Things vs Qualities: Different Kinds Of Role In Participant Structure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207):

We said that both things and qualities are construed as participants. This does not mean that they are different kinds of participant. Rather, it means that within the structure of a participant, they serve different kinds of role.

Typically, a quality combines with a thing to make up a participant in a figure: a dry plate, where the quality 'dry' is Epithet in the nominal group. The only context in which a quality serves on its own in a participant role is as Attribute; here it stands in intensive relation to a participant, either (i) in a figure of being, where the participant is Medium/Carrier (i.e. its sole function is to have the quality ascribed to it) or (ii) in a figure of doing, where the participant is Medium/Actor or Medium/Goal and quality results from the doing; for example:

being: The plate's dry —I've made the plate dry

doing: I've wiped the plate dry

Note that in the doing figure, where I is Actor, the Attribute could be omitted: I've wiped the plate; in the being figure it cannot, since the process itself is one of ascription and the other participant, if present, is merely the ascriber.

Qualities: Between Things And Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

As a category, qualities lie somewhere along a cline between things and processes, and their status varies considerably among different languages. In English, qualities belong more closely with things, since they contribute primarily to the construction of participants: grammatically, English favours construing a quality as Epithet in a nominal group, and the class of adjective is clearly related to that of noun. (By contrast, in Chinese, where qualities are typically construed clausally, as Attribute, rather than nominally, as Epithet, the adjective is equally clearly related to the verb.) Here English is similar to Latin, where in the traditional grammars a general class "noun" was classified into "noun substantive" and "noun adjective":

Things As The Frame Of Reference Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

Since qualities are assigned to things, they are construed with things as their frame of reference: in the first instance, a quality characterises a thing relative to other things in the same (primary) class. Thus a thick book is not a 'thick thing'; rather, it is a 'thick book' as opposed to a 'slim book': the scale of 'thick' to 'slim' is relative to book and a thick book would be much thicker than a thick envelope. This characteristic is particularly noticeable with scalar qualities, which have received particular attention in semantic studies; but it is also, in principle, a feature of taxonomic adjectives — even those construing complex classes. For example, the criteria for assigning 'wooden' to a 'spoon', a 'house' and a 'carriage' are fairly different in terms of the actual material make-up of these things.

Three Kinds Of Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

These values may be of three kinds, according to the type of contrast they set up: 

(i) binary, e.g. ('dead'/'alive'); 

(ii) scalar, e.g. ('happy/'sad'); 

(iii) taxonomic, e.g. 'wooden'/'plastic'/'stone'/... . 

Of the three, the most complex, experientially, are the taxonomic qualities; for example, the taxonomy of materials (whether a folk taxonomy or one that is more scientifically informed) is based on a variety of different features, such as (in a folk taxonomy) its appearance, its texture, its range of functions, its relative value in different contexts, and the like. Taxonomic qualities are thus the closest to things; they are often realised as denomina! adjectives, or even as nouns, and they tend to function as Classifier rather than Epithet (i.e. they sort things into classes rather than describing them).

Qualities (vs Things)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205-6):

The discussion of 'facets' illustrates the difference between things and qualities of things; it also illustrates the indeterminacy of the distinction. Let us begin our discussion of qualities by relating them to things.

[Previously] we discussed the complementary contributions made by qualities and things in the construal of participants. We showed that qualities and things differ in two related respects, temporal stability and experiential complexity: things tend to persist through time and to represent intersections of many dimensions, whereas qualities tend to be less stable through time and tend to represent values on single dimensions. Qualities thus construe values on dimensions such as size (e.g., 'big/ small'), weight ('heavy/light'), and shape ('round'/ 'square'/ 'rectangular'/ 'oval'...).

Cohesive Function Of Expansions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205):

As with names of projections, names of expansions often serve a role in creating cohesion in discourse: e.g. Instances such as these ..., Another way of approaching the situation ..., That aspect hadn't occurred to me. Such expressions construe preceding figures and sequences as participants in their turn, and so enable the speaker or writer to make explicit the organisation of the discourse itself.

Expansions As Things: Ambivalence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205):

Since things of these various kinds are the names of semantic relationships, it is not surprising that their status is somewhat ambivalent. Consider an expression such as a volume of poetry: this may be volume as Thing, qualified as being concerned with poetry, e.g. she picked up an old volume of poetry from the shelf, or Facet (extending: amount), e.g. she has just published a new volume of poetry. The latter example shows up the nature of the ambivalence: the quality 'new' is presumably a quality of the poetry (cf. I'd like a strong cup of tea). 

Similarly we have the ambivalent relationship between parts and wholes (the basis of synecdoche), and between symbols and what they represent, regarding which to construe as the participant in particular figure. In general, the uncertainty that arises is whether the expansion is to be construed as an independent thing or as a facet of something other than itself. This uncertainty is sometimes foregrounded under pressure from the textual metafunction: as Theme, for example, do we say the end of that story you're never going to hear! or that story you're never going to hear the end of?

Enhancements As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204-5):

Things of the enhancing type have already been cited as a micro category. They construe one or other of the general logical semantic relations of cause, manner, time and place. As Facet, they specify some circumstance of an element functioning as Thing: the cause/result/purpose of the breakdown, the manner of the breakdown, the time/occasion of the breakdown, the place/location of the breakdown; cf. also the circumstances of the breakdown. As Thing, they give the logico-semantic relation itself the status of participant; here the usual words are reason, way, time, place, and the phenomenon becomes a figure realised by a qualifying clause: the reason/way/time/place we broke down. These are closest to the borderline with projections: we may have either expansion the reason for which we broke down, or projection (the reason) why we broke down. Those with 'reason' and 'way' often enter into an identifying relation with some other figure; for example, the reason we broke down was that/because the engine overheated.

