Discontinuous Elaborating Nominal Group Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 561):

In an elaborating nominal group complex, the secondary nominal group may be used to include an embedded clause as Qualifier:

||| Near the San Diego Freeway interchange is the huge Shell Chemical Company plant, part of an industrial district [[[ that was established || before the plain became almost covered with tract housing]]] . |||

Note also that the secondary nominal group may be delayed for textual reasons, giving rise to a discontinuous complex:

While each of these elements is absolutely essential, || one must come first – people.

As with elaborating complexes in general, this is spoken on two tone groups, with tone concord.

Elaborating Paratactic Group Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 560-1):

This is the traditional category of ‘apposition’. As with clauses, appositional group or phrase complexes are characterised by tone concord, signalling the semantic relationship of elaboration. The elaborating group/phrase may restate or particularise; restatements include naming, explanatory glossing and shifts in perspective: a number of the themes of elaborating clause complexes are replayed on a smaller scale. Examples:

[verbal group:] 

(Unfortunately she) got killed, got run over, (by one of those heavy lorries). 

Yes, yes you can; || but then I think || emotion has to be – should be, anyhow – shaped by thought. 

[nominal group:] 

“Too often, human rights in the US are a tale of two nations – rich and poor, white and black, male and female.” 

... it’s because we, the elites, are so great [[ that we carried through the changes]] . 

Freedom and steam – a political ideal and a source of energy – these were the forces [[ that drove the new age on]]. 

How does it differ from other ideologies [[that are often associated with socialism]], such as Leninism? 

Have you read any poetry in the eighteenth century recently – any Pope? 

[adverbial group/prepositional phrase:] 

(I couldn’t have done it) alone, without help. 

This has just been when? – over the last few days? 

Aesthetically, in terms of the vision in your head, what is the relationship between the fiction and the nonfiction?

Paratactic Group And Phrase Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 560):

When groups and phrases are linked paratactically, they are given equal status; any of the members of the complex could, in principle, serve the same function as the whole complex. Thus alongside In the mid-’80s, Apple introduced the LaserWriter – the first PostScript laser printer, we could also have ... introduced the LaserWriter or ... introduced the first PostScript laser printer. 

Groups and phrases can be linked paratactically by apposition and by coordination. As with paratactic clauses the former are elaborating in function, the latter extending. Instances of the enhancing type are less common, since the meanings are too specific to be readily expressed as a relationship between units smaller than clauses; but they do occur. 

There are no paratactic group/phrase complexes linked by projection, except for nominal group complexes such as the examiner’s assessment, ‘a brilliant work’, seems hard to justify, which lie on the borderline of elaborating parataxis.

Taxis And Logico-Semantic Type At Group Rank

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 559):

Group and phrase complexes are formed out of series of nexuses just as clause complexes are formed out of series of clause nexuses. Groups and phrases form nexuses in the same way that clauses do, by a combination of parataxis or hypotaxis with some type of logicosemantic relation; the different possibilities are set out in Table 8-1. Only elements having the same function can be linked in this way. Typically this will mean members of the same class: verbal group with verbal group, nominal group with nominal group, and so on. But it also includes other combinations, especially: adverbial group with prepositional phrase, since these share many of the same circumstantial functions in the clause; and nominal group with prepositional phrase, as Attribute (e.g. plain or with cream).

The General Principle For Distinguishing Group And Phrase Complexes From Clause Complexes With Ellipsis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 558):

Note that we have to differentiate group and phrase complexes from clause complexes involving ellipsis. In clause complexes where the Subject or the Subject and the Finite have been ellipsed in a continuing clause, it is easy to see that a whole clause is involved:

||| Then he went in the Navy || and [∅: he] helped design various gunnery training devices [[ used during World War II]] . |||

But the whole clause is still involved in cases where other elements have been ellipsed:

The Land-Rover was to take him to Santander, then the train [∅: was to take him] to Bilbao for the late afternoon flight.

Here the train to Bilbao for the late afternoon flight is an elliptical clause consisting of three explicit elements – Subject: the train + Adjunct: to Bilbao + Adjunct: for the late afternoon flight, with Finite/Predicator and Complement left out by ellipsis. The general principle is that as long as only one element is involved, we can analyse the complexing at group/phrase rank, but as soon as more than one element is involved, we have to analyse the complexing at clause rank and posit ellipsis in one of the clauses.

