Wednesday, 22 January 2020

The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Cohesion


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 550):
The sequence of clauses within a clause complex is also textually significant as a cohesive domain; in particular, the clause complex licenses certain pattern of ‘ellipsis’ that may involve co-reference. Thus in the paratactic sequence 1 He pointed his arrow, 2 but saw nothing, the Subject of the secondary clause is ‘elliptical’ (but [Subject:] ∅ [Finite/Predicator:] saw [Complement:] nothing), and is interpreted as co-referential with the Subject of the primary clause (he). Similarly, ‘elliptical’ Subjects of non-finite dependent clauses, tend to be interpreted as co-referential with the Subjects of their dominant clauses (as in α I went on to birds β starting with my mother’s feeder). Thus in a clause complex, paratactic and hypotactic co-referential ellipsis may work together to signal the continuity of thematic Subjects, e.g.:
||| 1 The scientific community is beginning to recognise the opportunity || 2α but [Subject:] ∅ has done little so far || 2β [Subject:] ∅ to provide useful conceptual tools and means of [[communicating these linkages]] [[[ that can be used || to build the social and political consensus necessary for action]]].

Tuesday, 21 January 2020

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The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Information & Tonality


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 550):
In spoken English, the sequence of clauses within a clause complex may be mapped onto one or more information units; that is, there are textually different ways in which a clause complex can be mapped onto an information unit complex. The unmarked mapping is one (ranking) clause = one information unit. Thus the paratactic sequence 1 ^ 2 and the hypotactic sequence β ^ α would each be chunked into two information units (realised by different tone sequences, tone 3 followed by tone 1, and tone 4 followed by tone 1, respectively). However, there are regular departures from this unmarked pattern.
(1) When the dependent clause in a hypotactic nexus is included within the dominant clause, the nexus may be chunked into three information units, with three points of New information (as in //4 John //4 who arrived late //1 missed the speeches //). 
(2) When the dependent clause follows its dominant clause in a hypotactic nexus (progressive sequence), it may be included in the same information unit as the dominant clause, with the focus of New information within the dependent clause (as in //1 I came because he told me //). 
(3) When the logico-semantic relation of the nexus is one of projection, the projecting clause may be part of the same information unit as the projected clause, being tonally cliticised to it.

Monday, 20 January 2020

The Clause Complex As Textual Domain: Thematicity


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549-50):
The sequence of clauses within a clause complex is textually significant from a thematic point of view. This sequence is fixed in the case of parataxis (with the exception of parataxis in the environment of projection); here the primary clause is in a sense thematic in relation to the secondary one even though the sequence is fixed: the primary clause may serve as a point of departure or orientation for the secondary clause. However, in the case of hypotaxis, the sequence is not fixed; it can be progressive (α ^ β) or regressive (β ^ α) – or the hypotactically dependent clause may be included within the dominant clause (α << β >>). For example, the hypotactic nexus β as he came to a thicket, α he heard the faint rustling of leaves is regressive, with the dependent clause as he came to a thicket given thematic status within the nexus. In hypotactic nexuses of certain logicosemantic types, the dependent clause may be the focus of theme predication.

Sunday, 19 January 2020

Clause Complex As Message Complex


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):
At the same time as it contributes to the rhetorical-relational organisation of text, the clause complex also serves as a domain of organisation within the textual metafunction. We have seen that from a textual point of view clauses serve as messages – as quanta of information in the flow of discourse; based on this insight into the textual nature of the clause, we can characterise the clause complex as a message complex.

Blogger Comments:

From a theoretical point of view, this might be seen as a poor choice of term, since 'complex', in every other case, is applied only to rank units — to forms, not functions — and concerned with the logical metafunction, not the textual metafunction.

Saturday, 18 January 2020

The Clause Complex And The Rhetorical-Relational Development Of Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):
The clause complex is, as we have emphasised, the most extensive domain of grammatical patterning — of patterns of wording, patterns organised in terms of logical, recursive systems and structures. It makes a major contribution to the organisation of text, serving to realise (rhetorical) sequences within (rhetorical) paragraphs. In other words, it contributes to the rhetorical-relational development of text by providing grammatical resources for ‘choreographing’ local rhetorical complexes. The grammar also provides resources for guiding the development of text beyond the domain of the clause complex, but these resources are concerned with cohesion rather than with structure.

