Semantically, the nucleus construes the centre of gravity of a figure, the focal point around which the system of figures is organised. When we describe the Medium as "actualising" the Process, we are really saying that the unfolding is constituted by the fusion of the two together — there can be no Process without an element through which this process is translated from the virtual to the actual.
The manner of performance of a process may vary, in which case it is the Medium by which it is typically determined. This may be a major variation in the mode of actualisation, for example 'open + door, open + account, open + eye' where the process is respectively mechanical, verbal or physiological; or simply a minor difference in the means that is employed, e.g. "brush + teeth, brush + clothes'. Some examples:
In many cases, the difference in the manner of performance is the basis of a lexically codified taxonomic distinction; for example:
In the taxonomy of figures, the nature of the Medium is more criterial than that of any other participant or circumstance. For instance, if we consider processes such as 'strew, spill, pour, sprinkle', it is the Medium, not the Agent which enables us to differentiate among them (cf. sprinkle + salt, spill/ pour + water, coffee; strew + flowers); similarly with 'bend, straighten, flatten; melt, freeze, evaporate, condense; crack, break, shatter' and so on.
Of all the participants, the Medium is the most restricted in terms of the range of phenomena that may function in that role. We can see this in relation to the general types of figure:
We can also see this in relation to more delicately specified subtypes such as:
In other words, whatever the type of figure, the participant that is most closely bonded with the Process is the one that takes on the generalised role of Medium; it is this that is in a relation of mutual expectancy with the Process. This is not to say that only horses can neigh, but rather than anything that neighs is thereby endowed with horse-hood.
Blogger Comments:
Clearly, the Medium of a 'shine' figure is not limited to 'heavenly body', but includes artificial light sources and phenomena with reflective surfaces, such as black shoes.
The model thus construes a nuclear figure consisting of a process unfolding through the medium of a participant. This then makes it possible to construe a further variable: namely, the causal origin of this unfolding. The Medium's actualisation of the Process may be construed as being brought about by a further participant — the Agent: see Figure 4-10. If the figure is construed with an Agent, it is other-agentive; if it is construed without an Agent, it is self-agentive.
Medium and Process form the nucleus of the whole figure — that part of the figure which is essential to the complementarity of unfolding and persisting (cf. Figure 4-3 above). The participant functioning as Medium may be affected in various different ways, depending on the particular domain — the 'trace' may b[e] physical, mental, and so on; but the status of Medium generalises across these domains.
The particularistic model, then, comprises a set of submodels: (i) impacting, (ii) conscious processing, (iii) symbolic processing, (iv) relational ordering. The model that generalises across these various domains of experience is different from any one of these particular submodels. It sets up one central participant that is common to all processes. This is the participant through which the process comes to be actualised. We refer to it as the Medium: see Figure 4-9.
Semantically, the Medium is the participant through which the process is actualised. It is in the combination of Medium + Process that we find the complementarity we spoke of earlier between the temporal unfolding (the Process) and the atemporal persistence (the Medium).
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):
What we find, if we try to take in the picture as a whole, is a kind of focussed model in which the essentially human processes of consciousness [sensing], and the prototypically human processes of symbolic action [saying], constitute the experiential centre; while the two other types of figure, that of doing on the one hand and of being on the other, lie on opposite sides of this centre: the one (doing) lying towards the pole of the concrete, with the experience construed as 'this impacts on that', the other (being) lying towards the pole of the abstract, with the experience construed as 'this is related to that'.
But these "impacting" figures of sensing and saying are only submotifs within these two overall types. The general motif of figures of sensing is 'conscious processing'; that of figures of saying is 'symbolic processing'. And in figures of being, where we might characterise the general motif as 'relational ordering', there is no trace of a submotif of impacting at all.
In figures of saying, the Sayer is the symbolic source: prototypically human, but not necessarily so (e.g. the instructions tell you to switch it off first). The Process is symbolic; but here too there is a subtype of figures of saying that imparts a similar sense of action and impact, those where the Sayer 'does something to' another participant by means of a verbal process, as in Don't blame the messenger, Everybody praised her courage. We refer to this participant as the Target; and again we may note a partial analogy with figures of doing (though only partial — for example, such figures cannot take a resultative Attribute or other representation of the outcome).
Sensing is clearly modelled as a process of human consciousness, with the Senser as a human being — so much so that merely coming to occupy that role is sufficient to endow the participant in question with human-like consciousness. The Phenomenon, on the other hand, is given a somewhat ambivalent status: in one of its guises (as in Do you like those colours?) it seems to be just a part of the environment; but in its other guise (as in Do those colours please you?) it seems to be playing a more active role.Why does it give this impression? Partly no doubt because of the agnate form Are you pleased by those colours? where the Phenomenon those colours is brought in indirectly, like an instrument or means. But this is part of a larger syndrome whereby, on the one hand, there are other related 'sensing' figures like How do those colours strike you?, where the verb strike suggests a fairly violent kind of action; and on the other hand, the prototypical form of a 'doing' figure seems quite analogous to these, as in Were those boys hitting you? (with those boys as Actor, you as Goal).