Group And Phrase Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 558):

Group and phrase complexes thus serve to develop single elements within a clause (or, if these complexes are embedded, a single element within a group or phrase), serving the same function as a simple group or phrase would. Textually, this means there is a single message; interpersonally, it means there is a single proposition or proposal; and experientially, it means that there is a single figure.

Clause Complex And Tone

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 553, 554):

Table 7-30 summarises the intonation patterns that have been discussed in this chapter as realising systemic selections within the clause complex. These include (i) tone concord: sequences of two or more instances of the same tone; (ii) tone sequences: sequences of two tones, 1 1, 3 1, 4 1; (iii) tonality: post-tonic prolongation of tone group.

Thematic β-Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 551-2):

In general, thematic β-clauses serve to set up a local context in the discourse for the α-clause: they re-orient the development (as in the staging of a narrative), often distilling some aspect of what has gone before to provide the point of departure for the dominant clause, thus creating a link to the previous discourse. For example:

||| I remember an example [[[ that happened || when I was probably no more than four years old]]] . ||| My brother and I were playing in a neighbourhood friend’s garage, || and he disappeared for a minute. ||| When our friend came back || he said || that we had to go home, || ‘because my father doesn’t want any niggers in his house.’ ||| We didn’t even know || what the word was. ||| 

||| The DMK is already annoyed with the BJP government at the Centre || for not favourably considering its demand [[ to recall TN Governor Fathima Bheevi for her swearing in Jayalalitha as CM]] . ||| If the Centre accepts the AIADMK government’s objection || and drops the earlier list, || facilitating the AIADMK government to appoint its choice of judges to the Madras High Court, || then the DMK may voice its opposition to such a move. ||| 

||| If ifs and ans were pots and pans, || there’d be no need for tinkers. ||| 

The textual domain of a thematic dependent clause is often a sub-complex rather than just a single clause, and it may even extend beyond the clause complex in which the clause serves.

Theme In A Hypotactic Clause Nexus

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 550-1, 552):

Let us return briefly to thematic considerations within a hypotactic clause nexus. Compare the following two hypotactic nexuses from a procedural text:

α ^ β fry the onions until slightly brown
β ^ α if you want a more substantial stuffing add a little mashed potato 

In the first nexus, the sequence is α ^ β (progressive sequence). Here the dependent clause is given rhematic status. In the procedure, the process of frying the onions is started before the change of colour takes place: the sequence of clauses is iconic with the sequence of events. In the second nexus, the sequence is β ^ α (regressive sequence). Here the dependent clause is given thematic status: see the first structural layer (Theme₁ ^ Rheme₁) in Figure 7-27. This thematic clause signals a break in the procedure and introduces a variation on the basic method. This re-orientation in the development of the text is achieved by giving the conditional dependent clause thematic status.

The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Cohesion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 550):

The sequence of clauses within a clause complex is also textually significant as a cohesive domain; in particular, the clause complex licenses certain pattern of ‘ellipsis’ that may involve co-reference. Thus in the paratactic sequence 1 He pointed his arrow, 2 but saw nothing, the Subject of the secondary clause is ‘elliptical’ (but [Subject:] ∅ [Finite/Predicator:] saw [Complement:] nothing), and is interpreted as co-referential with the Subject of the primary clause (he). Similarly, ‘elliptical’ Subjects of non-finite dependent clauses, tend to be interpreted as co-referential with the Subjects of their dominant clauses (as in α I went on to birds β starting with my mother’s feeder). Thus in a clause complex, paratactic and hypotactic co-referential ellipsis may work together to signal the continuity of thematic Subjects, e.g.:

||| 1 The scientific community is beginning to recognise the opportunity || 2α but [Subject:] ∅ has done little so far || 2β [Subject:] ∅ to provide useful conceptual tools and means of [[communicating these linkages]] [[[ that can be used || to build the social and political consensus necessary for action]]].

