The Grammar's Model Of Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213-4):

… grammar’s model of time has been evolving unconsciously in the context of human survival; it is part of the selective and collective wisdom that the species has accumulated in the understanding of its relationship to its environment and in the interaction of its members one with another. And again, like everything else in the construal of experience it is the product of continual compromise, whereby divergent and often conflicting aspects of experience are adjusted and accommodated in such a way that all of them have some place in the total picture.

Processes: Internal Organisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213):

Thus from the point of view of the figure, a process is the central element, forming a nucleus around which participants and circumstantial elements are organised into a meaningful pattern.  From the point of view of its own internal organisation, a process is a construal of ‘eventing’ — a phenomenon perceived as having extension in time.

Thing Vs Event

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213):

But while the Thing is enmeshed in a[n] elaborate taxonomy of things the Event is taxonomically rather simple and its complexity lies in the construal of time itself. Hence the verbal group is lexically sparse — typically the Event is the only lexicalised part; whereas nominal groups can be lexically extremely dense.

Participants Vs Processes: Spatio-Temporality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213):

While participants are located in referential space, processes are located in time. The verbal group realising a process constructs a “moment” in time beginning with the ‘now’ (the time of speaking) leading up to the categorisation of the Event; this is analogous to the way the nominal group, realising a participant, constructs a “body” in space beginning with the ‘here’ and leading up to the categorisation of the Thing.

The Key To The Construal Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 213): 

The key to the construal of experience is the perception of change; the grammar construes a quantum of change as a figure (typically one clause) and sorts out figures in the first instance into those of consciousness (sensing and saying), those of the material world (doing & happening) and those of logical relations (being & having). The central element of a figure is the process; ‘things’ are construed as entities participating in processes, having different rôles, of which one is ‘that participant in which the process is actualised’ … ; hence the grammatical nucleus of the clause is the configuration of Process with Medium.

Qualities Of Enhancement: Realisation And Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

This relation is typically typically a temporal or spatial one involving the thing as a discoursal instance rather than the thing as a general experiential class. Consequently, like qualities of extension, qualities of enhancement tend to serve as deictic elements (Post-Deictic) rather than as Epithets; as Post-Deictics, they come before Numeratives in the structure of the nominal group: the preceding / subsequent two meetings. Here they relate a specific referent, recoverable in the current situation: the subsequent two meetings : the two meetings that followed this one. But the spatial qualities can also, being taxonomic, serve to subclassify the thing they are assigned to: interior monologue, external pipes. Here they relate to a general class of thing, inferable from the experiential system: interior monologue : monologue that is within a person, external pipes : pipes that are outside a house.

Qualities Of Enhancement: Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of enhancement also resemble those of ‘elaboration: identity’ and those of extension in that construe a relation between a thing they are assigned to and another thing. This is brought out by the fact that they are agnate with processes relating participants circumstantially: subsequent : be (come) before / precede, interior : be within, exterior : be outside, as in previous occasions : occasions coming before this one, interior design : design is what is within a house.

Qualities Of Extension

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of extension resemble those of ‘elaboration: identity’ in that they construe a relation between the thing they are assigned to and some other thing. The relation typically obtains between the thing as a discoursal instance rather than the thing as a general experiential class. Thus an alternative solution is a solution that can replace the one we have just been talking about. Consequently, properties of extension tend to serve as deictic elements (Post-Deictic) rather than as Epithets; they indicate how an instance (or instances) of the general class of the thing they are assigned to is selected from that class: we need an additional two volunteers means ‘two further instances of the general class of volunteer’. Like other properties serving as Post-Deictic, they may precede the Numerative (additional^two); but they may also follow, with no strong contrast in meaning: we need two additional volunteers.

Qualities Of Elaboration: Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 212):

Qualities of elaboration, subtype identity are not inherent properties, but rather are comparative. Thus the standard of comparison can always be construed: their car is the same/similar/different : their car is the same as / similar to / different from ours; and they are agnate with processes: their car is / resembles / differs from ours. The line between elaboration: identity and enhancement: manner: comparison is a fuzzy one; and processual agnates such as their car resembles ours are within the domain of enhancement.

