What Makes The Re-mapping In Ideational Metaphor Possible

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 713):

The ‘re-mapping’ is possible because semantic motifs such as cause are manifested repeatedly in the different environments of the grammar so that each environment is a possible domain of realisation for such a motif. These motifs are of the two primary types, expansion and projection. Ideational metaphor is based on patterns that exist already in the congruent mode of realisation; but it expands these patterns significantly, as can be seen when we analyse scientific, legal or administrative discourse – or, indeed, other kinds of discourse that the metaphorical mode has spread to in a systematic way.

Ideational Metaphor As A Downward Re-mapping

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 712-3, 719):

As illustrated by the example analysed in Figure 10-11, grammatical metaphor within the ideational metafunction involves a ‘re-mapping’ between sequences, figures and elements in the semantics and clause nexuses, clauses and groups in the grammar. In the congruent mode of realisation that we described in Chapters 5 and 7, a sequence is realised by a clause nexus and a figure is realised by a clause. In the metaphorical mode, the whole set of mappings seems to be shifted ‘downwards’: a sequence is realised by a clause, a figure is realised by a group, and an element is realised by a word. The two modes of realisation are contrasted diagrammatically in Figure 10-14 below.

Ideational Metaphor Example

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 711, 712):

Consider the following steps in the text:

(a) Most linguists today believe that there is no good evidence ...

(b) the strongest belief of all is [[ that there is no trace ... ]] 

… a projection sequence of figures in the semantics is realised congruently by a projection clause nexus in the grammar, and the two figures forming the sequence are realised by clauses. This is what we find in example (a); but in (b), a projection sequence has been realised not by a clause nexus but by a simple clause, and the figure of sensing is realised not by a clause but by a nominal group, while the projected figure has been realised not by a dependent ‘idea’ clause but by an embedded ‘fact’ clause. The congruent and metaphorical modes of realisation are combined in Figure 10-11. Just like interpersonal metaphor, ideational metaphor introduces additional layers of meaning that are construed by the grammar as additional layers of wording. …

Ideational Metaphor And Education

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 709-10):

Unlike interpersonal metaphor, the other type of grammatical metaphor, ideational metaphor, is learned later by children and is not part of the grammar of ordinary, spontaneous conversation that children meet in the home and neighbourhood; rather, it is associated with the discourses of education and science, bureaucracy and the law. Children are likely to meet the ideational type of metaphor when they reach the upper levels of primary school (see e.g. Christie & Derewianka, 2008; Derewianka, 1995); but its full force will only appear when they begin to grapple with the specialised discourses of subject-based secondary education.

Why Interpersonal Metaphor Can Be Learnt Early

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 709):

The interpersonal metafunction defines the environment in which children first learn the strategy of grammatical metaphor. No doubt this is partly because interpersonal metaphors tend to make selections more explicit, as when probability is realised by a ‘mental’ clause projecting the modalised proposition (‘explicit’ orientation), and partly because the interpretation of interpersonal metaphors is often both supported and ‘tested’ immediately in the ongoing dialogic interaction. For example:

Oh. Stefan, can you turn off the tape? – [Non-verbal response: tape is turned off.]

Here the responses show that the ‘yes/no interrogative’ clauses are interpreted as metaphorically realised commands rather than as congruently realised questions. The expansion of the interpersonal semantic system through grammatical metaphor provides speakers with additional, powerful resources for enacting social roles and relations in the complex network of relations that make up the fabric of a community of any kind. 

The Metaphorical Expansion Of Interpersonal Meaning Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 707):

We have explored certain key strategies involved in the metaphorical expansion of the interpersonal meaning potential, showing that they are not random or ad hoc features of the system but rather motivated and principled extensions of the congruent system. There are, of course, other strategies as well. The lexicogrammatical resources of MOOD, and the associated patterns of MODALITY and KEY, carry a very considerable semantic load as the expression of interpersonal rhetoric. Not surprisingly, these categories lend themselves to a rich variety of metaphorical devices; and it is by no means easy to decide what are metaphorical and what are congruent forms. Some common speech-functional formulae are clearly metaphorical in origin, for example 

(i) I wouldn’t ... if I was you: command, congruently don’t ... ! functioning as warning; 

(ii) I’ve a good mind to ... : modalised offer, congruently maybe I’ll ..., typically functioning as threat; 

(iii) she’d better ... : modulated command, congruently she should ... , typically functioning as advice. 