Extensions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Similarly, those of the extending type may also function in either of these two grammatical roles. As Facet, they specify some quantity (either by container, e.g. a jar of jam, or by division, e.g. a piece of cake), some aggregate (e.g. a crowd of onlookers), some aspect or component (e.g. the other side of the argument, the top of the mountain, the trunk of the tree), or something added or substituted (e.g. an extension of your ideas, the latest addition to the family, an alternative to this proposal). As Thing, again, they are participants, typically concrete objects (e.g. a glass jar, the top [= lid] of the canister, build an extension on the property).

Elaborations As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Those of the elaborating type may function in the nominal group either as Thing or as Facet. As Facet (always constructed with of), they serve to construe the element functioning as Thing in some particular guise or perspective; for example, picture in this will give you a general picture of the situation, kind in a jet cat is a kind of passenger vessel, example in there were no examples of successful integration. As Thing, they are participants in their own right, either 'objects' (e.g. is that picture for sale) or 'abstractions' (e.g. Darwin showed how species first evolved).

Expansions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Certain categories of thing denote an element which is an expansion of something else, either elaborating it ('kind of', 'instance of', or 'symbol of'), extending it ('part of', 'amount of', 'collection of, or 'extension of'), or enhancing it ('time of', 'place of', 'cause of', 'manner of'). The following are some typical examples:

Cohesive Functions Of Projections As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this type have an important role in discourse, because they function anaphorically to refer to (and at the same time to classify) previous sections of text interpreted as projection. For example:

[Graham's] simulated atmosphere evolved in much the same way as the real atmosphere had – the temperature rose, and evaporation and rainfall over the tropical ocean increased closely matching actual records.

Based on these findings, Graham concludes that the increases in sea surface temperatures could well have caused the intensification of the hydrological cycle, explaining the warming.

Projections As Things: Four Subtypes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this type fall into four subcategories, defined by their interaction with modality: cases, chance, proofs and needs. Cases represent simple facts; chances represent facts to which some degree of modalisation is attached; proofs are demonstrations of facts. The fourth category, that of needs, are facts accompanied by modulation, that is, where the projection is that of a proposal rather than a proposition.

Projections As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this category are the names of types of projection; in the taxonomy of things, they are semiotic abstractions, some discrete and some non-discrete, and as a grammatical class they are referred to under the heading of fact nouns. They are grammatically distinct because they can function as Thing in a nominal group with a fact clause as Qualifier, e.g. the notion that pigs can fly. Such clauses have the property that they can stand alone as participants in a figure, e.g. that pigs can fly is an intriguing notion.

Projections And Expansions Construed As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 202):

In the various categories of thing we find a manifestation of the same very general semantic principles that we have established before, the principles of projection and expansion. Certain categories of thing have grammatical properties that relate them to one or the other, see Figure 5-9.

Strategies For Assigning Qualities To Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 201-2):

It will be clear that both these strategies, the expansion of word to group and the accumulation of contrasting words, are strategies for assigning qualities to things: we can gloss a slipper, for example, as a soft supporting garment worn by either sex at the lower extremities of the body. In general the qualities involved will come from the same semantic domains in either case; and there is often fluctuation between the two strategies within the language — we sometimes talk of slippers and sometimes of soft shoes. …

And although we have presented the two strategies as discrete, there are of course intermediate modes of construing that form a continuum between the two: noun-compounding (more syntagmatic) and morphological derivation (more paradigmatic). So we find compounds such as pushbike, motorbike; and derivational series like cycle : bicycle, monocycle, tricycle. It is not difficult to invent new categories if we need them such as bikelet or megabike. Note also the morphological strategy for deriving casual terms from formal ones: bicycle > bike (cf. omnibus > bus). 

The sort of strict taxonomy that is typically associated with related series of nominal groups is often a feature of special registers of the language. The limiting cases of such taxonomies are those found in the specialised technical registers of science and technology; these include some which are partially or even wholly designed in a conscious exploitation of the grammatical resources involved. The "things" that are construed in this way include the more abstracts concepts of a scientific theory, the virtual objects that are postulated to explain the more arcane phenomena that impinge on human experience.

The Principle Of Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9):

This resource, the construal of systematically related lexico-semantic sets, illustrates well the principle of "lexis as most delicate grammar" (Halliday, 1961; Hasan, 1987; Matthiessen, 1991b; Cross, 1993). We have discussed above the principle that categories in the experiential grammar are ordered in delicacy, so that starting from the very general types of process that are construed into figures, we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach the degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. Thus lexis (vocabulary) is part of a unified lexicogrammar; there is no need to postulate a separate "lexicon" as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate.

Construing Things Paradigmatically

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198):

But we also have to recognise that there is a systematic relationship among a set of terms such as bicycle, tandem, scooter, car, van, truck and bus. Here the form of wording gives no clue to any such relationship; all we have is an inventory of different words. Yet these also form some kind of a taxonomic set: they are all wheeled vehicles. We can have taxonomies of things without using the syntagmatic resources of the nominal group, simply by the device of naming — the organising principle is not syntagmatic but paradigmatic.

But there is a difference. The paradigmatic strategy, that of inventing new names, typically construes sets of things which are systemically related but not in a relationship of strict taxonomy. This resource is typically associated with feature networks: that is, networks made up of systems of features, such that each lexical item (as the name of a thing) realises a certain combination of these features selected from different systems within the network — a particular clustering of values of systemic variables.

