Meaning Is A Social, Intersubjective Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 2):

But at the same time our own approach, both in theory and in method, is in contradistinction to that of cognitive science: we treat "information" as meaning rather than as knowledge and interpret language as a semiotic system, and more specifically as a social semiotic, rather than as a system of the human mind. This perspective leads us to place less emphasis on the individual than would be typical of a cognitivist approach; unlike thinking and knowing, at least as these are traditionally conceived, meaning is a social, intersubjective process. If experience is interpreted as meaning, its construal becomes an act of collaboration, sometimes of conflict, and always of negotiation.

The Construal Of Human Experience As A Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 1):

The construction of experience is usually thought of as knowledge, having the form of conceptual taxonomies, schemata, scripts and the like. We shall offer an interpretation that is complementary to this, treating experience not as knowing but as meaning; and hence as something that is construed in language. In other words, we are concerned with the construal of human experience as a semantic system; and since language plays the central role not only in storing and exchanging experience but also in construing it, we are taking language as our interpretative base.

Construing Experience As A Resource

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 1):

In this book we are concerned with how human beings construe experience. This means, first and foremost not experience as an instantial product — the particulars of the world that is around us and inside our heads, the particular individuals, the events of last Friday, and so on — but experience as a resource, as a potential for understanding, representing and acting on reality. It is in terms of this potential that the particulars of daily life are interpreted: they make sense because they are instantiations of this potential.

Construing Experience: The First Design

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: xiii):

Construing Experience Through Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: xi):

Condensed into one short paragraph, our own point of departure is the following. Language evolved, in the human species, in two complementary functions: construing experience, and enacting social processes. In this book we are concerned with the first of these, which we refer to as constructing the "ideation base"; and we stress that the categories and relations of experience are not "given" to us by nature, to be passively reflected in our language, but are actively constructed by language, with the lexicogrammar as the driving force. By virtue of its unique properties as a stratified semiotic system, language is able to transform experience into meaning. In our attempt to describe this process, we have deliberately used the grammar as the source of modelling, because we wanted to show how such a process could take place. We have confined ourselves, in principle, to how it takes place in English; the theoretical concepts we have used are general to all languages, but the descriptive categories should be interpreted in the context of a description of English.

Four Aspects Of Human Consciousness

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: x):

The semantic perspective enables us to emphasise four aspects of human consciousness which have been rather less foregrounded in cognitive approaches. One is that of meaning as a potential, a systemic resource which is deployed in — and ongoingly modified by — individual acts of meaning in language. (Whereas most theoretical work in linguistics since the mid century has focussed strongly on syntagmatic relations — what goes with what, systemic theory has foregrounded the paradigmatic — what is meant in relation to what might be). The second is that of meaning as growth, a semogenic resource which is constantly expanding in power by opening up new domains and refining those that are already within its compass. The third is that of meaning as a joint construction, a shared resource which is the public enterprise of a collective (whereas "thinking" is essentially a private phenomenon "located" within the individual). The fourth is that of meaning as a form of activity, a resource of energy which is powered by the grammar at the heart of every language.

SFL Models Knowledge As Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: ix-x):

… we have tried to represent language as the resource whereby the human species, and each individual member of that species, constructs the functioning mental map of their phenomenal world: of their experience of process, both what goes on out there and what goes on in the realms of their own consciousness.

It seems to us that our dialogue is relevant to current debates in cognitive science. In one sense, we are offering it as an alternative to mainstream currents in this area, since we are saying that cognition "is" (that is, can most profitably be modelled as) not thinking but meaning: the "mental" map is in fact a semiotic map, and "cognition" is just a way of talking about language. In modelling knowledge as meaning, we are treating it as a linguistic construct: hence, as something that is construed in the lexicogrammar. Instead of explaining language by reference to cognitive processes, we explain cognition by reference to linguistic processes. But at the same time this is an "alternative" only if it is assumed that the "cognitive" approach is in some sense natural, or unmarked. It seems to us that current approaches to neural networks, "connectionist" models and the like, are in fact more compatible with a semantic approach, where "understanding" something is transforming it into meaning, and to "know" is to have performed that transformation.

