Tuesday, 31 December 2013

Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday (2008: 90-1):
Grammatical metaphor is that type of metaphoric process in which the moving parts […] are not lexical items but grammatical categories. It is the process whereby the congruent form […] is transformed into its metaphorical agnate […] . This is perhaps the single most important source of the power that language has of reconstruing the reality that it has previously put in place.

Monday, 30 December 2013


Halliday (2008: 86-7):
But given that “system” is simply the name given to the potential that is instantiated in text, when we talk of the system changing what we mean is that the text potential has undergone a shift of some kind or other. This may be quantitative change, a shift in the probabilities of the terms in some grammatical system … ; or it may be qualitative change, as happens when a term disappears altogether … . Quantitative changes may stabilise; or they may move on to become qualitative … .

Sunday, 29 December 2013

The Main Problem The Discourse Analyst Has Had To Contend With

Halliday (2008: 86):
For the discourse analyst, the main problem has been the lack of any coherent account of the semantic system. A text is a construction of meaning; and while the meaning potential of a language is structured and powered by the lexicogrammar, it is the multidimensional organisation of semantic space that defines the overall topology within which speakers and writers are operating.

Saturday, 28 December 2013

The Main Problem The Grammarian Has Had To Contend With

Halliday (2008: 85):
For the grammarian (and I should say, by the way, that by “the grammarian” here I understand one who works in lexicogrammar and semantics: the systems thinker on the content plane), the problem has been one that is very simple to state: namely lack of data. The grammarian has never had access to the data that are needed for construing an adequate theory.

Friday, 27 December 2013

The Complementary Angles Of Instantiation: The Grammarian And The Discourse Analyst

Halliday (2008: 85):
… whichever of these rôles we are adopting, we need to observe from both ends. The grammarian, however system-oriented he may be, has to monitor instances of discourse; the discourse analyst, however text-oriented, has to keep an eye on the overall potential. The complementarity means that, unless you shift your angle, you will distort the picture: you cannot know all that is going on if you keep to just one observational perspective.

Thursday, 26 December 2013

The Importance Of The Complementary Angles Of Instantiation

Halliday (2008: 84):
It is particularly in accounting for different kinds of variation in language — dialect, register and genre, Bernstein’s “code” — that the complementarity becomes important for our understanding; and especially in overcoming those unfortunate disjunctions that we have come to live with, that between linguistics and pragmatics at one level, and that between theory of grammar and theory of discourse at another.

Wednesday, 25 December 2013

Instantiation As A Complementarity Of Angle

Halliday (2008: 84):
The system observer is viewing language from a greater distance in space and time. Any phenomenon in language can be observed from either end, in its environment within the system or within the text; each stance will afford certain insights — but the phenomenon will look different according to which we choose.

Tuesday, 24 December 2013

Contrasting Types Of Complementarity: Delicacy Vs Instantiation

Halliday (2008: 84):
In […] grammar and lexis, […] the complementarity is one of focus, based on the scale, or vector, of delicacy. System and text, on the other hand, form a complementarity of angle, based on the vector of instantiation.

Monday, 23 December 2013

Complementarity: The Management Of Contradiction

Halliday (2008: 84):
In the most general sense, complementarity is a special form of complexity; one can think of it perhaps as the management of contradiction. … I am using it here as a way of bringing together what are in fact three different types of complexity that we find in language, but which are all based on some kind of contradiction.

Sunday, 22 December 2013

Two Angles On Language: Text And System

Halliday (2008: 83):
In other words, system and text form a complementarity, one that is defined by the vector of instantiation. … What I am here calling system and text are two complementary positions of the observer, two observational perspectives on the phenomenon — in this case, on the phenomenon of language. Thus “text” is the instantiation of the system; or, alternatively, “system” is text potential.

Saturday, 21 December 2013

Two Angles On Functional Variation: Text Type And Register

Halliday (2008: 81-2):

The system and the text are not two different orders of reality … .  There can only be one set of phenomena here, not two.  But since there are two possible angles from which to approach and observe them, the same question of point of view arises [as with climate and weather].  Consider the phenomenon of functional variation in language.  If we look at this from the “instance” end, we will find in our corpus certain groups of texts that are alike in certain respects; we will be able to recognise something that we call a “text type”.  If we look at these same phenomena from the “system” end, we will see this as a sub-system, a recognisable alignment of the meaning-making resources of the system; this is what we refer to as a “register”.  Either we see a recurrent pattern of linguistic weather, or we see a definable motif within the linguistic climate.  Both of these are possible points of view; but they engender rather different modes of explanation.

Friday, 20 December 2013

The Sense In Which Semiotic Systems Carry Value

Halliday (2008: 80-1):
Like all analogies, that between climate and language is oblique and partial. It is an abstract tool for thinking with, not in any sense a strict proportion. Semiotic systems are not like physical systems. For one thing, an instance of a semiotic system carries value. Instances of physical systems do not. You may prefer one kind of weather to another, but that has no relevance whatsoever to the significance of an instance of that kind of weather to another in relation to the theory of climate. Such an instance is simply to be observed, measured and taken account of like any other. But a text has its own differential value. The value is not something fixed and determinate, in most cases; if it is a recorded text, its value may vary at different times, in different places, or under different conditions.

Thursday, 19 December 2013

Language As System And Language As Text

Halliday (2008: 80):
So the analogy whereby language is to text as climate is to weather is useful to think with — up to a point. It reminds us that there are not two different things at issue here, but only one. What we call “climate”, and what we call “weather”, are the same phenomenon seen from different angles, or different moments of time. So it is with “language” and “text”. But in the case of language, so much misunderstanding has been caused by counterposing these two terms, with language and text being treated as if they were different orders of reality, that I shall not make use of these terms in opposition. Instead I shall talk of “text” and “system”, these being two aspects, or guises, of the single phenomenon “language”: thus, language as system, and language as text. Here I am borrowing “system” from its place in the generalised opposition between system and instance.