Construing Things Syntagmatically

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

The expanded form of the nominal group makes explicit the systematic taxonomic relationship which links one thing with another: it is clear that (theoretically at least) a touring bike is a kind of bike, a bicycle wheel is a kind of wheel. It is always possible, of course, to expand in a metaphorical way, as with cart wheel (in turning cart wheels) and Catherine wheel (a kind of firework); these are not, strictly speaking, kinds of wheel, so we have to recognise either that these fall outside the taxonomic organisation or that the taxonomy itself is being extended metaphorically. But this does not affect the general principle at work; indeed, it is the taxonomic principle which makes such divergence possible.

Construing Things Into Strict Taxonomies

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

This syntagmatic resource serves prototypically to construe things into strict taxonomies, based on the principle of hyponymy. Thus a touring bike is a kind of bike, a reinforced touring bike is a kind of touring bike, and so on. Since touring is a Classifier, this means that it is one of a defined set: perhaps touring/racing/mountain/exercise/trail. Epithets do not assign classes, but they specify a particular dimension of taxonomic space: e.g. source European/American/Japanese...'.

One type of classification is meronymic (part-whole), where the thing is classified by the whole of which it forms a part, e.g. bicycle wheel 'wheel (that forms part) of a bicycle'. These are often indeterminate in meaning: if definite, they tend to be strictly meronymic (somebody stole my bicycle wheel), whereas if indefinite, they are often classifying by type (the kids were playing with a bicycle wheel 'wheel for/ from a bicycle').

The Syntagmatic Potential Of The Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

We have referred above to the syntagmatic potential of the nominal group: how the grammar builds up the representation of a thing, expanding outwards by modification. For example:

The expansion proceeds by adding qualities; these qualities, as we have seen, are typically ordered in English from right to left according to the degree of systemicity, with the most systemic (most permanent, least particularised) at the right, the most instantial (least permanent, most particularised) at the left. Broadly speaking these are distributed by the grammar into distinct functions as Classifier, Epithet, Numerative, and Deictic.

Micro Category Of Thing: Nuisances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Nuisances: nuisance, mess, disaster, shambles

General category: 'abstraction'

Particular features: formed as countable (a nuisance) but largely restricted to singular indefinite (forms such as nuisances, the nuisance, your nuisance are rare and outside this category); typically exclamative and/or ascriptive (that's a mess; what a mess), and accompanied by interpersonal Epithets (a horrible shambles, an utter disaster).

Micro Category Of Thing: Types Of Enhancement

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Types of enhancement: reason, time, place, way

General category: between 'semiotic object' and 'abstraction'

Particular features: countable, though typically occurring in singular; are names for major circumstantial classes (reason : why; time : when; place : where; way : how); can be qualified by relative clause (without the need for a circumstantial marker did you see the way [that] they glared at us?), varying with clause having corresponding relative adverb (did you see how they glared at us?), and sometimes both together (do you know the reason why they glared at us?).

Micro Category Of Thing: Drinks

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Drinks: coffee, beer, whiskey

General category: 'substance'

Particular features: whereas in general a substance, if counted, means 'a kind of' (these soils are less fertile), the counted form of this category may mean either 'a kind of' (I like this coffee) or 'a measure of' (Would you like a beer? Two coffees please!).

Micro Category Of Thing: Two-Pronged Implements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 196):

Two-pronged implements: scissors, pliers, tweezers, tongs, shears, clippers

General category: 'object (material)'

Particular features: inherent plural (hence pronominalised as they: the scissors/ they are in the drawer)', counted as a pair of... (two pairs of shears, not two shears), but not referred to as both (contrast a pair of shoes, both shoes).

Micro Category Of Thing: Musical Instruments

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195-6):

Musical instruments: piano, cello, flute, drum

General category: 'object (material)'

Particular features: represented as general class with definite article (play the flute, study the cello); alternate between Range and Goal (play the piano / shift the piano); performer construed as derivative in -ist or -er (pianist, flautist, drummer).

Micro Category Of Thing: Small Human Collectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Small human collectives: family, household, class (at school)

General category: between 'conscious' and 'institution'.

Particular features: common number (as institution: the class is ~ are writing a report)-, can be Senser (the family seemed to think that... ); pronominalised as it - they, not he/she, but self-referenced as we and addressed either as you or in third person (Do you eat together?/Does ~ do the household eat together?).

Micro Category Of Thing: Domestic Pets

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Domestic pets: cats, dogs

General category: between 'conscious' and 'animal'.

Particular features: alternation between he/she and it; general nouns as 'animal' (she's a stupid creature); individuated by proper names, with attitudinal variants; addressed as if conscious (what do you want?); expanded in talking to children (pussy-cat, puppy-dog).

Micro Category Of Thing: Professional Associates

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 195):

Professional associates: doctor, dentist, hairdresser, lawyer, teacher, butcher

General category: 'conscious'.

Particular features: may be "possessed" by clients (my doctor, Jane's music teacher — on model of kin: my daughter, Fred's first cousin); formerly masculine, gender now (redesigned as) common (he/she)', membership very variable: butcher etc. probably leaving this class with change in shopping practices.

The Elaboration Of Things Into Micro Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194-5):

… there is no limit to the differentiation that may be drawn between one class of things and another; each of these very broad categories comprises numerous micro categories within which (as a glance at Roget's Thesaurus quickly reveals) relatively small sets of closely related things are grouped together. We naturally think of these as being semantic groupings, for which we can find general labels by moving a little way up in the taxonomy: parts of the body, household appliances, edible grains, spectator sports, emotional disorders, and so on, and so on. Such groupings are most readily presented as lists of words and word compounds; but they are not simply lexical, they are lexicogrammatical, displaying some characteristic combination of grammatical properties or preferences.

