Tuesday, 1 May 2012

Identifying Clause: Decoding Is Medium + Range, Encoding Is Agent + Medium

Halliday (1994: 165):
[With] decoding clauses (those where Token = Identified/Medium) the passive [ie receptive] is … rather rare. By contrast, in an encoding identifying clause, where the Token is Identifier/Agent and the Value is Identified/Medium, passive [ie receptive] is more or less as frequent as active [ie operative] … but only the active [ie operative] will accommodate a further agency …

(Second Order) Agent In Identifying Relational Clauses: Assigner

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 292):
In the identifying type, it is normally possible to add a feature of agency (an Assigner) provided the clause is operative (Token as Subject) …

Agent In Attributive Relational Clauses: Attributor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 292):
In the attributive type, this is a distinct function analogous to the material Initiator: the one that brings about the attribution … This is the Attributor.

Agent In ‘Impinging’ Mental Clauses: Phenomenon

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 294):
[The please [impinging’] type of mental process] shares certain features of an effective material process: it occurs freely in the ‘receptive’ (I’m pleased with it), and it can be generalised as a kind of ‘doing to’ (What does it do to you? — It pleases me).  Here the Phenomenon shows some semblance to an Actor: from the ergative point of view, they are both Agent.  The like [‘emanating’] type, on the other hand, displays none of these properties …

Agent In Mental Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 292):
In a mental process, it is the Phenomenonprovided the process is encoded in one direction, from phenomenon to consciousness ['impinging'] and not the other way round ['emanating'].

Agent In Material Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 292):
In a material process, it is the Actor — provided the process is one that has a Goal; otherwise it may be present as the Initiator of the process.

The Agent [Definition]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 289-90):
… in addition to the Medium, there may be another participant functioning as an external cause. This participant we will refer to as the Agent. Either the process is represented as self–engendering, in which case there is no separate Agent; or it is represented as engendered from outside, in which case there is another participant functioning as Agent.

Doing Vs Happening: Agent

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 284-5):
The difference between ‘doing’ and ‘happening’ derives from a different principle from the transitive one of extension–and­–impact: ‘happening’ means that the actualisation of the process is represented as being self–engendered, whereas 'doing' means that the actualisation of the process is represented as being caused by a participant that is external to the combination of Process + Medium. This external cause is the Agent.