Blogger Comments:
Is it really the case that if we think or say the octopus can obviously see the crab, we are endowing the octopus — or any animal with sensory organs — with human-like consciousness?
The 'doing' figure is based prototypically on a schema we might refer to as "action and impact". There is always an Actor, the participant that performs the Process; and in an example such as the boys were jumping, the Process stops there — that is all there is to it. But in examples such as the boys were throwing stones, or the stones hit the wall the Actor's performance of the Process extends beyond, so as to 'impact' on another participant — this is the one known as the Goal (see Figure 4-8).
In the typical case (the "active voice", in grammatical terminology), the clause unfolds iconically, reflecting the movement of the impact from Actor to Goal.⁶ And, as we saw above, the latter may then be followed by representation of the outcome of the impact — a resultative Attribute (he knocked it flat), a circumstance of Role (he cut it into cubes), or a circumstance of Location (he threw it into the corner).⁶ This iconicity is, however, easily overridden by the textual metafunction, which has its own mode of iconic realisation.
In the limiting case, there is only one participant, the Existent; but generally there are two participants, the one being related by the process to the other. They may be being related by ascription, as Attribute to Carrier; or by identification, a rather complex relationship involving two pairs of participant roles: Identifier and Identified, and Token and Value. These latter intersect with each other, so there are two possible role combinations:(i) Identified/Token and Identifier/Value ['decoding'];(ii) Identifier/Token and Identified/Value ['encoding'].
Here there is one participant, the Actor, that performs the process in question; and this process may then impact upon another participant, the Goal (or may result in bringing the Goal into (material) existence). Other participants that may be present are the Beneficiary, the one that derives "benefit" from the process; and the Scope, the one that defines the domain over which the process extends.
Blogger Comments:
Strictly speaking, 'Beneficiary' is a participant of the generalised model. Its counterparts in the particularistic model, for doing figures, are Client and Recipient.
Here one participant, the Sayer, is involved as the originator of a process of symbolic (semiotic) activity, or "saying". There may be another participant the Receiver, whose role is that of 'decoding' what is said. What is said may itself be construed as a further participant, the Verbiage; or else it may be projected as another figure [locution] within the same sequence. Finally, there may be a participant functioning as Target of the saying process.
Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in "inert" conscious processing ("sensing", as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser's conscious processing). Alternatively, the Senser's conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.
In what we are calling its "particularist" modelling the grammar is categorising experience for us (or we are categorising experience through our grammar) by construing a small number of different types of figure, differentiated according to what kind of process is taking place and what kinds of participant are involved — in what relationships to each other and to the process.What is the principle on which the grammar categorises experience? In the most general terms, as we have seen, the principle is that all phenomena can be interpreted as falling within a small number of broad experiential domains:
- those happening "inside", within the realm of our own consciousness;
- those happening "outside", in the perceptual world that lies around us;
- those that are not kinds of happening at all, but rather kinds of being and of relating to something else.
We have referred to these as, respectively:(1) figures of sensing — or, more inclusively (since 'languaging' is treated as a distinct phenomenal realm), (1) figures of sensing and(2) figures of saying;(3) figures of doing — or, more explicitly (since the word 'doing' might suggest intentionality), figures of doing & happening;(4) figures of being — or, more accurately (since 'having' is construed as a kind of relative 'being'), figures of being & having.Each of these types of figure has its own special character, as revealed by the way it is organised in the lexicogrammar. We are not attempting to spell out here the grammatical features by which they are differentiated. But we shall characterise them briefly in semantic terms with reference to the forms of participation involved.
So far we have explored figures in terms of how they categorise experience into particular types or domains, showing how this typology extends in delicacy. The next step is to specify what modes of participant interaction the semantic system of figures engenders. There are two models of participation-in-process embodied in the semantic system of English —(i) One is particularistic: it diversifies our experience of participant interaction into four domains — doing, sensing, saying and being.(ii) The other is generalised it unifies our experience of participant interaction across the different domains.The system thus strikes a balance in the construal of figures between unity and diversity — between differentiating one aspect of experience from another and generalising over the whole. These constitute distinct but complementary perspectives: see Figure 4-7.
We have seen that figures of being, other than the existential, may be elaborative (intensive), extending (possessive) or enhancing (circumstantial). This enables us to recognisedfurther subcategories of doing according to the nature of the figure being brought about: see Table 4(7).
Notice that in some cases the outcome is embodied in the clause by which the figure is realised; for example in middle variants of the doing & happening type (the outcome of John ran is 'John + run'), and in clause with resultative elements (Attribute, Role) such as I'll boil the eggs hard (outcome: 'eggs + be + hard'), Let's appoint Fred timekeeper (outcome: Fred + be + timekeeper').
