Doing Vs Being

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

The domain outside this conscious-semiotic [sensing, saying] centre of the ideational universe is then quintessentially either active (doing) or inert (being).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Directionality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 131):

Saying is construed as proceeding from Sayer to Receiver (she asked/told/commanded him — ‘she addressed him’). In contrast, sensing embodies two complementary perspectives: either the Senser’s involvement in the sensing ranges over the Phenomenon or the Phenomenon is construed as impacting on the Senser’s consciousness (she likes the design : the design pleases her).

Interior Vs Exterior Symbolic Processing: Addressee

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130):

Figures of saying construe the addressee of exterior symbolic processing in the form of a participant, the Receiver, as in She told/asked/commanded him…; She said to him / asked of him…. In contrast, interior symbolic processing cannot be addressed; figures of sensing cannot be configured with a Receiver.

Interior & Exterior Symbolisers: Senser & Sayer

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 130): 

Sensing and saying construe the "Symboliser" along different lines.  The interior Symboliser of sensing is construed as a participant engaged in conscious processing; hence it is endowed with consciousness by virtue of serving in a figure of sensing. … The “Symboliser” of a figure of saying often is a conscious speaker. However, since saying is exterior rather than interior symbolic processing, the Symboliser of saying, unlike that of sensing, is not restricted to human consciousness; it may also be any kind of symbol source, a ‘semiotic thing’ such as institutions, documents and instruments of measurement. … We recognise the difference between a Symboliser of sensing and a Symboliser of saying by calling them Senser and Sayer, respectively.

Symbolic Processing & Levels Of Projected Content: Ideas & Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

“Symbolic processing” is a generalisation across sensing and saying that foregrounds the fact that they can both project. But sensing and saying differ in the level of projection: sensing projects interior content, ideas; saying projects exterior content, locutions. The level of the projected content determines the typical status of the projected content: locutions may be either quoted or reported, with quoting being favoured in many types of discourse; in contrast, ideas are typically reported and only rarely quoted. That is, ideas are construed as being further removed [than locutions] from experience that is shared. Projection thus construes a distinction between interior symbolic processing (sensing) and exterior symbolic processing (saying).

Symbolic Processing And Projected Symbolic Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 129):

… the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, processing that brings another figure into symbolic existence. Figures of symbolic processing involve the symbolic process itself (thinking, saying etc) and a participant engaged in the symbolic processing, as in ‘Symboliser’: she + ‘Process’: said/thought —> that he had left. The projected symbolic content is either a proposition (she said/thought —> he had left) or a proposal (she asked him —> to leave; she wanted —> him to leave).

Levels Of Sensing & Saying And Levels Of Content

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-9):

Projecting sequences differentiate rather sharply between figures of sensing and saying, on the one hand, and figures of doing and being, on the other, by selecting figures of sensing and saying as the ones that have the special power of setting up other figures as second-order, semiotic reality. That is, projecting sequences construe figures of sensing and saying on two levels, the level of sensing/saying itself, and the level of the content of sensing/saying.

Four Primary Domains Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

The system of figures construes experience as falling into four broadly conceived domains of goings-on: doing (including happening), sensing, saying and being (including having). Each type of figure has its own set of participant rôles.

Figures Embody Two Subtheories Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

There are two interlocking aspects of the configuration of a figure:

(i) the domain of experience to which the figure belongs; and
(ii) the nature of the interaction among its participants. 

To put this another way: as a theory of experience, the semantic system of figures embodies two subtheories: one concerning different domains of experience and one concerning the ways in which participating phenomena can interact.

Figures Are Configurations Of Elemental Phenomena

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

Compositionally, figures are phenomenal units that are formed by configurations of other phenomena (elements). Being “units” means that they are constituted as organic wholes with functionally distinct parts.  In this respect they differ from sequences, which are not compositional units but loci of serial expansion and projection.

Figures Embody One Quantum Of Change

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128):

… a figure is a basic fragment of experience that embodies one quantum of change. As such, it is like a little drama — it is a constellation of actors and props; and it unfolds through time.

Expansion & Projection As Trans-Phenomenal Categories

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

Sequences at lower ranks than that of figures retain their logical mode of realisation in the grammar. Expansion and projection thus flow throughout the system, forming sequences. This is in fact an instance of a general principle: expansion and projection are trans–phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks, but also experientially. […] This feature is particularly exploited when the system is expanded through grammatical metaphor.

