The Orientations Of The Different Types of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143-4):

As always in language, the picture that emerges from a consideration of a multiplicity of properties is far from simple; it is multifaceted. But it is possible to bring out certain salient features of the system of sensing as suggested in Figure 4-6.

Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from, but does not create, projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes. Cognition and desideration are different from both in that they can project (i.e., bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing. Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of 'understand' alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (11) Reification

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

Finally, when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, i.e. countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, i.e. masses, such as anger, fear, frustration.⁵ That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil (cf. Halliday, 1990). Indeed, one can see from Lakoff & Kovecses's (1987) discussion of the cognitive model of anger in American English that a number of the metaphors for anger construe it as concrete mass (e.g. as a fluid contained in the body: He was filled with anger, She couldn't contain her joy, She was brimming with rage). In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf. the unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).

 

⁵ A few processes of cognition are also unbounded, e.g. knowledge, realisation, understanding.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (10) Scalability

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (9) Construal As Attribute Of Ascription

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the 'like' type and the 'please' type. Thus I'm afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but it is much more productive with emotive ones. Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible);

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (8) Agnate Ascriptive Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142-3):

Processes of perception are unique among the different types of sensing in that they are agnate to a set of relational processes of ascription, those which ascribe an Attribute in terms of the way in which it presents itself to our sense[s], as in Madam, you'll look like a tulip.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (7) Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):

The different types of sensing have somewhat different potentials for unfolding in time. With perception and cognition we have various categories of duration, inception, and the like: e.g. (perception) glimpse, sight, spot as well as see; (cognition) discover, realise, remember as well as know. But similar distinctions do not seem to obtain with desiderative and emotive processes.

Blogger Comments:

 long, pine, yearn?

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (6) Construal As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2, 142n):

Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But, as already noted above, certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). For instance:

Stanley (urgently): Look —

McCann: Don't touch me.

Stanley: Look. Listen a minute.

Anna: Listen. What silence. Is it always as silent?

Deeley: It's quite silent here, yes. Normally. You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Here look, touch, listen are verbs in behavioural clauses rather than mental ones; they are construed as activities controlled by an active Behaver. The difference is suggested quite clearly in the last example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully. 

All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I'm watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance.⁴ 

Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind. As long as the 'phenomenon' is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and material domains of experience. 

There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.)

⁴ Notice also the difference with respect to ability: there is little to choose between I can see birds in the sky and I see birds in the sky, but I can be watching birds in the sky and I am watching birds in the sky are quite distinct — in fact the former would most probably be interpreted as usuality I sometimes watch ...'.

Blogger Comments:

Clearly, the clause Don't touch me is material, not behavioural. The participant me is neither the Range (Behaviour) nor Medium (Behaver) of a behavioural Process, but the Medium (Goal) of a material Process.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (5) Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional. They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in 

I like Mozart's music (the 'like' type) : Mozart's music pleases me (the 'please' type). 

Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience. 

Processes of desideration are not bidirectional; here there is no 'please' type, only the 'like' type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires. 

Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the 'like' type — perception almost exclusively so; 'please' type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Blogger Comments:

The 'like' type is termed 'emanating', the 'please' type 'impinging'.

I want that dessert (emanating) : that dessert tempts me (impinging)

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (4) Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:

I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to. 

There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (3) Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141, 141n):

Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:

I think that in a sense you've had to compromise, haven't you?

'in a sense you've probably had to compromise, haven't you'

Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.³

 

³ Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she's returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of a clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (2) Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by a metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me. The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project, namely perception and emotion. That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can 'react to' facts. In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry/worrying — cf. (8) [agnate ascriptive process] below.

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing: (1) Projection Of Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):

While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/ imagined/ dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying; cf. property (4) [verbal causation].

Distinctions Among Subtypes Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138-40):

The grammar thus draws a fairly clear line between cognition & desideration on the one hand and perception & emotion on the other. The former can create worlds of ideas, the latter cannot — at least, according to the theory of consciousness embodied in the grammar of English. Now, this difference with respect to the ability to project is one of a set of properties that collectively serve to differentiate perception, cognition, desideration and emotion as the major subtypes of sensing. These properties are summarised in Table 4(3).

Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):

Here projection turns out to be a major characteristic distinguishing between different types. Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):

I just thought —> I'd tell you that I appreciate it.

I think —> I'll give it up.

They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.

Thus the idea 'I'll give it up' is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea 'me to crawl on my bended knees' is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result of somebody seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts; for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]].

I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]].

We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].

Thus 'that I am fixed, concrete' is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

These features are summarised in Table 4(2).

The Overall Semantic Space Construed By Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137):

Figure 4-5 represents the overall semantic space construed by figures, taking account of some of the areas of indeterminacy.

Behavioural Processes [with caveat]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-7, 136n):

As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying intermediately at the borderline of the primary types. The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends. One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday, 1985: 128-9): "processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing". These can be interpreted as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching, listening, pondering, meditating) rather than as passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the 'Behaver' in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing ? — I'm meditating but not I'm believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon);² nor can they accept a 'fact' serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

 

² For the special case of quoting by a behavioural process, as in "You're late again", she frowned, cf. the discussion of saying in Section 4.3.