Qualities Of Elaboration: Attribution

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 211-2):

The most prototypical qualities are those of elaboration, subtype attribution: they stand in a pure intensive relation to the thing they are assigned to, being construed as inherent qualities. They are typically scalar, but certain types are taxonomic or binary. As Epithets (or Classifiers) they are agnate with the Attribute of a figure of being. Many of them can serve as the Attribute of a figure of doing (as in he squashed it flat, she painted it blue) and are related to the outcome of such figures (cf. she heated/widened/enlarged it : it was hot/wide/large). The limiting case of qualities of attribution are quantities; they are assigned to a thing as a discoursal instance rather than as a general experiential class. Consequently, they do not serve as Epithets; they have a special rôle, that of Numerative (as in two/many brave volunteers).

Qualities Of Expansion: Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

Qualities of expansion cannot normally be assigned to metathings. They expand the thing they are related to by elaboration, extension or enhancement. these different subtypes display different patterns of agnation, but as Epithet (or Classifier) + Thing configurations they are all agnate with figures of being & having.

Qualities Of Projection: Modalities & Attitudes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

As we have seen, sensing is agnate with modality and, in the case of emotive sensing, with attitude. Similarly, qualities of projection extend to include modalities and attitudes; when the thing (or metathing) they are assigned to is agnate with the Phenomenon, these qualities are construed as objective, impersonal ones: it is certain/likely/possible that the moon’s a balloon. (Contrast: I’m certain the moon’s a balloon.) With qualities of usuality, this is the only possible orientation.

Qualities Of Projection: Transferability

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210):

[when they are agnate with the Senser], these qualities [of projection] may be transferred to tokens of the senser’s sensing, as in an angry face/look/letter/reaction.

Qualities Of Projection: Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 210): 

Qualities of projection are all scalar and they are […] agnate with processes of sensing in figures of sensing; they are often realised by participial verb forms used as adjectives. The thing they are assigned to, as Attribute or as Epithet, is agnate either with the Senser (the ‘like’ type …) or with the Phenomenon (the ‘please’ type …). From this it follows that when they are agnate with the Senser, they are ascribed to conscious beings …, whereas when they are agnate with the Phenomenon, they can be ascribed not only to things but also to metathings, ie projections …

Qualities Of Projection & Expansion: Agnation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209-10):

Qualities can be distinguished according to the transphenomenal types of projection and expansion. Qualities of projection and qualities of expansion differ in a number of respects. Most fundamentally, they differ in their patterns of agnation. Qualities of projection are agnate with processes of sensing in figures of sensing; … In contrast qualities of expansion display patterns of agnation within being & having, with variation according to subtype. This fundamental difference explains other differences; for example, qualities of projection tend to occur in agnate pairs of the ‘like’ and ‘please’ type that we find with figures of sensing (e.g. afraid/scary, suspicious/suspect, bored/boring), whereas qualities of expansion do not.

Qualities & The Semantic Organisation Of Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209):

The former [closed grammatical systems] are taxonomically simple (although they are notoriously difficult to interpret in lexical glosses); they include specific/non-specific; personal/demonstrative; near/far; total/partial &c. In contrast, elements at the latter end [open lexical sets] tend to be construed in complex taxonomies. That is, greater experiential complexity is handled by means of greater taxonomic complexity. […] Qualities lie at different places along these various dimensions; hence they vary in their potential for taking on rôles in different types of figure.

The Semantic Organisation Of Nominal Groups

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209):

… the nominal group is organised as a move along two semantic dimensions: the elements become increasingly stable in time, and increasingly complex in their taxonomy of features. Lexicogrammatically, this corresponds to a move from grammatical items (determiners, determinative adjectives such as usual, same, typical, cardinal and ordinal numerals) to lexical items (adjectives [in general], and nouns); that is, a move from closed systems to open sets.

Qualitative Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 209):

… a quality, when attached to the figure as an Attribute (rather than to a participant …), is construed as being more like a circumstance. The fact that manner circumstances are typically realised by adverbs that are simply derived from (and in some cases identical with) adjectives is a further symptom of the way a quality may resemble a circumstance.

Construing Qualities As Attribute Vs Manner

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

Some qualities may occur as depictive (as opposed to resultative) Attribute in a figure of doing & happening; in such instances the quality is very close to a circumstance of Manner, as is shown by agnate pairs such as the following: 

quality as Attribute:                     quality as Manner: 

she came home cheerful              she came home cheerfully

he walked in drunk                      he walked in drunkenly

Construing Qualities As Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

Some qualities can be construed as processes of doing; here for example there is an agnate form I’ve dried the plate, with ‘dry’ worded as a verb. In these cases, the quality is not repeated as an Attribute — we do not usually say I’ve dried the plate dry; it may however reappear in an intensified form, e.g. I’ve dried it very dry. Very many qualities may be construed as verbs in this way.

