Things: Primary Distinctions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

The major classes of thing recognised in our school grammars have traditionally been presented as a list of category meanings of the word class 'noun': something like "persons, other living beings, objects, institutions, and abstractions". We will start with this categorisation, modifying it to take account of the point that the primary distinction within figures is that between conscious processing and other forms of experience: the key participant in a conscious process, the Senser, is restricted to things that are construed as being endowed with consciousness, so we take conscious/non-conscious as the primary distinction. It is also helpful, in the case of English, to make an initial distinction between objects, which are treated as bounded, and substances, which are not. This gives us an initial categorisation in the form 

'conscious/non-conscious: animals/institutions/objects/substances/abstractions'.

The Relative Complexity Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 188):

There is thus a marked contrast between things and all other elements. A quality enters into a figure only as Attribute; a process only as Process; and a circumstance only in some particular circumstantial role. Other than this, the only functional environment for qualities, processes and circumstances is that where they form parts of things — that is, grammatically, where they enter into the structure of the nominal group.

The fact that these other elements can themselves enter into the specification of a thing is another indication of the relative complexity of things.

Things: Rôles In Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 188):

We were able to define a thing by reference to one particular role within a figure: namely, as Carrier in an ascriptive figure construed grammatically as Carrier + Process + Attribute. But it is characteristic of things that they can take on a variety of roles in figures of all kinds. Here is a set of examples to illustrate this functional range:

Here we find one and the same class of thing functioning 

(a) as Actor, as Goal, and as Beneficiary in a material process; 

(b) as Phenomenon in a mental process; 

(c) as Sayer, as Verbiage, and as Target in a verbal process; 

(d) as Carrier, as Token, and as Value in a relational process, and 

(e) as Minirange in a circumstance of Location.

Even if we generalise across these configurational types in ergative terms, these examples still cover the full participant spectrum: the 'book' occurs as Medium, as Agent, as Beneficiary and as Range.

Things vs Other Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 187):

We have observed that things tend to be relatively stable in space and time, and relatively complex in their semantic make-up and in their interrelationships; and that these special characteristics of things are construed linguistically in various ways. By comparison with other elements, things tend to stand out 

(i) by their varied roles as elements in figures, 

(ii) by the overall weight and discursive force of their primary categorisation of experience, 

(iii) by their tendency to be elaborated into numerous micro-categories, 

(iv) by their complex internal organisation, and 

(v) by their highly systematic relationship one with another.

Taxonomic Qualities vs Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186-7):

Taxonomically organised qualities are often named by denominal adjectives, but they are still experientially simpler than the corresponding nouns. Consider e.g. nationality, philosophical persuasion, and biological kind: as qualities, these are classes and therefore closest to things, but their extension is still greater than that of the things that correspond to them: see Table 5(1).

Thus an Albanian always means 'a human citizen of Albania', whereas the adjective Albanian could refer to any of a large number of concrete or abstract entities: Albanian wine, Albanian literature, Albanian economy.

Non-Scalar Qualities vs Things: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186, 187):

Even with qualities that form binary and taxonomic oppositions rather than scalar ones, there seem to be differences in experiential complexity between adjective (quality) and noun (thing) pairs. A standard example of this contrast between qualities and things involves the two dimensions of maturity and sex: see Figure 5-6.

Qualities As Experientially Simple

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186):

Qualities tend to be experientially simple, specifying values along a single dimension or scale such as age, size, weight, loudness, colour, according to either scalar or binary distinctions (e.g. scalar: 'large' — 'small', 'tall' — 'short'; binary: 'male' — 'female', 'dead — 'alive'). Things, on the other hand, tend to be experientially more complex than qualities. They are often definable in terms of an elaborate taxonomy where several dimensions (parameters) are needed to distinguish them.

Consider for example the scale of size. The various qualities named by large, big, giant, small, tiny, and so on indicate a region on the scale, but do not specify the "substance" of whatever it is that size is being ascribed to. If we look for objects that are characterised in terms of size, we will find e.g. a giant, a morsel, and a mini. These, however, involve far more than the single dimension of size. A giant is 'any imaginary being of human form but of superhuman size and strength'. A morsel is 'a small bite or portion of food'. A mini is usually understood as 'a small car capable of holding a normal complement of passengers'. Small objects are typically objects of some particular kind, e.g. droplet, booklet, and kitchenette.

