All Modalities Are Realised As Indicative Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 692):

Note that modulation refers to the semantic category of proposals; but all modalities are realised as indicative (that is, as if they were propositions). Thus imperative go home!, when modulated, becomes indicative you must go home! (In philosophical semantics and linguistic accounts influenced by ‘modal logic’, probability is referred to as ‘epistemic’ modality (from Greek episteme, for ‘knowledge’) and obligation as ‘deontic’ modality (from Greek deon, for ‘what is binding’). Readiness has been referred to as ‘dynamic’ modality, and deontic and dynamic modalities have been grouped together as ‘root’ modality – our modulation type of modality; but usuality tends to be left out of accounts of modality.

The Four Types Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The four types are set out in diagrammatic form in Figure 10-6. 

The System Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 691):

The reason this area of the semantic system is so highly elaborated metaphorically is to be found in the nature of modality itself. … Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no – the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity. What this implies more specifically will depend on the underlying speech function of the clause. (1) If the clause is an ‘information’ clause (a proposition, congruently realised as indicative), this means either (i) ‘either yes or no’, i.e. ‘maybe’; or (ii) ‘both yes and no’, i.e. ‘sometimes’; in other words, some degree of probability or of usuality. (2) If the clause is a ‘goods-&-services’ clause (a proposal, which has no real congruent form in the grammar, but by default we can characterise it as imperative), it means either (i) ‘is wanted to’, related to a command, or (ii) ‘wants to’, related to an offer; in other words, some degree of obligation or of inclination. We refer to type (1) as MODALISATION and to type (2) as MODULATION; this gives a system as in Figure 10-5.

Expressions Of Probability In The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 688-9):

There is, in fact, a wide range of variants for the expression of modality in the clause, and some of these take the form of a clause nexus. This range is comparable to what we found with other types of modal assessment. If we limit ourselves first to the meaning of ‘probability’, the principal categories are as shown in Table 10-7; …

What happens is that, in order to state explicitly that the probability is subjective, or alternatively, at the other end, to claim explicitly that the probability is objective, the speaker construes the proposition as a projection and encodes the subjectivity (I think), or the objectivity (it is likely), in a projecting clause. (There are other forms intermediate between the explicit and implicit: subjective in my opinion, objective in all probability, where the modality is expressed as a prepositional phrase, which is a kind of halfway house between clausal and non-clausal status.)

An Interpersonal Metaphor Of Modality

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 686):

With modality, it is very clear that certain grammatical environments constitute metaphorical realisations of modality. … (see Figure 10-3). 

Here the cognitive mental clause I don’t believe is a metaphorical realisation of probability: the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it was a figure of sensing. Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does. The reason for regarding this as a metaphorical variant is that the proposition is not, in fact, ‘I think’; the proposition is ‘it is so’. This is shown clearly by the tag; if we tag the clause I think it’s going to rain we get I think it’s going to rain, isn’t it? not I think it’s going to rain, don’t I?. In other words the clause is a variant of it’s probably going to rain (isn’t it?) and not a first-person equivalent of John thinks it’s going to rain, which does represent the proposition ‘John thinks’ (tag doesn’t he?). …

What’s happened here is that there has been a realignment in the realisational relationship between semantics and grammar. … in examples such as the one analysed in Figure 10-3, a modalised proposition is realised as if it was a sequence, by a clause nexus of projection. The effect is that the modality and the modalised proposition are separated, each being realised by a clause in its own right: the modality is realised by the projecting mental clause and the proposition by the projected idea clause.

Manifestations Of Interpersonal Assessment: Clause vs Group

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 686):

The range of assessments assigned to propositions within the domain of the clause and the range of assessments assigned to things within the domain of the nominal group are not, of course, the same. They overlap; but there are kinds of assessment specific to the realm of propositions, just as there are other kinds specific to the realm of things. The common foundation is that they are both projections of the speaker’s assessment. This explains why clausal assessment can in fact be transformed into nominal assessment, as in disappointingly they forecast that ... => the disappointing forecast.