Construing Qualities: Participants, Processes And Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

Thus in its typical construal, as Epithet or as Attribute, a quality is clearly “participant-like”; we might also note that realised as an adjective in superlative form it does appear as a participant (these are the driest, pass me the driest; the smallest will fall through the holes). But there are also environments where a quality resembles a process or a circumstance.

A Quality Does Not Construe A Separate Class Of Thing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207-8):

The Attribute is not a prototypical participant. We have already noted that as it stands it cannot function interpersonally as Subject. On the other hand, it can easily be instated as a participant by adding the noun or the noun substitute one(s) to the nominal group which realises it: this is a dry plate, this is a dry one. The fact that the thing can be instated as the Head of the nominal group serving as Attribute illustrates the point already made: the quality does not construe a separate class of thing, it presumes this class from the environment. Thus this is heavy means that it is heavy relatively to whatever class of thing it has been assigned to …

The Rôles Served By Qualities Within The Structure Of A Participant

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207):

Typically, a quality combines with a thing to make up a participant in a figure: a dry plate, where the quality ‘dry’ is Epithet in the nominal group. The only context in which a quality serves on its own in a participant rôle is as Attribute; here it stands in intensive relation to a participant, either (i) in a figure of being, where the participant is Medium/Carrier (i.e. its sole function is to have the quality ascribed to it) or (ii) in a figure of doing, where the participant is Medium/Actor or Medium/Goal and the quality results from the doing; for example:

being: The plate’s dry — I’ve made the plate dry
doing: I’ve wiped the plate dry

Note that, in the doing figure, where I is Actor, the Attribute could be omitted: I’ve wiped the plate; in the being figure it cannot, since the process itself is one of ascription and the other participant, if present, is merely the ascriber.

The View Of Adjectives As “Stative Predicates”

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 207):

More recently, it has often been asserted that adjectives are really stative verbs, or “stative predicates”. This is the position of predicate logic, where both qualities and processes are simply predicates — but so also are things. It complicates the description of English grammar, but it is a reminder of the intermediate status of qualities as elements of figures.

Qualities: Element Topology

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

As a category, qualities lie somewhere along a cline between things and processes, and their status varies considerably among different languages.  In English, qualities belong more closely with things, since they contribute primarily to the construction of participants: grammatically, English favours construing a quality as Epithet in a nominal group, and the class of adjective is clearly related to that of noun. (By contrast, in Chinese, where qualities are typically construed clausally, as Attribute, rather than nominally, as Epithet, the adjective is clearly related to the verb.)

A Quality Characterises A Thing Relative To Other Things In The Same Class

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

Since qualities are assigned to things, they are construed with things as their frame of reference: in the first instance, a quality characterises a thing relative to other things in the same (primary) class. Thus a thick book is not ‘a thick thing’; rather it is a ‘thick book’ as opposed to a ‘slim book’: the scale of ‘thick’ to ‘slim’ is relative to book and a thick book would be much thicker than a thick envelope. This characteristic is particularly noticeable with scalar qualities, which have received particular attention in semantic studies; but it is also, in principle, a feature of taxonomic adjectives — even those construing complex classes. For example, the criteria for assigning ‘wooden’ to a ‘spoon’, a ‘house’ and a ‘carriage’ are fairly different in terms of the actual make-up of these things.

The Three Types Of Values Construed By Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 206):

These values may be of three kinds, according to the type of constrast they set up: (i) binary, e.g. (‘dead’/’alive’); (ii) scalar, e.g. (‘happy’/’sad’); (iii) taxonomic, e.g. ‘wooden’/’plastic’/’stone’ … . Of the three, the most complex, experientially, are the taxonomic qualities; for example, the taxonomy of materials (whether a folk taxonomy or one that is more scientifically informed) is based on a variety of different features, such as (in a folk taxonomy) its appearance, its texture, its range of functions, its relative value in different contexts, and the like. Taxonomic qualities are thus the closest to things; they are often realised as denominal adjectives, or even as nouns, and they tend to function as Classifier rather than Epithet (i.e. they sort things into classes rather than describing them).