Blogger Comment:

The term 'paragraph' might be seen as a poor choice of term for a semantic unit, not least because it is not mode-neutral. A paragraph is an organisation of written language, and would be more appropriately applied to a unit on the stratum of graphology.

Friday, 17 January 2020

Facts


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):
Such projections may be embedded as they stand, as nominalisations – equivalent to functioning as Head. But frequently they occur as Postmodifier to a noun of the ‘fact’ class, e.g. the fact that their team had won. Fact nouns include ‘cases’, ‘chances’ and ‘proofs’, related to propositions; and ‘needs’, related to proposals. We refer to these projections, therefore, as facts. Whereas any clause that is projected by another clause, verbal or mental, is either a quote (paratactic) or a report (hypotactic, or embedded if the process is a noun), any clause that has the status ‘projected’ but without any projecting process is a fact and is embedded, either as a nominalisation serving as Head or as Postmodifier to a ‘fact’ noun serving as Head. This includes some of those functioning in mental clauses, as mentioned above, and all projections functioning in relational clauses (since a relational process cannot project). It also includes ‘impersonal’ projections such as it is said ... , it is believed ... , it seems ... , where the ‘process’ is not really a process at all, but simply a way of turning a fact into a clause.

Thursday, 16 January 2020

Embedded Projections Serving As Phenomenon Of Mental Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 549):
However, it is possible for an idea to be associated with a mental process while not being projected by it, as in they rejoiced that their team had won. When one clause projects another, the two always form a clause nexus; but here, where that their team had won comes readymade as a projection, rather than being turned into one by the process of rejoicing, the idea is embedded as Phenomenon and the whole forms a single clause. This happens particularly when a proposition is an object of emotion: when the fact that ... is a source of pleasure, displeasure, fear, surprise, amusement, interest or some other emotion.

Wednesday, 15 January 2020

The Projection Of Goods-&-Services (Proposals)


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):
Parallel to projected information (propositions) is the projection of goods-&-services (proposals), which likewise may be paratactic, hypotactic, or embedded as Qualifier to a noun; and again the phenomenon may be verbal (locution, projected by the processes offer, command, suggest/suggestion, etc.) or mental (idea, projected by intend/intention, wish, hope, etc.). The difference in the mental processes is that propositions are projected by cognitive processes whereas proposals are projected by desiderative ones.

Tuesday, 14 January 2020

Projection By The Names Of Verbal And Mental Acts


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):
Both verbal and mental acts have names, such as statement, query, belief, doubt; and these also serve to project, with the projected clause embedded as Postmodifier: the belief that the sky might fall on their heads. There is a point of overlap between these and embedded expansions of the elaborating type (relative clauses): both may be introduced by that, and this produces ambiguities such as the report that he had submitted disturbed everyone:
(a) the report [[ = that he had submitted ]]
‘the document which he had drafted’ 
(b) the report [[ “ I that he had submitted ]]
‘to hear that he had yielded’

Monday, 13 January 2020

Mode And Level Of Projection


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):
Jill says something; this is a verbal event. To represent it, I use a ‘verbal’ clause Jill said, plus a quote of her verbal act ‘It’s raining’. The two have equal status (paratactic), because both are wordings. That is to say, both my locution Jill said and Jill’s locution it’s raining are lexicogrammatical phenomena. Fred thinks something; this is a mental event. To represent it, I use a ‘mental’ clause Fred thought, plus a report of his mental act (that) it had stopped. The two have unequal status (hypotactic), because one is a wording while the other is a meaning. That is to say, my locution Fred thought is a lexicogrammatical phenomenon, but Fred’s idea ‘that it had stopped’ is a semantic one.
Thus parataxis is naturally associated with verbal projections and hypotaxis with mental ones. But, as we have seen, the pattern can be inverted. I can choose to report a verbal act, presenting a locution as a meaning; and I can choose to quote a mental act, presenting an idea as a wording. If we report speech, we do not commit ourselves to ‘the very words’: if I say Henry said he liked your baking, you would not quarrel with this even if you had overheard Henry expressing his views and knew that what he had actually said was That was a beautiful cake.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, interdependency status turns on whether or not a clause in a nexus can 'serve on its own' (p509). Here Matthiessen claims, without supporting argument, that interdependency status turns on whether or not clauses in a nexus represent the same level of content, and concludes that there is a natural relation between verbal projection and parataxis and mental projection and hypotaxis.  That is, the argument is an instance of the logical fallacy known as petitio principii ('begging the question'), since the argument's premises assume the truth of its conclusion.