Participants: On A Scale Of Distance From The Human

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194):

… the grammar, in its role as a theory of human experience, categorises those phenomena that it construes as participants by locating them in a spectrum based on a scale of distance from the human — at one end humans themselves, and things most similar to (i.e. categorisable as) humans, at the other end things that are farthest away from being human: concrete substances in the material world and abstract "substances" in the semiotic world. By reference to the grammar of the clause on the one hand, and of the nominal group on the other, certain broad categories are set up such that some things will fall squarely into one category, while others will lie on the borderline, showing certain features of one category and certain features of another, or finding themselves equally at home in both.

The Dual Nature Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193-4):

The general picture we are suggesting, then, is that it is in the category of thing that the grammar captures to the greatest measure the complexity of the elemental phenomena of human experience. Put together with the different types of figure, which construe the complexity of goings-on upon the broad foundational categories of doing, sensing, saying and being, the different types of participant we have sketched in here foreground the dual nature of experience as being at once both material and semiotic — a world that is constituted out of the interaction between entities and meanings. On each of these dimensions there is a progression from things that are most like to things that are least like ourselves. The grammar imposes a categorisation that is compromising, fluid, indeterminate and constantly in process of change, along with changes in the human condition and in the interaction of humans with their environment. Yet it is also strong enough to bear and carry forward this wealth of often conflicting experience, and transmit it over and over again from one generation of human beings to the next

Ordering Of Things According To Different Criteria

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194):

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Semiotic Objects And Semiotic Abstractions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Discrete semiotic abstractions: intermediate between semiotic objects and (non-discrete) semiotic abstractions. These include non-personalised 'facts' and 'cases', mental entities like 'thoughts' and 'fears', and speech functions 'questions' and 'orders'; they are bounded, cannot function as Sayer but can accept a projection as Qualifier (e.g., the order to retreat, her anxiety that she might be disqualified).

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Conscious Beings And Institutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Human collectives: intermediate between conscious beings and institutions. These can function as Senser in figures of sensing of all kinds, including those embodying desideration; but they accept either singular or plural pronouns, and if singular pronominalise with it (e.g. the family says it is united / the family say they are united).

Simple Things: Intermediate Between Animals And Material Objects

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Natural forces (tides, hurricanes, etc.); instruments (as extended body parts); powered artefacts (locomotives, industrial machines, etc.): intermediate between animals and material objects. These are typically active (including effective action, moving other objects), but non-volitional; hence when the Actor is of this category, the process does not admit phases that construe intentionality (e.g. the hammer tried to force the lock).

Simple Thing: Semiotic Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192-3):

abstraction (semiotic)

typifying role: scope-defining participant in figure of sensing or saying [Range in mental process, e.g. find out more information; in verbal process, e.g. tell the truth]; also participant in figures of being & having [e.g. possessed Attribute, have you any evidence].

pronoun it; general noun: some attitudinally loaded ones such as nonsense [non-attitudinal ones for some, e.g. idea, fact]; number category: mass.

unbounded semiotic substance; may be qualified by projection [as Thing + Qualifier in nominal group, e.g. the knowledge that they had failed]', no material existence.

Simple Thing: Semiotic Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

object (semiotic)

typifying role: scope-defining participant in figure of saying [Range in verbal process, e.g. read the notice, tell me a story]; also active participant [Sayer, e.g. the book says.,., the regulations require... ].

pronoun it/them, they; general noun (none); number category: count (singular/plural).

may also exist as material object, e.g. book, clock; has potential for being symbol source [hence Sayer in projecting clause].

Simple Thing: Institution

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

institution

typifying roles: active participant in figure of saying [Sayer, e.g. the ministry announced...], of doing [Actor, e.g. the school is closing down]; also of sensing, typically thinking and intending [Senser, e.g. the class decided that...]. 

pronoun it ~ they; general noun people, place, set-up etc.; number category: count (singular).²

has potential for voluntary action, typically semiotic with authority of a collective [verbal process of ordering, mental process of deciding or judging]; also material [material processes, middle and effective].

² Institutions of course do appear in the plural — although relatively infrequently: the plural pronoun they typically refers to a single institution.

Simple Thing: Material Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191-2):

abstraction (material)

typifying role: as Phenomenon in figure of sensing [e.g. estimate the depth], as participant in figure of being [Carrier in ascriptive figure, e.g. the colours were too bright; Value in identifying figure, e.g. the score was 2-1].

pronoun it; general noun: none; number category: mass.

has no extension in space and is unbounded; typically some parameter of a material quality or process.

Simple Thing: Substance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

substance

typifying role: thing as part of circumstance [Range in prepositional phrase, especially Location, e.g. on the ground], rather than having direct role as participant in figure.

pronoun it; general noun stuff; number category: mass.

has extension in space, but unbounded; can be manipulated and measured; if participant in figure, is typically being distributed [Goal, e.g, cut the string, keep rain out].

Simple Thing: Material Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

object (material)

typifying role: impacted participant in figure of doing [Goal, e.g. build a house, pick up sticks].

pronoun it/ them; general noun thing; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has extension in space, bounded so participates in figures as unit whole; if acting, then in figure of happening [Actor in involuntary process, e.g. the button fell off}.

Simple Thing: Animal

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

animal

typifying role: active participant in figure of doing [Actor, typically middle, e.g. birds fly].

pronoun it/they; general noun creature; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has potential for self-initiated action and movement [processes in which animal occurs as Actor are (unconscious but) voluntary; and may also be effective, e.g. ... was bitten by a snake]', also for perception [Senser in process of seeing & hearing],

Simple Thing: Conscious

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190-1):

conscious (prototypically adult human)

typifying roles: active participant in figure of sensing [Senser, e.g. do you think so?], of saying [Sayer, e.g. the teacher said.,.] and of doing [Actor: middle, e.g. Pat skipped, or effective, e.g. Chris held the rope].

pronoun he/she/they (also I/you); general noun person etc.; number category: count (singular/ plural).

has potential for voluntary action [material: doing, including doing to another participant; verbal (semiotic): saying] and conscious processing of all kinds [mental: sensing, including feeling, thinking, intending as well as perceiving].