Semantic Sequences & Grammatical Complexing

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127):

One question that arises here is the extent to which the semantics and the grammar are in phase with one another. It is conceivable that a semantic sequence of figures could be realised in the grammar by a single clause with complexes at group/word rank — i.e., the sequencing is downranked in the course of realisation. One argument in favour of exploring this possibility is that it would be possible to sort out the potential ambiguity of examples such as Henry and Anne went to the movies — grammatically, we have a group complex (Henry and Anne), but semantically, it could be either a sequence of figures […] or a sequence of elements […].

The Limiting Case Of Expansion: Sequence Of Elements

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126-7):

The limiting case is that where what is being expanded is not a figure but an element of a figure, in which case instead of a sequence of figures we get a sequence of elements, realised by group or phrase complexes. […] Putting this in terms of the grammar, the sequential relationships remain constant, but the rank at which the complex occurs depends on the domain being related.

Sequence Relations Of Expansion & Projection: Domain Of Relation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

To say that these relations are between figures means in principle that they hold between figures as a whole; that is, given a pair of related figures the domain of expansion or projection relation between them is each of the figures in its entirety. But in some instances, some subdomain may be particularly implicated. This is perhaps especially true with elaborating sequences — the grammar of hypotactic elaborating clause complexes tells us as much: the elaborating dependent clause includes a relative reference expression (if the clause is finite) and the clause is placed immediately after the domain that is being elaborated, whether that is the whole clause […] or some element within the clause […].

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Or Figure? [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

The grammar forms complexes at ranks below the clause, of course […]. It is always possible to interpret certain instances of these as sequences that have been ‘shrunk’ by the grammar because they share one or more elements. Thus Henry and Anne went to the store might be interpreted as a simple figure if they went to the store together but as a sequence if they went there separately.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Element Realising Figure In Sequence

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 126):

In addition, one or more of the figures in the [sequence] may be realised by something ‘less than’ a clause. One major source of this is ideational grammatical metaphor […]. But there are also other cases such as circumstances of Rôle with temporal implications — for example: as a child, he was very shy ‘when he was a child, he was very shy’.

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Clause Complex Realising Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125-6):

On the other hand, a clause complex may in principle correspond to a figure rather than a sequence.  This happens through grammatical metaphor of an interpersonal kind: an interpersonal modality that would be realised congruently as a modal auxiliary (can, may, will &c.) or a modal adjunct (perhaps, probably &c.) is ‘upgraded’ to the status of projecting clause in a clause complex; for example:

I don’t suppose || there’s very much                             ‘there is probably not’

Dissociation Of Sequence & Clause Complex: Sequence Realised Beyond The Clause Complex

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 125):

On the one hand, a sequence may extend beyond a single clause complex […]. That is, the general potential is simultaneously semantic and grammatical; but in the creation of […] text, this potential may be taken up semantically to create a sequence that is more extensive than the clause complexes realising it. […] 

In other words, once sequence and clause complex have become partly dissociated so that one sequence does not automatically imply one clause complex, the decision how to associate them in realisation becomes a meaningful, significant choice.  (This significance may vary from one register to another, but the principle that the choice is meaningful is quite general.)

Sequences (Semantics) And Clause Complexes (Grammar) Evolve Together

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124-5):

… semantics and grammar evolve together (in all three senses of semohistory …).  In the present context that means that sequences and clause complexes evolve together.  The basic principle is that a sequence is realised by a clause complex. But the two may become dissociated from one another.

Interactional Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 124):

We can generalise as follows: the logical resources for forming sequences have evolved in the environment of ideational meaning as sequences of figures. But these highly generalised resources can then also be applied in an interpersonal environment to form interactional sequences. (We should note here, however, that evidence from language development studies suggests that the logico-semantic relations are first construed in interpersonal contexts). In producing a text, we may use either or both, depending on the nature of the text.

Text & The Interaction Base: Interpersonally-Oriented Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

As already noted, text organisation also draws on the interaction base; and there are certain parallels with the ideation base with respect to sequences. The interaction base certainly has text forming resources that are uniquely interpersonal. In particular, it has the resources for the collaborative exchanges that are embodied in the notion of interaction — for producing dialogue jointly by means of coordinated moves alternating between the interlocutors. But these interpersonal moves may also form sequences of moves in a way that is similar to the formation of sequences in the ideation base. Typical examples involve motivating condition (‘I invite you to accept x, if you want x’; for example: If you’re thirsty, there’s a beer in the fridge) and evidence (‘I think, infer / you should believe x because y’; for example: John’s in Germany because I just talked to him).