Some words, such as mind, seem particularly to lend themselves to this kind of transference: cf. would you mind ... ?, mind you!, I don’t mind ... (including I don’t mind if I do, positive response to offer of drink in the environment of a pub), and so on.

The ‘Indicative’ Realisation Of Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 706):

The ‘indicative’ realisation of proposals has the effect of blurring the line between proposals directed to the addressee and propositions about how the world ought to be. For example, through the extension of you from ‘addressee’ to ‘generalised person, including the addressee’ (in contrast with generalised they), we get general rules, general advice, and the like:

||| If you find [[ yourself coming back the next day || and erasing more of the so-called improvements [[ than you keep]] ]], || you’d better get the hell out of that book. ||| 

||| If you are writing about something [[ that you have not experienced]] , || then you must supply yourself with experience. ||| 

||| You cannot drink on the job. |||

Other Metaphors Of Mood: Command Realised As Modulated Indicative

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 705):

In addition to metaphors based on ideational projection, there are other kinds of metaphor of mood as well. One prominent type involves a shift in the realisational domain of commands from ‘imperative’ to ‘indicative’ clauses. The ‘indicative’ clause can be either ‘declarative’ or ‘interrogative’; for example: 

[iii] proposal ↘ modulated indicative

(1) declarative

||| Yes, well, if you apply that criterion, || then surely you must start to rearrange your estimates of Lawrence’s novels, surely. |||

||| Perhaps you should tell me about your current project. |||

||| You just don’t think about it; || you shouldn’t. |||

||| Well look, honestly, Mrs Finney, my suggestion to you would be [[[ that if you want to read English honours || you should spend a year in solid preparation for it || and then reapply]]] . |||

||| I think || you should talk to David Hawker, || whose committee, <<I think,>> put this in train. |||

(2) interrogative

||| Oh can you get some napkins? |||

||| Can you name a moment, or an image [[[ that you can point to || and say || this is [[ when you decided || that you were going to write The Greenlanders]] ]]] ? |||

||| Would you like to take the comfortable chair? |||

||| Could you tell us about a poem [[ which lives up to this ideal of yours]] in whatever period? |||

The Reason For The Metaphorical Expansion Of The Speech Function System

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 704, 705):

As we have noted, metaphors of mood make it possible for the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION to be further elaborated in delicacy. Why does the speech functional system need to be expanded in this way? The basic principle is this: the expansion of the speech functional system has increased the meaning potential available to interactants for negotiation in dialogue. …

The potential for negotiation in dialogue created by metaphors of mood is directly related to the different contextual variables within tenor. Metaphors of mood expand the interpersonal resources for negotiation, whether the negotiation involves consensus or conflict. The tenor variables are usually discussed in terms of status, formality, face, tact and politeness (and their negative counterparts). What these have in common is a very general sense of the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. Here interpersonal metaphor is part of a principle of interpersonal iconicity: metaphorical variants create a greater semiotic distance between meaning and wording, and this enacts a greater social distance between speaker and addressee. The semiotic distance is often manifested directly in the lexicogrammar as a syntagmatic extension of the wording.

