Figures Of Sensing: Forms Of Participation Involved

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 151):

Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in “inert” conscious processing (“sensing”, as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser [impinging] (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser’s conscious processing [emanating]). Alternatively, the Senser’s conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.

The Particularistic Model: The Principle On Which The Grammar Categorises Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 150-1):

In the most general terms […] the principle is that all phenomena can be interpreted as falling within a small number of broad experiential domains:

those happening “inside”, within the realm of our own consciousness; 

those happening “outside”, in the perceptual world that lies around us; 

those that are not kinds of happening at all, but rather kinds of being and of relating to something else.

We have referred to these as, respectively:

(1) figures of sensing — or, more inclusively, (since ‘languaging’ is treated as a distinct phenomenal realm), (1) figures of sensing and 

(2) figures of saying; 

(3) figures of doing — or, more explicitly (since the word ‘doing’ might suggest intentionality), figures of doing & happening; 

(4) figures of being — or more accurately (since ‘having’ is construed as a kind of relative ‘being’), figures of being & having.

Each of these types of figure has its own special character, as revealed by the way it is organised in the lexicogrammar.

The Particularistic Model Of Participation-In-Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 150):

In what we are calling its “particularist” modelling, the grammar is categorising experience for us (or we are categorising our experience through our grammar) by construing a small number of different types of figure, differentiated according to what kind of process is taking place and what kinds of participant are involved — in what relationships to each other and to the process.

Composition: The Two Models Of Participation-In-Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 149-50):

There are two models of participation-in-process embodied in the semantic system of English —

(i) One is particularistic: it diversifies our experience of participant interaction into four domains — doing, sensing, saying, and being. 

(ii) The other is generalised: it unifies our experience of participant interaction across the different domains.

Thus the system strikes a balance in the construal of figures between unity and diversity — between differentiating one aspect of experience from another and generalising over the whole. These constitute distinct but complementary perspectives.

The Outcome Of Dispositive Doing & Happening: Figures Of Doing Or Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148-9):

If the process is dispositive, the outcome is more variable; it may be either (i) a figure of doing (more specifically, doing [to]/happening), or (ii) a figure of being (more specifically, being [at]/having):

(i) the cat chased the mouse      outcome: ‘the mouse ran’

(ii) the boys mended the roof     outcome: ‘the roof was whole’

John gave his sister a violin      outcome: ‘John’s sister had a violin’

[The being outcomes] may be elaborative (intensive), extending (possessive) or enhancing (circumstantial). …

Notice that in some cases the outcome is embodied in the clause by which the figure is realised; for example in middle variants of the doing & happening type (the outcome of John ran is 'John + run'), and in clause[s] with resultative elements (Attribute, Rôle) such as I'll boil the eggs hard (outcome: 'eggs + be + hard'), Let's appoint Fred timekeeper (outcome: 'Fred + be + timekeeper').

The Outcome Of Creative Doing & Happening: Figures Of Existing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

If the process is creative, the outcome is that some entity comes into existence: such a figure may be construed as a doing with effectum, as in he baked a cake; but it may simply be a creative happening such as icicles formed. In either case the outcoming figure is one of being (more specifically, existing):

he baked a cake     outcome: ‘there exists a cake’

icicles formed        outcome: ‘there exist icicles’

Doing & Happening Can Be Subcategorised By The Outcome Of The Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

As pointed out earlier, doing is a process of change involving time and energy. Such change implies an outcome; the outcome may be of various kinds, but it is always such that it can be construed by another figure. We can therefore examine what kind of figure emerges as the outcome of the one under investigation.

Doing & Happening: Traditional Grammatical Distinctions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 148):

The subtypes that have generally recognised in the grammar are (1) intransitive/transitive; (2) within intransitive, action/event; and within transitive, effectum/affectum. The first is the distinction between doings that involve only a doer (intransitive: John ran) and those that also involve something ‘done to’ (transitive: Mary threw the ball); realised respectively as Actor + Process, Actor + Process + Goal. The second is that between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and an unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell). […] The third is the distinction between a Goal that ‘exists’ prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house).

Being & Having: Enhancement Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146-7): 

One participant enhances along a circumstantial dimension of time, space, cause, condition and the like. … Thus enhancing figures may be used to construe arrangements or orderings in space or time, such as chronologies, maps or structures. … Enhancing figures construing temporal and causal ordering play an important rôle in constructing knowledge in a metaphorical mode …

Elaboration, Extension & The Interpretation Of Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 146):

Elaboration and extension are agnate, one with the other; they offer alternative modes of construal, often with little apparent difference. … But if we technicalise these alternatives, they do constitute significantly different approaches to the interpretation of meaning … in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.