Text & The Ideation Base: ‘Macro-Figures’

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123):

Many text types are heavily influenced by patterns in the meaning base — they can be seen as ‘macro-figures’, i.e. as expansions of figures by means of logico-semantic relations. This is not to say that that the relationship between organisation in the meaning base and the discoursal organisation is always one-to-one even when a text is organised according to an ideational sequence. In particular, a text may leave to be inferred certain steps that would be specified in the sequence in the meaning base (e.g. to make explicit the inferential processes involved).

Sequences & Text

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122-3):

Texts and sequences are of the same order of abstraction; both are semantic phenomena. A text is a piece of language that is functional in context. It draws on the ideational meaning base but it involves the full metafunctional spectrum; i.e. there are interpersonal and textual contributions as well. Since text draws on the ideational meaning base, sequences are one principle for organising text.

Sequences & Text Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Sequences impose a certain order on our experience in terms of the relations that connect [one] happening with another. Hence sequences can be used to store information about the world in the form of organised text — ‘this is how to change tyres on your car’, ‘this is how to make cauliflower surprise’, etc.. Such texts often fall into a clearly recognisable text type, such as procedures, proofs, explanations, and episodic narratives. Not all texts are as highly regulated as these; but it is usually possible to make some prediction about the kinds of sequence, and the complexity to which sequences extend, in most our culturally recognised modes of discourse.

Sequences: Constraints

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 122):

Thus sequences are formed by binary logico-semantic relations which may relate either single figures or sequences of figures [i.e. internal nesting]. Certain relations may impose constraints on the phenomena being related; for example, a projecting relation can only obtain when the first figure is one of sensing or saying. But the range of different logico-semantic relations is highly varied, so that constraints tend to be specific to particular subtypes.

Relational Organisation Vs Configurational Organisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

In contrast to figures, sequences are not constructional units.  We can specify the range of projecting and expanding relations available for further developing a sequence, but we cannot specify where a sequence has to come to an end — that is, we cannot specify a sequence as a unit whole with a conventional configuration of parts.  Thus if we have expanded one figure we can always repeat the operation … .  In contrast, a figure is a unit with a finite number of elements … .  Hence a sequence can be indefinitely complex, whereas a figure cannot.

Condition & Projection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119):

… the distinction between expansion and projection is less determinate than we have suggested.  The logico-semantic relation of condition, which is prototypically construed as a form of enhancement, could also be construed as a kind of projection; and this is also brought out in the grammar. Conditions specify a potential and actualisable but non-actual situation.  This potential situation can also be set up through projection:

If the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do? 

Supposing the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do? 

Say the power supply fails, what’s the best thing to do?

Words such as supposing and assuming are verbs of projection which have come to function as conjunctions in conditional figures; while other words such as imagine and say retain more of their projecting force. Sometimes even variants of the same word have come to differ a little in their locations on this cline: for example, suppose and assume seem closer to projection than their corresponding participial variants.  This is an uncertain region in which a figure hangs in the air, so to speak, suspended between the hypothetical material plane and the semiotic one.

Expansion Relations: Lexicogrammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 119-20):

Relations of expansion are typically realised in the grammar by conjunctions or conjunctive expressions linking a pair of clauses, either paratactically or hypotactically (e.g. that is, in other words; and, but, or, also, besides; so, yet, then, when, if, because, unless).  Some of these may realise more than one category; for example, but may be adversative ‘and yet’ (extending), or concessive ‘and in spite of this’ (enhancing); while may be additive ‘and in addition’ (extending), or temporal ‘and at the same time’ (enhancing); or may be alternative ‘or else’ (extending: alternatives in the external world, like take it or leave it), or restating ‘in other words’ (elaborating: alternatives in the world ‘internal’ to the discourse, like they are reduced to the smallest size, or micro-miniaturised.).  Overlaps of this kind show that the primary categories we have set up do in fact shade into one another; in particular, extending in some sense occupies a space intermediate between elaborating and enhancing, and shares a fuzzy borderline with each.