Modal Assessment: Domains Of Realisation

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 679-85):

The full range of modal assessment is shown in Table 10-6. The table indicates the different realisational domains of modal assessment, and it gives an indication of where categories of modal assessment correspond to categories of appraisal as described by Peter White and others. We have also noted assessments that may be realised as the Epithet of a nominal group. Such nominal groups serve as the Attribute of an intensive attributive relational clause with a fact as Carrier – the explicitly objective form of assessment. However, such Epithets of assessment may be assigned to things as well as to metathings: either the nominal group in which the Epithet serves is the Attribute assigned to a Carrier denoting a thing rather than a metathing, or else the Epithet is assigned directly to the Thing of the nominal group in which it serves.

Projection And Interpersonal Assessment

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 679):

Projection is thus dispersed across different grammatical environments. But the different manifestations of projection are not, of course, synonymous. The ideational manifestations make explicit the orientation of the assessment: the logical manifestation is explicitly subjective (e.g. I regret) whereas the experiential manifestation is explicitly objective (e.g. it’s regrettable). In contrast, the interpersonal manifestation leaves the orientation implicit:

ideational, logical – nexus:      explicit orientation: subjective (I regret)
ideational, exper. – 2 clauses: explicit orientation: objective (it’s regrettable)
interpersonal – 1 clause:          implicit orientation (regrettably)

The difference between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ orientation in the ideational manifestation follows from the general difference between a projecting ‘mental’ or ‘verbal’ clause with a Senser or Sayer and a ‘relational’ clause without such a ‘projector’. When the assessment is explicitly ‘subjective’, the Senser or Sayer has to be the speaker I if the clause is ‘declarative’ or the addressee you if it is ‘interrogative’ (as in Do you regret that it’s taken so long for you and your dad to get to work together?). If it is a person other than the speaker or addressee, the clause will still be a projecting one; but it will not be agnate with an interpersonal assessment.

Interpersonal Manifestations Of Projection: Subjective vs Objective Modal Assessment

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 678):

… projection includes both hypotactic projection of ideas/reports and pre-projected facts serving in a ‘mental’ or ‘relational’ clause. A hypotactic projection is always ‘subjective’; the speaker is represented explicitly as the Senser (e.g. I presume) or Sayer (e.g. I admit). A pre-projected fact in a ‘mental’ clause is like hypotactic projection in representing the assessment as ‘subjective’ – the speaker is explicitly represented as the Senser (e.g. I regret). In contrast, a pre-projected fact in a ‘relational’ clause represents the assessment as ‘objective’ (e.g. it is regrettable); but it may be ‘prefaced’ by a ‘mental’ clause with a ‘subjective’ orientation [e.g. I think it is regrettable].

Ideational vs Interpersonal Manifestations Of Projection

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 676-8):

When the need arises in discourse to attribute information to some source, this can be done logically by means of clause nexus of projection; but it can also be done experientially by means of a circumstance of Angle. …

Projection can also be manifested interpersonally in the form of a modal Adjunct … Unlike the logical and experiential manifestations, the interpersonal manifestation does not represent the Sayer or Senser; rather it enacts the speaker’s opinion – an enactment of his or her degree of commitment to the proposition: the proposition is assessed as being projected by somebody other than the speaker. This type of assessment is known as ‘evidentiality’: the modal Adjunct is used to indicate the evidential status of the proposition. The nearest logical equivalent would be ‘people say/they say that ...’, or ‘I hear that’: evidentiality is related to ‘verbal’ clauses and ‘mental’ clauses of perception.

In Chapter 4, we called this kind of modal assessment presumption; the comment Adjunct is realised by adverbial groups with adverbs as Head such as evidently, supposedly, reportedly, allegedly; arguably; presumably and they may have cognate verbs such as report, allege, argue serving as Process in a ‘verbal’ clause or suppose, presume serving as Process in a ‘mental’ clause. …

Projection is thus manifested interpersonally as modal assessment of the presumption type; but it extends beyond presumption to cover quite a few other types of modal assessment as well.

Grammatical Manifestations Of Projection vs Expansion

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 676):

Like expansion, projection is manifested both logically and experientially within the ideational metafunction; but outside the ideational domain, it is manifested interpersonally rather than textually, thus contrasting with the textual manifestation of expansion: see Table 10-5.

That is, while there are conjunctions marking rhetorical relations of elaboration, extension and enhancement, there are no conjunctions marking relations of quoting or reporting; and while there are interpersonal resources for realising projection (e.g. allegedly ‘they allege’; probably ‘I think’), there are no interpersonal Adjuncts or other interpersonal manifestations of expansion. There is thus a significant difference between expansion and projection.