Simple Thing Taxonomy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190):

These primary categories of things represent an ordering of the phenomena of experience. This ordering has to do with their inherent potential for bringing about change: that is, their ability to initiate processes and to affect other participants.

One way of exploring this is by noting which participant roles each category of participant is typically associated with. The critical roles, in this respect, are those of Senser, Sayer and Actor, operating respectively in figures of sensing, saying and doing & happening. When we investigate these, however, we find that the overall categorisation of phenomena that is revealed in this way displays a further dimension of complexity: at the highest level, all phenomena are distributed into two broad experiential realms, the material and the semiotic. This suggests that we should further modify the schema of primary categorisation by splitting it into these two realms as shown in Figure 5-7. This figure also splits the categories of object and abstraction between the two realms.

The Conscious/Non-Conscious Distinction In English

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

The most prominent reflex of the conscious/non-conscious distinction in English is that it is built into the system of pronouns:

This distinction is all-pervasive, since third-person pronouns provide one of the main resources for constructing discourse through anaphora. The boundary between conscious and non-conscious, of course, is fluid and negotiable: different systems, and different speakers (or the same speaker on different occasions), may draw it in different places. But the guiding principle is that 'conscious' means prototypically adult human and may be extended outwards (a) to babies, (b) to pets, and (c) to higher animals — as well as by rhetorical strategies of various kinds.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, less anthropocentrically, the grammar construes anything with a nervous system and sense organs as the medium of a mental process of perception, and thus as conscious. That is, the clause the ant saw the worm construes the ant as conscious.

Things: Primary Distinctions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

The major classes of thing recognised in our school grammars have traditionally been presented as a list of category meanings of the word class 'noun': something like "persons, other living beings, objects, institutions, and abstractions". We will start with this categorisation, modifying it to take account of the point that the primary distinction within figures is that between conscious processing and other forms of experience: the key participant in a conscious process, the Senser, is restricted to things that are construed as being endowed with consciousness, so we take conscious/non-conscious as the primary distinction. It is also helpful, in the case of English, to make an initial distinction between objects, which are treated as bounded, and substances, which are not. This gives us an initial categorisation in the form 

'conscious/non-conscious: animals/institutions/objects/substances/abstractions'.

The Relative Complexity Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 188):

There is thus a marked contrast between things and all other elements. A quality enters into a figure only as Attribute; a process only as Process; and a circumstance only in some particular circumstantial role. Other than this, the only functional environment for qualities, processes and circumstances is that where they form parts of things — that is, grammatically, where they enter into the structure of the nominal group.

The fact that these other elements can themselves enter into the specification of a thing is another indication of the relative complexity of things.

Things: Rôles In Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 188):

We were able to define a thing by reference to one particular role within a figure: namely, as Carrier in an ascriptive figure construed grammatically as Carrier + Process + Attribute. But it is characteristic of things that they can take on a variety of roles in figures of all kinds. Here is a set of examples to illustrate this functional range:

Here we find one and the same class of thing functioning 

(a) as Actor, as Goal, and as Beneficiary in a material process; 

(b) as Phenomenon in a mental process; 

(c) as Sayer, as Verbiage, and as Target in a verbal process; 

(d) as Carrier, as Token, and as Value in a relational process, and 

(e) as Minirange in a circumstance of Location.

Even if we generalise across these configurational types in ergative terms, these examples still cover the full participant spectrum: the 'book' occurs as Medium, as Agent, as Beneficiary and as Range.

Things vs Other Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 187):

We have observed that things tend to be relatively stable in space and time, and relatively complex in their semantic make-up and in their interrelationships; and that these special characteristics of things are construed linguistically in various ways. By comparison with other elements, things tend to stand out 

(i) by their varied roles as elements in figures, 

(ii) by the overall weight and discursive force of their primary categorisation of experience, 

(iii) by their tendency to be elaborated into numerous micro-categories, 

(iv) by their complex internal organisation, and 

(v) by their highly systematic relationship one with another.

Taxonomic Qualities vs Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186-7):

Taxonomically organised qualities are often named by denominal adjectives, but they are still experientially simpler than the corresponding nouns. Consider e.g. nationality, philosophical persuasion, and biological kind: as qualities, these are classes and therefore closest to things, but their extension is still greater than that of the things that correspond to them: see Table 5(1).

Thus an Albanian always means 'a human citizen of Albania', whereas the adjective Albanian could refer to any of a large number of concrete or abstract entities: Albanian wine, Albanian literature, Albanian economy.

Non-Scalar Qualities vs Things: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186, 187):

Even with qualities that form binary and taxonomic oppositions rather than scalar ones, there seem to be differences in experiential complexity between adjective (quality) and noun (thing) pairs. A standard example of this contrast between qualities and things involves the two dimensions of maturity and sex: see Figure 5-6.

Qualities As Experientially Simple

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186):

Qualities tend to be experientially simple, specifying values along a single dimension or scale such as age, size, weight, loudness, colour, according to either scalar or binary distinctions (e.g. scalar: 'large' — 'small', 'tall' — 'short'; binary: 'male' — 'female', 'dead — 'alive'). Things, on the other hand, tend to be experientially more complex than qualities. They are often definable in terms of an elaborate taxonomy where several dimensions (parameters) are needed to distinguish them.

