unbounded; can be manipulated and measured; if participant in figure, is typically being distributed [Goal, e.g, cut the string, keep rain out].

Simple Thing: Material Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

object (material)

typifying role: impacted participant in figure of doing [Goal, e.g. build a house, pick up sticks].

pronoun it/ them; general noun thing; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has extension in space, bounded so participates in figures as unit whole; if acting, then in figure of happening [Actor in involuntary process, e.g. the button fell off}.

Simple Thing: Animal

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

animal

typifying role: active participant in figure of doing [Actor, typically middle, e.g. birds fly].

pronoun it/they; general noun creature; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has potential for self-initiated action and movement [processes in which animal occurs as Actor are (unconscious but) voluntary; and may also be effective, e.g. ... was bitten by a snake]', also for perception [Senser in process of seeing & hearing],

Simple Thing: Conscious

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190-1):

conscious (prototypically adult human)

typifying roles: active participant in figure of sensing [Senser, e.g. do you think so?], of saying [Sayer, e.g. the teacher said.,.] and of doing [Actor: middle, e.g. Pat skipped, or effective, e.g. Chris held the rope].

pronoun he/she/they (also I/you); general noun person etc.; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has potential for voluntary action [material: doing, including doing to another participant; verbal (semiotic): saying] and conscious processing of all kinds [mental: sensing, including feeling, thinking, intending as well as perceiving].

Simple Thing Taxonomy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190):

These primary categories of things represent an ordering of the phenomena of experience. This ordering has to do with their inherent potential for bringing about change: that is, their ability to initiate processes and to affect other participants.

One way of exploring this is by noting which participant roles each category of participant is typically associated with. The critical roles, in this respect, are those of Senser, Sayer and Actor, operating respectively in figures of sensing, saying and doing & happening. When we investigate these, however, we find that the overall categorisation of phenomena that is revealed in this way displays a further dimension of complexity: at the highest level, all phenomena are distributed into two broad experiential realms, the material and the semiotic. This suggests that we should further modify the schema of primary categorisation by splitting it into these two realms as shown in Figure 5-7. This figure also splits the categories of object and abstraction between the two realms.

The Conscious/Non-Conscious Distinction In English

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

The most prominent reflex of the conscious/non-conscious distinction in English is that it is built into the system of pronouns:

This distinction is all-pervasive, since third-person pronouns provide one of the main resources for constructing discourse through anaphora. The boundary between conscious and non-conscious, of course, is fluid and negotiable: different systems, and different speakers (or the same speaker on different occasions), may draw it in different places. But the guiding principle is that 'conscious' means prototypically adult human and may be extended outwards (a) to babies, (b) to pets, and (c) to higher animals — as well as by rhetorical strategies of various kinds.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, less anthropocentrically, the grammar construes anything with a nervous system and sense organs as the medium of a mental process of perception, and thus as conscious. That is, the clause the ant saw the worm construes the ant as conscious.