Qualities Vs Things: Temporal Stability And Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205-6):

… qualities and things differ in two related respects, temporal stability and experiential complexity: things tend to persist through time and to represent intersections of many different dimensions, whereas qualities tend to be less stable through time and tend to represent values on single dimensions. Qualities thus construe values on dimensions such as size, weight, and shape.

Names Of Expansions: Cohesion In Discourse

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 205):

As with names of projections, names of expansions often serve a rôle in creating cohesion in discourse: e.g Instances such as these … , Another way of approaching the situation … , That aspect hadn’t occurred to me. Such expressions construe preceding figures and sequences as participants in their turn, and so enable the speaker or writer to make explicit the organisation of the discourse itself.

Enhancements As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204-5):

Things of the enhancing type […] construe one or other of the general logical semantic relations of cause, manner, time and place. As Facet, they specify some circumstance of an element functioning as Thing: the cause/result/purpose of the breakdown, the time/occasion of the breakdown, the place/location of the breakdown; cf. also the circumstances of the breakdown. As Thing, they give the logico-semantic relation itself the status of participant; here the usual words are reason, way, time, place, and the phenomenon becomes a figure realised by a qualifying clause: the reason/way/time/place we broke down. These are closest to the borderline with projections: we may have either expansion the reason for which we broke down, or projection (the reason) why we broke down. Those with ‘reason’ and ‘way’ often enter into an identifying relation with some other figure; for example, the reason we broke down was that/because the engine overheated.

Extensions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Similarly, those of the extending type may also function in either of these two grammatical rôles [as Thing or as Facet]. As Facet, they specify some quantity (either by container, e.g. a jar of jam, or by division, e.g. a piece of cake), some aggregate (e.g. a crowd of onlookers), some aspect or component (e.g. the other side of the argument, the top of the mountain, the trunk of the tree), or something added or substituted (e.g. an extension of your ideas, the latest addition to your family, an alternative to this proposal). As Thing, again, they are participants, typically concrete objects (e.g. a glass jar, the top [=lid] of the canister, build an extension on the property).

Elaborations As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Those of the elaborating type may function in the nominal group either as Thing or as Facet. As Facet (always constructed with of), they serve to construe the element functioning as Thing in some particular guise or perspective; for example, picture in this will give you a general picture of the situation, kind in a jet cat is a kind of passenger vessel, example in there were no examples of successful integration. As Thing, they are participants in their own right, either ‘objects’ (e.g. is that picture for sale) or ‘abstractions’ (e.g. Darwin showed how species first evolved).

Expansions As Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 204):

Certain categories of thing denote an element which is an expansion of something else, either elaborating it (‘kind of’, ‘instance of’, or ‘symbol of’), extending it (‘part of’, ‘amount of’, ‘collection of’, or ‘extension of’), or enhancing it (‘time of’, ‘place of’, cause of’, ‘manner of’).

Projections As Things: Subcategorised By Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this type fall into four subcategories, defined by their interaction with modality: cases, chances, proofs and needs. Cases represent simple facts; chances represent facts to which some degree of modalisation is attached; proofs are demonstrations of facts [caused modalisation]. The fourth category, that of needs, are facts accompanied by modulation, that is, where the projection is that of a proposal rather than a proposition.

Projections As Things: Realisational Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 203):

Things of this category are the names of types of projection; in the taxonomy of things, they are semiotic abstractions, some discrete and some non-discrete, and as a grammatical class they are referred to under the heading of fact nouns. They are grammatically distinct because they can function as Thing in a nominal group with a fact clause as Qualifier … Things of this type have an important rôle in discourse, because they function anaphorically to refer to (and at the same time classify) previous sections of text interpreted as projection.

Taxonomies Of Things: Limiting Cases

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 202):

The sort of strict taxonomy that is typically associated with related series of nominal groups is often a feature of special registers of the language […]. The limiting cases of such taxonomies are those found in the specialised technical registers of science and technology; these include some which are partially or even wholly designed in a conscious exploitation of the grammatical resources involved. The “things” that are construed in this way include the more abstract concepts of a scientific theory, the virtual objects that are postulated to explain the more arcane phenomena that impinge on human experience.

Lexis As Most Delicate Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198-9): 

… we can differentiate both processes and participants into finer and finer subcategories, until we reach a degree of differentiation that is associated with the choice of words (lexical items). Note that it is not (usually) the lexical items themselves that figure as terms of the systems in the network. Rather, the systems are systems of features, and the lexical items come in as the synthetic realisation of particular feature combinations. Thus lexis (vocabulary) is part of a unified lexicogrammar; there is no need to postulate a separate “lexicon” as a pre-existing entity on which the grammar is made to operate.

