Quoted vs Reported Offers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Quoted offers naturally retain the property of being variously realised in the mood system:

declarative: She said: "I can do the laundry."

interrogative: She said: "Shall I do the laundry?"

imperative: She said: "Let me do the laundry!"

However, reported offers can always be realised in the same way as reported commands — as in the case of reported propositions, the distinction in orientation between giving and demanding is realised by the projecting clause; for example:

command: she told him —> to do the laundry

offer: she offered (promised; threatened) —> to do the laundry

The category of reported projected proposal is thus realised generally as a perfective non-finite clause when it is reported.

Offers: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative), offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:

declarative: I can do the laundry.

interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?

imperative: Let me do the laundry!

Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation (see e.g. Halliday, 1985: Section 10.4).

Reported Projections: Speech Function And Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114-5):

As was said above, in quoting, where the projected clause retains its mood, the general verb say can be used whatever speech function is being projected. In reporting, on the other hand, the projected clause is no longer specified for mood; its speech function is signalled by the verb in the projecting clause (asked, ordered, etc.). This gives the projected element more of an ideational status (cf. its treatment in traditional grammar as "object" of the projecting verb), and opens up the way to a series of agnate expressions such as (the king ordered) "Execute him!" / that he should be executed / him to be executed/him executed/his execution.

Grammatical Realisations Of Projected Propositions vs Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Grammatically the distinction between propositions and proposals is constructed as follows.

When the projection is reported, propositions are realised by finite bound clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by irrealis (infinitival) non-finite bound clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above: 

(he said) that he had done the laundry : (she told him) to do the laundry.

When the projection is quoted, propositions are realised by indicative clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by imperative clauses — taking the contrasting examples from above: 

(he said) "I have done the laundry" : (she said to him) "do the laundry". 

These realisational patterns are summarised below:

Projected Proposals (Non-Actual) vs Projected Propositions (Actual)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Projected proposals are non-actual, or uninstantiated: that is, the occurrence of a projected proposal is always future in relation to the figure that projects it. In contrast, propositions are actual, or instantiated: that is, the occurrence of a proposition is located in actual time (which may be past, present or future).

Projected Propositions vs Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

The interpersonal system for dialogic interaction thus creates a fundamental distinction between 'content' as proposition and 'content' as proposal. This distinction is then reflected in the ideational system of projection: a figure is projected in one or other of these two modes, as a proposition or as a proposal. The two categories combine freely with ideas and locutions:

Blogger Comments:

The table confusingly presents verbally reported locutions as ideas. Instances of genuine reported ideas are:

• he thought —> that he had done the laundry (proposition)
• she wanted him  —> to do the laundry (proposal).

'Proposition ideas' are projected by cognitive mental Processes, whereas 'proposal ideas' are projected by desiderative mental Processes.

Proposition (Information) vs Proposal (Goods-&-Services)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113-4):

Information is either given or demanded; in either case it is encoded as a proposition. Similarly, goods & services are either given or demanded, but the linguistic act is a mediating one, specifying the (typically non-linguistic) action that embodies the exchange, as an offer to do or a demand that something should be done. This is a proposal for a deed, one that commits either the speaker (giving) or the addressee (demanding); together with a third type, which is a combination of these two, viz. suggestion: Let's do the laundry.

Interpersonal Semantics: Semiotic vs Material Commodities of Exchange

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113):

Interpersonal semantics is centrally concerned with varieties of symbolic exchange. Here, as in other places in the meaning base, the system is organised in such a way that it creates a difference between non-symbolic reality and symbolic reality, between phenomena and metaphenomena. The "commodity" that is being exchanged in interpersonal dialogue is either semiotic or material: it is either one that is construed by language itself — information — or it is one that exists independently of language — goods & services. In the first case, language constitutes the exchange; in the second, it facilitates the exchange of a nonlinguistic commodity. For example:

No Temporal Constraints On Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

In general, there is no temporal constraint between the projected and the projecting figures: the projected figure may be past, present or future relative to the projecting one. The dimension affected by projection [is] order of reality, not time. However, there is a major dichotomy between two types of projection which does have temporal implications. To explore it, we have to look briefly at a fundamental interpersonal category, that of mood.