Extending Being & Having: A Theory Of Constituency And Composition In Language

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145): 

Extending figures can thus be used to construe meronymic taxonomies. In other words, they are (among other things) a theory of constituency, semantic composition, and other meronymic relations in language; so they can be used to create further relationships of the same kind.

Being & Having: Extension Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):

One participant extends another in a relation of composition, possession, or association. As with elaboration, there is also the intersecting variable of either identity or membership.

Elaborating Being & Having: A Theory Of The Systemic Organisation Of The Meaning Potential Itself

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145):

Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further.

Being & Having: Elaboration Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5):

One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.

Being & Having: Expansion Relations Between Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 

Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we realise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144): 

Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of ‘understand’ alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.

Sensing Topology: Cognition & Desideration

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143-4): 

Cognition and desideration are different from both [emotion and perception] in that they can project (ie bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing.

Sensing Topology: Emotion & Perception

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143): 

Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from but does not create projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes.

Different Reifications Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

… when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, ie countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, ie masses, such as anger, fear, frustration. That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil. … In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).

Scalability Of Emotive Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to a degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.

Construal Of Emotion As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 143):

With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the ‘like’ type and the ‘please’ type.  Thus I’m afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but is much more productive with emotive ones.  Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible).

Processes Of Perception: Agnate Ascriptive Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142-3): 

Processes of perception are unique among the different types of sensing in that they are agnate to a set of relational processes of ascription, those that ascribe an Attribute in terms of the way in which it presents itself to our senses, as in Madam, you’ll look like a tulip.

Processes Of Perception & Cognition: Phase Potential

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):

The different types of sensing have somewhat different potentials for unfolding in time. With perception and cognition we have various categories of duration, inception, and the like: e.g. (perception) glimpse, sight, spot as well as see; (cognition) discover, realise, remember as well as know. But similar distinctions do not seem to obtain with desiderative and emotive processes.

Processes Of Cognition Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):

There are some behavioural processes that are agnate to cognitive ones (pondering, puzzling, meditating) but none that are agnate to desiderative or emotive ones. (Behavioural processes of giggling, laughing, crying, smiling and the like are outward manifestations of emotions; but they are not active variants of inert emotive processing such as rejoicing, grieving, and fearing.

Processes Of Perception Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 142):

All the modes of perception may be construed either as behaviour or as sensing. One significant grammatical difference is that present behaviour would normally be reported as present-in-present (the present progressive) — What are you doing? I’m watching the last whales of August. — but present sensing would not — I (can) see the whales in the distance. Another one is that only sensing can involve a Phenomenon of the metaphenomenal kind.  As long as the ‘phenomenon’ is of the same order of existence as ordinary things, there is no problem with either process type; we can both see and watch macro-phenomena: I saw/watched the last whales leave the bay. But while we can say I saw that he had already eaten we cannot say I watched that he had already eaten, which includes a metaphenomenon. This is the borderline between the mental and the material domains of experience.

Sensing Construed As Behaviour

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141-2):

Sensing is not construed in the grammar as activity. But certain types of conscious process may be construed not only as sensing but also alternatively as a kind of doing — as behaviour (as if active sensing). […] The difference is suggested quite clearly in the example — You can hear the sea sometimes if you listen very carefully.

Processes Of Cognition & Perception: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Cognitive and perceptive processes may be bidirectional but favour the ‘like’ type — perception almost exclusively so; ‘please’ type perception such as the noise assailed my ears seems quite marginal.

Processes Of Desideration: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Processes of desideration are not bi-directional; here there is no ‘please’ type, only the ‘like’ type. Here the grammar upholds the view that we are in control of our desires.

Blogger Note:

On the other hand, perhaps verbs such as attract, tempt and seduce can serve as desiderative processes of the 'please' type; otherwise, how else to explain the following projection nexus:

The talking snake tempted the naked woman to eat a piece of magic fruit.

Cf

The talking snake made the naked woman want to eat a piece of magic fruit. 

Processes Of Emotion: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Processes of emotion are typically bidirectional.  They can be construed either as the emotion ranging over the Phenomenon or as the Phenomenon causing the emotion — as in I like Mozart’s music (the ‘like’ type) : Mozart’s music pleases me (the ‘please’ type) Here the grammar of English construes a complementarity between two conflicting interpretations of emotional processes, with opposing angles on whether we are in control of our emotions, as if neither one by itself constitutes a rounded construction of experience.