Feature Networks Vs Strict Taxonomies

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 198):

The paradigmatic strategy [of taxonomising], that of inventing new names, typically construes sets of things which are systemically related but not in a relationship of a strict taxonomy. This resource is typically associated with feature networks: that is, networks made up of systems of features, such that each lexical item (as the name of a thing) realises a certain combination of these features selected from different systems within the network — a particular clustering of systemic variables. … This resource, the construal of systematically related lexico-semantic sets, illustrates well the principle of “lexis as most delicate grammar”.

Principle Behind The Ordering Of Qualities In Nominal Group Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 197):

The expansion [of the nominal group] proceeds by adding qualities … typically ordered in English from right to left according to the degree of systemicity, with the most systemic (most permanent, least particularised) at the right, the most instantial (least permanent, most particularised) at the left.  Broadly speaking these are distributed by the grammar into distinct functions as Classifier, Epithet, Numerative, and Deictic.

[Note permanence and particularisation as factors in the cline from systemic to instantial.]

Elaboration Of Things Into Broad Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194):

By reference to the grammar of the clause on the one hand, and of the nominal group on the other, certain broad categories are set up such that some things will fall squarely into one category, while others will lie on the borderline, showing certain features of one category and certain features of another, or finding themselves equally at home in both.

Construing Participants: Scale Of Distance From The Human

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 194): 

… the grammar, in its rôle as a theory of human experience, categorises those phenomena that it construes as participants by locating them in a spectrum based on a scale of distance from the human — at one end humans themselves, and things most similar to (ie categorisable as) humans, at the other end things that are farthest away from being human: concrete substances in the material world and abstract “substances” in the semiotic world.

The Nature Of Grammatical Categorisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193-4):

The grammar imposes a categorisation that is compromising, fluid, indeterminate and constantly in process of change, along with changes in the human condition and in the interaction of humans with their environment. Yet it is also strong enough to bear and carry forward this wealth of often conflicting experience, and transmit it over and over again from one generation of human beings to the next.

Thing: The Most Complex Elemental Phenomenon Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193): 

The general picture we are suggesting, then, is that it is the category of thing that the grammar captures to the greatest measure the complexity of the elemental phenomena of human experience. Put together with the different types of figure, which construe the complexity of goings-on upon the broad foundational categories of doing, sensing, saying and being, the different types of participant we have sketched in here foreground the dual nature of experience as both material and semiotic — a world that is constituted out of the interaction between entities and meanings. On each of these dimensions there is a progression from things that are most like to things that are least like ourselves.

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Intermediate Between Between Semiotic Objects And (Non-Discrete) Semiotic Abstractions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Discrete semiotic abstractions: intermediate between semiotic objects and (non-discrete) semiotic abstractions. These include non-personalised ‘facts’ and ‘cases’, mental entities like ‘thoughts’ and ‘fears’, and speech functions ‘questions’ and ‘orders’; they are bounded and cannot function as Sayer but can accept a projection as Qualifier (e.g. the order to retreat, her anxiety that she may be disqualified).

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Intermediate Between Conscious Beings And Institutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Human collectives: intermediate between conscious beings and institutions. These can function as Senser in sensing of all kinds, including those embodying desideration; but they accept either singular or plural pronouns, and if singular pronominalise with it (e.g. the family says it is united/the family say they are united).

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Intermediate Between Animals And Material Objects

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 193):

Natural forces (tides, hurricanes, etc); instruments (as extended body parts); powered artefacts (locomotives, industrial machines, etc): intermediate between animals and material objects. These are typically active (including effective action, moving other objects), but non-volitional; hence when the Actor is of this category, the process does not admit phases that construe intentionality …

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Semiotic Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192-3):

typifying rôle: scope-defining participant in figure of sensing or saying [Range in mental process, e.g. find out more information; in verbal process, e.g. tell the truth]; also participant in figures of being & having [e.g. possessed Attribute, have you any evidence] 

pronoun it; general noun: some attitudinally loaded ones such as nonsense [non-attitudinal ones for some, e.g. idea, fact; number category: mass. 

unbounded semiotic substance; may be qualified by projection [as Thing + Qualifier in nominal group, e.g. the knowledge that they had failed]; no material existence.