Default Alignments: Quoted Locutions And Reported Ideas

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111-2):

The second consequence is that although the two variables, locution/idea and quoting/reporting, can combine in either of the two possible alignments, there is a natural default condition, which is that locution goes with quoting and idea goes with reporting, as shown in Figure 3-6. 

The reason for this is clear where the first-order phenomenon is one of saying (prototypically shared semiosis), the projected figure can be presented as if it was also of the same order: Harriet said + "Shall I feed the cat?" (reversible as "Shall I feed the cat?" + said Harriet). 

Where the first-order phenomenon is one of sensing (unshared semiosis), the projected figure has no counterpart on the first-order plane of experience and cannot be naturally presented as if it had; so, Harriet wondered + whether she should feed the cat. 

But there is always the possibility of semogenic extension by cross-coupling; so we also find the corresponding marked alignments: locution/report Harriet asked + whether she should feed the cat, and idea/quote Harriet wondered + "Shall I feed the cat?" — the latter being again reversible. See Halliday (1985: Chapter 7) and Nesbitt & Plum (1988).

Quoting vs Reporting: Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

There are two consequences of this. The first is that, in quoting, the form of wording is still that of the first-order realm of experience: "Shall I feed the cat ?" — taken by itself, there is nothing about this to show it is a projection. In reporting, on the other hand, the form of wording is clearly marked as being of the second order: whether she should feed the cat has lost its first-order semantic features — and hence has to be projected by words that specify its particular speech function: asked/wondered, not said/thought.

Equal vs Unequal Semantic Weight: Quoting vs Reporting

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

But there is another variable intersecting with the above. We pointed out in Chapter 2, Section 2.2 that whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. We illustrated this interdependency system with reference to expansion; but it applies also to projection. The projecting and the projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting, as in Harriet said/thought "Shall I feed the cat?". Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting, as in (Harriet asked/wondered) whether she should feed the cat. 

We can relate this to the fact that projection is the creating of a second-order reality. In reporting, the status of the two parts is unequal — the projected figure is dependent on the projecting: hence the projected figure is clearly construed as belonging to a different, second-order plane of reality — a reality that is made of meaning, as it were. In quoting, on the other hand, the two have equal status as independent figures; the projected figure is thus projected as if it was still part of the same first-order reality.

Symbolic Processing: Sensing vs Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 110-1):

Let us look more closely at these two modes of projecting, in both of which the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, the processing that brings the other figure into symbolic existence. Either the projection takes the prototypical form of semiosis: it is presented as verbal, shared, an exchange or joint construction of meanings (e.g. Harriet said 'me feed cat?'); or it is fashioned into a derived semiotic form, unshared, interiorised, and without any meaning being exchanged (e.g. Harriet thought 'me feed cat?'). In the first, the projecting figure is one of saying; the projected is referred to as locution. In the second, the projecting figure is one of sensing; the projected is referred to as idea. Ideas are projections which are sensed, locutions are projections which are said.

Thinking Ideas (Meanings) vs Saying Locutions (Wordings)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 109, 110):

In (i) the 'content' of his thinking is the meaning. It remains internal to his consciousness and unrealised, i.e. unworded. In (ii) the 'content' of his saying is the wording. It has been externalised, realised as a wording. We will refer to these in the context of projection as (i) ideas and (ii) locutions. The contrast between these two statuses of projected figures is typically reflected in the shape of balloons in comic strip projections: see Figure 3-5.

Projected Content: Meaning (Idea) vs Wording (Locution)

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 109, 110):

We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording: see Figure 3-4.

Projected Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108-9):

We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of 'content': see Figure 3-3.