Wednesday, 18 December 2013

Language System As A (Commonsense Or Scientific) Theory Of The Text

Halliday (2008: 80):
In the same — or at least an analogous — sense [as climate being a theory of the weather], language is a theory of the text. Again, it may be a low-level commonsense theory, as when we comment on a particular person’s language, or on the language of advertisers or of politicians. … Or it may be a designed scientific theory, such as we find in learned articles on the grammar or phonology of a given language, or of several languages or even language in general. When this happens we turn the theory itself into a virtual entity and call it “linguistics”, or, in the case of the weather, “climatology”.

Tuesday, 17 December 2013

Text Vs Discourse

Halliday (2008: 78):
I do make a distinction between these two; but it is a difference in point of view, between different angles of vision on the phenomena, not in the phenomena themselves. So we can use either to define the other: “discourse” is text that is being viewed in its sociocultural context, while “text” is discourse that is being viewed as a process of language.

Monday, 16 December 2013

The System Network: Lexis

Halliday (2008: 67):
[…] you can, as expected, network through the grammar into the lexis; but what you end up with are not lexical items but lexical features. The lexical item will appear, but it will appear as a conjunct realisation of a number of these terminal features. The features are thus components of the lexical items, but the description differs from a usual componential analysis in two important respects. In the first place, the components are systemic: they are organised in sets of systemic options; and in the second place, more significantly, they are derived by ordered steps in delicacy all the way from the primary grammatical categories.

Sunday, 15 December 2013

The System Network: Delicacy

Halliday (2008: 66-7):
Each feature (that is, each term in each system) is entered in the network together with its realisation, the contribution it makes to the shape of the final output. In the most general (least delicate) systems, this contribution is typically structural: some change in the functional configuration, like adding new elements or putting them in a certain order. But some items of wording appear as realisations in the network almost from the start: these are the function words of English like the and of and it and and and to. As you move over towards the right, the systems become less general; and more and more of the features get to be lexicalised. First there will be middle order items, those functioning somewhere in between the grammatical and lexical poles: like pronouns, and certain types of conjunction and of adverb; then particular classes of verbs, of adjectives or of nouns.

Saturday, 14 December 2013

The System Network

Halliday (2008: 66):
The vertical axis of the network is unordered; systems are arranged so as to make the two-dimensional representation of the wiring as simple as possible. But the horizontal axis is ordered from left to right on a scale of delicacy, or refinement in detail (referred to in computational grammars as “granularity”). Here the ordering is determined by the interrelations among the various systems, irrespective of how their terms are realised in structure. This is a fundamental consideration: one of the reasons for making the underlying representation paradigmatic was in order to free it from constraints of structure, so that every feature could be located according to its relationship with other features. In other words, describing something, and relating it to everything else (to its agnates), which in a description based on structure are two distinct operations, in a systemic grammar are one and the same operation. Each feature is described by being located in its paradigmatic context.

Friday, 13 December 2013

Systemic Grammar As Generative Rather Than Contraceptive

Halliday (2008: 65):
In a systemic grammar, the most abstract representation takes the form of a system network, modelling the sets of options that the grammar makes available, and the interrelation between one set of options and another: whether they are simultaneous or dependent. The network is a theory of what the speaker can do: what he can mean, at the semantic stratum; what he can say, or “word”, at the stratum of lexicogrammar; what he can say, or “sound”, at the strata of phonology and phonetics. It is a more truly generative grammar, as distinct from the earlier Chomskyan kind of generative grammar which, as Peter Wexler once remarked, should really be called a “contraceptive grammar” since it was all about the enforcement of constraint.

Thursday, 12 December 2013

Polarity As Pre-Metafunctional

Halliday (2008: 64):
Polarity can be taken as the quintessential example of a grammatical system; it is involved in everything we say — everything that language can turn into meaning. It has a place in all metafunctions — in a sense it is pre-metafunctional; this is why it can be ambivalent, if realised on its own (as yes or no), and can be lexicalised in both ideational and interpersonal combinations (eg allow forbid; nice / nasty). It provides a model of how meaning gets grammaticalised: no doubt it was central to the evolution of language in the species, though that we can never know; it is the first opposition to appear in the development of language in infancy, in the context of “I want / I don’t want” signalled by sound or gesture.

Wednesday, 11 December 2013

Lexical + Grammatical Construals Of Meaning

Halliday (2008: 53):
In principle any meaning can be construed in either perspective. Languages vary, of course, as regards which semantic categories they construe grammatically and which lexically, as well in how the distinction is formally expressed; and any given feature may turn up at different locations along the cline.

Tuesday, 10 December 2013

Interpersonal Complementarity: Lexical + Grammatical Perspectives

Halliday (2008: 49):
Thus in the interpersonal domain, the organisation of meaning into the two regions, the lexical and the grammatical, is less polarised; there is not such a clear demarcation between the general and the particular in the management of human relationships. The two contrasting perspectives are still distinct; but it becomes more apparent that the differences between them is one of depth of focus, not one of discontinuity in the phenomena themselves.

Monday, 9 December 2013

Interpersonal Complementarity: General + Particular Perspectives

Halliday (2008: 49):
Interpersonally, the same two perspectives come into play.  Some interpersonal meanings are highly generalised, like the enactment of dialogic rôles (speech function);  Hasan (1992) and Hasan & Cloran (1990) present semantic networks for interpersonal systems of speech function (questions and commands) showing their realisations in the grammar. 
With options in the way something is evaluated (“I approve / I disapprove”) or contended (“I agree / I disagree”), the borderline between grammar and lexis is shaded over; systems of appraisal, as described by Martin & White (2005), represent more delicate (more highly differentiated options within the general region of evaluation. 
There are then mixed systems where the two perspectives intersect; for example systems of modality, in which the various degrees of probability and usuality have multiple realisations, including those where items which elsewhere function lexically are organised into systemic sets — wordings like certainly, perhaps, I think, I’m convinced and many others. 