Classifiers: Qualities Of The 'Class' Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184-5, 211):

Semantically, Classifiers are qualities of the 'class' type (cf. Table 5(4)): they are like things and may be derived from things, but unlike things they do not have independent existence — they cannot be established in referential space and re-identified in running discourse. So for example although a 'passenger' is undoubtedly a thing, in a passenger train, where passenger functions as Classifier, it is being construed as a quality; hence it cannot be picked up by anaphoric reference — we cannot say this is a passenger train; they must have valid tickets. (Contrast this train is for passengers; they must have valid tickets, where passengers is functioning as Thing.) Grammatically, Classifiers are realised by 'substantives' or by 'adjectives', and this indeterminacy in grammatical class is symbolic of their status as qualities which are like things.

Simple Participants: Qualities And Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184, 185, 186):

Grammatically speaking, (simple) participants are realised by nominal groups, which are made up of both things and qualities. In terms of the structure of the nominal group, the cut-off point between things and qualities is between the Classifier and the Thing: see Figure 5-5.

This distribution of qualities and things across the nominal group indicates two related points:

(i) things are more time-stable than qualities; and

(ii) things are more experientially complex than qualities. …

But this difference in experiential complexity is in turn related to the first of our two points, in that whatever is being construed as stable, as having persistence through time, is essentially a construct, an assemblage of different qualities, that (to borrow Jespersen's metaphor) can be crystallised only as an organic whole. The nominal group embodies this essential association between complexity and permanence.

Figures Metaphorised As Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184):

The theoretical principle that a participant can be defined as the potential carrier of an attribute holds for participants of all kinds. We need however to make one proviso: namely, that more or less any figure can be construed metaphorically "as if" it was a participant. This is a central feature of grammatical metaphor. An example would be Our earlier encounter with this species [had led us to believe that...] where 'encounter' is semantically a process: cf. We had encountered this species earlier [and as a consequence we believed that...]. If 'encounter' is construed congruently in the grammar as a process, it cannot enter into an ascriptive figure. But once it is metaphorised into a participant, it can: our earlier encounter with this species had been almost disastrous. This in fact is one of the discursive contexts favouring this type of grammatical metaphor, and hence serves indirectly as a further illustration of the general principle we have outlined.

Participants As Expansions Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 183-4):

There is the same range of types of ascription as are found in ascriptive figures, and these can be interpreted in terms of the different categories of expansion. These are exemplified in the following table: 

The table illustrates how participants are interpretable as expansions of things — they are things, with added qualities. It also shows how things can be construed into highly elaborate taxonomies (e.g. this extremely desirable two-storey double-brick executive residence) which are categorised by ascriptive figures of these different types — elaborating, extending and enhancing. The Thing in these examples corresponds to the Carrier of the agnate figure of ascription: 

these nutritious swedes : these swedes are nutritious :: 

these vases from the 18th century : these vases are from the 18th century ::

my aunt's teapot : the teapot is my aunt's/belongs to my aunt. 

Note that with extension, there may be a reversal of the Carrier-Attribute correspondence: the Thing may correspond most naturally to the Attribute, as in 

my aunt has a teapot : the leek has a stem.

Blogger Comments:

Note that 'circumstantial' includes 'projection' as well as 'enhancement': a book about teapots.

Participants As Things That Can Accrue Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 183):

Experientially, there is a 'carrier' — the Thing — and there are 'attributes' — Epithets and other modifiers. However, participants are construed not only experientially but also logically, which means that the Thing (typically) saves as a Head that can be modified by successive attributes and that this modifying relation is inherently ascriptive. There is thus no equivalent, in the nominal group, of the Process in an ascriptive figure; this is construed instead as the logical relation of modification, indefinitely repeatable. For instance, corresponding to the figure the swede is nutritious we have the participant the nutritious swede, which, unlike the figure with its experiential, multivariate organisation (Carrier + Process + Attribute), can be logically expanded through further modification: the tasty tolerant orange nutritious swede. That is, participants are construed as things that can accrue attributes.

Participant Defined As A Potential Carrier Of An Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182-3):

We have already set up the general theory of participants, defining them in relation to ascriptive processes of being, being at, and having, in a process-participant configuration. There are three elements in such a configuration: the Process, intensive, possessive or circumstantial; the Attribute, which is being ascribed by one or other of these processes; and the Carrier. It is the role of Carrier which defines the concept of a participant. A participant, according to this theory, is that which may have assigned to it, in the discourse, properties, parts or circumstantial features. For example:

(a) properties (Process of 'being')

some dishes are very tolerant

the grain looks orange and full

a kitchen should be a cheerful place

the swede is more nutritious than the turnip

(b) parts (Process of 'having')

it has branching stems covered with a green succulent flesh

spinach has a decided flavour which some people dislike

they have a pleasant fresh flavour

(c) circumstantial features (Process of 'being at')

this plant is like chicory

these mangoes are from Mexico

the seeds will be inside long coffee-coloured pods

this effect might be because of over-heating

This analysis reveals two important aspects of a participant: 

(i) that it is a thing that can 'carry' or be ascribed attributes, and 

(ii) that the ascription may be of different kinds — intensive (elaborating), possessive (extending), circumstantial (enhancing).