Conscious And Non-Conscious Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106-7, 108):

We could say that the world view that is constructed in this way is (quite reasonably, from our point of view) focussed on humans, with human consciousness occupying a privileged place. Thus typically only humans can project into second-order reality. However, since human consciousness is the locus of semiotic activity, it has the power of interpreting as metaphenomenon that which is manifested by some other, non-conscious symbolic source. Thus while "sensing" (that is, semiotic activity that is unmanifested, like thinking) does require a human senser, saying can be ascribed to a nonhuman as well as to a human sayer (cf. he thinks —> the moon is a balloon vs he says/the book says —> the moon is a balloon. Figure 3-2 shows the relationship between the two orders of metaphenomena and the presence of consciousness in the act of projection.

Expansion vs Projection In Comic Strip Conventions

 Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106, 107):

We can explore this distinction through the conventions of comic strips. Expansions are typically represented pictorially by means of consecutive frames — 'x then y', 'x so y', 'x meanwhile y', and so on (the relationship is sometimes spelt out in writing, e.g. Meanwhile... ). 

We can even identify the three different kinds of expansion, those of elaborating, extending, and enhancing. When further detail is given in a picture of a magnifying glass, this is elaboration; where two frames are joined to form a continuous picture, this suggests extension; otherwise, consecutive frames display a relation of enhancement But in all cases the representation is pictorial throughout. 

In contrast, projections involve two modes: the projecting figure is represented pictorially as the symbol source, but the projected figure is represented linguistically and this second-order reality is typically named within a 'balloon'. … The two types of relation can be shown as in Figure 3-1.

Expansion vs Projection In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

This differentiation is embodied in relations of sequence in the following way. Either a sequential relation expands one figure by adding another one to it, the two still remaining at the same phenomenal level; or the sequential relation projects one of the two figures onto the plane of second-older, semiotic phenomena, so that it enters the realm of metaphenomena (meanings or wordings). This is the distinction between expansion and projection. For example, 

expansion: highs will be mid-8Os to mid-90s —> but parts of Texas could reach the 100s; 

projection: the forecast predicts —> "parts of Texas could reach the 100s".

Two Orders Of Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

Instead of referring to formal logic, let us ask what kind of construal of experience is embodied in semantic sequences. 

Throughout the semantic construal of human experience, there is a differentiation between two orders of reality: between the everyday reality of our material existence on the one hand and on the other hand the second-order reality that is brought into existence only by the system of language. This is a contrast between semiotic phenomena, those of meanings and wordings, and the first-order phenomena that constitute our material environment. (Note that the linguistic processes themselves, as apprehended by our senses, are part of the first-order reality; second-order reality is formed of the meanings and the wordings that these processes bring into being.)

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, if meaning is immanent, then both first-order phenomena/reality and second-order phenomena/reality are construals of experience as meaning.

Characterising Sequences By Reference To Propositional Logic?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105-6):

In a restricted register, such as those of weather forecasts and recipes, it may be possible to define sequential relations more precisely; but that is only because these registers are special cases, rather in the same way that the applications of propositional logic are special cases.

One might try to characterise sequences by reference to propositional logic; this would give some indication of what type of knowledge representation system is embodied in this domain of ideational semantics. However, such a characterisation would be likely to distort our understanding of sequences, because sequences cover and organise a considerably larger domain of the ideational semantic space than propositional logic attempts to do.

Why Natural Logic Differs From Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105):

Both the difference in scope and the difference in 'definability' can be explained in functional terms. 

Sequences have evolved in the interpretation of human experience in general; consequently, they have to be flexible and powerful enough to cope with a large amount of variation, and the implicit 'definition' of each relation (i.e., its location in the semantic system along various dimensions) is the evolving distillation of innumerable instances where it is invoked (for a revealing account of how sequences may construe rationality in everyday talk, see Hasan, 1992). 