Interpersonal Differences In Grammatical Manifestations Of Cause

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 675-6):

Just as the different domains of manifestation are textually distinct, they are also interpersonally distinct. When the domain of manifestation is a cohesive sequence of clauses, or a paratactic nexus of (free) clauses, the two figures related by expansion are enacted interpersonally as propositions or proposals. This means that each of them can be negotiated in their own right – accepted or denied, complied with or refused, and so on, as in she didn’t know the rules – oh yes, she certainly did. The same is true of the dominant (α) clause of a hypotactic nexus, since if it is a free clause, it realises a negotiable proposition or proposal. However, while the dependent (β) clause supports a proposition or proposal, it does not constitute one itself ; and if it is non-finite, it is even further removed from the realm of negotiation. A causal dependent clause (e.g. because she didn’t know the rules) is thus not presented as directly accessible to negotiation; it has to be accepted without argument.

When the domain of manifestation is a simple clause, there is just a single proposition rather than two. This obviously restricts the scope for negotiation; but when the causal relation is construed within the Process, it has become propositionalised or proposalised, and can be assessed … and negotiated … Here it is no longer the cause or the effect that is held up for negotiation but rather the causal relation. Being construed as nominal groups, the cause and the effect are not negotiable at all.

Textual Differences In Grammatical Manifestations Of Cause

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 674-5):

The different domains of manifestation of expansion, illustrated for cause in Table 10-4, are textually distinct. When the domain of manifestation is a cohesive sequence of clauses or a nexus of tactically related clauses, the conjunction group realising the causal relation is given a textual status within the clause in which it appears: it is either textual Theme or part of the Rheme. While a conjunction group with a structural conjunction such as so or because as Head is obligatorily thematic, there is a choice for conjunction groups with a cohesive conjunction such as consequently as Head …

In a hypotactic nexus, there is a further textual contrast that is not open to cohesive sequences and paratactic nexuses: the dependent β clause representing the cause may be either thematic or rhematic within the clause nexus; …

When the domain of manifestation of expansion is a simple clause, the potential textual status of the manifestation of the cause depends on how it manifested – (1) as minor Process within a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance of Cause, (2) as Process, or (3) as Thing within a nominal group serving as a participant in a circumstantial relational clause.

(1) When it is manifested within a circumstance of Cause, the cause may be given the status of either Theme or Rheme, and, if it is Theme, it may be given the status of predicated Theme; …

(2) When the causal relation is manifested as Process (either in a hypotactic verbal group complex in a clause of any process type, or as the nuclear process in a circumstantial relational clause), its textual status will most likely be rhematic. More specifically, it is likely to be (part of) the transition between Theme and New. …

(3) When the cause is manifested as the Thing in a nominal group serving as a participant, it will have the thematic status assigned to that nominal group as a whole – either thematic or rhematic. But, in addition, it will be within the domain of operation of another textual system – the system of REFERENCE. This means that it is given a textual status as a discourse referent – either recoverable (identifiable) or non-recoverable (non-identifiable), and that it can be tracked in the development of the discourse.

Ideational Differences In Grammatical Manifestations Of Cause

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 673-4):

From an ideational point of view, the difference in meaning relates most directly to the question of what is construed as a quantum of change in the flow of events. The examples in Table 10-4 form a scale extended between two poles. At one pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as two distinct quanta of change, realised by two independent clauses that are related cohesively but not structurally (She didn’t know the rules. Consequently, she died.). At the other pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as a component part of a quantum of change – a participant that can itself be an element of some other quantum of change (cf. the quite incredible ignorance on which it is based must be a cause for grave concern), realised by a single nominal group (her death through ignorance of the rules). Intermediate between these two poles are various manifestations that represent a move from two distinct quanta of change via two interdependent ones to a single one.

The scale is thus one of degree of integration of two quanta of change. This scale of integration is based on the rank scale. At one pole, the sequence of cohesively related clauses transcends the rank scale, and, at the other, the nominal group is located at the rank below that of the clause. These two poles are thus connected by a move down the rank scale. At the same time, this move involves a shift in metafunction: textual – logical – logical + experiential – experiential. Here the meaning of expansion changes with the change of metafunctional manifestation. For example, the manifestation of cause changes from rhetorical relation (textual: consequently) via logico-semantic relation (logical: so, because) to process or minor process and even participant (experiential: cause, through; cause). This means that the category meaning of ‘cause’ changes; so while, for example, consequently and through share the meaning of cause, they differ in the category meanings they assign to it. (We shall see below that some of these realisations of cause are, in fact, ideational metaphors within the domain of the grammar.)