The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Information & Tonality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 550):

In spoken English, the sequence of clauses within a clause complex may be mapped onto one or more information units; that is, there are textually different ways in which a clause complex can be mapped onto an information unit complex. The unmarked mapping is one (ranking) clause = one information unit. Thus the paratactic sequence 1 ^ 2 and the hypotactic sequence β ^ α would each be chunked into two information units (realised by different tone sequences, tone 3 followed by tone 1, and tone 4 followed by tone 1, respectively). However, there are regular departures from this unmarked pattern.

(1) When the dependent clause in a hypotactic nexus is included within the dominant clause, the nexus may be chunked into three information units, with three points of New information (as in //4 John //4 who arrived late //1 missed the speeches //). 

(2) When the dependent clause follows its dominant clause in a hypotactic nexus (progressive sequence), it may be included in the same information unit as the dominant clause, with the focus of New information within the dependent clause (as in //1 I came because he told me //). 

(3) When the logico-semantic relation of the nexus is one of projection, the projecting clause may be part of the same information unit as the projected clause, being tonally cliticised to it.

The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Thematicity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549-50):

The sequence of clauses within a clause complex is textually significant from a thematic point of view. This sequence is fixed in the case of parataxis (with the exception of parataxis in the environment of projection); here the primary clause is in a sense thematic in relation to the secondary one even though the sequence is fixed: the primary clause may serve as a point of departure or orientation for the secondary clause. However, in the case of hypotaxis, the sequence is not fixed; it can be progressive (α ^ β) or regressive (β ^ α) – or the hypotactically dependent clause may be included within the dominant clause (α << β >>). For example, the hypotactic nexus β as he came to a thicket, α he heard the faint rustling of leaves is regressive, with the dependent clause as he came to a thicket given thematic status within the nexus. In hypotactic nexuses of certain logicosemantic types, the dependent clause may be the focus of theme predication.

Clause Complex As Message Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):

At the same time as it contributes to the rhetorical-relational organisation of text, the clause complex also serves as a domain of organisation within the textual metafunction. We have seen that from a textual point of view clauses serve as messages – as quanta of information in the flow of discourse; based on this insight into the textual nature of the clause, we can characterise the clause complex as a message complex.

Blogger Comments:

From a theoretical point of view, this might be seen as a poor choice of term, since 'complex', in every other case, is applied only to rank units — to forms, not functions — and concerned with the logical metafunction, not the textual metafunction.

The Clause Complex And The Rhetorical-Relational Development Of Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):

The clause complex is, as we have emphasised, the most extensive domain of grammatical patterning — of patterns of wording, patterns organised in terms of logical, recursive systems and structures. It makes a major contribution to the organisation of text, serving to realise (rhetorical) sequences within (rhetorical) paragraphs. In other words, it contributes to the rhetorical-relational development of text by providing grammatical resources for ‘choreographing’ local rhetorical complexes. The grammar also provides resources for guiding the development of text beyond the domain of the clause complex, but these resources are concerned with cohesion rather than with structure.

Blogger Comment:

The term 'paragraph' might be seen as a poor choice of term for a semantic unit, not least because it is not mode-neutral. A paragraph is an organisation of written language, and would be more appropriately applied to a unit on the stratum of graphology.

Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):

Such projections may be embedded as they stand, as nominalisations – equivalent to functioning as Head. But frequently they occur as Postmodifier to a noun of the ‘fact’ class, e.g. the fact that their team had won. Fact nouns include ‘cases’, ‘chances’ and ‘proofs’, related to propositions; and ‘needs’, related to proposals. We refer to these projections, therefore, as facts. Whereas any clause that is projected by another clause, verbal or mental, is either a quote (paratactic) or a report (hypotactic, or embedded if the process is a noun), any clause that has the status ‘projected’ but without any projecting process is a fact and is embedded, either as a nominalisation serving as Head or as Postmodifier to a ‘fact’ noun serving as Head. This includes some of those functioning in mental clauses, as mentioned above, and all projections functioning in relational clauses (since a relational process cannot project). It also includes ‘impersonal’ projections such as it is said ... , it is believed ... , it seems ... , where the ‘process’ is not really a process at all, but simply a way of turning a fact into a clause.