Simple Participants: Things And Qualities

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182):

Participant vs Process: Referential Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 181):

Both the difference in temporal permanence and the difference in experiential complexity are reflected logogenetically. Participants tend to persist in the unfolding of a text; and since they do, they can accrue various qualities. In contrast, processes cannot persist in text: unlike the deictic system of the nominal group, the deictic system of the verbal group, the tense system, is not a system for tracking textual instances of processes as a text unfolds. To achieve persistence in text, processes have to be reconstrued metaphorically as participants. When processes are construed as if they were participants, they can be established and maintained as referents in a text; hence under these conditions they also can accrue various qualities.

Process vs Participant: Taxonomic Elaboration

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180-1):

Nominal groups have, in fact, far greater potential than verbal groups for creating experientially complex categories; and this reflects a fundamental difference between participants and processes. The nominal group has the potential for intersecting any number of qualities in the representation of a participant; and this makes it possible for the taxonomic ordering of participants to be considerably more elaborated than that of processes.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: A Path Between Interpersonal And Experiential Reference Points

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180, 181):

Finally, the structures of both types of group constitute a kind of path between the interpersonal reference point, reflected in the Deictic or Finite, and the experiential one, reflected in the Thing or Event But in the case of the verbal group, the path is made up of one or more temporal relations: past/present/future in relation to a moment in some dimension of time construed between 'now' and the time of the occurrence of the event; for example, see Figure 5-3. 

In the nominal group, on the other hand, the path from Deictic to Thing is not a chain in time — alt[h]ough it does reflect time in another way. The path goes through qualities of various kinds, beginning with qualities that are textual and transitory (unstable in time) and moving towards increasing permanence (time-stability) and experiential complexity.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: Primary Experiential Category

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

Secondly, both types of group include a specification of a primary experiential category — Thing in the nominal group and Event in the verbal group. But in the simple verbal group, this is the only semantic category that is lexicalised — other categories are represented grammatically by auxiliaries; whereas in the nominal group, there is a large amount of other lexical material.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 179, 180):

Both types of element begin with a location in the 'here & now': they construct a path from the spatio-temporal moment defined instantially by the interaction base — the 'here & now' of the act of speaking — to a primary category of ideational phenomena: see Figure 5-2.

For example:

In other words, both types of group include deixis. But the deixis is of two different kinds: nominal deixis (such as near/remote) and verbal deixis (such as past/present/future), structurally realised as Deictic and Finite respectively. What this suggests is that, since processes occur in time — their mode of existence is temporal — that is how they are tied to the speech situation; whereas participants exist in some kind of referential space, which may be grounded concretely in the speech interaction (this = 'near me'; that = 'away from me') but may also be a more abstract, discoursal space. The latter is the space where we 'record' discourse referents as we work our way through a text (this = 'about to be mentioned (by me)'; that = 'mentioned earlier').

Processes vs Participants: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178, 179):

Being elements, participants and processes occupy roles in figures; but whereas processes only serve in the single role of Process, participants (as we have seen) range over a much wider experiential spectrum — the direct participant roles of Actor, Goal, Senser, Phenomenon, and so on, and also the indirect participant roles within circumstances such as Location and Cause. Thus, seen from the point of view of figures, participants are construed as being experientially more complex, in the sense that they can take on a variety of configurational roles: see Figure 5-1. This difference between participants and processes is also reflected in differences in their internal organisations, as we shall suggest below

Internal Organisation: Figures vs Elements (Circumstances And Relators)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

The situation with circumstances and relators is a little more complicated.

(i) Circumstances of the "macro" type are realised by prepositional phrases, which as we have seen are like miniaturised clauses; their components are thus of different types — a (minor) process plus a participant. Circumstances of the simple type, on the other hand, are realised by adverbial groups; these are groups of adverbs, like more soundly, not so very fast, with the single adverb again as the limiting case.