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing: Verbal Causation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration may be brought about through verbal action:

I have told you that : you know that :: I have persuaded you to : you intend to.

There are no related verbal types causing perception and emotion.

Emotion, Attitude & Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141n):

Emotion is related to interpersonal attitude — I rejoice that she’s returned : she has, happily, returned. Unlike modality, attitude is not an assessment of the validity of the clause (grammatically it is not a Mood Adjunct). Rather, it is a comment on the information presented in a clause.

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing As Metaphor For Modality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 141):

Both cognition and desideration can come to serve as metaphors for the interpersonal system of modality — for modalisation and modulation respectively — alongside congruent realisations such as modal auxiliaries and adverbs. That is, a number of processes of cognition can stand for probabilities — I think : probably, I suppose : perhaps; and a number of processes of desideration can stand for inclinations and obligations — I want : should, I insist : must. For instance:

I think that in a sense you’ve had to compromise, haven’t you?

Neither perceptive nor emotive sensing can serve as metaphors for modalities.

Metaphenomenon & Types Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140-1):

A process of sensing may range over or be caused by metaphenomenon, i.e. by a pre-projected fact serving as Phenomenon, as in (the fact) that she is late worries me.  The two types of sensing that can involve a Phenomenon of this metaphenomenal type are the ones that cannot project*, namely perception and emotion  That is, while perception and emotion cannot create ideas, they can ‘react to’ facts.  In this respect, they are like certain relational clauses such as (the fact) that she is late is a worry /worrying.

*Blogger Note:

Consider the following desideratively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:

The fact [[that he had to diet]] made him wish —> he had bought a secret supply of chocolate.

Consider the following cognitively projecting clause with metaphenomenonal Phenomenon as Agent:

The fact [[that the bailiff was coming on Monday]] made him think —> it might be time to emigrate.

Projection Of Ideas & Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 140):

While both cognition and desideration project ideas, they project ideas of different kinds. Cognition projects propositions — ideas about information that may or may not be valid: he believed/imagined/dreamt —> that the earth was flat. In contrast, desideration projects proposals — ideas about action that has not been actualised but whose actualisation is subject to desire: he wanted/intended/hoped for —> her to leave. Projection is the critical link between sensing and saying.

Sensing: Cognitive & Desiderative Vs Perceptive & Emotive

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138): 

Cognitive and desiderative processing create ideas … but perceptive processing and emotive processing don’t … they are activated by [pre-projected] facts.

Perceptive & Emotive Sensing Cannot Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 138):

In contrast, perceptive and emotive types of sensing cannot project ideas into existence. That is, ideas do not arise as a result as a result of someone seeing, hearing, rejoicing, worrying, grieving or the like. However, these two types of sensing may accommodate pre-existing projections, i.e. facts, for instance:

It assures me [[that I am as I think myself to be, that I am fixed, concrete]]. 

I was impressed, more or less at that point, by an intuition [[that he possessed a measure of sincerity the like of which I had never encountered]]. 

We heard [[that you kindly let rooms for gentlemen]].

Thus ‘that I am fixed, concrete’ is construed as something already projected (hence we could add assures me of the fact that) and this fact brings about the emotion of assurance.

Cognitive & Desiderative Sensing Can Project Ideas Into Existence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 137-8):

Sensing projects ideas into existence; the projection may take place either through cognition or through desideration, for example (from Pinter, The Birthday Party):

I just thought —> I’d tell you that I’d appreciate it.

I think —> I’ll give it up.

They want —> me to crawl down on my bended knees.

Thus the idea ‘I’ll give it up’ is created by the process of thinking; it does not exist prior to the beginning of that process. Similarly, the idea ‘me to crawl on my bended knees’ is brought into hypothetical existence by the process of wanting.

Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 136):

These can be treated as a subtype of material processes or as a borderline category between material and mental. They include conscious processing construed as active behaviour (watching listening, pondering, meditating) rather than just passive sensing (seeing, hearing, believing). Like the Senser in a mental clause, the ‘Behaver’ in a behavioural one is endowed with consciousness; whereas in other respects behavioural clauses are more like material ones. Like material clauses (but unlike mental ones), behavioural clauses can be probed with do: What are you doing? — I’m meditating but not I’m believing. Furthermore, behavioural clauses normally do not project, or project only in highly restricted ways (contrast mental: cognitive David believed —> the moon was a balloon with behavioural: David was meditating —> the moon was a balloon; nor can they accept a ‘fact’ serving as Phenomenon (mental: David saw that the others had already left but not behavioural: David watched that the others had already left). In these respects, behavioural processes are essentially part of the material world rather than the mental one. Many of them are in fact further removed from mental processes, being physiological rather than psychological in orientation.