Embedded Projections Serving As Phenomenon Of Mental Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):

However, it is possible for an idea to be associated with a mental process while not being projected by it, as in they rejoiced that their team had won. When one clause projects another, the two always form a clause nexus; but here, where that their team had won comes readymade as a projection, rather than being turned into one by the process of rejoicing, the idea is embedded as Phenomenon and the whole forms a single clause. This happens particularly when a proposition is an object of emotion: when the fact that ... is a source of pleasure, displeasure, fear, surprise, amusement, interest or some other emotion.

The Projection Of Goods-&-Services (Proposals)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):

Parallel to projected information (propositions) is the projection of goods-&-services (proposals), which likewise may be paratactic, hypotactic, or embedded as Qualifier to a noun; and again the phenomenon may be verbal (locution, projected by the processes offer, command, suggest/suggestion, etc.) or mental (idea, projected by intend/intention, wish, hope, etc.). The difference in the mental processes is that propositions are projected by cognitive processes whereas proposals are projected by desiderative ones.

Projection By The Names Of Verbal And Mental Acts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):

Both verbal and mental acts have names, such as statement, query, belief, doubt; and these also serve to project, with the projected clause embedded as Postmodifier: the belief that the sky might fall on their heads. There is a point of overlap between these and embedded expansions of the elaborating type (relative clauses): both may be introduced by that, and this produces ambiguities such as the report that he had submitted disturbed everyone:

(a) the report [[ = that he had submitted ]]
‘the document which he had drafted’ 

(b) the report [[ “ I that he had submitted ]]
‘to hear that he had yielded’

Mode And Level Of Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):

Jill says something; this is a verbal event. To represent it, I use a ‘verbal’ clause Jill said, plus a quote of her verbal act ‘It’s raining’. The two have equal status (paratactic), because both are wordings. That is to say, both my locution Jill said and Jill’s locution it’s raining are lexicogrammatical phenomena. Fred thinks something; this is a mental event. To represent it, I use a ‘mental’ clause Fred thought, plus a report of his mental act (that) it had stopped. The two have unequal status (hypotactic), because one is a wording while the other is a meaning. That is to say, my locution Fred thought is a lexicogrammatical phenomenon, but Fred’s idea ‘that it had stopped’ is a semantic one.

Thus parataxis is naturally associated with verbal projections and hypotaxis with mental ones. But, as we have seen, the pattern can be inverted. I can choose to report a verbal act, presenting a locution as a meaning; and I can choose to quote a mental act, presenting an idea as a wording. If we report speech, we do not commit ourselves to ‘the very words’: if I say Henry said he liked your baking, you would not quarrel with this even if you had overheard Henry expressing his views and knew that what he had actually said was That was a beautiful cake.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, interdependency status turns on whether or not a clause in a nexus can 'serve on its own' (p509). Here Matthiessen claims, without supporting argument, that interdependency status turns on whether or not clauses in a nexus represent the same level of content, and concludes that there is a natural relation between verbal projection and parataxis and mental projection and hypotaxis.  That is, the argument is an instance of the logical fallacy known as petitio principii ('begging the question'), since the argument's premises assume the truth of its conclusion.

Summary Of Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):

Blogger Comments:

 Note the error in table layout: the 'Fact' cell should be coterminous with the 'Nominal group' cell.

Facts (Projections) And Acts (Expansions)

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):

A fact is thus analogous, as a form of projection, to what we called an ‘act’ as a form of expansion. Each represents the least prototypical form of its own general category; and hence the least differentiated. Whereas there is a clear distinction between expansion and projection in their finite clausal forms – between, say, (projection) he never asked if/whether it was snowing and (expansion) he never came if/when it was snowing – there is only a minimal distinction, and perhaps even blending, between (projection: fact) she liked the snow falling (that the snow was falling) and (expansion: act) she watched the snow falling (as the snow was falling). Seeing that facts and acts come so close together in this way, we can understand how it is that the same scale of interdependency types (parataxis/hypotaxis/ rank shift) is associated with both these logical-semantic relations.

What Kind Of Projection Is A Fact?

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):

What kind of projection is a fact? It is still a meaning, a semantic abstraction, not some third type differing both from meanings and from wordings (indeed, there is no third level to which it could belong). But it is not a meaning created in anybody’s consciousness, nor is it emitted by any signal source; it is simply got up so as to function as a participant in some other process – typically a relational process, but sometimes also a mental or a verbal one. Not, however, in a material process; facts cannot do things, or have things done to them.