Consider for example the scale of size. The various qualities named by large, big, giant, small, tiny, and so on indicate a region on the scale, but do not specify the "substance" of whatever it is that size is being ascribed to. If we look for objects that are characterised in terms of size, we will find e.g. a giant, a morsel, and a mini. These, however, involve far more than the single dimension of size. A giant is 'any imaginary being of human form but of superhuman size and strength'. A morsel is 'a small bite or portion of food'. A mini is usually understood as 'a small car capable of holding a normal complement of passengers'. Small objects are typically objects of some particular kind, e.g. droplet, booklet, and kitchenette.

Classifiers: Qualities Of The 'Class' Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184-5, 211):

Semantically, Classifiers are qualities of the 'class' type (cf. Table 5(4)): they are like things and may be derived from things, but unlike things they do not have independent existence — they cannot be established in referential space and re-identified in running discourse. So for example although a 'passenger' is undoubtedly a thing, in a passenger train, where passenger functions as Classifier, it is being construed as a quality; hence it cannot be picked up by anaphoric reference — we cannot say this is a passenger train; they must have valid tickets. (Contrast this train is for passengers; they must have valid tickets, where passengers is functioning as Thing.) Grammatically, Classifiers are realised by 'substantives' or by 'adjectives', and this indeterminacy in grammatical class is symbolic of their status as qualities which are like things.

Simple Participants: Qualities And Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184, 185, 186):

Grammatically speaking, (simple) participants are realised by nominal groups, which are made up of both things and qualities. In terms of the structure of the nominal group, the cut-off point between things and qualities is between the Classifier and the Thing: see Figure 5-5.

This distribution of qualities and things across the nominal group indicates two related points:

(i) things are more time-stable than qualities; and

(ii) things are more experientially complex than qualities. …

But this difference in experiential complexity is in turn related to the first of our two points, in that whatever is being construed as stable, as having persistence through time, is essentially a construct, an assemblage of different qualities, that (to borrow Jespersen's metaphor) can be crystallised only as an organic whole. The nominal group embodies this essential association between complexity and permanence.

Figures Metaphorised As Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184):

The theoretical principle that a participant can be defined as the potential carrier of an attribute holds for participants of all kinds. We need however to make one proviso: namely, that more or less any figure can be construed metaphorically "as if" it was a participant. This is a central feature of grammatical metaphor. An example would be Our earlier encounter with this species [had led us to believe that...] where 'encounter' is semantically a process: cf. We had encountered this species earlier [and as a consequence we believed that...]. If 'encounter' is construed congruently in the grammar as a process, it cannot enter into an ascriptive figure. But once it is metaphorised into a participant, it can: our earlier encounter with this species had been almost disastrous. This in fact is one of the discursive contexts favouring this type of grammatical metaphor, and hence serves indirectly as a further illustration of the general principle we have outlined.

Participants As Expansions Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 183-4):

There is the same range of types of ascription as are found in ascriptive figures, and these can be interpreted in terms of the different categories of expansion. These are exemplified in the following table: 

The table illustrates how participants are interpretable as expansions of things — they are things, with added qualities. It also shows how things can be construed into highly elaborate taxonomies (e.g. this extremely desirable two-storey double-brick executive residence) which are categorised by ascriptive figures of these different types — elaborating, extending and enhancing. The Thing in these examples corresponds to the Carrier of the agnate figure of ascription: 

these nutritious swedes : these swedes are nutritious :: 

these vases from the 18th century : these vases are from the 18th century ::

my aunt's teapot : the teapot is my aunt's/belongs to my aunt. 

Note that with extension, there may be a reversal of the Carrier-Attribute correspondence: the Thing may correspond most naturally to the Attribute, as in 

my aunt has a teapot : the leek has a stem.

Blogger Comments:

Note that 'circumstantial' includes 'projection' as well as 'enhancement': a book about teapots.

Participants As Things That Can Accrue Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 183):

Experientially, there is a 'carrier' — the Thing — and there are 'attributes' — Epithets and other modifiers. However, participants are construed not only experientially but also logically, which means that the Thing (typically) saves as a Head that can be modified by successive attributes and that this modifying relation is inherently ascriptive. There is thus no equivalent, in the nominal group, of the Process in an ascriptive figure; this is construed instead as the logical relation of modification, indefinitely repeatable. For instance, corresponding to the figure the swede is nutritious we have the participant the nutritious swede, which, unlike the figure with its experiential, multivariate organisation (Carrier + Process + Attribute), can be logically expanded through further modification: the tasty tolerant orange nutritious swede. That is, participants are construed as things that can accrue attributes.

Participant Defined As A Potential Carrier Of An Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182-3):

We have already set up the general theory of participants, defining them in relation to ascriptive processes of being, being at, and having, in a process-participant configuration. There are three elements in such a configuration: the Process, intensive, possessive or circumstantial; the Attribute, which is being ascribed by one or other of these processes; and the Carrier. It is the role of Carrier which defines the concept of a participant. A participant, according to this theory, is that which may have assigned to it, in the discourse, properties, parts or circumstantial features. For example:

(a) properties (Process of 'being')

some dishes are very tolerant

the grain looks orange and full

a kitchen should be a cheerful place

the swede is more nutritious than the turnip

(b) parts (Process of 'having')

it has branching stems covered with a green succulent flesh

spinach has a decided flavour which some people dislike

they have a pleasant fresh flavour

(c) circumstantial features (Process of 'being at')

this plant is like chicory

these mangoes are from Mexico

the seeds will be inside long coffee-coloured pods

this effect might be because of over-heating

This analysis reveals two important aspects of a participant: 

(i) that it is a thing that can 'carry' or be ascribed attributes, and 

(ii) that the ascription may be of different kinds — intensive (elaborating), possessive (extending), circumstantial (enhancing).