Sunday, 12 January 2020

Summary Of Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 548):

Blogger Comments:

 Note the error in table layout: the 'Fact' cell should be coterminous with the 'Nominal group' cell.

Saturday, 11 January 2020

Facts (Projections) And Acts (Expansions)


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):
A fact is thus analogous, as a form of projection, to what we called an ‘act’ as a form of expansion. Each represents the least prototypical form of its own general category; and hence the least differentiated. Whereas there is a clear distinction between expansion and projection in their finite clausal forms – between, say, (projection) he never asked if/whether it was snowing and (expansion) he never came if/when it was snowing – there is only a minimal distinction, and perhaps even blending, between (projection: fact) she liked the snow falling (that the snow was falling) and (expansion: act) she watched the snow falling (as the snow was falling). Seeing that facts and acts come so close together in this way, we can understand how it is that the same scale of interdependency types (parataxis/hypotaxis/ rank shift) is associated with both these logical-semantic relations.

Friday, 10 January 2020

What Kind Of Projection Is A Fact?


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):
What kind of projection is a fact? It is still a meaning, a semantic abstraction, not some third type differing both from meanings and from wordings (indeed, there is no third level to which it could belong). But it is not a meaning created in anybody’s consciousness, nor is it emitted by any signal source; it is simply got up so as to function as a participant in some other process – typically a relational process, but sometimes also a mental or a verbal one. Not, however, in a material process; facts cannot do things, or have things done to them.

Thursday, 9 January 2020

Embedded Proposals: Impersonal Form


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 547):
As with propositions, there is an impersonal form of expression, it is required/expected that you wait in line; these are the imperative (proposal) equivalents of it is said/thought that ... with propositions. They have an important function as explicitly ‘objective modulations’ whereby the speaker disclaims responsibility for making the rules.

Wednesday, 8 January 2020

Projected vs Embedded Proposals


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 546-7):
Like a proposition, a proposal may either be embedded as Qualifier to one of these nouns, as in the examples above, or may function on its own as a nominalisation e.g.
You’ve said that one of your editorial rules is [[not to publish your buddies]].
Again, a first requirement is [[ to do no harm to organisational frameworks [[ that, through years of evolution, are finally at the stage [[ where they are supporting programs [[ that are actually helping us to get on with the business [[ of increasing understanding]] ]] ]] ]] ]].
The title for king fell out of use because its final requirement was [[ that the man [[ who aspires to be king]] would first pay all the debt [[ owed by every single man and every single woman in the community]] ]]
and we can construct similar pairs, for example
(a) ||| he insisted || that they had to wait in line |||
         α                  ‘β
(b) ||| he resented (the rule) [[that they had to wait in line ]]
where in (a) it is the ‘mental’ clause he insisted that does the projecting, while in (b) the projected clause is embedded. The ‘mental’ clause with the embedded fact clause is of the ‘emotive’ subtype, just as with propositions. But the ‘mental’ clause projecting the idea clause in (a) is not a ‘cognitive’ one but rather a ‘desiderative’ one. With ‘mental’ clauses, the general principle is that embedded fact clauses serve as Phenomenon in ‘emotive’ clauses, whether the facts are propositions or proposals; and that propositions are projected by ‘cognitive’ clauses whereas proposals are projected by ‘desiderative’ ones.

Blogger Comments:

Note that insisted here serves as a verbal Process (projecting a locution clause), not a mental one (projecting an idea clause).

Tuesday, 7 January 2020

Proposals As Embedded Fact Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 546):
Finally, as may be expected an embedded projection may belong to the class of proposals rather than propositions, as in
The thorniest problem for next week’s conference is [[to settle the relationships between them and the rest of the country]]. 
The surprise was [[to meet Russians (not intellectuals, but common folk) [[who took a contrary view ]] ]]. 
You mentioned the need of the artist and the right of the artist [[to withdraw]] and yet you have lived consistently a public life. 
if I had not been asked to terminate a life, I would not be so vehement about the need [[to help people who are begging for death]] 
The two-year study by Amnesty International, its first comprehensive analysis of North America, accuses Washington of failing in its duty [[to provide a moral lead to the rest of the free world]].
This defines the fourth category of ‘fact’ nouns referred to earlier:
(4) needs (nouns of modulation) relate to proposals, which are inherently modulated – e.g. ‘it is necessary for ... to ...’.
These, again, have no corresponding mental process verbs; they differ from nouns like order (the name of a verbal process) and insistence (the name of a mental process) in the same way that fact differs from thought and statement — they do not imply a Sayer or a Senser.