The Cline From Sequence To Figure

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

There is no sharp line between a figure and a sequence of figures: a quantum of experience is not defined before it is construed, and the grammar rather sets up a cline from sequence to simple figure. […] For example:

1 sequence of 2 figures:   Tarzan pulled the rope; so it broke.
                                          Tarzan made the rope break (by pulling it).
                                          Tarzan broke the rope.
                        1 figure:    The rope broke.

Elaboration Sequences: Repetition As The Other Limiting Case Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 118):

And there is a third type of accumulation where the logical relation is that of ‘equals’: x is the same figure as a. Here at this end the limiting case is a simple repetition; this may be further elaborated in such a way that one figure is reworded as another, or else further clarified or brought out by an example.

Extension Sequences: No Logical Priority

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117-8):

But figures may also be added to one another, making them part of the same story without assigning any kind of logical priority to either: x as well as / instead of / in contradistinction to a’. We have referred to these as extensions.

Enhancement Sequences: Temporality As One Limiting Case Of Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

From one standpoint the limiting case of expansion would be accumulation in a temporal sequence (hence our general term “sequence” for the product of this construal): ‘a happens, then x happens’. This gives value to a as the temporal circumstance of x. From this we could derive a wide range of more complex enhancing relations: variations on the simple temporal sequence (‘after’, ‘before’, ‘at the same time’, ‘immediately after’, &c.) and further circumstances such as cause, condition, concession and their subcategories. […] These are ‘enhancements’, multiplying one figure by another, as it were.

Expansion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion can be thought of as construing another dimension of experience, so that superimposed, as it were, on the construal of a figure — a basic fragment of experience in the form of a quantum of change (event, action, behaviour &c.) — is the construal of a nexus between two figures, such that one fragment is non-randomly (i.e. meaningfully) cumulated with another.

Enhancement Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

enhancement is a circumstantial or qualifying relation between figures: it is, in a sense, extension plus a circumstantial feature — ‘and’ + time (‘and then’, ‘and at the same time’, etc.), ‘and’ + manner (‘and in the same way’, ‘and likewise’), ‘and’ + cause (‘and therefore’, etc.), etc.: it is autumn, so the leaves are turning brown.

Extension Sequences: Addition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

extension is an additive relation between figures: a sequence is made bigger by the addition of another figure. This may involve pure addition (‘and’: he is too young and he doesn’t speak the language) or addition with an adversative feature (‘and yet’: he speaks the language but he is too young). As a variant of addition, we also have alternation (he is too young or else he is just immature).

Elaboration Sequences: Identity & Inclusion

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

elaboration is a (partial) identity relation between figures: one is identified with another with a difference in perspective (it matters a lot; it plays an important rôle) or one is included under another as an example (it plays an important rôle; e.g., it provides the infrastructure).  These are clearly related to one another: identity is the limiting case of inclusion and inclusion is partial identity.

Expansion Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 117):

Expansion is a highly generalised type of relation, whereby one figure is joined logico-semantically to another figure by a relator to form a sequence of the same order of reality. […] immediate subtypes: elaborate (reiterate), extend (add) and enhance (qualify).

Proposals Realised As Modulated Indicative Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115-6):

We saw that quoted offers may be realised by modulated indicative clauses. This would seem to be an exception to the generalisation that indicative clauses realise propositions. However, it is a principled one: the type of indicative clause involved is precisely the type that lies closer in the interpersonal clause grammar to imperative clauses — modulated indicative clauses, i.e. those with an imperative modality. As can be expected, this is then also a possible realisation of commands; it is a metaphorical strategy for expanding the meaning potential, typically to vary the tenor between speaker and listener.

Reported Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

However, reported offers can always be realised in the same way as reported commands — as in the case of reported propositions, the distinction in orientation between giving and demanding is realised by the projecting clause; for example:

command: she told him —> to do the laundry

offer: she offered (promised; threatened) —> to do the laundry

The category of reported proposal is thus realised generally as a perfective non-finite clause when it is reported.

Quoted Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Quoted offers naturally retain the property of being variously realised in the mood system:

declarative: She said: “I can do the laundry.”

interrogative: She said: “Shall I do the laundry?”

imperative: She said: “Let me do the laundry!”

Offers: Grammatical Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

There is thus a parallel between reported propositions/proposals and quoted ones. But with offers (proposals: giving goods–&–services) there is a difference in respect of realisation. Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative) offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:

declarative: I can do the laundry.

interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?

imperative: Let me do the laundry!

Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation.

Quoting Vs Reporting: Speech Function & Mood

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114-5):

… in quoting, where the projected clause retains its mood, the general verb say can be used whatever speech function is being projected. In reporting, on the other hand, the projected clause is no longer specified for mood; its speech function is signalled by the verb in the projecting clause (asked, ordered, etc.). This gives the projected element more of an ideational status (c.f. its treatment in traditional grammar as “object” of the projecting verb), and opens up the way to a series of agnate expressions such as (the king ordered) “Execute him!” / that he should be executed / him to be executed / him executed / his execution.

Quoted Proposition Vs Quoted Proposal: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

When the projection is quoted, propositions are realised by indicative clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by imperative clauses:

(he said) “I have done the laundry” : (she said to him) “do the laundry”.

Reported Proposition Vs Reported Proposal: Grammatical Realisations

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114):

Grammatically the distinction between propositions and proposals is constructed as follows. When the projection is reported, propositions are realised by finite bound clauses, i.e. clauses that select for primary tense or modality; and proposals are realised by irrealis (infinitival) non-finite bound clauses: 

(he said) that he had done the laundry : (she told him) to do the laundry.

Projected Proposals Vs Projected Propositions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 114): 

The interpersonal system for dialogic interaction thus creates a fundamental distinction between ‘content’ as proposition and ‘content’ as proposal. This distinction is then reflected in the ideational system of projection: a figure is projected in one or other of these two modes, as a proposition or as a proposal. The two categories combine freely with ideas and locutions. Projected proposals are non-actual, or uninstantiated: that is, the occurrence of a projected proposal is always future in relation to the figure that projects it. In contrast, propositions are actual, or instantiated: that is, the occurrence of a proposition is located in actual time (which may be past, present or future).

Propositions & Proposals

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113-4):

Information is either given or demanded; in either case it is encoded as a proposition. Similarly, goods and services are either given or demanded, but the linguistic act is a mediating one, specifying the (typically non-linguistic) action that embodies the exchange, as an offer to do or a demand that something should be done. This is a proposal for a deed, one that commits either the speaker (giving) or the addressee (demanding); together with a third type, which is a combination of these two, viz. suggestion: Let’s do the laundry.

Interpersonal Semantics & Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 113):

Interpersonal semantics is centrally concerned with varieties of symbolic exchange. Here, as in other places in the meaning base, the system is organised in such a way that it creates a difference between non-symbolic reality and symbolic reality, between phenomena and metaphenomena. The “commodity” that is being exchanged in interpersonal dialogue is either semiotic or material: it is either one that is construed by language itself — information — or it is one that exists independently of language — goods & services. In the first case, language constitutes the exchange; in the second, it facilitates the exchange of a non-linguistic commodity.

Projecting & Projected Figures: Temporal Implications

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

In general, there is no temporal constraint between the projected and projecting figures: the projected figure may be past, present or future relative to the projecting one. The dimension affected by projection [is] order of reality, not time. However, there is a major dichotomy between two types of projection which does have temporal implications. To explore it, we have to look briefly at a fundamental interpersonal category, that of mood.

Projections Of Ideas And AI & Computational Linguistics: Hearer Modelling & Interpersonal Distance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

The projection of ideas has also played an important rôle in hearer modelling in AI and computational linguistics. From a systemic-functional point of view, hearer modelling corresponds to one aspect of the interaction base: the interactants in a dialogue have to be able to assess and model the way their experiences diverge. This is one measure of overall interpersonal distance between them. In hearer modelling, this tends to be construed ideationally by means of cognitive projection, where the projected idea is represented as a separate partition or space within overall knowledge: ‘the speaker believes —> the hearer knows —> …’. Such models may involve long projecting sequences (often called “nested beliefs”) …

Projections Of Ideas And Intensional (& Epistemic) Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 112):

Projections of ideas have played a special rôle in the extension of standard logic within intensional logic (or more restrictedly for knowing and believing, within epistemic logic) to allow for reasoning in this domain. One of the features of the projection of ideas that has received special attention in logically-oriented approaches to meaning is its “referential opacity”.   If a speaker knows that Henry is the king, and construes someone else’s belief as Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man, the referring expression Henry cannot be replaced by the king although the speaker knows they have the same referent: ‘Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man’ cannot be inferred from ‘Thomas thinks Henry is a nice man’ since the identity of Henry and the king has not been established in the projected world of Thomas’s consciousness.