Why The Study Of Discourse Cannot Properly Be Separated From The Study Of The Grammar That Lies Behind It

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 731):

In the most general terms, the purpose of analysing a text is to explain the impact that it makes: why it means what it does, and why it gives the particular impression that it does. … What the metaphorical interpretation does is to suggest how an instance in the text may be referred to the system of the language as a whole. It is therefore an important link in the total chain of explanations whereby we relate the text to the system. A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

Textual Metaphor?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 731n):

While some scholars have explored the possibility of grammatical metaphor within the textual metafunction, we do not see any evidence that the textual metafunction engenders metaphor. It is certainly a factor in the metaphorical mode of realisation – particularly, in ideational metaphor, as we have illustrated above; but the origins of metaphor lie in the need to re-construe experience (ideational) and to re-enact roles and relations (interpersonal). The role of the textual metafunction is of a different nature (cf. Matthiessen, 1992).

Metaphorical Wording Means Both Metaphorically And Congruently

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 730):

The important point to make is that a piece of wording that is metaphorical has, as it were, an additional dimension of meaning: it ‘means’ both metaphorically and congruently. Thus, to go back to alcohol impairment: here impairment is a noun functioning as Thing, and hence takes on the status of an entity participating in some other process, as in:

Because alcohol impairment effects are well established and documented, alcohol impairment can be used as a benchmark for other forms of driving impairment, such as fatigue, or in comparison to the effects of other drugs.

It does not thereby lose its own semantic character as a process, which it has by virtue of the fact that congruently it is realised as a verb; but it acquires an additional semantic feature by becoming a noun. Compare failure in Engines of the 36 class only appeared on this train in times of reduced loading, or engine failure. – where a more congruent version would be whenever an engine failed. Thus, however far one may choose to go in unpacking ideational metaphor, it is important also to analyse each instance as it is. A significant feature of our present-day world is that it consists so largely of metaphorically constructed entities, like access, advances, allocation, impairment and appeal.

How Far Should Metaphor Be Unpacked?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 730):

How far should one pursue the analysis of ideational metaphors? There can be no universally valid answer to this question; it depends on what one is trying to achieve. In an example such as The second day of the convention saw the advantage pushed further, there is an obvious tension between day as Senser and saw as mental Process which needs explaining (cf. Figure 10-13). But in most instances of contemporary discourse it is only when we start to analyse that we become aware of the grammatical metaphors involved.

The Emergence Of Nominalising Metaphors

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 730):

This kind of nominalising metaphor probably evolved first in scientific and technical registers (cf. Halliday, 1967b, 1988), where it played a dual role: it made it possible on the one hand to construct hierarchies of technical terms, and on the other hand to develop an argument step by step, using complex passages ‘packaged’ in nominal form as Themes. It has gradually worked its way through into most other varieties of adult discourse, in much of which, however, it loses its original raison d’être and tends to become merely a mark of prestige and power. Notice that when clausal patterns are replaced by nominal ones, some of the information is lost: for example, the Classifier + Thing construction alcohol impairment gives no indication of the semantic relation between the two and could be agnate to alcohol impairs (alcohol as Actor), alcohol is impaired (alcohol as Goal), and maybe other transitivity configurations besides. The writer presumably knows exactly what it means; but the reader may not, and so this kind of highly metaphorical discourse tends to mark off the expert from those who are uninitiated.

Nominalisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 729):

Nominalising is the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor. By this device, processes (congruently worded as verbs) and properties (congruently worded as adjectives) are reworded metaphorically as nouns; instead of functioning in the clause, as Process or Attribute, they function as Thing in the nominal group. Thus, for example:

is impaired by alcohol                                alcohol impairment

they allocate an extra packer                     the allocation of an extra packer

some shorter, some longer                         of varying length

they were able to reach the computer        their access to the computer

technology is getting better                        advances in technology

What then happens to the original ‘things’? They get displaced by the metaphoric ones, and so are reduced to modifying these: alcohol becomes a Classifier of impairment; the computer, one extra packer and technology go into prepositional phrases functioning as Qualifier to, respectively, access, allocation and advances.