As pointed out earlier, doing is a process of change involving time and energy. Such change implies an outcome; the outcome may be of various kinds, but it is always such that it can be construed as another figure. We can therefore examine what kind of figure emerges as the outcome of the one under investigation.(1) If the process is creative, the outcome is that some entity comes into existence: such a figure may be construed as a doing with effectum, as in he baked a cake; but it may be simply a creative happening such as icicles formed. In either case the outcoming figure is one of being (more specifically, existing):he baked a cake outcome: 'there exists a cake'icicles formed outcome: 'there exist icicles'(2) If the process is dispositive, the outcome is more variable; it may be either (i) a figure of doing (more specifically, doing [to]/happening), or (ii) a figure of being (more specifically, being [at]/having):(i) the cat chased the mouse outcome: 'the mouse ran'
(ii) the boys mended the roof outcome: 'the roof was whole'John gave his sister a violin outcome: 'John's sister had a violin'
The subtypes that have been generally recognised in grammar are
(1) intransitive/transitive;(2) within intransitive, action/event; and(3) within transitive, effectum/affectum.
The first is the distinction between doings that involve only a doer (intransitive: John ran) and those that also involve something 'done to' (transitive: Mary threw the ball, realised respectively as Actor + Process, Actor + Process + Goal.
The second is that between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and an unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell).
The third is the distinction between a Goal that 'exists' prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house).
We shall use this distinction, referred to as dispositive/creative, to explain figures of doing in terms of their outcome in other figures.
Throughout the history of the study of language, in all the major traditions, grammarians and philosophers have focussed primarily on figures of doing. Certain subtypes have been fairly well explored: usually those having some special structural feature, such as figures involving transfer of possession ('giving') where there is an additional participant role (Beneficiary, recognised in traditional grammar as indirect or dative object). And figures of doing in their very simplest form (John ran, Mary threw the ball) have remained for more than two millennia as the foundation of the theory of transitivity. But there has been little attempt at a systematic treatment of the total range of material clauses with their intersecting features and subtypes. Here we shall refer to three major distinctions that have traditionally been recognised; and then take one further step … bringing together figures of doing and being.
Thus enhancing figures may be used to construe arrangements or orderings in space or time, such as chronologies, maps or structures. For example, the following extract from an account of the structure of skeletal muscles construes locations through enhancing figures:The fibrous connective tissue proteins within the tendons continue in an irregular arrangement around the muscle to form a sheath known as the epimysium (epi = above; my = muscle). Connective tissue from this outer sheath extends into the body of the muscle, subdividing it into columns, or fascicles (e.g., the "strings" in stringy meat) . Each of these fascicles is thus surrounded by its own connective tissue sheath, known as the porimysium (peri = around).Enhancing figures construing temporal and causal ordering play an important role in constructing knowledge in a metaphorical mode, as the following example illustrates:The divergence of impulses from the spinal cord to the ganglia, and the convergence of impulses within the ganglia, usually results in the mass activation of almost all of the postganglionic fibres.
One participant enhances another along a circumstantial dimension of time, space, cause, condition and the like. Table 4(6) illustrates the categories of time and cause.
Elaboration and extension are agnate, one with the other; they offer alternative modes of construal, often with very little apparent difference. Thus we may find both(1)Elaborating 'Man' is +male, + adult & + human ;'Man' is a male, adult & human being(2)Extending 'Man' consists of +male, + adult & + human :'Man' has the features +male, +adult & +humanBut if we technicalise these alternatives, they do constitute significantly different approaches to the interpretation of meaning. In this book and elsewhere in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy, and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.
Extending figures can thus be used to construe meronymic taxonomies. In other words, they are (among other things) a theory of constituency, semantic composition, and other meronymic relations in language; so they can be used to create further relationships of the same kind. For example, the following paragraph establishes a meronymic taxonomy for sentences in Hawaiian:
Sentences are sequences bordered by periods, question marks, or exclamation points. In Hawaiian they can be thought of as simple, verbless, or complex. The most common simple sentence consists of verb phrase ± noun phrase(s). Verb phrases contain verbs as their heads; verbs are defined on the basis of potential occurrence with the particles marking aspect, especially ua (perfective aspect) . Noun phrases contain nouns or substitutes for nouns; these are names of persons or places, or are defined on the basis of potential occurrence after the article ka/ke (definite), or the preposition ma 'at'.
One participant extends another in a relation of composition, possession or association. As with elaboration, there is also the intersecting variable of identity or membership: see Table 4(5).
Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and, by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further. For example:
The fuels of the body are carbohydrates, fats and proteins. These are taken In the diet. They are found mainly In cereal grains, vegetable oils, meat, fish and dairy products. Carbohydrates are the principal source of energy in most diets. […] Fats make up the second largest source of energy in most diets. […]
One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.
Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz. elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we recognise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.
Blogger Comments:
Strictly speaking, though categorised as enhancement in this context, matter, is actually a relation of projection, not enhancement.