Blogger Comments:

Caveat: Importantly, this is Matthiessen, not Halliday. For Halliday, behavioural processes do not project. Instead, instances like David was meditating (that) the moon was a balloon are mental clauses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a mental Process. Likewise, instances like "You're late again", she frowned are verbal nexuses, where a behavioural feature has been added to a verbal Process. Importantly, process type depends on the clause in which a verbal group functions, not on the most probable function of a verb (meditating, frowned).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Projection: Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the 'content' of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Participation: Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Unfolding in time: In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I'm doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he's mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawn mower; I'm busy)';

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Nature Of Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Nature of participants: In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness — s/he thought the moon was a balloon but not normally it thought the moon was a balloon. This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material or relational clauses. While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or metaphenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house). Participants in a material process cannot be metaphenomenal. For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house/their ideas/his argument), it is not possible to demolish "metathings" (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Grammatical Reactances For Figure Types: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):

The grammatical reactances for the figure types include:

Directionality of process: many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it/ it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser's consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser's consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). Neither material nor relational clauses display this dual directionality.

Relating Types Of Figure To Clause Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134, 136):

We have characterised the distinctions among the different types of figure in semantic terms. Let us now relate them to the grammar of TRANSITIVITY — the ideational grammar of the clause where the semantics of figures is construed. The different semantic types, sensing, saying, doing & happening and being & having are realised in the grammar of transitivity as shown in Figure 4-4. Thus doing & happening are realised as material clauses, sensing as mental ones, saying as verbal ones, and being (at, etc.) & having as relational clauses. The different process types are not signalled overtly in the grammar; they are covert or cryptotypic categories and emerge only when we consider their reactances, shown in italics in Figure 4-4. 

Process/Participant Complementarity: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133-4):

The complementarity can also be seen in the different kinds of deixis (relation to the here & now) associated with processes on the one hand and participants on the other. A process is made finite — it is pinned down in time, with point of reference in the act of speaking. A participant is made determinate, being held in a location within a referential space. This same distinction also appears in the temporal unfolding of a text, where participants have the potential to persist as discourse referents, but processes are excluded, unless they are turned into honorary participants through the use of grammatical metaphor.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Temporal Unfolding/Persistence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133, 134):

Whatever the mode of occurrence of any figure, it will always unfold in time. This temporal unfolding is construed as an inherent property of the process itself, realised grammatically as tense and aspect; it thus serves to validate the distinction between process and participant. Whereas on the one hand in its manifestation as process, the figure unfolds in time, in its manifestation as participant, on the other hand, it persists through time — whether or not the participant undergoes a change of state. The limiting case is a creative or destructive process, such as writing or erasing a symbol, through which a participant comes into being or ceases to exist. Figure 4-3 illustrates this process/participant complementarity.

Doing-&-Happening And Being-&-Having

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133):

Here we should note finally that the category of doing includes events, so the figure is one of 'doing & happening'; while the category of being includes (i) being in some circumstantial relation, and also (ii) having, itself a special case of (i).

Doing and Being As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132-3):

Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a 'quantum of change'. Construed as doing, the change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result. Consider a causal consequence such as 

[doing:] 'he washed it' —<so>—> [being:] 'It was clean'. 

This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.). Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view. If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result. If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor. The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process. See Figure 4-2.

 

This complementarity between doing and being … is not confined to those figures where the 'being' is of the intensive (qualitative/ quantitative) type; we also find pairs such as

(circumstantial) I put it on the shelf/ it's on the shelf 

they covered the floor with a carpet/ the carpet covers the floor.

(possessive) she's given him a new car/ he has a new car 

Doing vs Being: Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing requires some input to occur. This will typically come from one of the participants involved, the doer (as with voluntary motion); but the source of energy may also be outside the figure (as with falling). No input of energy is required with a figure of being.

Doing vs Being: Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing involves a change over time of occurrence (including maintaining a state in spite of force for change). The change may take place along any one of a number of dimensions: 

(a) circumstantial: spatial (motion or disposition, concrete or abstract); 
(b) intensive: qualitative (colour, size, shape, solidity, etc.), quantitative (increase, decrease); 
(c) possessive (transfer of ownership, loss or accretion of parts); 

(d) existential (creation or destruction). 

In contrast, being does not depend on any change over time. As a figure of being unfolds over time, the only change is that embodied in the temporal unfolding of the process itself. The nature of the actualisation will be the same at any point in time.

Doing And Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing and being do not preclude the involvement of a conscious participant; but they do not require it — and hence do not have the effect of endowing a participant with human-like consciousness. They can be differentiated in terms of two parameters, time and energy, both of which are involved in their actualisation.

Borderline Locations In The Semantic Space Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

There is of course a great deal of indeterminacy here, including such borderline cases as those where sensing and saying are construed as forms of action (and therefore cannot project), e.g. watching, listening, chatting, speaking. These properties reflect the borderline location of such processes in the overall semantic space.

Types Of Figure As Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being): see Figure 4-1.