Choreographic Complexity Of Spoken Mode vs Crystalline Complexity Of Written Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 728-9):

In spoken language, the ideational content is loosely strung out, but in clausal patterns that can become highly intricate in movement: the complexity is dynamic – we might think of it in choreographic terms. In written language, the clausal patterns are typically rather simple; but the ideational content is densely packed in nominal constructions: here the complexity is more static – perhaps crystalline. These are, it should be made clear, general tendencies; not every particular instance will conform. But they do bring out the essential character of the relationship between the two. And it is the written kind of complexity that involves grammatical metaphor.

The Primary Grammatical Resource For Increasing Lexical Density

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 728):

The nominal group is the primary resource used by the grammar for packing in lexical items at high density. An example is that in Figure 10-18. Here the relationships which are expressed clausally in the spoken version (the viaducts were constructed of masonry and had numerous arches in them) are instead expressed nominally (masonry viaducts of numerous arches). The clause complex is replaced by the nominal group.

Lexical Density & Grammatical Intricacy: Metaphorical vs Congruent Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 726-8):

Consider the following sentence, from The Horizon Book of Railways, pp. 74–75:

In bridging river valleys, the early engineers built many notable masonry viaducts of numerous arches.

The clause complex and transitivity analysis is given in Figure 10-17.

To measure lexical density, simply divide the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses. This example has eleven lexical items (bridging, river, valleys, early, engineers, built, notable, masonry, viaducts, numerous, arches), and two clauses; hence lexical density [is] 5.5. Note that the grammatical structure both of the clause complex as a whole and of each constituent clause is rather simple.

Let us now reword this in a form more typical of the spoken language. If we retain the same lexical items, but reword in a more naturally spoken form, we might arrive at something like the following:

In the early days when engineers had to make a bridge across a valley and the valley had a river flowing through it, they often built viaducts, which were constructed of masonry and had numerous arches in them; and many of these viaducts became notable.

Here the structure of the clause complex is

1×b1 ^ 1×β+2 ^ 1aa ^ 1α =β1 ^ 1α=β+2 ^ +2

There are now six grammatically related clauses, rather than just two. The total number of lexical items has gone up to seventeen, mainly because there is some repetition; but since there are six ranking clauses, the lexical density is slightly under 3. In other words, the written version is more complex in terms of lexical density, while the spoken version is more complex in terms of grammatical intricacy. The lexical items in the written version thus have fewer clauses to accommodate them; but obviously they are still part of the overall grammatical structure – what typically happens is that they are incorporated into nominal groups.

Metaphor, Mode & Complexity: Lexical Density And Grammatical Intricacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 726):

The factor that perhaps tends most to determine the extent of metaphor in the grammar of a text is whether that text is spoken or written; speech and writing are rather different in their patterns of metaphoric usage. This is because they have different ways of constructing complex meanings. … Typically, written language becomes complex by being lexically dense: it packs a large number of lexical items into each clause; whereas spoken language becomes complex by being grammatically intricate: it builds up elaborate clause complexes out of parataxis and hypotaxis.

Step-By-Step Analysis Of A Transitivity Metaphor

 Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 726, 727):

Let us round off the discussion of types by showing an analysis that relates the metaphorical and congruent versions of an example through a series of steps: see Figure 10-16.

Figure Realised By A Metaphorical Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 725, 726):

When the realisation of a whole figure is downgraded through metaphor from clause to nominal group, its elements will, of course, also be downgraded: the process is nominalised and serves as Thing (except in the case of a qualitative attributive relational clause, where it is the Attribute that is reconstrued as Thing, as noted above); the other elements of the figure are realised either as downranked groups/phrases serving as Qualifier or Deictic (instead of as ranking ones, serving in a clause) or, by a further step, as words serving as Classifier, Epithet or post-Deictic. For example, my original intention in my original intention was to write a saga covering three generations of the Okonkwo family in one book is structured as Deictic ^ Post-Deictic ^ Thing, corresponding to the congruent clause Subject ^ Adjunct ^ Predicator: see Figure 10-15.