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Semiotic Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

typifying rôle: scope-defining participant in figure of saying [Range in verbal process, e.g. read the notice, tell me a story]; also active participant [Sayer, e.g. the book says, the regulations require …] 

pronoun it/them, they; general noun (none); number category: count (singular/plural). 

may also exist as a material object, e.g. book, clock; has the potential for being a symbol source [hence Sayer in projecting clause].

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Institution

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 192):

typifying rôles: acting participant in a figure of saying [Sayer, e.g. the ministry announced …], of doing [Actor, e.g. the school is closing down]; also of sensing [Senser, e.g. the class decided that…]. 

pronoun it/they; general noun people, place, set-up etc.; number category: count (singular). (Institutions of course do appear in the plural — although relatively infrequently: the plural pronoun they typically refers to a single institution.) 

has potential for voluntary action, typically semiotic with authority of a collective [verbal process of ordering, mental process of deciding or judging]; also material [material processes, middle and effective].

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Material Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191-2):

typifying rôles: as Phenomenon in figure of sensing [e.g. estimate the depth], as participant in figure of being [Carrier in ascriptive figure, e.g. the colours were too bright; Value in identifying figure, e.g. the score was 2-1]. 

pronoun it; general noun none; number category: mass. 

has no extension in space and is unbounded; typically some parameter of a material quality or process.

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Substance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

typifying rôles: thing as part of circumstance [Range in prepositional phrase, especially Location, e.g. on the ground], rather than having direct rôle as participant in figure. 

pronoun it; general noun stuff; number category: mass. 

has extension in space, but unbounded; can be manipulated and measured; if participant in figure, is typically being distributed [Goal, e.g. cut the string, keep rain out].

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Material Object

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

typifying rôles: impacted participant in figure of of doing [Goal…] 

pronoun it/them; general noun thing; number category: count (singular/plural). 

has extension in space, bounded so participates in figures as unit whole; if acting, then in figure of happening [Actor in involuntary process…].

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Animal

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 191):

typifying rôles: active participant in figure of of doing [Actor…] 

pronoun it/they; general noun creature; number category: count (singular/plural). 

has potential for self-initiated action and movement [processes in which animal occurs as Actor are (unconscious but) voluntary; and may also be effective …]; also for perception [Senser in process of seeing and hearing].

Taxonomy Of (Simple) Things: Conscious

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190-1):

typifying rôles: active participant in figure of sensing [Senser…], of sayng [Sayer…] and of doing [Actor…] 

pronoun he/she/they (also I/you); general noun person etc.; number category: count (singular/plural).

has potential for voluntary action [material: doing, including doing to another participant; verbal (semiotic): saying] and conscious processing of all kinds [mental: sensing, including feeling, thinking, intending as well as perceiving].

Primary Categories Of Things: Material Vs Semiotic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190):

One way of exploring [the primary categories of things] is by noting which participant rôles each category of participant is typically associated with. The critical rôles, in this respect, are those of Senser, Sayer and Actor, operating respectively in figures of sensing, saying and doing-&-happening. When we investigate these, however, we find that the overall categorisation of phenomena that is revealed in this way displays a further dimension of complexity: at the highest level, all phenomena are distributed into two broad experiential realms, the material and the semiotic.

Primary Categories Of Things: Potential For Bringing About Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 190):

These primary categories of things represent an ordering of the phenomena of experience. This ordering has to do with their inherent potential for bringing about change: that is, their ability to initiate processes and to affect other participants.

The Conscious/Non-Conscious Categorisation Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

The boundary between conscious and non-conscious, of course, is fluid and negotiable: different systems and different speakers (or the same speaker on different occasions), may draw it in different places. But the guiding principle is that ‘conscious’ means prototypically adult human and may be extended outwards (a) to babies, (b) to pets, and (c) to higher animals — as well as by rhetorical strategies of various kinds.

Primary Categorisation Of Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 189):

… the primary distinction within figures is that between conscious processing and other forms of experience: the key participant in a conscious process, the Senser, is restricted to things that are construed as being endowed with consciousness, so we take conscious/non-conscious as the primary distinction. It is also helpful, in the case of English, to make an initial distinction between objects, which are treated as bounded, and substances, which are not. This gives us an initial categorisation in the form ‘conscious / non-conscious: animals / institutions / objects / substances / abstractions’.