Sunday, 8 December 2013

Ideational Complementarity: Lexical + Grammatical Perspectives

Halliday (2008: 48-9):
So the lexicogrammar adopts two contrasting perspectives for construing all this complexity. The one is specific and open-ended; hence flexible, but low in information: this the lexical perspective, good for seeing phenomena as particular. The other is general and systemic: hence high in information, but creating closure: this is the grammatical perspective, good for seeing phenomena as generality. The two perspectives are complementary; any phenomenon can be looked at in terms of either, but they will present two different images of the whole.

Saturday, 7 December 2013

Ideational Complementarity: Particular + General Perspectives

Halliday (2008: 45, 48):
Ideationally, the lexicogrammar sorts out the complex world of our surroundings, including the part that consists of our own bodies, our own “selves”.  But the things that surround us, and impinge on us, are immense varied and complex.  There are particular things; these have to be sorted into classes, by selecting, out of the innumerable ways in which one thing can be like one another, those analogies that seem to be significant.  The classes, in turn, are sorted into classes of classes, or taxonomies.  But the critical factor in the way things impinge upon us is that of change.  As well as things, there are happenings, which give the things their value; the particular happenings also have to be sorted into their classes, but in addition to this they have to be located in the matrix of space and time.  At the same time, however, both things and happenings display certain very general features, properties which can be abstracted out of their particulars and construed as features of whole classes of phenomena, or even of all.  All happenings have several “moments” in time; all things have certain qualities or quantities; and so on. 

Friday, 6 December 2013

Metafunctional Complementarity: Ideational + Interpersonal

Halliday (2008: 45):
Survival depends on both aspects of our existence. Language has to be both a way of thinking, of construing the world, and a way of doing, of acting on and interacting with the people in it. This is in fact another complementarity; language acts out this complementarity, at a more abstract level, by transforming both thinking and doing into meaning. It is this that has shaped the evolution of lexicogrammar.

Thursday, 5 December 2013

The Textual Metafunction

Halliday (2008: 45):
Every clause in every kind of discourse combines an ideational and an interpersonal strand of meaning. But weaving these two together is an extremely complicated task; and in managing all this complexity, language evolved a third metafunctional component, by which it is enabled to organise itself in the form of discourse. Discourse is what linguists perceive as text; so we call this the textual metafunction. This is what enables a language to function meaningfully in all its multifarious contexts.

Wednesday, 4 December 2013

The Evolving Relation Between An Organism And Its Environment

Halliday (2008: 44-5):
But the principle is usually formulated in terms of just one aspect of this relationship, the ideational: the way our language functions to construe our own experience of the world. Yet the human condition is a social one, and our environment is not just ecological — it is eco-social; so our language functions also interpersonally. And here it is performing a more active rôle: it is not just construing but enacting our relationships with our fellow creatures. In terms of the classical model deriving from Plato, there is the “first–&–second person” component of language, that which is organised around the interaction of “you” and “me”, as well as the “third person” component of language, that which is organised around the construal of others, of “him, her, it, them”. These two metafunctional components are at the foundation of every human language, and both evolved under the same conditions. Our social interactions increased in complexity just as did our relations with all aspects of the environment. Neither component can be instantiated without the other.

Tuesday, 3 December 2013

Language As A Probabilistic System

Halliday (2008: 38-9):
I have always held the view that language is a probabilistic system. Word frequency is the manifestation of probability in the lexicogrammar — or rather, of one particular aspect of it. Another, more powerful aspect of lexicogrammatical probability is the relative probability of the terms in a grammatical system. A grammatical system, such as polarity, or mood, or tense, is a small set of contrasting options with a defined condition of entry — but it is more than that: it is a set of options each having a certain measure of probability.

Monday, 2 December 2013

Complementarity In Grammar And Grammatics

Halliday (2008: 37):
A grammar is an evolved system, and evolved systems readily admit complementarity; a grammatics is a designed system, and designed systems tend to be hostile to it (it’s too messy). Twentieth century linguistics has been a monument to either/or-ism; which is one reason perhaps why we still do not understand too well how natural semiotic systems work.

Sunday, 1 December 2013

Complementarity In Grammar

Halliday (2008: 36):
Time is both linear and aspectual (tense and aspect)
Process is both extension and causation (transitive and ergative)
Matter is both discrete and concrete (count and mass)
Causality is both a relation between processes and a single complex process (clause nexus and clause)

Saturday, 30 November 2013

Complementarity As Extension

Halliday (2008: 36):
Complementarity is what turns “either / or” into “both + and”. …
And one thing is obvious: grammar has no place for “either/or-ism”; it always turns “either / or” into “both + and” …

Friday, 29 November 2013

Complementarity In Grammar: Construing Agency (Transitive + Ergative)

Halliday (2008: 35-6):
Then think of agency: how it is that processes are brought about. Either I do something, which may or may not impact on some other entity (I as Actor; plus or minus a Goal); or I do something, which may or may not be caused by some other entity (I as Medium; plus or minus an Agent). Whichever way we choose to model these, whether as extension (“transitive”) or as causation (“ergative”), we cannot know all about how processes with two participants take place.

Thursday, 28 November 2013

Complementarity In Grammar: Construing Time (Tense + Aspect)

Halliday (2008: 35):
The grammar of every language is (in one of its metafunctions, the ideational) a construal of human experience: it constructs our “reality” by transforming our experiences into meanings. And in doing this, the grammar often has to choose: to choose either one way of seeing things, or the other. For example, think of time. Either time is a linear progression, out of future through present into past; or else it is a translation from the virtual into the actual. It can’t be both. We may choose to model it (and note here that I am talking about our grammar — not our theory of grammar, our “grammatics”; so we means the speakers of the language, not the linguists) … so let us say our language may choose to model it either as tense, or as aspect;

Wednesday, 27 November 2013

The Complementarity Of Spoken And Written Language

Halliday (2008: 19-20):
The point to be made is that one aspect of the complementarity of spoken and written language lies in their different ways of achieving and managing complexity. The complexity of written language resides in its density: the way it packages its meanings into highly condensed, mainly noun-based structures which combine into rather simple clausal configurations. The complexity of spoken language resides in its intricacy: the way it knots together long strands of quite sparsely loaded clauses into intricate patterns of logical-semantic relationships. So the complementarity of speaking and writing is not simply that of their different modes of being and of happening, but rather in the different strategies for the organisation of meaning — as “spoken language” and “written language” — that have evolved to match, and to exploit, these two different modes of existence.