The Expansion Of Speech Function Through Interpersonal Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 703):

In the type of mood metaphor shown in Table 10-11, the proposition/proposal is realised by a clause nexus of projection rather than by a simple clause. The interpersonal projection embodied in speech function has thus been realised as if it was an ideational projection. This has two consequences for the expansions of the meaning potential of speech function, just as in the case of modality. On the one hand, the option of making the subjective orientation of the speech functional selection explicit is added to the system, as in vote against ... (implicit) vs. I urge you to vote against (explicit). On the other hand, the speech functional system can be further elaborated in delicacy by drawing on the extensive resources of the lexicogrammar of ‘verbal’ and ‘mental’ clauses. Thus in addition to vote against ..., we now have, for example, (‘verbal’) I tell you/command you/order you/ask you/urge you/implore you/ beseech you/plead with you/suggest to you → to vote against ...; (‘mental’) I want/desire/‘d like/ intend/plan → (for) you to vote against .... And while these clauses are constrained in terms of SUBJECT PERSON and DEICTICITY, they still allow for additional systemic variation; for example: I urge you/I would urge you/I should urge you/I must urge you//can I (please) urge you/could I perhaps urge you → to vote against ....

The Line Between Explicitly Objective Propositions And Modal Assessment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 703):

In the realm of propositions, the line between explicitly objective propositions and modal assessment seems to disappear. Forms such as it is said that, it is rumoured that serve as assessments of the nature of the evidence for a proposition: it is, as it were, represented as being projected by somebody other than the speaker (thus it is said and they say are very close in meaning); the projection thus serves as a device enabling speakers to distance themselves from the proposition. For example:

||| Of Samuel it is said || that when he asked the people || to bear witness || that he had not taken anything of theirs || the people said || that they were witnesses. |||

||| It is said || that television keeps people at home. ||| But you, at any rate, have proved that wrong. ||| And they say, too, || that television makes its appeal to those of lesser intelligence. |||

||| Furthermore, it is claimed, || there are no known connections between the languages of the Old World and those of the Americas. |||

Examples Metaphorical Realisations Of Proposals & Propositions Involving Projection Nexuses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 704):

Metaphorical Realisations Of Speech Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 700-1):

The command ‘vote against ...’ is realised metaphorically by a hypotactic clause nexus; it is realised as if it was a report of what the speaker says. This is just like the metaphorical realisation of modality of the explicitly subjective orientation. Thus the reported command can be tagged: I urge you to vote against ... will you? In other words, just like modality, speech function can be represented as a substantive proposition in its own right; and this proposition is a figure of sensing or saying that projects the original [i] proposal or [ii] proposition.

Interpersonal Projection: Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 700-1):

But the notion of interpersonal projection is not, in fact, limited to modal assessment. Consider the short persuasive text in Text 10-5:

Text 10-5: Exploring – arguing: open letter appealing to members of an organisation [Text 6]

I don’t believe that endorsing the Nuclear Freeze initiative is the right step for California Common Cause. Tempting as it may be, we shouldn’t embrace every popular issue that comes along. When we do so we use precious limited resources where other players with superior resources are already doing an adequate job. Rather, I think we will be stronger and more effective if we stick to those issues of governmental structure and process, broadly defined, that have formed the core of our agenda for years. Open government, campaign finance reform, and fighting the special interests and big money – these are our kinds of issues. 

Let’s be clear: I personally favour the initiative and ardently support disarmament negotiations to reduce the risk of war. But I don’t think endorsing a specific freeze proposal is appropriate for CCC. We should limit our involvement in defence and weaponry to matters of process, such as exposing the weapons industry’s influence on the political process. Therefore, I urge you to vote against a CCC endorsement of the nuclear freeze initiative.

Expressions of modulation are bolded and expressions of modalisation are italicised; metaphorical expressions are underlined. Subjective assessment of modality permeates the text, like a prosody. In the case of modalisation, it is largely explicit; in the case of modulation, it is implicit until the very last clause. This clause realises the nucleus of the whole text; it is here that the key proposal is presented with a nuclear punch… . 

But what is the key proposal? One variant of I urge you to vote ... is you must vote ..., the two being relatable as explicit and implicit variants of subjective, high modulations of the type obligation. However, we can take one step further in the analysis. What the author is saying is Vote against ..., which is an ‘imperative’ clause – the congruent realisation of a proposal of the subtype ‘command’. This indicates the connection between ‘imperative’ clauses and modulation, which is why modulation was characterised as the ‘imperative type’ of modality. On the one hand, an ‘imperative’ clause imposes an obligation; on the other hand, the imperative tag checks the addressee’s inclination to comply (will you?). But the example also illustrates the connection between mood and projection.