Grammatical Manifestations Of Cause

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 669, 673):

… for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources. For example, if we want to express an enhancing relationship of cause, the opportunities made available by the grammar include the one set out in Table 10-4.

These patterns of wording are agnate, but just like agnate patterns in general they are not synonymous: agnation always embodies both similarity and difference. The similarity is the basis for interpreting the patterns as alike, bringing them together within a paradigm, while the difference is the basis for treating them as variant types rather than as tokens of the same type. The patterns are similar in that they are all manifestations of different kinds of expansion, as illustrated by the examples of the enhancing notion of cause above. But how do the agnate variants differ in meaning? As always with questions of meaning, the answer can be found in its metafunctional organisation: differences turn out to be (i) ideational, (ii) textual and (iii) interpersonal.

Synoptic Summary Of Expansion

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 669-72):

Let us now present a systematic and comprehensive summary of the different grammatical environments in which elaboration, extension and enhancement are manifested: see Table 10-3. As the table shows, the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of (i) metafunction – textual (CONJUNCTION), logical (INTERDEPENDENCY; MODIFICATION) and experiential (CIRCUMSTANTIATION; PROCESS TYPE: relational), and (ii) rank – clause and group/phrase. (The table could, in fact, be extended downwards along the rank scale to take account of patterns below the rank of group/phrase within the logical metafunction: word and morpheme complexes also embody interdependency relations that combine with expansion.)

From a grammatical point of view, the environments set out in Table 10-3 are, of course, all different. But seen from above, from the vantage point of semantics, they are all agnate ways of construing expansion. Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system.

Logical vs Experiential Manifestations Of Expansion

Halliday And Matthiessen (2014: 666-7):

… the three subtypes of expansion (elaboration, extension and enhancement) combine with tactic relations to link one clause to another in the formation of clause complexes. The same pattern was found to operate in the formation of group and phrase complexes. In clause complexes and in group/phrase complexes, expansion is manifested within the logical mode of the ideational metafunction.

But we had already met two experiential manifestations of expansion within the system of transitivity. On the one hand, expansion is manifested in the augmentation of the clause by circumstances: these circumstantial augmentations cover all three types of expansion, with enhancement being the most highly developed one. On the other hand, expansion is manifested in the process of a ‘relational’ clause: ‘intensive’ clauses embody elaboration, ‘possessive’ clauses extension, and ‘circumstantial’ clauses enhancement. In the domain of the nominal group, there are also various manifestations of the three types of expansion. Thus the Qualifier may elaborate, extend or enhance the Thing;

Dispersed vs Compact Grammatical Realisations Of Semantic Systems

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 666, 667):

The semantic system of EXPANSION may be contrasted in this respect with that of FIGURATION: see Figure 10-2. The grammatical realisation of FIGURATION is ‘compact’, being confined to the TRANSITIVITY system of the clause. In contrast, the grammatical realisation of EXPANSION is ‘dispersed’, ranging over more than one grammatical unit. (We shall see later that compactly realised systems such as configuration may become dispersed in their realisation through the process of grammatical metaphor.)

 

Semantic Systems Realised In More Than One Grammatical Domain: Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 666):

There are two fundamental semantic domains of this kind – expansion and projection. For example, the expanding relation of ‘addition’ may be realised (1) cohesively by a conjunction such as also or (2) structurally by (a) an additive paratactic clause nexus marked by the structural conjunction and, (b) a circumstance of accompaniment marked by the preposition with or (c) an additive paratactic group nexus marked by and:

(1) She went to the market. Her son also went to the market.
(2a) She went to the market and so did her son.
(2b) She went to the market with her son.
(2c) She and her son went to the market.

These realisational variants are dispersed in the grammar, since they constitute different grammatical environments; but they are semantically agnate in that they all have the feature of ‘addition’. The fact that they are semantically agnate does not mean that they are synonymous; they share the feature ‘addition’ but they differ in other respects. For example, (2b) and (2c) construe one event, whereas (2a) and (1) imply two events. One semantic system, the system of EXPANSION, has thus evolved to bring together patterns of wording within grammatically distinct units, thereby extending its overall meaning potential.