Configurational Rôles Of Things Vs Other Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 188):

There is thus a marked contrast between things and all other elements. A quality enters into a figure only as an Attribute; a process only as a Process; and a circumstance only in some particular circumstantial rôle. Other than this, the only functional environment for qualities, processes and circumstances is that where they form parts of things — that is, grammatically, where they enter into the structure of the nominal group. The fact that these other elements can themselves enter into the specification of a thing is another indication of the relative complexity of things.

Things

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 187):

By comparison with other elements, things tend to stand out

(i) by their varied rôles as elements in figures,
(ii) by the overall weight and discursive force of their primary categorisation of experience,
(iii) by their tendency to be elaborated into numerous micro-categories,
(iv) by their complex internal organisation, and
(v) by their highly systematic relationship one with another.

Things Vs Qualities: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 186):

Qualities tend be experientially simple, specifying values along a single dimension or scale such as size, weight, loudness, colour, according to either scalar or binary distinctions (e.g. scalar: ‘large’ — ‘small’, ‘tall’ — ‘short’; binary: ‘male’ — ‘female’, ‘dead’ — ‘alive’). Things, on the other hand, tend be experientially more complex than qualities. They are often definable in terms of an elaborate taxonomy where several dimensions (parameters) are needed to distinguish them.

Things Vs Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 185):

This distribution of qualities and things across the nominal group indicates two related points:

(i) things are more time-stable than qualities; and

(ii) things are more experientially complex than qualities.

Things & Qualities: Classifiers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 184):

Grammatically speaking, (simple) participants are realised by nominal groups, which are made up of both things and qualities. In terms of the structure of the nominal group, the cut-off point between things and qualities is between the Classifier and the Thing. Semantically, Classifiers are qualities of the ‘class’ type: they are like things and may be derived from things, but unlike things they do not have independent existence — they cannot be established in referential space and re-identified in running discourse. So for example although a ‘passenger’ is undoubtably a thing, in a passenger train, where passenger functions as Classifier, it is being construed as a quality; hence it cannot be picked up by anaphoric reference […] Grammatically, Classifiers are realised by ‘substantives’ or by ‘adjectives’, and this indeterminacy in grammatical class is symbolic of their status as qualities which are like things.

A Participant Is A Thing That Can Carry Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 183):

Experientially, [in a nominal group] there is a ‘carrier’ — the Thing — and there are ‘attributes’ — Epithets and other modifiers. However, participants are construed not only experientially but also logically, which means that the Thing (typically) serves as a Head that can be modified by successive attributes and that this modifying relation is inherently ascriptive. There is thus no equivalent, in the nominal group, of the Process in an ascriptive figure; this is construed instead as the logical relation of modification, indefinitely repeatable. […] That is, participants are construed as things that can accrue attributes.

Participant [Definition]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 182):

We have already set up the general theory of participants, defining them in relation to ascriptive processes of being, being at, and having, in a process-participant configuration.  There are three elements in such a configuration: the Process, intensive, possessive or circumstantial; the Attribute, which is being ascribed by one or other of these processes; and the Carrier.  It is the rôle of Carrier which defines the concept of a participant. A participant, according to this theory, is that which may have assigned to it, in the discourse, properties [intensive/elaborating], parts [possessive/extending] or circumstantial features [enhancing].

Participants & Processes: Temporal Permanence & Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 181):

Both the difference in temporal permanence and the difference in experiential complexity are reflected logogenetically. Participants tend to persist in the unfolding of a text; and since they do, they can accrue various qualities. In contrast, processes cannot persist in text: unlike the deictic system of the nominal group, the deictic system of the verbal group, the tense system, is not a system for tracking textual instances of processes as a text unfolds. To achieve persistence in a text, processes have to be construed metaphorically as participants. When processes are construed as if they were participants, they can be established and maintained as referents in a text; hence under these conditions they also can accrue various qualities.

The Elaborative Potential Of Participants: Qualities

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180-1):

Nominal groups have, in fact, far greater potential than verbal groups for creating experientially complex categories; and this reflects a fundamental difference between participants and processes. The nominal group has the potential for intersecting any number of qualities in the representation of a participant; and this makes it possible for the taxonomic ordering of participants to be considerably more elaborated than that of processes.

Nominal Group Structure: From Transitory To Permanence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

In the nominal group, on the other hand, the path from Deictic to Thing is not a chain in time — alt[h]ough it does reflect time in another way. The path goes through qualities of various kinds, beginning with qualities that are textual and transitory (unstable in time) and moving towards increasing permanence (time-stability) and experiential complexity.