Monday, 6 January 2020

Hypotactic Projection vs Embedded Fact Clauses Across Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 545):
Table 7-28 summarises the distribution of hypotactic projection of idea and locution clauses in clauses nexuses vs. embedded fact clauses across process types. The table includes both propositions and proposals; 

Blogger Comments:

Importantly, note that the table mistakenly presents the 'perceptive' example of projection, (we saw) that the boats had been turned, as a hypotactic report of a clause complex instead of an embedded fact serving as Phenomenon of a single clause. Perceptive mental processes do not project idea clauses into existence.  The Phenomenon that is seen here is the state of affairs resulting from a past event. See § 7.4.6 (pp505-6).

Sunday, 5 January 2020

Fact Serving As Range In Cognitive And Verbal Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 544-5):
But even with some cognitive and verbal processes, a projected element may occur which is not projected by that process; for example:
[cognitive]
Just before dress rehearsal, under pressure from the company, he reluctantly accepted [[that such ideas were outmoded]], and dropped them. 
The second category of temple land was particularly important and it was accepted [[that the holders of this land could sub-lease it]]. 
[verbal]
‘That was pretty obvious,’ smiled Sir Cedric, ‘and I admit [[I once had doubts about you]]’. 
With sly winks and discreet sniggering he conveyed [[[that he knew very well || that there was a great deal more than Philip confessed]]]. 
And there will always be ‘borderline cases’, instances where the line is hard to draw.

Saturday, 4 January 2020

Fact vs Idea In Impinging Mental Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 544):
Like ‘middle mental’ clauses, ‘effective’ ones either project ideas within a clause nexus or include fact clauses as Phenomenon, e.g. 
 
The first means ‘in my opinion there’s no one here’, with there’s no one here as an idea. The second means ‘there’s no one here, and that worries me’, with there’s no one here as a fact. The fact exists prior to the occurrence of the mental process; but the idea does not – it is brought into existence in the course of the mental process. Thus the second is agnate with there’s no one here, which worries me; but we cannot say there’s no one here, which strikes me. The two are very distinct in speech, thanks to the intonation pattern (see below); the different analyses are given in Figure 7-25. 
 
The difference in structure is clear from the intonation pattern. That of (a) corresponds to I rather think there’s no one here, with falling tonic (tone 1) on here and perhaps a separate falling-rising tonic (tone 4) on strikes/think; that of (b) corresponds to it worries me, the emptiness of the place, a compound tone group with tone 1 on worries and tone 3 on here/emptiness, showing clearly that that there’s no one here is functioning as a postposed Subject. Again, it strikes me is a cognitive process clause, and so can project an idea, whereas it worries me is and emotive one and cannot.

Friday, 3 January 2020

Fact As Phenomenon In Impinging Mental Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):
In fact, the ‘emotive’ type with a fact clause as Phenomenon is more common in the ‘effective’ variant of agency (the ‘please’ type) than the ‘middle’ one (the ‘like’ type): the Phenomenon is explicitly construed as an Agent bringing about the Medium/Senser’s involvement in the process of emotion.
It did not surprise him very much [[to find [[that the door opened on the latch]] ]], for it was so old and worn that it offered little security. 
She had never reconciled herself to things which hurt her, and sometimes he was frightened [[[that when bad things began to happen || she would have so little habit of optimism to support her ]]]. 
The evidence against him was by no means decisive, but both judge and jury seem to have been influenced by the fact [[that the doctor himself was a morphine addict]].

Thursday, 2 January 2020

The Meaning Of An Idea vs The Meaning Of A Fact

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):
 
The meaning of (a) in the preceding paragraph is that Mark Antony’s thinking brought the idea that Caesar was dead into existence (as with Mark Anthony believed/imagined that Caesar was dead); but the meaning of (b) is that the already existing fact that Caesar was dead impinges on Mark Antony’s consciousness (as with that Caesar was dead scared Mark Anthony).