Interpersonal Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 700):

There is thus a fundamental relationship between modal assessment, including modality, and projection. To bring this out, we can interpret modal assessment as interpersonal projection. Interpersonal projection always involves the speaker or addressee as ‘projector’: ‘I think’, ‘I say’; ‘do you think’, ‘do you say’. It is always implicit unless it is made explicit through grammatical metaphor, by ‘co-opting’ ideational resources to do interpersonal service.

Metaphor Opens Up New Systemic Domains Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 699-700):

This is the general effect of grammatical metaphor: it construes additional layers of meaning and wording. To capture this layering in our grammatical analysis, we introduce one or more additional structural layers in the box diagram. The representation of grammatical metaphor in such diagrams shows how the metaphor is embodied in the structural organisation as an increase in the layers of meaning and wording. 

But there is, of course, also a systemic effect. Systemically, metaphor leads to an expansion of the meaning potential: by creating new patterns of structural realisation, it opens up new systemic domains of meaning. And it is the pressure to expand the meaning potential that in fact lies behind the development of metaphorical modes of meaning. Thus in the system of MODALITY, the system of ORIENTATION is expanded by the addition of a systemic contrast in MANIFESTATION between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’: the metaphorical modalities described above make it possible to make the orientation explicit in wordings such as I think and it is likely that, which, in turn, makes it possible to increase the delicacy of differentiations (cf. I think/imagine/expect/assume/suppose/reckon/guess; I would think/I would have thought; I imagine/I can imagine; and so on). 

As we have already seen, this same principle extends beyond modality and applies to modal assessment more generally (e.g. I regret, it is regrettable that). The metaphoric strategy is to upgrade the interpersonal assessment from group rank to clause rank – from an adverbial group or prepositional phrase serving within a simple clause to a clause serving within a clause nexus of projection.

The Extension Of Modality Through Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 698-9):

As we have seen, the semantic domain of modality is extended through grammatical metaphor to include explicit indications of subjective and objective orientation: a modal proposition or proposal is realised, as if it was a projection sequence, by a nexus of two clauses, or as if it was a fact embedded as a Carrier in a relational clause with a modal Attribute, rather than by a single clause. Here the modal assessment itself is given the status of a proposition in its own right; but because the projecting clause of the nexus is metaphorical in nature, standing for an interpersonal assessment of modality, it is also, at the same time, a modal Adjunct in the clause realising the proposition/proposal.

Example Analysis Of Modal And Transitivity Metaphors

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 698, 699):

Figure 10-9 gives a further example, containing both an interpersonal metaphor and one of an ideational kind.

 

The Apparent Paradox On Which The Modality System Rests

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 698):

The importance of modal features in the grammar of interpersonal exchanges lies in an apparent paradox on which the entire system rests – the fact that we only say we are certain when we are not. If unconsciously I consider it certain that Mary has left, I say, simply, Mary’s left. If I add a high value probability, of whatever orientation, such as Mary’s certainly left, I’m certain Mary’s left, Mary must have left, this means that I am admitting an element of doubt – which I may then try to conceal by objectifying the expression of certainty. Hence whereas the subjective metaphors, which state clearly ‘this is how I see it’, take on all values (I’m sure, I think, I don’t believe, I doubt, etc.), most of the objectifying metaphors express a ‘high’ value probability or obligation – that is, they are different ways of claiming objective certainty or necessity for something that is in fact a matter of opinion. Most of the ‘games people play’ in the daily round of interpersonal skirmishing involve metaphors of this objectifying kind.

Metaphorical Realisations Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 698):

The explicitly subjective and explicitly objective forms of modality are all strictly speaking metaphorical, since all of them represent the modality as being the substantive proposition. Modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal; in its congruent form, it is an adjunct to a proposition rather than a proposition in its own right. Speakers being what we are, however, we like to give prominence to our own point of view; and the most effective way of doing that is to dress it up as if it was this that constituted the assertion (‘explicit’ I think ... ) – with the further possibility of making it appear as if it was not our point of view at all (‘explicit objective’ it’s likely that ... ).