Verbal Group Structure: Path Of Temporal Relations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

But in the case of the verbal group, the path is made up of one or more temporal relations: past/present/future in relation to a moment in some dimension of time construed between ‘now’ and the time of the occurrence of the event.

Nominal & Verbal Group Structure: Path From Interpersonal To Experiential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

… the structures of both types of group constitute a kind of path between the interpersonal reference point, reflected in the Deictic or Finite, and the experiential one, reflected in the Thing or Event.

Process & Participant: Relative Lexicalisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

… both types of group include a specification of a primary experiential category — Thing in the nominal group and Event in the verbal group. But in the simple verbal group, this is the only semantic category that is lexicalised — other categories are represented grammatically by auxiliaries; whereas in the nominal group, there is a large amount of other lexical material.

Processes & Participants: Mode Of Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 179):

… since processes occur in time — their mode of existence is temporal — that is how they are tied to the speech situation; whereas participants exist in some kind of referential space, which may be grounded concretely in the speech interaction (this = ‘near me’; that = ‘away from me’) but may also be a more abstract discoursal space. The latter is the space where we ‘record’ discourse referents as we work our way through a text (this = ‘about to be mentioned (by me); that = ‘mentioned earlier’).

Process & Participant: Two Kinds Of Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 179):

Both types of element begin with a location in the ‘here & now’: they construct a path from the spatio-temporal moment defined instantially by the interaction base — the ‘here & now’ of the act of speaking — to a primary category of ideational phenomena. In other words, both types of group include deixis. But the deixis is of two different kinds: nominal deixis (such as near/remote) and verbal deixis (such as past/present/future), structurally realised as Deictic and Finite respectively.

Participants & Processes: Temporal Complementarity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178-9):

In our discussion of figures, we pointed out that participants form a temporal complementarity: participants persist, whereas processes unfold, through time. This complementarity is reflected both in the similarities and differences between the two.

Participants & Processes: Experiential Complexity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

Being elements, participants and processes occupy rôles in figures; but whereas processes only serve in the the single rôle of Process, participants range over a much wider experiential spectrum — the direct participant rôles of Actor, Goal, Senser, Phenomenon, and so on, and also the indirect participant rôles within circumstances such as Location and Cause. Thus, seen from the point of view of figures, participants are construed as being experientially more complex, in the sense that they can take a variety of configurational rôles.

The Internal Organisation Of Elements: Relators

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

Relators are typically realised by conjunctions, like and, so, if, that, because, however; these can form groups, such as as if, and yet, but conjunctions are more often expanded by adverbs (just because, even if). In addition, there are numerous other types of relator: prepositional phrases (in addition, in the event (that), for fear that), nominal groups remaining from earlier prepositional phrases ([at] the moment (that), [on] the day (that)), and various expressions involving non-finite verbs (supposing (that), provided (that)). The relator construes a logico-semantic relation between the clauses in a clause nexus (realising a sequence), but it is itself an element in the structure of one or other of the two clauses concerned;

The Internal Organisation Of Elements: Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

Circumstances of the “macro” type are realised by prepositional phrases, which as we have seen are like miniaturised clauses; their components are thus of different types — a (minor) process plus a participant. Circumstances of the simple type, on the other hand, are realised by adverbial groups; these are groups of adverbs, like more soundly, not so very fast, with the single adverb again as the limiting case.

The Internal Organisation Of Elements: Participants & Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 178):

… there is a significant difference between element and figures in the nature of their internal organisation. While figures consist of phenomena that are ontologically of different types — participants, processes and circumstances, the components of an element belong in principle to the same type. That is, the components of the participant are themselves potential participants, and the components of a process are themselves potential processes. Grammatically speaking, participants are realised by nominal groups, which are groups of nouns; and processes are realised by verbal groups, which are groups of verbs. The limiting case of a group is a single word. The situation with circumstances and relators is a little more complicated.

Elements: Primary Types & Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177):

Elements serve as component parts of figures. Three primary types of element may be differentiated according to the generalised categories of configurational rôles: process, participant, and circumstance. In addition to these three, we need to recognise a fourth category of element, the relator; this is the element which forms figures into sequences. The congruent (prototypical) grammatical realisations of these types of element in English are as follows:

process î verbal group

participant î nominal group

circumstance î adverbial group; prepositional phrase

relator î conjunction group