Simple Participants: Things And Qualities

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182):

Participant vs Process: Referential Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 181):

Both the difference in temporal permanence and the difference in experiential complexity are reflected logogenetically. Participants tend to persist in the unfolding of a text; and since they do, they can accrue various qualities. In contrast, processes cannot persist in text: unlike the deictic system of the nominal group, the deictic system of the verbal group, the tense system, is not a system for tracking textual instances of processes as a text unfolds. To achieve persistence in text, processes have to be reconstrued metaphorically as participants. When processes are construed as if they were participants, they can be established and maintained as referents in a text; hence under these conditions they also can accrue various qualities.

Process vs Participant: Taxonomic Elaboration

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180-1):

Nominal groups have, in fact, far greater potential than verbal groups for creating experientially complex categories; and this reflects a fundamental difference between participants and processes. The nominal group has the potential for intersecting any number of qualities in the representation of a participant; and this makes it possible for the taxonomic ordering of participants to be considerably more elaborated than that of processes.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: A Path Between Interpersonal And Experiential Reference Points

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180, 181):

Finally, the structures of both types of group constitute a kind of path between the interpersonal reference point, reflected in the Deictic or Finite, and the experiential one, reflected in the Thing or Event But in the case of the verbal group, the path is made up of one or more temporal relations: past/present/future in relation to a moment in some dimension of time construed between 'now' and the time of the occurrence of the event; for example, see Figure 5-3. 

In the nominal group, on the other hand, the path from Deictic to Thing is not a chain in time — alt[h]ough it does reflect time in another way. The path goes through qualities of various kinds, beginning with qualities that are textual and transitory (unstable in time) and moving towards increasing permanence (time-stability) and experiential complexity.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: Primary Experiential Category

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

Secondly, both types of group include a specification of a primary experiential category — Thing in the nominal group and Event in the verbal group. But in the simple verbal group, this is the only semantic category that is lexicalised — other categories are represented grammatically by auxiliaries; whereas in the nominal group, there is a large amount of other lexical material.

Temporal Complementarity Of Persistent Participants And Unfolding Processes: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 179, 180):

Both types of element begin with a location in the 'here & now': they construct a path from the spatio-temporal moment defined instantially by the interaction base — the 'here & now' of the act of speaking — to a primary category of ideational phenomena: see Figure 5-2.

For example:

In other words, both types of group include deixis. But the deixis is of two different kinds: nominal deixis (such as near/remote) and verbal deixis (such as past/present/future), structurally realised as Deictic and Finite respectively. What this suggests is that, since processes occur in time — their mode of existence is temporal — that is how they are tied to the speech situation; whereas participants exist in some kind of referential space, which may be grounded concretely in the speech interaction (this = 'near me'; that = 'away from me') but may also be a more abstract, discoursal space. The latter is the space where we 'record' discourse referents as we work our way through a text (this = 'about to be mentioned (by me)'; that = 'mentioned earlier').

Processes vs Participants: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178, 179):

Being elements, participants and processes occupy roles in figures; but whereas processes only serve in the single role of Process, participants (as we have seen) range over a much wider experiential spectrum — the direct participant roles of Actor, Goal, Senser, Phenomenon, and so on, and also the indirect participant roles within circumstances such as Location and Cause. Thus, seen from the point of view of figures, participants are construed as being experientially more complex, in the sense that they can take on a variety of configurational roles: see Figure 5-1. This difference between participants and processes is also reflected in differences in their internal organisations, as we shall suggest below

Internal Organisation: Figures vs Elements (Circumstances And Relators)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

The situation with circumstances and relators is a little more complicated.

(i) Circumstances of the "macro" type are realised by prepositional phrases, which as we have seen are like miniaturised clauses; their components are thus of different types — a (minor) process plus a participant. Circumstances of the simple type, on the other hand, are realised by adverbial groups; these are groups of adverbs, like more soundly, not so very fast, with the single adverb again as the limiting case.

(ii) Relators are typically realised by conjunctions, like and, so, if, that, because, however; these can form groups, such as as if, and yet, but conjunctions are more often expanded by adverbs (just because, even if). In addition there are numerous other types of relator prepositional phrases (in addition, in the event (that), for fear that), nominal groups remaining from earlier prepositional phrases ( [at] the moment (that), [on] the day (that)), and various expressions involving non-finite verbs (supposing (that), provided (that)). The relator construes a logico-semanuc relation between the clauses in a clause nexus (realising a sequence), but it is itself an element in the structure of one or other of the two clauses concerned; e.g. if you have some ink fish preserved in oil, add a few slices at the same time as the halibut.

Internal Organisation: Figures vs Elements (Participants And Processes)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

However, there is a significant difference between elements and figures in the nature of their internal organisation. While figures consist of phenomena that are ontologically of different types — participants, processes and circumstances, the components of an element belong in principle to the same type. That is, the components of a participant are themselves potential participants, and the components of a process are themselves potential processes. Grammatically speaking, participants are realised by nominal groups, which are groups of nouns; and processes are realised by verbal groups, which are groups of verbs. The limiting case of a group is a single word.

Elements: Internal Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

These phenomena are "elemental" in relation to figures (just as chemical elements such as H and O are elemental in relation to compounds such as H₂O, CO₂). But the elements themselves may be internally complex, as in the following examples of processes and participants:

Congruent Grammatical Realisations Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

The congruent (prototypical) grammatical realisations of these types of element in English are as follows:

Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

Elements serve as component parts of figures. Three primary types of element may be differentiated according to the generalised categories of configurational roles: process, participant, and circumstance. In addition to these three, we need to recognise a fourth category of element, the relator; this is the element which forms figures into sequences.