Embedded Proposals: Impersonal Form

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):

As with propositions, there is an impersonal form of expression, it is required/expected that you wait in line; these are the imperative (proposal) equivalents of it is said/thought that ... with propositions. They have an important function as explicitly ‘objective modulations’ whereby the speaker disclaims responsibility for making the rules.

Projected vs Embedded Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 546-7):

Like a proposition, a proposal may either be embedded as Qualifier to one of these nouns, as in the examples above, or may function on its own as a nominalisation e.g.

You’ve said that one of your editorial rules is [[not to publish your buddies]].
Again, a first requirement is [[ to do no harm to organisational frameworks [[ that, through years of evolution, are finally at the stage [[ where they are supporting programs [[ that are actually helping us to get on with the business [[ of increasing understanding]] ]] ]] ]] ]].
The title for king fell out of use because its final requirement was [[ that the man [[ who aspires to be king]] would first pay all the debt [[ owed by every single man and every single woman in the community]] ]]

and we can construct similar pairs, for example

(a) ||| he insisted || that they had to wait in line |||
         α                  ‘β

(b) ||| he resented (the rule) [[that they had to wait in line ]]

where in (a) it is the ‘mental’ clause he insisted that does the projecting, while in (b) the projected clause is embedded. The ‘mental’ clause with the embedded fact clause is of the ‘emotive’ subtype, just as with propositions. But the ‘mental’ clause projecting the idea clause in (a) is not a ‘cognitive’ one but rather a ‘desiderative’ one. With ‘mental’ clauses, the general principle is that embedded fact clauses serve as Phenomenon in ‘emotive’ clauses, whether the facts are propositions or proposals; and that propositions are projected by ‘cognitive’ clauses whereas proposals are projected by ‘desiderative’ ones.

Blogger Comments:

Note that insisted here serves as a verbal Process (projecting a locution clause), not a mental one (projecting an idea clause).

Proposals As Embedded Fact Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 546):

Finally, as may be expected an embedded projection may belong to the class of proposals rather than propositions, as in

The thorniest problem for next week’s conference is [[to settle the relationships between them and the rest of the country]]. 

The surprise was [[to meet Russians (not intellectuals, but common folk) [[who took a contrary view ]] ]]. 

You mentioned the need of the artist and the right of the artist [[to withdraw]] and yet you have lived consistently a public life. 

if I had not been asked to terminate a life, I would not be so vehement about the need [[to help people who are begging for death]] 

The two-year study by Amnesty International, its first comprehensive analysis of North America, accuses Washington of failing in its duty [[to provide a moral lead to the rest of the free world]].

This defines the fourth category of ‘fact’ nouns referred to earlier:

(4) needs (nouns of modulation) relate to proposals, which are inherently modulated – e.g. ‘it is necessary for ... to ...’.

These, again, have no corresponding mental process verbs; they differ from nouns like order (the name of a verbal process) and insistence (the name of a mental process) in the same way that fact differs from thought and statement — they do not imply a Sayer or a Senser.

Hypotactic Projection vs Embedded Fact Clauses Across Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 545):

Table 7-28 summarises the distribution of hypotactic projection of idea and locution clauses in clauses nexuses vs. embedded fact clauses across process types. The table includes both propositions and proposals; 

Blogger Comments:

Importantly, note that the table mistakenly presents the 'perceptive' example of projection, (we saw) that the boats had been turned, as a hypotactic report of a clause complex instead of an embedded fact serving as Phenomenon of a single clause. Perceptive mental processes do not project idea clauses into existence.  The Phenomenon that is seen here is the state of affairs resulting from a past event. See § 7.4.6 (pp505-6).

Fact Serving As Range In Cognitive And Verbal Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 544-5):

But even with some cognitive and verbal processes, a projected element may occur which is not projected by that process; for example:

[cognitive]
Just before dress rehearsal, under pressure from the company, he reluctantly accepted [[that such ideas were outmoded]], and dropped them. 

The second category of temple land was particularly important and it was accepted [[that the holders of this land could sub-lease it]]. 

[verbal]
‘That was pretty obvious,’ smiled Sir Cedric, ‘and I admit [[I once had doubts about you]]’. 