Prototypicality Vs Borderline Cases & Blends: Behavioural Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135-6, 137):

As with all systems in language, any given instance will be more or less prototypical; and there may be subtypes lying immediately at the borderline of the primary types.  The grammar construes the non-discreteness of our experience by creating borderline cases and blends.  One such area is that of behavioural processes (Halliday 1985: 128-9): “processes of physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, dreaming, smiling, coughing”. […] Such borderline cases, in which the pattern of reactances does not conform exactly to that of a major type, are typical of grammatical systems in general.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Mental and verbal clauses are distinct from material and relational clauses in that the former can project ideas and locutions (quote or report). These represent the ‘content’ of sensing and saying, as in David thought —> the moon was a balloon, where the relation of projection is represented by an arrow. Verbal clauses are distinct from mental clauses in that the Sayer is not necessarily an entity endowed with consciousness; and in verbal clauses there may be a further participant, the Receiver, which is not found in a mental clause.*

* Except, of course, where sensing is construed as interior saying: he thought to himself.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Participation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

Material clauses have a special pro-verb, do (to/with), as in what he did to the lawn was mow it. This does not occur in mental clauses: what he did to the story was believe it; nor in relational ones: what he did to the lawn-mower was have it.

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Unfolding In Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

In material clauses, the unmarked present tense is present-in-present (he is mowing the lawn; I’m doing the job), whereas with the other process types it is the simple present (mental: she believes he’s mowing the lawn; relational: he has a lawnmower; I’m busy).

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Nature Of Participants — Consciousness & Phenomenality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 135):

In a mental clause, the Senser is endowed with consciousness … .  This constraint does not apply to any of the participants in material and relational clauses.  While the Senser is heavily restricted in this way, the other mental participant, the Phenomenon, is entirely unrestricted: it can be not only phenomenal (she remembered the old house) but also macro-phenomenal (act: she remembered him coming down the stairs) or meta-phenomenal (fact: she remembered that they had been happy in the old house).  Participants in material clauses cannot be meta-phenomenal.  For instance, while it is possible to demolish not only concrete things such as buildings but also abstract things such as ideas and arguments (she demolished the house / their ideas / his argument), it is not possible to demolish “meta-things” (we do not find she demolished that the earth was flat).

Grammatical Reactances Of Figures: Directionality Of Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134-5):

Many mental processes are typically bidirectional, appearing in two opposite configurations (I like it / it pleases me; cf. detest/revolt; fear/frighten; remember/remind, notice/strike). It is thus possible to construe conscious processing either as the Phenomenon impinging on the Senser’s consciousness (the music pleases him) or as the Senser’s consciousness having the Phenomenon as its domain (he likes the music). neither material nor relational* clauses display this dual directionality.

*Blogger Comment:

Identifying relational processes are bidirectional in their coding, decoding vs encoding, and these are proportional to the bidirectionality of mental processes, emanating vs impinging, respectively:

	Medium	Process	Range
emanating:	Senser	Process: mental	Phenomenon
decoding:	Identified	Process: identifying	Identifier

	Agent	Process	Medium
impinging:	Phenomenon	Process: mental	Senser
encoding:	Identifier	Process: identifying	Identified

Grammatical Realisation Of Figures: Transitivity

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 134):

… doing & happening are realised as material clauses, sensing as mental ones, saying as verbal ones, and being (at, etc.) & having as relational clauses. The different process types are not signalled overtly in the grammar; they are covert or cryptotypic categories and emerge only when we consider their reactances.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Deixis

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133-4):

The complementarity can also be seen in the different kinds of deixis (relation to the here & now) associated with processes on the one hand and participants on the other. A process is made finite — it is pinned down in time, with point of reference in the act of speaking. A participant is made determinate, being held in a location within a referential space. The same distinction also appears in the temporal unfolding of a text, where participants have the potential to persist as discourse referents, but processes are excluded, unless they are turned into honorary participants through the use of grammatical metaphor.