Tuesday, 26 November 2013

The Vector Of Instantiation

Halliday (2008: 13):
Observed from close up, language appears in the guise of text, instances of spoken or written discourse that can be perceived by the senses — that can be heard or seen. Observed from a distance, language appears as a potential, an open ended network of possibilities with certain statistical properties and having certain kinds of interrelationship with its eco-social environment. The text is a process of selecting, and a product of selection, from within this overall potential.

Monday, 25 November 2013

The Complementarity Of Language As System And Language As Text

Halliday (2008: 13):
I feel it is important to refer to the complementarity in these terms, “language as system” and “language as text”, in order to stress that these are two aspects of one single phenomenon — not two different phenomena, as is implied if you use a simple duality like “language and text”, or “langue and parole”. System and text are one and the same phenomenon; the system is simply the potential that is instantiated in every moment of discourse.

Sunday, 24 November 2013

The “Trinocular” Perspective

Halliday (2008: 6):
The boundaries of any grammatical category are likely to be fuzzy […] — such indeterminacy is a general property of the grammar. The grammarian attempts to define each category as accurately as possible, looking at it from three different angles: its systemic environment (contrast with other term or terms in the system, and the relationship of that system to other systems); its meaning (proportionality in semantic terms), and it form. In other words, the grammarian adopts a “trinocular” perspective on the stratal hierarchy so that every category is viewed “from round about”, “from above” and “from below”. And since the views from these different angles often conflict, assigning instances to a particular category involves some degree of compromise, where criteria will depend on the purposes of the description.

Saturday, 23 November 2013

The Grammatical System

Halliday (2008: 5,6):
This is the “system” in the sense in which it was formulated and defined by JR Firth (Firth 1957a,b); the system is the paradigmatic relation that “gives value to” the elements of syntagmatic structure. […] It is the system that defines the set of options from which any feature derives its value. […] What characterises the system is the regular proportionality between its terms. The system is closed, so that its terms are mutually defining […]

Friday, 22 November 2013

Construing Experience: Lexis-Grammar Complementarity

Halliday (2008: 3):
It seemed to me that the lexis and the grammar were complementary, at least in their reality-construing, ideational function. In principle, any phenomenon of human experience could be construed either way: either lexically, as specific and open-ended, or grammatically, as generalised and closed; and hence, if some phenomenon showed a high degree of complexity, it might be construed in both ways at once.

Thursday, 21 November 2013

Construing Experience [Defined]

Halliday (2008: 2):
I had always been interested in the ways in which the “grammars” of natural languages — that is, the lexicogrammatical resources as a whole — parcelled out the immense task of representing human experience. I referred to this as construing, with construe meaning “construct semiotically, transform into meaning”; so the task of transforming experience into meaning.

Wednesday, 20 November 2013

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Why A Text Is Meaningful

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):
A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

Tuesday, 19 November 2013

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Metaphorical Interpretation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):
What the metaphorical interpretation does is to suggest how an instance in the text may be referred to the system of language as a whole. It is therefore an important link in the total chain of explanations whereby we relate the text to the system.

Monday, 18 November 2013

Text (Discourse) Analysis: Purpose

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):
In the most general terms, the purpose of analysis a text is to explain the impact that it makes: why it means what it does, and why it gives the particular impression that it does.

Sunday, 17 November 2013

Metaphorical Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 657):
The important point to make is that a piece of wording that is metaphorical has as it were an additional dimension of meaning: it ‘means’ both metaphorically and congruently. … however far one may choose to go in unpacking ideational metaphor, it is important also to analyse each instance as it is.

Saturday, 16 November 2013

Nominalisation: Evolution

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 657):
This kind of nominalising metaphor probably evolved first in scientific and technical registers, where it played a dual rôle: it made it possible on the one hand to construct hierarchies of technical terms, and on the other hand to develop an argument step by step, using complex passages ‘packaged’ in nominal form as Themes. It has gradually worked its way through into most other varieties of adult discourse, in much of which, however, it loses its original raison d’être and tends to become merely a mark of prestige and power.

Friday, 15 November 2013


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656-7):
Nominalising is the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor. By this device, processes (congruently worded as verbs) and properties (congruently worded as adjectives) are reworded metaphorically as nouns; instead of functioning in the clause, as Process or Attribute, they function as Thing in the nominal group. … What the happens to the original ‘things’? They get displaced by the metaphoric ones, and so are reduced to modifying these…

Thursday, 14 November 2013

Spoken Choreographic Complexity Vs Written Crystalline Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656):
In spoken language, the ideational content is loosely strung out, but in clausal patterns that can become highly intricate in movement: the complexity is dynamic — we might think of it in choreographic terms. In written language, the clausal patterns are typically simple; but the ideational content is densely packed in nominal constructions: here the complexity is more static — perhaps crystalline.

Wednesday, 13 November 2013

How To Measure Lexical Density

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 655):
To measure lexical density, simply divide the number of lexical items by the number of ranking clauses.

Tuesday, 12 November 2013

Written Vs Spoken Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 654):
Typically, written language becomes complex by being lexically dense: it packs a large number of lexical items into each clause; whereas spoken language becomes complex by being grammatically intricate: it builds up elaborate clause complexes out of parataxis and hypotaxis.

Monday, 11 November 2013

Realisational Downgradings Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 652):
When the realisation of a whole figure is downgraded through metaphor from clause to nominal group, its elements will of course also be downgraded: the process is nominalised and serves as Thing… ; the other elements of the figure are realised either as downranked groups/phrases serving as Qualifier or Deictic… or, by a further step, as words serving as Classifier, Epithet or Post-Deictic.

Sunday, 10 November 2013

Some Possible Realisational Downgradings Of Figures

All Of Figure Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 650):
The incongruent realisation of a figure may retain the clause as the domain of realisation, but downgrade all of the figure as a metaphorical nominal group, creating a new Process.