Wednesday, 1 January 2020

Idea vs Fact In A Mental Clause [Diagnostics]


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 543):
Note the following pair (Figure 7-24):
In (a) the clause that Caesar was dead is projected as an ‘idea’ by Mark Antony thought. It is therefore a separate, hypotactic clause; and hence
(i) it cannot be preceded by the fact;
(ii) it cannot be replaced by Caesar’s death;
(iii) it can be quoted: ‘Caesar is dead,’ thought Mark Antony;
(iv) it can be replaced by the substitute so: Mark Antony thought so.
In (b), however, the clause that Caesar was dead, although it is a projection, is not projected by Mark Antony regretted, which is a clause of emotion not of cognition. It is not an idea but a fact; hence it is embedded, and hence
(i) it can be preceded by a ‘fact’ noun;
(ii) it can be replaced by a nominal group Caesar’s death;
(iii) it cannot readily be quoted: Mark Antony regretted, ‘Caesar is dead’ is very forced; and
(iv) it can be replaced by the reference item it, but not by the substitute so: Mark Antony regretted it (not so). 
The form Mark Antony dreaded that Caesar was dead is an example of a type that allows both interpretations, and hence is ambiguous: as idea (hypotactic), ‘he thought (and wished otherwise)’, or as fact (embedded), ‘he was afraid because’.

Blogger Comments:

In the case of Mark Antony regretted, ‘Caesar is dead’, the projection ‘Caesar is dead’ is an idea (ranking clause), not a fact (embedded clause).  Here the verb regretted serves as a cognitive — rather than emotive — mental Process, the lexical choice adding an 'emotive' feature to the cognition. This is the same principle as lexical choice adding a behavioural feature to a verbal Process, as in 'Caesar is dead', mumbled Cassius.

Tuesday, 31 December 2019

Facts Embedded In Mental Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542):
There is no mental process corresponding to fact or chance, no implication of a conscious participant that is doing the projecting. Unlike nominal groups with nouns of projection, nominal groups with fact nouns are not nominalisations of projection nexuses. A fact, as already pointed out, is an impersonal projection.
However, it is possible for a fact to enter into a ‘mental’ process clause without being projected by it. In this case it functions as a Phenomenon within the mental process clause. For example:
The fact [[that he rides in such exalted company]] will not deter Scott. 
With the heavy expenditure on new rating, plus a new street costing 1,000,000, the cost of the Pump Room, new Municipal Offices, and so on, the eventual rates are likely to deter people from coming to live in the town, as they would probably be influenced more by excessively high rates than by the fact [[that there was a luxury swimming bath for use in winter]]. 
He overlooked the fact [[that Ceylon had to be governed not only in the first few years after independence but for all time]]; and this raises several questions. 
Sternberg himself photographed the film, revelling in such pure artificiality, regretting only [[that he had to use real water]]. 
You know I smoke and I hate it. I hate [[that I do it]]. And I’m at that point where I have to make the decision. I can’t go on any longer with it.

Monday, 30 December 2019

Facts Embedded In Existential Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542):
Another, minor but significant, environment in which fact clauses occur is that of ‘existential’ clauses (an environment favoured by evidence):
There is evidence [[that the Russians were just as surprised as anyone else at the suddenness and violence of them]], but it is, of course, a situation ideal for exploitation. 
If the serum of a D negative individual agglutinates the D positive but not the D negative control cells, there is a high probability [[that the serum contains anti-D]], but the specificity should be confirmed by testing against several more examples of D-positive and D-negative red cells.

Sunday, 29 December 2019

Facts Embedded In Personal Attributive Clauses


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 542):
However, we also need to take note of ‘attributive’ clauses where the Carrier is realised by a nominal group denoting a person and the Attribute is a nominal group with an embedded fact clause, either ‘possessive’ with a noun as Head (e.g. idea, notion, inkling [[that ...]]) or ‘intensive’ with an adjective as Head of the nominal group (e.g. sure, certain, aware, cognisant, oblivious (of the fact) [[that ...]]); for example:
They would have no idea [[[that the current British theatrical renaissance is having an effect far beyond the West End of London, || so that Broadway is heavily influenced by the highly successful plays of today [[that it has imported from Britain]] ]]]. 
However, I am not sure [[that [[what probabilists and what physicists mean here by ‘fields’ ]] are quite synonymous]].
These ‘personal’ ‘attributive’ clauses are closely agnate with projecting ‘mental’ clauses: they have no idea ~ they don’t know, I’m not sure ~ I don’t know.