Why Quoting Locutions & Reporting Ideas Are The Natural Default Condition

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111-2):

… although the two variables, locution/idea and quoting/reporting, can combine in either of the two possible alignments, there is a natural default condition, which is that locution goes with quoting and idea goes with reporting. The reason for this is clear: 

where the first-order phenomenon is one of saying (prototypically shared semiosis), the projected figure can be presented as if it was also of the same order: Harriet said + “Shall I feed the cat?” (reversible as “Shall I feed the cat?” + said Harriet). 

Where the first-order phenomenon is one of sensing (unshared semiosis), the projected figure has no counterpart on the first-order plane of experience and cannot be naturally presented as if it had; so, Harriet wondered + whether she should feed the cat. 

But there is always the possibility of semogenic extension by cross-coupling; so we also find corresponding marked alignments: locution/report Harriet asked + whether she should feed the cat, and idea/quote Harriet wondered + “Shall I feed the cat?” — the latter being again reversible.

Reporting: Wording Marking Second-Order Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

… in quoting, the form of wording is still that of the first-order realm of experience: “Shall I feed the cat?” — taken by itself, there is nothing about this to show it is a projection. In reporting, on the other hand, the form of wording is clearly marked as being of the second-order: whether she should feed the cat has lost its first-order semantic features — and hence has to be projected by words that specify its particular speech function: asked/wondered not said/thought.

Quoting Vs Reporting And The Creation Of A Second-Order Reality

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

In reporting, the status of the two parts is unequal — the projected figure is dependent on the projecting: hence the projected figure is clearly construed as belonging to a different, second-order plane of reality — a reality that is made up of meaning, as it were. In quoting, on the other hand, the two have equal status as independent figures; the projected figure is thus projected as if it was part of the same first-order reality.

Semantic Weight: Quoting Vs Reporting

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 111):

… whenever two figures are related in a sequence, they may be either equal or unequal in semantic weight. … The projecting and projected figures may have equal status in the sequence: this relation is that of quoting … . Or they may have unequal status: this relation is that of reporting ….

Sensed Ideas Vs Said Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 110-1):

Let us look more closely at these two modes of projecting, in both of which the projecting figure represents symbolic processing, the processing that brings the other figure into symbolic existence. Either the projection takes the prototypical form of semiosis: it is presented as verbal, shared, an exchange or joint construction of meanings; or it is fashioned into a derived semiotic form, unshared, interiorised, and without any meaning being exchanged. In the first, the projecting figure is one of saying; the projected is referred to as locution. In the second, the projecting figure is one of sensing; the projected is referred to as idea. Ideas are projections which are sensed, locutions are projections which are said.

Second-Order Experience: Meaning & Wording

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 108):

We have suggested that the relation of projection sets up one figure on a different plane of reality — we refer to this as the second-order or semiotic level. This second-order level of reality is the content plane of a semiotic system. That is to say, the projected figure is projected in the form of ‘content’. We have seen that the content plane is stratified into two levels — semantics (the level of meanings) and lexicogrammar (the level of wordings). Consequently, we would expect projections to be located at either or both of these levels, and this is indeed what happens: a projected figure is either a meaning or a wording. […] We will refer to these [i.e. meaning and wording] in the context of projection as ideas and locutions.

Non-Human Sayers

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106-7): 

… typically only humans can project into second-order reality. However, since human consciousness is the locus of semiotic activity, it has the power of interpreting as metaphenomenon that which is manifested by some other, non-conscious symbolic source. Thus while “sensing” (that is semiotic activity that is unmanifested, like thinking) does require a human senser, saying can be ascribed to a non-human as well as to a human sayer …

The Differentiation Of Two Orders Of Reality Embodied In Sequences

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

This differentiation is embodied in relations of sequence in the following way. Either a sequential relation expands one figure by adding another one to it, the two still remaining on the same phenomenal level; or the sequential relation projects one of the two figures onto the plane of second-order, semiotic phenomena, so that it enters the realm of metaphenomena (meanings or wordings).

Language & Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106):

Note that the linguistic processes themselves, as apprehended by our senses, are part of the first-order reality; second-order reality is formed of the meanings and wordings that these processes bring into being.