Degree Of Involvement As General Domains Within The Semantic Space Of Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175-6):

What this brings out is that there are a small number of very general domains within this overall semantic space, which may be construed in different ways according to the status they are assigned within the figure. For example, there is one area that is concerned with the spatial orientation of the process. Construed as an outer circumstance, this appears as the position within which the process unfolds; construed as an inner circumstance, it means the direction towards which the process is oriented; construed as a participant, it shows up as receiver or recipient in the process. Thus this general motif is manifested in a form which corresponds to its ecological niche at that location. Note that the boundaries do not exactly coincide across the different bands of the helix; in any case, they are fuzzy, and they tend to become more fuzzy with increasing distance from the centre. Our characterisation here is inevitably somewhat overdeterminate. The outer circumstances, in turn, are typically agnate to clauses (e.g. while he was in LA, he sent a parcel); thus we could construe the same general relationships over again in the form of a sequence — grammatically, as one nexus in a clause complex.

Degree Of Involvement: Participant > Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 175):

The examples in Table 4(10) illustrate both the different degrees and the different kinds of involvement of elements falling outside the Process + Medium nucleus.

Angle

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174-5):

This type of circumstance relates to projection rather than expansion, and specifically to the projecting not the projected component Hence there is no agnate participant; instead, the Angle corresponds to the process of saying (grammatically, the projecting verbal clause in a 'locution' nexus) or the process of sensing (grammatically, the projecting mental clause in an 'idea' nexus). Thus according to the newspaper corresponds to the newspaper says; and to her students corresponds to her students think.

Manner: Comparison

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

This category lies on the borderline of elaborating and extending: compare he spoke like an expert 'in the manner of', he spoke as an expert 'in the role of'. The analogous participant is that of Attribute in an ascriptive clause as in he was/seemed an expert, which is construed as elaborating; but the analogous sequence is an enhancing clause complex he spoke as if he was an expert.

Blogger Comments:

The 'elaborating' interpretation of Manner: comparison disappears if the analogous ascriptive clauses are instead:

Accompaniment

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 174):

The circumstance of Accompaniment does not correspond to any one particular participant role. Rather, it corresponds to an extending of the participant itself, by addition or variation: John came with Mary is agnate to both John and Mary came; Mary came without John is agnate to Mary but not John came; Mary came instead of John is agnate to not John but Mary came. Grammatically, the analogous type of participant is one represented by a nominal group complex.

Cline Of Involvement x Expansion And Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 173-4):

The "degree of involvement", in the sense of how deeply some element is involved in actualising the process that is construed by the figure, can thus be represented as a cline: the difference appears not only between participants and circumstances as a whole, but also within each of these primary categories, so that there is a continuum from one to the other along this scale.

At the same time, and cutting across this cline of involvement, we find that — like the participants themselves — the circumstantial elements fall into distinct types according to their relationship to the Process + Medium nucleus. These types correspond to the four transphenomenal categories of logico-semantic relations that are now familiar: the circumstance is either a circumstance of projection or a circumstance of expansion and, if the latter, then either elaborating, extending or enhancing. If we combine the degree of involvement with the logico-semantic categories, we can represent the elements of a figure in the form of a helix (Figure 4-14).

Degree Of Involvement: Subject

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 173):

The difference in the degree of involvement is also reflected in the extent to which an element is available for a critical role in the interpersonal metafunction. Prototypically, as we have noted, participants can be assigned the status of Subject, being made to carry the burden of the argument, whereas circumstances cannot. This distinction is however being obscured in Modern English, where although the prepositional phrase as a whole cannot function as Subject, the nominal group inside a prepositional phrase often can; e.g. the grass shouldn't be walked on.

Blogger Comments:

The obvious exceptions are circumstantial relational clauses, which are metaphorical.

Degree Of Involvement: Participant vs Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 173):

Sometimes some entity can be construed in a figure either as a participant or as (an element in) a circumstance; in that case, construing it as participant means that it is being treated as more directly involved. Compare pairs of examples such as:

The pianist is more likely to escape unscathed as a circumstance than as a participant; likewise, the answer seems more impenetrable if guessed at than if guessed.

The Status Of Macro Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 172-3):

What is the status of these "macro circumstances"? They are really reduced or minor figures, functioning as elements inside other figures. The preposition is a kind of miniverb; the line between circumstances and figures is a very fuzzy one, and we often find agnate expressions where one is a prepositional phrase and the other a non-finite clause: cf. I washed it using sugar soap, she came accompanied by her children. The entity that occurs inside the macro circumstance is therefore already entering into a relationship with a reduced form of a process; its participation in the main process is thus mediated and oblique. We can thus contrast the different statuses of two entities where one is a direct participant and the other enters in circumstantially; e.g. this dictionary was published in two volumes, where this dictionary is Goal while two volumes enters into the publishing process indirectly in a circumstance of Role.

Degree Of Involvement: Reflections In The Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 172):

The different degrees of involvement are reflected in the way the figure, and its elements, are realised in the grammar of the clause. A participant is realised as a nominal group, and is typically placed next before or next after the verbal group realising the process. Circumstances typically occur further away from the process, and are of two distinct types. Type 1, simple circumstance, represents a quality; this type is realised as an adverbial group … . Type 2, macro circumstance, is realised as a prepositional phrase, which in turn consists of preposition + nominal group. The nominal group, as we have seen, construes an entity — something that could function directly as a participant Here however the entity is functioning only as a circumstantial element in the process: a location, or an instrument, or an accompanying entity, or so on (e.g. don't walk on the grass, I washed it with sugar soap, she came with her children); it enters into the clause by courtesy of the preposition, only indirectly so to speak.