 

Metaphorical Realisations Of Internal Cause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 721):

Relations of internal cause – cause in the sense of ‘x so I think/say y’ – are construed metaphorically by verbs of proving such as prove, show, demonstrate, argue, suggest, indicate, imply in ‘intensive identifying relational’ clauses:

||| The wide range of potential contributions by the RC has proven to be a bright spot || as we strive to match available resources to a demanding mission load, || and demonstrates clearly the enduring value and relevance of the citizen-soldier. ||| 

||| Further experiments proved [[[ that the dye lowered fertility in rats, || induced still-births || and even produced malformed and macerated foetuses]]] . ||| 

||| Large amounts of feldspar in a sandstone may imply rapid deposition and burial [[ before chemical weathering could decompose the feldspar]] , || or it might imply a cold climate [[ in which chemical weathering is very slow]] . |||

Four Types Of Downgrading The Realisation Of Sequences Through Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 720):

The possibilities of downgrading include the four types set out in Table 10-12.

The Metaphorical Realisation Of Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 719-20):

In the congruent mode, a sequence of two figures is realised by a nexus of two clauses; but in the metaphorical mode, the domain of realisation is downgraded from clause nexus to clause. In the metaphorical mode, the domain of realisation of either one or both of the figures is, in turn, downranked from clause to group/phrase. These successive steps in downgrading are possible because, as we have seen, both projection and expansion are motifs that are manifested throughout the grammatical system: a sequence of projection can thus be realised not only by the manifestation of projection in the clause nexus, but also by its manifestation in the clause or the group/phrase. The same principle applies to expansion.

Interpersonal vs Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 719):

In our presentation of interpersonal metaphor, we identified a number of common types. The general tendency is for interpersonal metaphor to ‘upgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation; for example, while the congruent realisation of modality is a group serving in the clause, the metaphorical realisation is a clause that projects (I think ... , etc.) or embeds (it is probable ... , etc.) the clause to which a modal value is assigned. In this way, interpersonal metaphor tends to expand interpersonal systems by adding explicit variants – that is, variants where the subjective or objective orientation is made explicit.

In contrast, the general tendency for ideational metaphor is to ‘downgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation of a semantic sequence, figure or element – from clause nexus to clause, from clause to group/phrase, and even from group/phase to word. Such downgrading affects both the unit whose domain of realisation is downgraded, and the units of which it is composed: the downgrading proceeds down the rank scale by a kind of ‘domino effect’. The downgrading may start with (i) a whole sequence of figures, (ii) with a single figure, or (iii) with a single element within a figure.

Ideational Metaphor: Reconstruals Of Experience With Textual And Interpersonal Consequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 718):

As we have seen, grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience – but which has made modern science possible. At the same time, there are also textual and interpersonal consequences of this metaphorical realignment in the grammar: ideational metaphor can be a powerful textual resource for managing the creation of text, creating new mappings between the ideational and textual quanta of information; and it can also be a powerful interpersonal resource for organising the ongoing negotiation of meaning, creating new mappings between the ideational and interpersonal propositions/proposals.

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Figure Realised By Group Or Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 718):

By the same token, when a figure is realised metaphorically by a group or phrase, it is deprived of the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it inarguable. It is thus presented as something already established; and any modifications, including interpersonal evaluative ones, have to be taken for granted:

A standard empirical hypothesis is that one component of the mind/brain is a parser, which assigns a percept to a signal (abstracting from other circumstances relevant to interpretation). [Chomsky, 1995, The minimalist program. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, p.18.]

Any serious approach to complex phenomena involves innumerable idealisations, and the one just sketched is no exception. [Chomsky, The minimalist program, p.19.]

But interesting (and conflicting) arguments have been presented. [Chomsky, The minimalist program, p. 22.]

Much of the fruitful inquiry into generative grammar in the past years has pursued the working hypothesis that UG is a simple and elegant theory, with fundamental principles that have an intuitive character and broad generality. [Chomsky, The minimalist program, p. 29.]

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Sequence Realised By Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 718):

… ideational metaphor also realigns the ideational in relation to the interpersonal. When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, it is given the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it arguable. For example:

||| Too many unprogrammed deployments will inevitably disrupt operating budgets, || sap morale, || cause lost training opportunities, || and accelerate wear and tear on equipment. ||| 

||| A magnitude-6 quake can cause severe damage || if it is centred under a populated area. ||| 

||| This is consistent with the concept [[ that the antarctic ozone hole phenomenon causes a dilution effect throughout much of the Southern Hemisphere]] . |||

As the examples illustrate, a ‘propositionalised’ sequence can be modalised, doubted, argued and negotiated interpersonally in numerous other ways.