Construing Material Vs Semiotic Orders Of Experience

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 106): 

Throughout the semantic construal of human experience, there is a differentiation between two orders of reality: between the everyday reality of our material existence on the one hand and on the other hand the second-order reality that is brought into existence only by the system of language. This is a contrast between semiotic phenomena, those of meanings and wordings, and the first-order phenomena that constitute our material environment.

Why Natural Logic & Propositional Logic Differ

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 105):

Both the difference in scope and the difference in ‘definability’ can be explained in functional terms. Sequences have evolved in the interpretation of human experience in general; consequently, they have to be flexible and powerful enough to cope with a large amount of variation, and the implicit ‘definition’ of each relation (i.e., its location in the semantic system along various dimensions) is the evolving distillation of innumerable instances where it is invoked […]. In contrast, the truth-functional connectives of propositional logic have been designed for a restricted purpose — the kind of deductive reasoning western philosophy came to focus on — and their definitions are fixed by reference to values of “true” and “false” (by means of truth tables.

Propositional Logic Vs Natural Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104n, 105n): 

Propositional logic is interpersonally invariable. Unlike natural logic, it is only concerned with statements, or rather — since language is concerned with validity rather than truth — with the philosophical version of what are statements in natural language. […]

Projecting figures of the ‘think’ type — ‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘want’ — have been represented outside standard logic within intensional logic.

Evolved Natural Logic Vs Designed Propositional Logic

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104):

Sequences might be said to constitute the  ‘natural logic’ equivalent of propositional logic — that is, the evolved system for reasoning about relations of cause, conditionality, etc from which propositional logic has been derived by design. […] Since propositional logic is a designed system, its relations are codified and defined (typically in truth-functional terms). In contrast, sequential relations have evolved. A certain type of relation will have a core — the prototypical representatives of that type; but there will also be peripheral representatives and ‘grey areas’ where one type shades into another. There is another important difference between propositional logic and natural logic of sequences. While there is only a very small handful of truth-functional connectives in propositional logic (conjunction, disjunction [exclusive or non-exclusive], implication), there is a very wide range of sequential relations in language — all the more specific varieties of projecting and expanding.

Sequence Models The Logical Relations Between Figures

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 104):

A sequence constitutes a model of how figures can be related. One prominent form of this relationship, which has been foregrounded in various guises in science and logic, is that of cause & effect, whereby experience is given causal interpretation. But that is only one among many such possible relationships, which taken together can be said to constitute the logic of natural language.

The Effect Of The Special Subcategories Of Participant & Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 102):

These special subcategories have the effect of construing other elements as “referable” — that is, of enabling them to retain their semiotic identity for subsequent access and hence as it were authenticating them (e.g. Don’t give me any more of that peanut butter! I can’t stand the stuff.) This applies primarily, though not exclusively, to participants. At the same time, it allows us to recognise not only of the ‘simple’ type but also ‘larger’ elements known as macro- and meta-phenomena. Macro-phenomena are figures downranked to function as ordinary elements; meta-phenomena are figures projected as elements of a second order.

Subcategories Of The Elements Participant & Circumstance As Viewed From The Grammar

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99, 102):

The view from the grammar brings into relief a number of relevant factors relating to participants and circumstances. There are certain special subcategories of these, in the grammar, which are distinguished by the fact that they embody features of interpersonal or textual meaning:

(1) interpersonal: questioning 

interrogative: who, what, when, where, how far, how long, how, why 

(2) textual: cohesive

(i) referring, personal: he, she, it, they; demonstrative: this, that, now, then, here, there, thus 

(ii) generalising: lexical items such as person, creature, thing, stuff, affair

These are significant in their own right because they are critical to the construction of discourse: the textual ones provide internal cohesion, while the interpersonal ones construe dialogic speech rôles. They have further significance in that they reveal by reactance the major subclasses within the general classes of participant and circumstance.

The Three Types Of Element Constructed Within The Grammar — Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99):

Relating to the textual metafunction: participants and circumstances can both readily serve as Theme (though there potentials differ); processes only rarely, other than in imperative clauses. Participants and (more restrictedly) circumstances can serve as referables identified by referring expressions, but processes cannot — as with WH- interrogation, they have to be construed as a Range together with the pro-verb do as Process: do it/that.