With sly winks and discreet sniggering he conveyed [[[that he knew very well || that there was a great deal more than Philip confessed]]]. 

And there will always be ‘borderline cases’, instances where the line is hard to draw.

Fact vs Idea In Impinging Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 544):

Like ‘middle mental’ clauses, ‘effective’ ones either project ideas within a clause nexus or include fact clauses as Phenomenon, e.g. 

 

The first means ‘in my opinion there’s no one here’, with there’s no one here as an idea. The second means ‘there’s no one here, and that worries me’, with there’s no one here as a fact. The fact exists prior to the occurrence of the mental process; but the idea does not – it is brought into existence in the course of the mental process. Thus the second is agnate with there’s no one here, which worries me; but we cannot say there’s no one here, which strikes me. The two are very distinct in speech, thanks to the intonation pattern (see below); the different analyses are given in Figure 7-25. 

 

The difference in structure is clear from the intonation pattern. That of (a) corresponds to I rather think there’s no one here, with falling tonic (tone 1) on here and perhaps a separate falling-rising tonic (tone 4) on strikes/think; that of (b) corresponds to it worries me, the emptiness of the place, a compound tone group with tone 1 on worries and tone 3 on here/emptiness, showing clearly that that there’s no one here is functioning as a postposed Subject. Again, it strikes me is a cognitive process clause, and so can project an idea, whereas it worries me is and emotive one and cannot.

Fact As Phenomenon In Impinging Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):

In fact, the ‘emotive’ type with a fact clause as Phenomenon is more common in the ‘effective’ variant of agency (the ‘please’ type) than the ‘middle’ one (the ‘like’ type): the Phenomenon is explicitly construed as an Agent bringing about the Medium/Senser’s involvement in the process of emotion.

It did not surprise him very much [[to find [[that the door opened on the latch]] ]], for it was so old and worn that it offered little security. 

She had never reconciled herself to things which hurt her, and sometimes he was frightened [[[that when bad things began to happen || she would have so little habit of optimism to support her ]]]. 

The evidence against him was by no means decisive, but both judge and jury seem to have been influenced by the fact [[that the doctor himself was a morphine addict]].

The Meaning Of An Idea vs The Meaning Of A Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):

 

The meaning of (a) in the preceding paragraph is that Mark Antony’s thinking brought the idea that Caesar was dead into existence (as with Mark Anthony believed/imagined that Caesar was dead); but the meaning of (b) is that the already existing fact that Caesar was dead impinges on Mark Antony’s consciousness (as with that Caesar was dead scared Mark Anthony).

Idea vs Fact In A Mental Clause [Diagnostics]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):

Note the following pair (Figure 7-24):

In (a) the clause that Caesar was dead is projected as an ‘idea’ by Mark Antony thought. It is therefore a separate, hypotactic clause; and hence

(i) it cannot be preceded by the fact;
(ii) it cannot be replaced by Caesar’s death;
(iii) it can be quoted: ‘Caesar is dead,’ thought Mark Antony;
(iv) it can be replaced by the substitute so: Mark Antony thought so.

In (b), however, the clause that Caesar was dead, although it is a projection, is not projected by Mark Antony regretted, which is a clause of emotion not of cognition. It is not an idea but a fact; hence it is embedded, and hence

(i) it can be preceded by a ‘fact’ noun;
(ii) it can be replaced by a nominal group Caesar’s death;
(iii) it cannot readily be quoted: Mark Antony regretted, ‘Caesar is dead’ is very forced; and
(iv) it can be replaced by the reference item it, but not by the substitute so: Mark Antony regretted it (not so). 

The form Mark Antony dreaded that Caesar was dead is an example of a type that allows both interpretations, and hence is ambiguous: as idea (hypotactic), ‘he thought (and wished otherwise)’, or as fact (embedded), ‘he was afraid because’.

Blogger Comments:

In the case of Mark Antony regretted, ‘Caesar is dead’, the projection ‘Caesar is dead’ is an idea (ranking clause), not a fact (embedded clause).  Here the verb regretted serves as a cognitive — rather than emotive — mental Process, the lexical choice adding an 'emotive' feature to the cognition. This is the same principle as lexical choice adding a behavioural feature to a verbal Process, as in 'Caesar is dead', mumbled Cassius.