Process/Participant Complementarity: Temporal Unfolding

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 133):

Whatever the mode of occurrence of any figure, it will always unfold in time. This temporal unfolding is construed as an inherent property of the process itself, realised grammatically as tense and aspect; it thus serves to validate the distinction between process and participant. Whereas on the one hand in its manifestation as a process, the figure unfolds in time, in its manifestation as participant, on the other hand, it persists through time — whether or not the participant undergoes any change of state. The limiting case is a creative or destructive process, such as writing or erasing a symbol, through which a participant comes into being or ceases to exist.

Doing & Being As Complementary Perspectives

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132): 

Figures of doing and being can be interpreted as complementary perspectives on a ‘quantum of change’. Construed as doing, a change appears as a change in the thusness of a participant. Construed as being, the change appears as an achieved or attainable result.  Consider a causal consequence such as [doing:] ‘he washed it’ —<so>—> [being:] ‘it was clean’. This quantum of change may be construed as two figures, as it is here (He washed it, so it was clean.).   Alternatively, it may be construed as one figure, in which case it may adopt either point of view.   If construed as doing, he washed it clean, the figure is elaborated with a result.   If construed as being, he made it (be) clean, the figure is enhanced with an agentive Attributor.  The wording he cleaned it embodies both perspectives in a single process.

Doing Vs Being: The Parameter Of Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing requires some input to occur. This will typically come from one of the participants involved, the doer (as with voluntary motion); but the source of energy may also be outside the figure (as with falling). No input of energy is required with a figure of being.

Doing Vs Being: The Parameter Of Time

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing involves a change over time of occurrence (including maintaining a state in spite of force for change). The change may take place along any one of a number of dimensions: 

• (a) circumstantial: spatial (motion or disposition, concrete or abstract); 
• (b) intensive: qualitative (colour, size, shape, solidity, etc.), quantitative (increase, decrease); 
• (c) possessive (transfer of ownership, loss or accretion of parts); 
• (d) existential (creation or destruction). 

In contrast, being does not depend on change over time. As a figure of being unfolds over time, the only change is that embodied in the temporal unfolding of the process itself. The nature of of the actualisation will be the same at any point of time.

Doing Vs Being: Parameters Of Time & Energy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 132):

Doing and being do not preclude the involvement of a conscious participant; but they do not require it — and hence do not have the effect of endowing a participant with human-like consciousness. They can be differentiated in terms of two parameters, time and energy, both of which are involved in their actualisation.

Domains Of Experience: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

There is of course a great deal of indeterminacy here, including such borderline cases as those where sensing and saying are construed as forms of action (and therefore cannot project), e.g. watching, listening, chatting, speaking. These properties reflect the borderline location of such processes in the overall semantic space.

Doing Vs Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic [sensing, saying] centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — ‘she addressed him’). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser’s involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser’s consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Addressee

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him / asked of him…. In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.

Interior & Exterior Symbolisers: Senser & Sayer

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130): 

Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines.  The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. … The “Symboliser” of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However, since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a ‘semiotic thing’ such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement. … We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.

Symbolic Processing & Levels Of Projected Content: Ideas & Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

“Symbolic processing” is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast, ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed [than locutions] from experience that is shared. Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying).

Symbolic Processing And Projected Symbolic Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

… the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying etc) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in ‘Symboliser’: she + ‘Process’: said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).

Levels Of Sensing & Saying And Levels Of Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-9):

Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying, on the one hand, and figures of doing and being, on the other, by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second-order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself, and the level of the content of sensing/saying.

Four Primary Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant rôles.

Figures Embody Two Subtheories Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:

(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and
(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants. 

To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.

Figures Are Configurations Of Elemental Phenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being “units” means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts.  In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.

Figures Embody One Quantum Of Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time.

Expansion & Projection As Trans-Phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain their logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans–phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks, but also experientially. […] This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

Semantic Sequences & Grammatical Complexing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in the course of realisation. One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures […] or a sequence of elements […].

The Limiting Case Of Expansion: Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. […] Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related.

Sequence Relations Of Expansion & Projection: Domain Of Relation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause […] or some element within the clause […].

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Or Figure? [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course […]. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been ‘shrunk’ by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Element Realising Figure In Sequence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

In addition, one or more of the figures in the [sequence] may be realised by something ‘less than’ a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor […]. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: as a child, he was very shy ‘when he was a child, he was very shy’.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Complex Realising Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence.  This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind: an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c.) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c.) is ‘upgraded’ to the status of projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don’t suppose || there’s very much                             ‘there is probably not’

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Realised Beyond The Clause Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125):

On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex […]. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of […] text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. […] 

In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly dissociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice.  (This significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)