(ii) Relators are typically realised by conjunctions, like and, so, if, that, because, however; these can form groups, such as as if, and yet, but conjunctions are more often expanded by adverbs (just because, even if). In addition there are numerous other types of relator prepositional phrases (in addition, in the event (that), for fear that), nominal groups remaining from earlier prepositional phrases ( [at] the moment (that), [on] the day (that)), and various expressions involving non-finite verbs (supposing (that), provided (that)). The relator construes a logico-semanuc relation between the clauses in a clause nexus (realising a sequence), but it is itself an element in the structure of one or other of the two clauses concerned; e.g. if you have some ink fish preserved in oil, add a few slices at the same time as the halibut.

Internal Organisation: Figures vs Elements (Participants And Processes)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

However, there is a significant difference between elements and figures in the nature of their internal organisation. While figures consist of phenomena that are ontologically of different types — participants, processes and circumstances, the components of an element belong in principle to the same type. That is, the components of a participant are themselves potential participants, and the components of a process are themselves potential processes. Grammatically speaking, participants are realised by nominal groups, which are groups of nouns; and processes are realised by verbal groups, which are groups of verbs. The limiting case of a group is a single word.

Elements: Internal Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

These phenomena are "elemental" in relation to figures (just as chemical elements such as H and O are elemental in relation to compounds such as H₂O, CO₂). But the elements themselves may be internally complex, as in the following examples of processes and participants:

Congruent Grammatical Realisations Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

The congruent (prototypical) grammatical realisations of these types of element in English are as follows:

Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

Elements serve as component parts of figures. Three primary types of element may be differentiated according to the generalised categories of configurational roles: process, participant, and circumstance. In addition to these three, we need to recognise a fourth category of element, the relator; this is the element which forms figures into sequences.

Degree Of Involvement As General Domains Within The Semantic Space Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175-6):

What this brings out is that there are a small number of very general domains within this overall semantic space, which may be construed in different ways according to the status they are assigned within the figure. For example, there is one area that is concerned with the spatial orientation of the process. Construed as an outer circumstance, this appears as the position within which the process unfolds; construed as an inner circumstance, it means the direction towards which the process is oriented; construed as a participant, it shows up as receiver or recipient in the process. Thus this general motif is manifested in a form which corresponds to its ecological niche at that location. Note that the boundaries do not exactly coincide across the different bands of the helix; in any case, they are fuzzy, and they tend to become more fuzzy with increasing distance from the centre. Our characterisation here is inevitably somewhat overdeterminate. The outer circumstances, in turn, are typically agnate to clauses (e.g. while he was in LA, he sent a parcel); thus we could construe the same general relationships over again in the form of a sequence — grammatically, as one nexus in a clause complex.

Degree Of Involvement: Participant > Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175):

The examples in Table 4(10) illustrate both the different degrees and the different kinds of involvement of elements falling outside the Process + Medium nucleus.

Angle

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174-5):

This type of circumstance relates to projection rather than expansion, and specifically to the projecting not the projected component Hence there is no agnate participant; instead, the Angle corresponds to the process of saying (grammatically, the projecting verbal clause in a 'locution' nexus) or the process of sensing (grammatically, the projecting mental clause in an 'idea' nexus). Thus according to the newspaper corresponds to the newspaper says; and to her students corresponds to her students think.

Manner: Comparison

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

This category lies on the borderline of elaborating and extending: compare he spoke like an expert 'in the manner of', he spoke as an expert 'in the role of'. The analogous participant is that of Attribute in an ascriptive clause as in he was/seemed an expert, which is construed as elaborating; but the analogous sequence is an enhancing clause complex he spoke as if he was an expert.

Blogger Comments:

The 'elaborating' interpretation of Manner: comparison disappears if the analogous ascriptive clauses are instead:

Accompaniment

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

The circumstance of Accompaniment does not correspond to any one particular participant role. Rather, it corresponds to an extending of the participant itself, by addition or variation: John came with Mary is agnate to both John and Mary came; Mary came without John is agnate to Mary but not John came; Mary came instead of John is agnate to not John but Mary came. Grammatically, the analogous type of participant is one represented by a nominal group complex.

Cline Of Involvement x Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 173-4):

The "degree of involvement", in the sense of how deeply some element is involved in actualising the process that is construed by the figure, can thus be represented as a cline: the difference appears not only between participants and circumstances as a whole, but also within each of these primary categories, so that there is a continuum from one to the other along this scale.

At the same time, and cutting across this cline of involvement, we find that — like the participants themselves — the circumstantial elements fall into distinct types according to their relationship to the Process + Medium nucleus. These types correspond to the four transphenomenal categories of logico-semantic relations that are now familiar: the circumstance is either a circumstance of projection or a circumstance of expansion and, if the latter, then either elaborating, extending or enhancing. If we combine the degree of involvement with the logico-semantic categories, we can represent the elements of a figure in the form of a helix (Figure 4-14).