Semantic Systems Realised In More Than One Grammatical Domain: Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 666):

Every lexicogrammatical system realises some semantic system. For example, we have seen that the grammatical system of MOOD [clause] realises the semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION [proposition/proposal]. Here one lexicogrammatical domain, the clause, corresponds to one semantic domain, the proposition/proposal. In addition, there are semantic systems that are realised by grammatical systems operating in more than one place in the grammar. These semantic domains range over two or more grammatical domains, spanning two or more grammatical units, as in the case of MODALITY noted above.

Metaphorical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 665):

(ii) On the other hand, there are realignments in the realisational relationship between semantic units and grammatical ones. According to Table 10-1, a sequence is realised by a clause complex; the combination of a figure, a proposition/proposal and a message is realised by a clause; and we could add further realisational correspondences: for example, a participant is realised by a nominal group, a process by a verbal group and a circumstance by an adverbial group or a prepositional phrase. But once these couplings between the two strata of the content plane have been established, ‘cross-couplings’ become theoretically possible. 

For example, while sequences are realised by clause complexes and figures by clauses, it is theoretically possible that, under certain conditions, sequences would be realised by clauses – that is, as if they were figures. This is the possibility of metaphorical realisation, which has been taken up in English and many other languages, creating a more complex relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar than the one shown in Table 10-1. 

For example, instead of saying we and this common homeland are spiritually and physically united, so we were deeply pained as we saw ..., we can say that spiritual and physical oneness we all share with this common homeland explains the depth of the pain we all carried in our hearts as we saw .... But the two forms of realisation are not, of course, synonymous, so the effect is one of expanding the meaning potential of the language.

Transgrammatical Semantic Domains

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 665):

(i) On the one hand, there are semantic domains that range over more than a single grammatical unit. Thus the semantic domain of modality is realised in more than one place in the grammar; for example, it is realised by ‘mental’ clauses such as I suppose and by ‘relational’ clauses such as it is possible, by verbal groups with finite modal operators such as may and by adverbial groups with modal adverbs such as perhaps. These modal patterns within different grammatical units are not interchangeable synonyms; they have distinct values within the overall semantic system of modality. As we shall see below, while the forms above can all realise ‘low probability’, I think is explicitly subjective, it is possible is explicitly objective, may is implicitly subjective and perhaps is implicitly objective. This means that the semantic system of modality is more extensive than the modal features of any one given grammatical unit would suggest; it is realised not by a single grammatical unit but by a range of units: semantic unit a ↘ grammatical units m, n & o.

Summary Of Semantic Units In Relation To Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 664, 665):

The account that we have outlined is summarised in Table 10-1. The table shows the intersection of two content strata (semantics and lexicogrammar) with the three metafunctions. Within each metafunction there are semantic patterns that are intermediate between (1) the local semantic units that are realised by the clause and the clause complex and (2) the global semantic unit, i.e. the text.

Table 10-1 shows how semantic units are mapped onto grammatical ones. The principle is that of rank-based constituency – semantic unit a ↘ grammatical unit m; the key grammatical unit is the clause, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 10-1. But while this is the foundation on which the relationship between semantics and lexicogrammar is based, there are two other principles affecting this relationship, making it more complicated but also extending the meaning potential of language: (i) transgrammatical semantic domains – domains of meaning extending across different grammatical units, and (ii) metaphor – incongruent realisational relations between semantics and lexicogrammar.

Intermediate Ideational Semantic Units: Episodic Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 663):

Ideational. Figures combine to form sequences; and these, in turn, may combine to form episodic patterns, as in narratives and other chronologically organised texts or chronological passages within other kinds of text.

Intermediate Interpersonal Semantic Units: Patterns Of Exchange

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661, 663):

Interpersonal. Propositions/proposals combine to form patterns of exchange involving two or more interactants… . At least in some registers such as interviews, classroom discourse and quiz shows, the patterns are regular and predictable enough to appear to be compositional in nature: interpersonal units of exchange consisting of certain sequences of propositions/proposals. But whatever the status is of such exchange patterning, the critical point is that it is interpersonal rather than textual or ideational, and that it is intermediate between propositions/proposals and the whole text.