Part Of Figure Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 650-1):
The incongruent realisation of a figure may retain the clause as the domain of realisation, but downgrade … part of the figure as a metaphorical nominal group.

Figure Realised As Group/Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 651):
The incongruent realisation of the figure may downgrade the domain from clause to group/phrase. Grammatically, this is only possible in an environment of rankshift, as when the congruent clause or metaphorical group/phrase serves as the Head or Postmodifier of a nominal group.

Saturday, 9 November 2013

Some Possible Realisational Downgradings Of Sequences

One Figure Of Expansion Sequence Realised As Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646-7):
With expansion, one figure of a sequence may be realised congruently by a clause, while the other is realised incongruently as a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstantial element within that clause; here the relator of the sequence is realised as the minor Process of the phrase. The relator and the minor Process are matched in terms of subtype of expansion.

Projecting Figure Of Sequence Realised As Range

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 647):
With projection, the projecting figure may be realised congruently as a ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause, while the projected figure is realised incongruently as the Range — the Verbiage or the Phenomenon.

Expansion Sequence Realised As Circumstantial Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 647-8):
With expansion, both figures of a sequence may be realised incongruently as Token and Value in a ‘circumstantial relational’ clause; here the relator of the sequence is realised, also incongruently, as the Process element in the clause. The expansion type of the relator is matched by the nature of the circumstantial process. … Alternatively, the ‘circumstantial relational’ clause is ‘attributive’ rather than ‘identifying’, with expanding figure as Attribute and the expanded one as Carrier.

Sequence Of Internal Cause Realised As Intensive Identifying Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 648):
Relations of internal cause — cause in the sense of ‘x so I think/say y’ — are construed metaphorically by verbs of proving such as prove, show, demonstrate, argue, suggest, indicate, imply in ‘intensive identifying relational’ clauses.

Expansion Sequence Realised As Intensive Identifying Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 648):
With expansion, both figures of the sequence may be realised incongruently as Token and Value in an ‘intensive relational’ clause; but the relator is nominalised as the Thing of the nominal group serving as Value, and the expanding figure is embedded as a Qualifier. The nominalised relator is a noun of expansion such as time, place, cause, result, reason.

Projected Figure Of Sequence Realised As Embedded Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):
With projection, the projected figure may be realised metaphorically as an embedded ‘fact’ clause serving as Token.

Relator And Figure Of Expansion Sequence Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):
With expansion, the relator in the sequence may be realised incongruently as a noun serving as the Head or Thing of the nominal group and the figure(s) being related as Modifier.

Figures Of Projection Sequence Realised As Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649):
With projection, the projecting figure in a sequence may be realised incongruently as a noun of projection serving as the Head/Thing of a nominal group and the projected figure as a downranked clause serving as Qualifier.

Sequence Realised As Clause: Domino Effect

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 649-50):
There is always a domino effect: as the realisational domain of the sequence is downgraded, so are the realisational domains of its component parts. At least one of the figures is, in turn, realised metaphorically as a ranking group or phrase, and elements within figures are realised either by downranked groups or phrases or by words.

Friday, 8 November 2013

Why The Downgrading In Ideational Metaphor Is Possible

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):
These successive steps in downgrading are possible because both projection and expansion are motifs that are manifested throughout the grammatical system: a sequence of projection can thus be realised not only by the manifestation of projection in the clause nexus, but also by its manifestation in the clause or the group/phrase. The same principle applies to expansion.

Thursday, 7 November 2013

The Downgrading Tendency Of Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):
… the general tendency for ideational metaphor is to ‘downgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation of a semantic sequence, figure or element — from clause nexus to clause, from clause to group/phrase, and even from group or phrase to word. Such downgrading affects both the unit whose domain of realisation is downgraded, and the units of which it is composed: the downgrading proceeds down the rank scale by a kind of ‘domino effect’.

Wednesday, 6 November 2013

The Upgrading Tendency Of Interpersonal Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):
The general tendency is for interpersonal metaphor to ‘upgrade’ the domain of grammatical realisation; for example, while the congruent realisation of modality is a group serving in the clause, the metaphorical realisation is a clause that projects or embeds the clause to which a modal value is assigned. In this way, interpersonal metaphor tends to expand interpersonal systems by adding explicit variants — that is, variants where the subjective or objective orientation is made explicit.

Tuesday, 5 November 2013

The Strategy That Is Ideational Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):
… grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience — but which has made modern science possible.

Monday, 4 November 2013

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Figure Realised By Group Or Phrase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 645):
… when a figure is realised metaphorically by a group or phrase, it is deprived of the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it inarguable. It is thus presented as something already established; and any modifications, including interpersonal evaluative ones, have to be taken for granted.

Sunday, 3 November 2013

Interpersonal Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Sequence Realised By Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 645):
When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, it is given the interpersonal status of a proposition or proposal, making it arguable. … a ‘propositionalised’ sequence can be modalised, doubted, argued and negotiated interpersonally in numerous other ways.

Saturday, 2 November 2013

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Figure Realised By Nominal Group

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 644):
… a figure, realised metaphorically by a nominal group rather than congruently as a clause, gains access to the textual systems of the nominal group — most significantly, the system of determination.  This means it can be treated textually as a discourse referent.  It is marked either as ‘non-specific’ or as ‘specific’, in which case the identity is presented as recoverable to the addressee.

Friday, 1 November 2013

Textual Effects Of Ideational Metaphor: Sequence Realised By Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642-3, 644): 
When a sequence is realised metaphorically by a clause, this means not only that it is mapped onto the transitivity patterns of the clause but also that it falls within the domain of Theme + Rheme organisation of the clause and also, by extension, that of the Given + New organisation of the information unit. … There is thus a gain in textual meaning in the shift from the congruent mode of realisation to the metaphoric mode.
… when a sequence is realised by a clause rather than by a clause nexus, it will be structured textually into Theme + Rheme and, since a clause is an information unit in the unmarked case, also into Given + New. This means that the figures that make up the sequence can be given thematic or newsworthy status.