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor (Summarised)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 716):

To sum up: when a sequence is realised by a clause rather than by a clause nexus, it will be structured textually into Theme + Rheme and, since a clause is an information unit in the unmarked case, also into Given + New. This means that the figures that make up the sequence can be given thematic or newsworthy status. In addition, such a figure, realised metaphorically by a nominal group rather than congruently by a clause, gains access to the textual systems of the nominal group – most significantly, the system of DETERMINATION. This means that it can be treated textually as a discourse referent. It is marked either as ‘non-specific’ or as ‘specific’, in which case its identity is presented as recoverable to the addressee.

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor (Exemplified)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 715-6):

When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, this means not only that it is mapped onto the transitivity patterns of the clause but also that it falls within the domain of the Theme + Rheme organisation of the clause and also, by extension, that of the Given + New organisation of the information unit. Thus the following sequence –

Displacement along these faults caused failure of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir in 1963

– is realised metaphorically as a ‘relational’ clause, and the figures making up the sequence are realised metaphorically as nominal groups serving as elements of the clause. Since they function within the clause, these nominal groups can be assigned textual statuses: the nominal group displacement along these faults serves as Theme, and the nominal group failure of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir in 1963 serves as New: see Figure 10-12. The metaphoric ‘relational’ clause thus creates a textual pattern of Theme: figure ‘displacement’ + New: figure ‘failure’.

This textual patterns is an effective resource in the rhetorical development of scientific discourse (see Halliday, 1988; Halliday & Martin, 1993). There is thus a gain in textual meaning in the shift from the congruent mode of realisation to the metaphoric mode. In this way, the ideational metaphor accommodates the textual metafunction: the experiential configuration of Identified + Process + Identifier structures the sequence into two textual quanta, one figure as Theme followed by another as New. In some cases, this kind of textual accommodation may be the main reason behind the ideational metaphor.

Textual And Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 715):

Within the ideational metafunction, the general effect of this realignment in the semantic system is a shift from the logical to the experiential – an experientialisation of our construal of experience (see Halliday & Matthiessen, 1999: 264). Thus logical sequences of figures are reconstrued as experiential configurations of elements. But the significance of grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind extends beyond the ideational metafunction to both the textual and interpersonal ones. The textual and interpersonal effects of ideational metaphor are due to the fact the realignment of ideational patterns described above also means that there is a realignment of the textual and interpersonal environments in which ideational systems operate.

Ideational Metaphor: Loss Of Ideational Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 715):

… the metaphorical mode thus makes available a great deal of further ideational potential that is not accessible in the congruent mode. At the same time, the metaphorical mode also denies access to significant aspects of the potential that is associated with the congruent mode: there is a loss of ideational meaning. For example, the tactic patterns of clause complexing (with the distinction between paratactic interdependency and hypotactic dependency) are not available to sequences that are realised metaphorically as clauses, and the configurational patterns of participant roles are lost or obscured when figures are realised as groups or phrases. Thus in the nominal group the perception of an inadequate retirement program, it is likely that an inadequate retirement program is what is perceived, but this has to be inferred (contrast the perception of concerned citizens, where concerned citizens is likely to be the perceiver, not what is perceived); and the perceiver is left implicit. In more congruent versions, such underspecification does not occur: people see the retirement program as inadequate, people think that the retirement program is inadequate, and so on. This is because the grammar of the clause construes participants as inherent in the process, and only allows them to be absent through ellipsis if they are recoverable.

The Underlying Significance Of The Metaphorical ‘Re-mapping’ Between Semantics And Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 713-4):

As we have seen, the ideational metafunction is a resource for construing our experience of the world that lies around us and inside us. In the congruent mode, the grammar construes sequences (of figures), figures and elements as the basic phenomena of experience. In the metaphorical mode, the model is enriched through combinations of these categories: in addition to the congruent categories, we now also have metaphorical combinations of categories – sequences construed as figures, figures construed as elements, and so on. These combinations open up new meaning potential. For example, in a sequence, there is a temporally invariant logico-semantic relation such as cause, but in a sequence construed as a figure, this relation is typically construed as a process. Unlike a logical relation, a process is construed as unfolding through time, and in the grammar of the verbal group it is marked for tense or modality.