In contrast, the truth-functional connectives of propositional logic have been designed for a very restricted purpose — the kind of deductive reasoning western philosophy came to focus on — and their definitions are fixed by reference to values of "true" and "false" (by means of truth tables).

Types Of Natural vs Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104-5, 105n):

There is another important difference between propositional logic and the natural logic of sequences. While there is only a very small handful of truth-functional connectives in propositional logic (conjunction, disjunction [exclusive or non-exclusive], implication), there is a very wide range of sequential relations in language — all the more specific varieties of projecting and expanding. A summary of these is given in Table 3(1).

² Projecting figures of the 'think' type — 'know', 'believe', 'want — have been represented outside standard logic within intensional logic.

Natural Logic vs Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104, 104n):

Sequences might be said to constitute the 'natural logic' equivalent of propositional logic — that is, the evolved system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc. from which propositional logic has been derived by design. Thus we have parallel series such as:

But, as has often been pointed out, the two are not translation equivalents; for example, material implication (p –> q) applies even when the rendering in ordinary language seems odd, and disjunction in logic is either inclusive or exclusive whereas natural disjunction is non-committal. Since propositional logic is a designed system, its relations are codified and defined (typically in truth-functional terms¹). In contrast, sequential relations have evolved. A certain type of relation will have a core — the prototypical representatives of that type; but there will also be more peripheral representatives and 'grey areas' where one type shades into another.

¹ Propositional logic is interpersonally invariable. Unlike natural logic, it is only concerned with statements, or rather — since language is concerned with validity rather than truth — with the philosophical version of what are statements in natural language.

Sequence [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104):

A sequence constitutes a model of how figures can be related. One prominent form of this relationship, which has been foregrounded in various guises in science and logic, is that of cause & effect, whereby experience is given a causal interpretation. But that is only one among many such possible relationships, which taken together can be said to constitute the logic of natural language.

Reference As A Means Of Differentiating Macrophenomena And Metaphenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102-3):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as "referable" — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don't give me any more of that peanut butter! I can't stand the stuff.). This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants (cf. Webber, 1987, on reference to phenomena other than things). At the same time it allows us to recognise not only participants of the 'simple' type but also the 'larger' elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order. Halliday & Hasan (1976), where reference to macro-phenomena is called extended reference, and reference to meta-phenomena is called reference to facts, cite ambiguities which bring out the difference among elements of these various kinds:

(i) extended reference — to macro-phenomenon:

They broke a Chinese vase.

(i) That was valuable. (phenomenon: thing — the vase)

(ii) That was careless, (macro-phenomenon— the act of their breaking of the vase)

(ii) reference to 'fact' — to meta-phenomenon

It rained day and night for two weeks. The basement flooded and everything was under water.

(i) It spoilt our calculations. (meta-phenomenon (fact)—the fact that it rained so much upset our predictions)

(ii) It spoilt our calculations. (macro-phenomenon —the act of raining destroyed physical records)

Note how this relates to the shift of perspective from figure to participant: a figure such as 'catch + mouse' becomes referable as a macro-phenomenon (Your cat's caught a mouse — It's never done that before), and by the same token can enter into participant-based construal through the system of modification (Table 2(11)): (cats are) creatures that catch mice.

Grammatical Evidence For The Differentiation Of Participants And Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99, 102):

The view from grammar brings into relief a number of relevant factors relating to participants and circumstances. There are certain special subcategories of these, in the grammar, which are distinguished by the fact that they embody features of interpersonal or textual meaning:

(1) interpersonal: questioning

interrogative: who, what, when, where, how far, how long, how, why

(2) textual: cohesive

(i) referring, personal: he, she, it, they; demonstrative: this, that, now, then,, here, there, thus

(ii) generalising: lexical items such as person, creature, thing, stuff, affair

These are significant in their own right because they are critical to the construction of discourse: the textual ones provide internal cohesion, while the interpersonal ones construe dialogic speech roles. They have a further significance in that they reveal by reactance the major subclasses within the general classes of participant and circumstance, as shown in Table 2(12). 