Thursday, 31 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor: Textual And Interpersonal Significance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):
The textual and interpersonal effects of ideational metaphor are due to the fact the realignment of ideational patterns […] also means that there is a realignment of the textual and interpersonal environments in which ideational systems operate.

Wednesday, 30 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor As An Experientialisation Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):
Within the ideational metafunction, the general effect of this realignment in the semantic system is a shift from the logical to the experiential — an experientialisation of experience. Thus logical sequences of figures are reconstrued as experiential configurations of elements.

Tuesday, 29 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor: Loss Of Ideational Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):
… the tactic patterns of clause complexing (with the distinction between paratactic interdependency and hypotactic dependency) are not available to sequences that are realised metaphorically as clauses, and the configurational patterns of participant rôles are lost or obscured when figures are realised as groups or phrases.

Monday, 28 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor: Expanding And Contracting Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 641-2):
… the metaphorical mode thus makes available a great deal of further ideational potential that is not accessible in the congruent mode. At the same time, the metaphorical mode also denies access to significant aspects of potential that is associated with the congruent mode: there is a loss of ideational meaning.

Sunday, 27 October 2013

The Underlying Significance Of Re-Mappings Between Semantics And Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 640):
… the ideational metafunction is a resource for construing our experience of the world that lies around us and inside us. In the congruent mode, the grammar construes sequences (of figures), figures and elements as the basic phenomena of experience… . In the metaphorical mode, the model is enriched through combinations of these categories: in addition to the congruent categories, we now also have metaphorical combinations of categories — sequences construed as figures, figures construed as elements, and so on. These combinations open up new meaning potential.

Saturday, 26 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor: Why Realisational Re-Mappings Are Possible [Transgrammatical Semantic Domains]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 640):
The ‘re-mapping’ is possible because semantic motifs such as cause are manifested repeatedly in the different environments of the grammar so that each environment is a possible domain of realisation for such a motif. These motifs are of the two primary types, expansion and projection

Friday, 25 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor As Realisational Re-Mappings

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 639):
… grammatical metaphor within the ideational metafunction involves a ‘re-mapping’ between sequences, figures and elements in the semantics and clause nexuses, clauses and groups in the grammar. … In the metaphorical mode, the whole set of mappings seems to be shifted ‘downwards’: a sequence is realised by a clause, a figure is realised by a group, and an element is realised by a word.

Thursday, 24 October 2013

Metaphor: Additional Layers Of Meaning And Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 638):
Just like interpersonal metaphor, ideational metaphor introduces additional layers of meaning that are construed by the grammar as additional layers of wording.

Wednesday, 23 October 2013

Ideational Metaphor: Ontogenesis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):
Unlike interpersonal metaphor, the other type of grammatical metaphor, ideational metaphor, is learned later by children and is not part of the grammar of ordinary, spontaneous conversation that children meet in the home and neighbourhood; rather it is associated with the discourses of education and science, bureaucracy and the law. Children are likely to meet the ideational type of metaphor when they reach the upper levels of primary school; but its full force will only appear when they begin to grapple with the specialised discourses of subject-based secondary education.

Tuesday, 22 October 2013

The Metaphorical Expansion Of Interpersonal Meaning Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):
The expansion of the interpersonal semantic system through grammatical metaphor provides speakers with additional, powerful resources for enacting social rôles and relations in the complex network of relations that make up the fabric of a community of any kind.

Monday, 21 October 2013

The Interpersonal Metafunction And The Ontogenesis Of Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 636):
The interpersonal metafunction defines the environment in which children first learn the strategy of grammatical metaphor [a manifestation of a more general principle]. No doubt this is partly because interpersonal metaphors tend to make selections more explicit, as when probability is realised by a ‘mental’ clause projecting the modalised proposition (‘explicit’ orientation), and partly because the interpretation of interpersonal metaphors is often both supported and ‘tested’ immediately in the ongoing dialogic interaction.

Sunday, 20 October 2013

Representing Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 634):
Both interpersonal and ideational metaphors can be represented in the same way, by postulating some congruent form and then analysing the two in relation to each other.

Saturday, 19 October 2013

Metaphors Of Mood: Commands Realised As Indicative Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 632-3):
In addition to metaphors based on ideational projection, there are other kinds of metaphors of mood as well. One prominent type involves a shift in the realisational domain of commands from ‘imperative’ to ‘indicative’ clauses. The ‘indicative’ clause can be either ‘declarative’ or ‘interrogative’; … The ‘indicative’ realisation of proposals has the effect of blurring the line between proposals directed to the addressee and propositions about how the world ought to be.

Friday, 18 October 2013

Interpersonal Iconicity: Semiotic And Social Distance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 631):
The potential for negotiation in dialogue created by metaphors of mood is directly related to the contextual variables of tenor. These are usually discussed in terms of status, formality and politeness. What they have in common is a very general sense of the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. Here interpersonal metaphor is part of a principle of interpersonal iconicity: metaphorical variants create a greater semiotic distance between meaning and wording, and this enacts a greater social distance between speaker and addressee.

Thursday, 17 October 2013

Speech Function And Interpersonal Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 627):
… just like modality, speech function can be represented as a substantive proposition in its own right; and this proposition is a figure of sensing or saying that projects the original (i) proposal or (ii) proposition… .

Wednesday, 16 October 2013

Imperative Mood And Modulation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 627):
On the one hand, an ‘imperative’ clause imposes an obligation; on the other hand, the imperative tag checks the addressee’s inclination to comply… .

Tuesday, 15 October 2013

Interpersonal Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):
Interpersonal projection always involves the speaker or addressee as ‘projector’… . It is always implicit unless it is made explicit through grammatical metaphor, by ‘co-opting’ ideational resources to do interpersonal service.

Monday, 14 October 2013

The Metaphoric Strategy In Explicit Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):
The metaphoric strategy is to upgrade the interpersonal assessment from group rank to clause rank — from an adverbial group or prepositional phrase serving within a simple clause to a clause serving within a clause nexus of projection.