Saturday, 28 December 2019

Fact Clause Serving As Token In An Identifying Clause


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 541-2):
In an ‘identifying’ clause, the fact clause serving as Token is identified with a Value realised by a nominal group with a noun as Head that typically belongs to the class of fact nouns; this fact noun may itself be qualified by an embedded fact clause. The Value is an interpretation of the fact clause, identifying it as a particular fact of some class of fact such as reason, problem, lesson, difficulty. … the Value nominal group may include an Epithet (thorniest, most important, plain … ; cf. obvious, indisputable, appalling, significant, simple, mere) assessing the fact represented by the Token (in the same way as Epithets within Attributes do) or a Numerative (cf. first, next, last). This latter is important in the development of discourse, being agnate with an internal temporal conjunction (cf. thirdly, the supreme interest for the whole world ...): the enumerated Value is the thematic point of departure of the clause and this Theme locates the clause as a message in the unfolding text.

Friday, 27 December 2019

Attributes Ascribed To A Fact Clause Serving As Carrier


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 540-1):
In an ‘attributive’ clause, the Attribute ascribed to the fact clause serving as Carrier is realised by a nominal group with an adjective or noun as Head belonging to one of a small number of classes. These are illustrated in Table 7-27. Several of the types are similar to classes of interpersonal Adjunct and two of them can also be related to types of sensing in ‘mental’ clauses.³⁴ We shall return to this area in Chapter 10, Section 10.3.1, showing that certain ‘attributive’ clauses with fact clauses as Carrier and Attributes of assessment form part of the realisation of a semantic system of assessment. The nouns in it is include fact nouns such as fact, idea, but they also include nouns of evaluation such as pity, shame, nuisance that are less likely to function as Head/Thing in nominal groups with a fact clause as Postmodifier/Qualifier.
³⁴ The ‘attributive’ clause may have an agnate ‘mental’ clause of the “please” type: it is surprising (to me) that ... ~ it surprises me that ...; the equivalent of the Senser in the ‘mental’ clause is a circumstance of Angle

Thursday, 26 December 2019

The Typical Environment For A Fact


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 540):
Other than with impersonals such as it is said, it is rumoured, it seems, the typical environment for a fact is a ‘relational’ process clause of the ‘intensive’ type, either ‘attributive’ or ‘identifying’, e.g.
[attributive] 
Earl Russell says it is inevitable, though profoundly regrettable, [[that the agitation against the Polaris base has generated some antagonism to the policy of the United States]].
In that article, it’s no coincidence [[that I have a big fight with Twain and Eliot]], || because I disagree with them on issues [[that concern all of us]].
Until 1940 it was an observable fact [[that there were composers whose music was highly prized in some countries and entirely neglected by their neighbours]], and this was explained by the difference in national characters.
It is clear [[that the Princess and her husband are settling down in London]] and for this purpose, Kensington Palace is well suited.
[attributed variant] 
The Federal Government has made it clear [[that it would have no part in any project for the development of long-range missiles – which in any case would contravene the provisions of the Brussels treaty]].
[identifying] 
The third reason is [[that the supreme interest for the whole world – East and West and uncommitted nations – is the prevention of nuclear war]].
The lesson [[that’s learned]] is [[that they aren’t Kangan]]; Kangan is everybody, as represented by the people gathered in Beatrice’s apartment at the end of the novel. [Text 16]Perhaps the most important point of all is the fact [[that capital was available for expansion as required]].
The plain fact is [[[that it is extremely difficult [[for MPs to accept invitations from foreign Governments, or from public relations organisations [[working for them]] ]], || without being compromised]]].
[identifying clause of proving] 
But the fact [[that they are caught]] proves [[that they do not lift above the headline]].
Here the fact is an embedded clause standing as a nominalisation on its own, functioning as the realisation of an element in the relational process clause (Carrier or Identifier/Token, in these examples).³³ Since it is embedded, there is always an agnate version where the fact clause serves as a Qualifier of a noun of the ‘fact’ class, e.g. the fact that Caesar was ambitious.
³³ Strictly speaking the embedded ‘fact’ clause functions as Head of a nominal group which, in turn, functions as an element in the ranking clause. This analysis shows how clauses serving as Head are agnate with clauses serving as Postmodifier in nominal groups with a fact noun as Head: that Caesar was ambitious is obvious: the fact that Caesar was ambitious is obvious. But since a fact clause functioning as Head takes up the whole of that nominal group we can just as well leave out that stage in the structural analysis and show it as directly embedded into the clause.