The Three Types Of Element

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99, 101):

There are three types of semantic elements serving in figures — processes, participants and circumstances. Broadly speaking, these are constructed in the grammar as follows.

(i) Within the ideational component: they are realised by different classes of units:

process ➘ verbal group

participant ➘ nominal group

circumstance ➘ adverbial group, prepositional phrase

Participants tend to be inherent elements of a figure; circumstances are typically optional.

(ii) Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: participants can serve as Subject; circumstances and processes cannot. Furthermore, participants and circumstances can serve as WH-elements, but processes cannot (if the process is being questioned, a participant element has to be construed as a Range: what...do?)

(iii) Relating to the textual metafunction: participants and circumstances can both readily serve as Theme (though their potentials differ); processes only rarely, other than in imperative clauses. Participants and (more restrictedly) circumstances can serve as referables identified by referring expressions, but processes cannot — as with WH-interrogation, they have to be construed as a Range together with the pro-verb do as Process: do it/that (see Halliday & Hasan, 1976: 125).

These properties are summarised in Table 2(11).

The Four Types Of Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98, 100):

There are four types of figure — doing & happening, sensing, saying, being & having. Broadly speaking, these are constructed in the grammar as follows:

(i) Within the ideational metafunction, each is realised congruently by one particular transitivity type: doing & happening ➘ material, sensing ➘ mental, saying ➘ verbal, and being & having ➘ relational. These have various reactances, such as the number and nature of participants and the unmarked present tense selection (see Table 2(10)).

(ii) Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: in any given register there may be typical correspondences between the type of figure and the speech function; e.g. in procedural registers, material clauses are typically imperative, relational ones indicative.

(iii) Relating to the textual metafunction: different types of figure are presumed in different ways and have different potential for textual prominence; e.g. only material clauses are substituted by the pro-verb do (to/with).

Blogger Comments:

With regard to Table 2(10), the Medium of an identifying clause is the Identified, which coincides with the Value only when the relation is encoding. In decoding clauses, it is the Token that is the Medium/Identified.

Semantic Categories Are Construed By Means Of Realisation In The Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 97-8):

The semantic categories are themselves construed by means of realisation; they are constructed within the grammar and the lexis of a language. If we model the ideation base as a semantic space, we are foregrounding one aspect of the construction of meaning in language, namely the way in which lexicogrammar construes our experience of the world in the guise of multidimensional matrices or grids. This is an important feature of language as a semiotic system, an inevitable consequence of the principle of arbitrariness: since the forms of expression are arbitrary, they impose discontinuity on the content. We have to decide about any given instance whether it is singular or plural, temporal or causal, possible, probable or certain; whether it is a bus or a van, smiling or grinning, cloudy, misty or foggy. But the semantic categories themselves (seen from above, as it were) are much more fluid and indeterminate than their realisations in wording imply. The notion of semantic space allows us to adopt a complementary standpoint from which we can view these phenomena topologically, bringing out the inherently elastic quality of the dimensions involved, and gaining a deeper insight into the semogenic processes by which the meaning potential is ongoingly remoulded in the history of the system, of the user, and of the text.

The Ontogenetic Move From Concrete To Abstract Phenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 97):

Children are able to construe the semantic system because they start in situations with a material setting that is shared — cf. above, and see Hasan (1985b: 25 ff.) on Malinowski's contribution to this insight. As they build up their ideation base, they can begin to construe categories internal to the system out of existing ideational values; and they can begin to move into the abstract domains of a purely symbolic world, where the significations of semantic categories are abstract categories in social and socio-semiotic systems. But precisely because these abstract categories are construed as meanings, they can still be built up, negotiated and validated in collaboration with other members of the meaning group. The move from the realm of concrete phenomena to the various realms of abstract phenomena is made possible through the homogenising power of meaning.