Sunday, 13 October 2013

The Systemic Effect Of Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):
Systemically, metaphor leads to an expansion of the meaning potential: by creating new patterns of structural realisation, it opens up new systemic domains of meaning.  And it is the pressure to expand the meaning potential that in fact lies behind the development of metaphorical modes of meaning.  Thus in the system of modality, the system of orientation is expanded by the addition of a systemic contrast in manifestation between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’…

Saturday, 12 October 2013

The General Effect Of Interpersonal Grammatical Metaphor

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):
…the semantic domain of modality is extended through grammatical metaphor to include explicit indications of subjective and objective orientation: a modal proposition or proposal is realised, as if it were a projection sequence, by a nexus of two clauses, rather than by a single clause. Here the modal assessment itself is given the status of a proposition in its own right; but because the projecting clause of the nexus is metaphorical in nature, standing for an interpersonal assessment of modality, it is also, at the same time, a modal Adjunct in the clause realising the proposition/proposal. This is the general effect of grammatical metaphor: it construes additional layers of meaning and wording.

Friday, 11 October 2013

The Apparent Paradox Of Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 624-5):
The importance of modal features in the grammar of interpersonal exchanges lie in an apparent paradox on which the entire system rests — the fact that we only say we are certain when we are not.

Thursday, 10 October 2013

Modality: Why Explicit Forms Are Metaphorical

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 624):
The explicitly subjective and explicitly objective forms of modality are all strictly speaking metaphorical, since all of them represent the modality as being the substantive proposition. Modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal; in its congruent form, it is an adjunct to a proposition rather than a proposition in its own right.

Wednesday, 9 October 2013


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 621):
This is on the fringe of the modality system.  It has the different orientations of subjective (implicit only) realised by can/can’t, objective implicit by be able to, and objective explicit by it is possible (for …) to.  In the last of these, the typical meaning is ‘potentiality’… .  In the subjective it is closer to inclination; we could recognise a general category of ‘readiness’, having ‘inclination’ and ‘ability’ as subcategories at one end of the scale… .  In any case can in this sense is untypical of the modal operators: it is the only case where the oblique form functions as a simple past

Tuesday, 8 October 2013

Modality Variables

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 619ff):
The basic distinction that determines how each type of modality will be realised is the orientation: that is, the distinction between subjective and objective modality, and between the explicit and implicit variants… .  The third variable in modality is the value that is attached to the modal judgement: high, median or low. … The median value is clearly set apart from the two ‘outer’ values by the system of polarity: the median is that in which the negative is freely transferable between the proposition and the modality… .  With the outer values, on the other hand, if the negative is transferred the value switches (either from high to low, or from low to high)… .  This generates a set of 4x4x3x3 = 144 categories of modality. … The actual number of systematic distinctions that are made in this corner of the language runs well into the tens of thousands;

Monday, 7 October 2013


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):
If the clause is a ‘goods–&–services’ clause (a proposal, which has no real congruent form in the grammar, but by default we can characterise it as imperative), it means either (i) ‘is wanted to’, related to a command, or (ii) ‘wants to’, related to an offer; in other words, some degree of obligation [‘deontic’ modality] or inclination. … Note that modulation refers to the semantic category of proposals; but all modalities are realised as indicative (that is, as if they were propositions).

Sunday, 6 October 2013


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):
If the clause is an ‘information’ clause (a proposition, congruently realised as indicative), this means either (i) ‘either yes or no’, that is, ‘maybe’; or (ii) ‘both yes and no’, that is, ‘sometimes’; in other words, some degree of probability [‘epistemic’ modality] or usuality.

Saturday, 5 October 2013

Modality [Defined]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 618):
Modality refers to the area of meaning that lies between yes and no — the intermediate ground between positive and negative polarity.

Friday, 4 October 2013

Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6):
What happens is that, in order to state explicitly that the probability is subjective, or alternatively, at the other end, to claim explicitly that the probability is objective, the speaker construes the proposition as a projection and encodes the subjectivity (I think), or the objectivity (it is likely), in a projecting clause.  (There are other forms intermediate between the explicit and implicit: subjective in my opinion, objective in all probability, where the modality is expressed as a prepositional phrase, which is a kind of halfway house between clausal and non-clausal status.)

Thursday, 3 October 2013

Mental Clause As Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 614):
What’s happened here is that there has been a realignment in the realisational relationship between semantics and grammar. … a modalised proposition is realised as if it was a sequence, by a clause nexus of projection.  The effect is that the modality and the modalised proposition are separated, each being realised by a clause in its own right…

Wednesday, 2 October 2013

Mental Clause As Metaphorical Realisation Of Probability

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 614):
…the probability is realised by a mental clause as if it were a figure of sensing.  Being metaphorical, the clause serves not only as the projecting part of a clause nexus of projection, but also as a mood Adjunct, just as probably does.  The reason for regarding this as a metaphorical variant is that the proposition is not, in fact, ‘I think”; the proposition is ‘it is so’.  This is shown clearly by the tag… .  It is the fact that a mental clause is a modal clause and serves as mood Adjunct that explains the tag… the Mood tag picks up the Mood element of the modalised proposition… .

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

Why Clausal Assessment Can Be Transformed Into Nominal Assessment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613):
The range of assessments assigned to propositions within the domain of the clause and the range of assessments assigned to things within the domain of the nominal group are not, of course, the same. They overlap; but there are kinds of assessment specific to the realm of propositions just as there are other kinds specific to the realm of things. The common foundation is that they are both projections of the speaker’s assessment. This explains why clausal assessment can in fact be transformed into nominal assessment…

Monday, 30 September 2013

Projection As Modal Assessment: Subjective Vs Objective Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 607):
The difference between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ orientation in the ideational manifestation follows from the general difference between a projecting ‘mental’ or ‘verbal’ clause with a Senser or Sayer and a ‘relational’ clause without such a ‘projector’.  When the assessment is explicitly ‘subjective’, the Senser or Sayer has to be the speaker I.  If it is a person other than the speaker, the clause will still be a projecting one; but it will not be agnate with interpersonal assessment.