Wednesday, 25 December 2019

Impersonal Projections Of Facts


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 539):
While there is no participant doing the projecting – no Sayer or Senser – a fact may be projected impersonally, either by a relational process (‘it is the case that ...’) or by an impersonal mental or verbal process, as in
[i] relational
it is/may be/is not (the case) that ...
it happens (to be the case) that ...
it has been shown/can be proved (to be the case) that ...
it happened/came about that ...
[ii] mental: impersonal
it seems/appears/is thought (to be the case) that ...
[iii] verbal: impersonal
it is said/rumoured (to be the case) that ...
Here the it is not a participant in the projecting process but is simply a Subject placeholder; hence the fact clause can occupy its position at the front: that Caesar was ambitious is certainly the case/is widely held/is generally believed, etc. By contrast we do not normally say that Caesar was ambitious was thought/said by Brutus – at least not in a reporting context, only in the special sense of ‘these lines were spoken by ...’; and this is because, as we have seen, where there is a personal projecting process, mental or verbal, the clause that is projected by it is not embedded but hypotactic.


Blogger Comments:

Lest this wording be misunderstood, the impersonal projection of a fact occurs within a single clause, since the fact is embedded; the projection is not a relation between ranking clauses in a clause complex.

Tuesday, 24 December 2019

A Fact Clause Serving As Head In A Nominal Group


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 538-9):
A fact clause serving as Head in a nominal group without a fact noun can be related to the first class of fact noun – that of ‘cases’, since such a fact clause is always agnate with an expanded nominal group with fact as Head. Whether the nominal group has a fact noun as Head or not, the fact clause is embedded. Because there is no projecting process involved, to which it could be paratactically or hypotactically related, a fact can appear only in embedded form: either as Qualifier to a ‘fact’ noun, or as a nominalisation on its own (Figure 7-23); for example:
Historically, the fact is [[[that Uncle Tom’s Cabin was the most popular novel of the nineteenth || century and had a huge effect on American history]]].

Monday, 23 December 2019

Fact Nouns And Reference


Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 538):
Like nouns of projection, fact nouns can be used anaphorically (or cataphorically) to create cohesion in discourse; for example:
Warwick Town Council originally decided to build its own crematorium, but in April last year it abandoned the idea and entered into a joint scheme with Leamington Town Council and Warwick Rural District Council. 
The Bill is short and modest in scope, and it is doubtful whether the other Private Members’ Bills in the offing will fill all the gaps. This fact may give the Government an extra excuse for counselling patience until the next report from the Molony committee. 
In the first place our business is foreign policy, and it is the business of the Presidential leadership and his appointees in the Department to consider the domestic political aspects of a problem. Mr Truman emphasised this point by saying, ‘You fellows in the Department of State don’t know much about domestic politics’.
Here a passage of text is picked up by anaphoric reference, as in the case of text reference by means of this and that on their own; but fact nouns add a classification and often an assessment (which may be supported by post-Deictics or Epithets) of the discursive antecedent:
There is a subdued aspect of the current political voices: with all the tension generated by the electoral process, it is only a means to an end. The end actually is the transformation in the quality of lives of the people. We must never lose focus of this as an issue. This obvious point can certainly not be over-emphasised.


Blogger Comments:

Here again Matthiessen misrepresents Halliday's model of cohesive reference.  Like nouns of projection, fact nouns do not refer anaphorically or cataphorically.  It is the reference item that precedes the noun (the, this etc.) that refers.  The absence of a reference function of a noun can be made obvious by simply removing the reference item that precedes it, and trying to identify the referent of the noun.

To be clear, any classification or assessment of a fact noun is made through nominal group structure, and is distinct from the system of cohesive reference.