Intermediate Textual Semantic Units: Information Flow Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661):

Textual. Messages combine to form periodic movements of information… . Such phases of messages help construct the flow of information as the text unfolds and we can refer to them simply as information flow patterns.

Intermediate Semantic Units

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661):

What is intermediate in the semantics between text on the one hand and message, proposition/proposal and figure on the other hand? Messages, propositions/proposals and figures can combine with units of the same metafunctional type to form more extensive semantic patterns in the creation of text. These patterns are distinct for each metafunction.

Semantic Units Realised By The Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 661, 662):

However, even though we have to leave open the question of whether there is a single semantic compositional scale or more than one, we can say something about the lower region of such a scale or such scales. This is the region where semantic units are realised by lexicogrammatical ones. We have already referred to these semantic units throughout the book, and the principle that emerges here is the familiar metafunctional one. The clause is a multifunctional construct in the grammar, one that realises three different semantic units, one for each metafunction: textual – message, interpersonal – proposition/proposal, and experiential – figure. These relationships are shown in Figure 10-1: the three semantic units deriving from the three metafunctions are all mapped onto the clause, which thus unifies the three metafunctional strands of meaning.

A Single Compositional Scale For Semantics?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 660-1):

The upper bound of the semantic stratum is, as we have said, the text: this is the most extensive unit of meaning. The upper bound of the lexicogrammatical system is the clause: this is the most extensive unit of wording. In the grammar, there is a single, generalised compositional scale – the grammatical rank scale (clause – group/phrase – word – morpheme); and we can specify not only the upper and lower bounds of this scale – the clause and the morpheme, respectively – but also the intermediate units of patterning: group/phrase and word. But in the semantics, it is far from clear whether there is a single compositional scale: such a scale would have to be generalised across all registerial varieties of a language, but we know that texts vary considerably from one register to another. It is quite possible that different registers operate with different compositional scales; for example, one such scale was identified in the organisation of class room discourse by Sinclair & Coulthard (1975) and another in the organisation of certain types of conversation by Cloran (1994). This issue can only be settled after a great deal more research into the semantics of text has been carried out.

Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 660):

A text is thus a unit of meaning – more accurately, a unit in the flow of meaning that is always taking place at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. How does this semantic unit relate to the units and unit complexes of grammar – the clause (clause complex), the groups (group complexes) and so on? The folk view is that a text consists of clauses (or ‘sentences’); but this is a misleading simplification of a more indirect – but much more flexible and powerful – relationship. A text does not ‘consist of’ clauses (clause complexes) – there is no part-whole or ‘constituency’ relationship between a text and a clause (complex) and there is no single rank scale with text and clause as ranks. Rather a text is realised by clauses (clause complexes), the two being located on different strata – semantics (the stratum of meaning) and lexicogrammar (the stratum of wording) respectively.

Blogger Comments:

It is important to understand (and maintain) the difference between a text as semantic unit, and text as an instance of language. A text as semantic unit is the highest unit on the semantic stratum, and so, realised by the clauses of lexicogrammar. A text as an instance of language is an instance of language as a whole, not just the semantic stratum.

Logogenetic Patterns And Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 659-60):

Through the accumulation of logogenetic patterns and through the resources of cohesion, lexicogrammar makes a considerable contribution to the development of patterns in a text that extend beyond a single grammatical unit such as the clause, or even a complex of units such as the clause complex; and this is, of course, why lexicogrammatical analysis of a text can tell us so much about how it works. The patterns that are developed in this way are, however, patterns of meaning, not patterns of wording; they are patterns at the level of semantics rather than at the level of lexicogrammar. This is so because text is, as we have emphasised, a semantic phenomenon in the first instance; it is meaning unfolding in some particular context of situation. For example, the grammatical system of conjunction gives speakers and writers the resources to mark transitions in the development of a text – i.e., to mark rhetorical relations used to expand the text step by step; and the rhetorical relations that are marked in this way by conjunctions are semantic relations organising the text as a flow of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

A logogenetic pattern is a pattern of instantiation; that is, a pattern of feature selection and realisation statement activation. Different patterns identify different texts, and different patterns of patterns identify difference 'above' the instance pole of the cline of instantiation. A logogenetic pattern thus includes selections from the lexicogrammatical system of cohesion.