Sunday, 29 September 2013

Projection As Modal Assessment: Explicit Vs Implicit Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 606):
The ideational manifestations make explicit the orientation of the assessment: the logical manifestation is explicitly subjective whereas the experiential manifestation is explicitly objective. In contrast, the interpersonal manifestation leaves the orientation implicit

Saturday, 28 September 2013

Projection As Modal Assessment: Hypotactic Projection And Pre-Projected Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 605-6):
… projection includes both hypotactic projection of ideas or reports and pre-projected facts serving in a ‘mental’ or ‘relational’ clause. A hypotactic projection is always ‘subjective’; the speaker is represented explicitly the Senser or Sayer. A pre-projected fact in a ‘mental’ clause is like hypotactic projection in representing the assessment as ‘subjective’ — the speaker is explicitly represented as the Senser. In contrast, a pre-projected fact in a ‘relational’ clause represents the assessment as ‘objective’.

Friday, 27 September 2013

Interpersonal Manifestations Of Projection: Modal Assessment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 604-5):
Projection can also be manifested interpersonally in the form of a modal Adjunct. … Unlike the logical and experiential manifestations, the interpersonal manifestation does not represent the Sayer or Senser; rather it enacts the speaker’s opinionan enactment of his or her degree of commitment to the proposition: the proposition is assessed as being projected by someone other than the speaker. This type of assessment is known as ‘evidentiality’: the modal Adjunct is used to indicate the evidential status of the proposition. … evidentiality is related to ‘verbal’ clauses and ‘mental’ clauses of perception.

Thursday, 26 September 2013

Projection: Logical And Experiential Manifestations

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 604):
When the need arises in discourse to attribute information to some source, this can be done logically by means of a nexus of projection; but it can also be done experientially by means of a circumstance of Angle. … the projecting feature has thus been incorporated into the clause as one element of a transitivity configuration.

Wednesday, 25 September 2013

Metafunctional Manifestations Of Projection Vs Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):
Like expansion, projection is manifested both logically and experientially within the ideational metafunction; but outside the ideational domain, it is manifested interpersonally rather than textually, thus contrasting with the textual manifestation of expansion. That is, while there are conjunctions marking rhetorical relations of elaboration, extension and enhancement, there are no conjunctions marking relations of quoting or reporting; and while there are interpersonal resources for realising projection, there are no interpersonal Adjuncts or other interpersonal manifestations of expansion.

Tuesday, 24 September 2013

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Interpersonal Differences

Cohesively & Tactically Related Free Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):
When the domain of manifestation is a cohesive sequence of clauses, or a paratactic nexus of (free) clauses, the two figures related by expansion are enacted interpersonally as propositions or proposals.  This means that each can be negotiated in its own right — accepted or denied, complied with or refused, and so on… .  The same is true of the dominant (a) clause of a hypotactic nexus, since if it is a free clause, it realises a negotiable proposition or proposal.

Dependent Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):
… while the dependent (b) clause supports a proposition or proposal, it does not constitute one itself; and if it is non-finite, it is even further removed from the realm of negotiation.

Simple Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 603):
… when the causal [eg] relation is construed within the Process, it has become propositionalised or proposalised… .  Here it is no longer the cause or the effect that is held up for negotiation but rather the causal relation.  When they are construed as nominal groups, the cause and the effect are not negotiable at all.

Monday, 23 September 2013

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Textual Differences

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Cohesively & Tactically Related Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 601):
While a conjunction group with a structural conjunction such as so or because as Head is obligatorily thematic, there is a choice for conjunction groups with a cohesive conjunction such as consequently as Head.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Hypotactic Nexus

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):
In a hypotactic nexus, there is a further textual contrast that is not open to cohesive sequences and paratactic nexuses: the dependent b clause […] may be either thematic or rhematic within the clause nexus.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Simple Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):
When the domain of manifestation of expansion is a simple clause, the potential textual status of the manifestation […] depends on how it is manifested — (1) as minor Process within a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance […], (2) as Process, or (3) as Thing within a nominal group serving as a participant in a circumstantial relational clause.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Minor Process Within A Prepositional Phrase Serving As A Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):
When it is manifested within a circumstance of Cause [eg], the cause may be given the status of either Theme or Rheme…

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):
When the causal [eg] relation is manifested as Process (either in a hypotactic verbal group complex in a clause of any process type, or as the nuclear process in a circumstantial relational clause), its textual status will most likely be rhematic.  More specifically, it is likely to be (part of) the transition between Theme and New.

Thematic Status Of Expansion: Thing Within A Nominal Group Serving As A Participant In A Circumstantial Relational Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 602):
When the cause [eg] is manifested as Thing in a nominal group serving as a participant, it will have the thematic status assigned to that nominal group as a whole — either thematic or rhematic.  But in addition, it will be within the domain of operation of another textual system — the system of reference.  This means that it is given textual status as a discourse referent — either recoverable (identifiable) or non-recoverable (non-identifiable), and that it can be tracked in the development of the discourse.

Sunday, 22 September 2013

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences: Manifestations Of Expansion Down The Rank Scale

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 601):
… this move involves a shift in metafunction … [and] the meaning of expansion changes with the change of metafunctional manifestation.  For example, the manifestation of cause changes from rhetorical relation (textual: consequently) via logico-semantic relation (logical: so, because) to process or minor process or even participant (experiential: cause, through; cause).  This means that the category meaning of ‘cause’ changes

Saturday, 21 September 2013

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences: Scale Of Integration Of Quanta Of Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):
At one pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as two distinct quanta of change… . At the other pole, the experience of the flow of events is construed as a component part of quantum of change… . Intermediate between these two poles are various manifestations that represent a move from two distinct quanta of change via two interdependent ones to a single one. The scale is thus one of degree of integration of two quanta of change. This scale of integration is based on the rank scale.

Friday, 20 September 2013

Agnate Variants Manifesting Expansion: Ideational Differences

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):
From an ideational point of view, the difference in meaning relates most directly to the question of what is construed as a quantum of change in the flow of events.

Thursday, 19 September 2013


Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):
… agnation always embodies both similarity and difference. The similarity is the basis for interpreting the patterns as alike, bringing them together in a paradigm, while the difference is the basis for treating them as variant types rather than as tokens of the same type.