Subjective vs Objective Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 696, 698):

The general difference in meaning between the subjective and the objective orientation can be seen from the effect of the tag. Compare the following two clauses:

he couldn’t have meant that, could he?
surely he didn’t mean that, did he?

In the first, the speaker wants the listener to confirm his estimate of the probabilities: ‘I think it unlikely; do you share my opinion?’. In the second, he wants the listener to provide the answer: ‘I think it unlikely, but is it in fact the case?’. It is possible to switch from a subjectively modalised clause to a non-modalised tag, as in this exchange in a store selling children’s books:

What do you reckon would be good for a five-year-old kid?
– She’ll like fairy tales, does she?

Here the salesperson’s reply means ‘I think it likely she likes fairy tales; is that the case?’ – whereas she’ll like fairy tales, will she? would have meant ‘do you agree that it is likely?’. The speaker is assuming, in other words, that the customer knows the preferences of the child; there would be no point in simply exchanging opinions on the subject.

Readiness: Ability vs Inclination

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 696):

There is one further category that needs to be taken into account, that of ability/potentiality, as in she can keep the whole audience enthralled. This is on the fringe of the modality system. It has the different orientations of subjective (implicit only) realised by can/can’t, objective implicit by be able to, and objective explicit by it is possible (for ... ) to. In the last of these, the typical meaning is ‘potentiality’, as in it was possible for a layer of ice to form. In the subjective it is closer to inclination; we could recognise a general category of ‘readiness’, having ‘inclination’ and ‘ability’ as subcategories at one end of the scale (can/is able to as ‘low’-value variants of will/is willing to). In any case can in this sense is untypical of the modal operators: it is the only case where the oblique form functions as a simple past, as in I couldn’t read that before; now with my new glasses I can.

Key To 30 Of The 144 Categories Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 695-6):

30 Of The 144 Categories Of Modality Exemplified

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 695, 697):

This generates a set of 4 × 4 × 3 × 3 = 144 categories of modality. Thirty of these are illustrated in Figure 10-8.

Outer Value Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693-4):

With the outer values, on the other hand, if the negative is transferred the value switches (either from high to low, or from low to high):

Median Value Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693):

The median value is clearly set apart from the two ‘outer’ values by the system of polarity: the median is that in which the negative is freely transferable between the proposition and the modality:

Three ‘Values’ Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 693-4):

The third variable in modality is the VALUE that is attached to the modal judgment: high, median or low. These values are summarised in Table 10-9, with ‘objective implicit’ forms as category labels.

Modality Examples By Type Of Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 692-3):

Examples of the combination of orientation and type are given in Table 10-8.

 

System Of Types Of Orientation In Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 692):

The basic distinction that determines how each type of modality will be realised is the ORIENTATION: that is, the distinction between subjective and objective modality, and between the explicit and implicit variants… . The system is as in Figure 10-7.

 

These combine with all four types of modality, but with gaps; for example, there are no systematic forms for making the subjective orientation explicit in the case of usuality or inclination (i.e. no coded expressions for ‘I recognise it as usual that ... ’ or ‘I undertake for ... to ... ’). This is a systematic gap; these particular combinations would represent semantic domains where the speaker cannot readily pose as an authority.

Examples Of The Four Types Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 692):

Here is an example of each of the four types:

1.i [probability]      There can’t be many candlestick-makers left.
1.ii [usuality]          It’ll change right there in front of your eyes.
2.i [obligation]       The roads should pay for themselves, like the railways.
2.ii [inclination]     Voters won’t pay taxes any more.

As these examples show, the modal operators can occur in all four types. Their use is more restricted in usuality and in inclination than in the other two types; but as a class they cover all these senses. This brings out what it is that the four types of modality have in common: they are all varying degrees of polarity, different ways of construing the semantic space between the positive and negative poles.