The Three Types Of Element Constructed Within The Grammar — Interpersonal Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99):

Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: participants can serve as Subject; circumstances* and processes cannot. Furthermore, participants and circumstances can serve as WH- elements, but processes cannot (if the process is being questioned, a participant element has to be construed as a Range: What … do?).

[*Note that circumstances can serve as Subject in circumstantial relational clauses.]

The Three Types Of Element Constructed Within The Grammar — Ideational Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 99):

Within the ideational component, they are realised by different classes of units:

• process ( verbal group,
• participant ( nominal group,
• circumstance ( adverbial group; prepositional phrase.

Participants tend to be inherent elements of a figure; circumstances are typically optional.

The Four Types Of Figure Constructed Within The Grammar — Textual Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98):

Relating to the textual metafunction: different types of figure are presumed in different ways and have different potential for textual prominence; e.g. only material clauses are substituted by the pro-verb do (to/with).

The Four Types Of Figure Constructed Within The Grammar — Interpersonal Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98):

Relating to the interpersonal metafunction: in any given register there may be typical correspondences between the type of figure and speech function; e.g. in procedural registers, material clauses are typically imperative, relational ones indicative.

The Four Types Of Figure Constructed Within The Grammar — Ideational Metafunction

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 98):

Within the ideational metafunction, each is realised congruently by one particular transitivity type: doing & happening ( material, sensing ( mental, saying ( verbal, and being & having ( relational.  These have various reactances, such as the number and nature of participants and the unmarked present tense selection.

The Ideation Base As A Semantic Space

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 97-8):

The semantic categories are themselves construed by means of realisation; they are constructed within the grammar and lexis of a language. If we model the ideation base as a semantic space, we are foregrounding one aspect of the construction of meaning in language, namely the way in which lexicogrammar construes our experience of the world in the guise of multidimensional matrices or grids. This is an important feature of language as a semiotic system, an inevitable consequence of the principle of arbitrariness: since the forms of expression are arbitrary, they impose discontinuity on the content. […] But the semantic categories themselves (seen from above, as it were) are much more fluid and indeterminate than their realisations in wording imply. The notion of semantic space allows us to adopt a complementary standpoint from which we can view these phenomena topologically, bringing out the inherently elastic quality of the dimensions involved, and gaining a deeper insight into the semogenic processes by which the meaning potential is ongoingly remoulded in the history of the system [phylogenesis], of the user [ontogenesis], and of the text [logogenesis].

Why & How Children Are Able To Construe The Semantic System

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 97):

Children are able to construe the semantic system because they start in situations with a material setting that is shared. As they build up their ideation base, they can begin to construe categories internal to the system out of existing ideational values; and they can begin to move into abstract domains of a purely symbolic world, where the significations of semantic categories are abstract categories in social and socio-semiotic systems. But precisely because these abstract categories are construed as meanings, they can still be built up, negotiated and validated in collaboration with other members of the meaning group. The move from the realm of concrete phenomena to the various realms of abstract phenomena is made possible through the homogenising power of meaning.

Construing Experience As Meaning

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 96-7):

… young children will typically construe concrete phenomena that are part of the field of visual perception they share with their interactants. In other words, they are construing into linguistic meanings their experience of the material world as it is construed in the categories of another semiotic system, viz. (visual) perception. These extra-linguistic categories are construed as the signification of the semantic categories of the ideation base — always in some particular situation when the child first engages with them. To construe experience of concrete phenomena as meaning is thus to construe some signification which lies outside the ideation base as a value which is internal to the ideation base system. Part of the power of categorisation is that extra-linguistic phenomena that are quite varied in signification can be construed as alike in value.

Construing Categories: Valeur & Stratification

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 96):

A phenomenon of experience is construed as a category in the ideation base by being given a location in the three semantic networks […]. This taxonomic, meronymic and eco-functional location is the category’s value (valeur) in relation to the other categories in the ideation base. By being assigned a value internal to the ideational system, a semantic category is also being related to categories that lie beyond semantics itself. On the one hand it is being related to categories within systems that lie outside language but which the semantic system interfaces with; on the other hand it is being related to the grammatical categories in terms of which it is realised.

The Semogenic Strategy Of Opening Up The Phenomenal Domains Of Selection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 95):

… the fact that a participant serves a participant rôle in a figure can be viewed either from the perspective of the figure or from the perspective of the participant (i.e. as a property of the participant). If cats kill mice, the ideation base accommodates the view from the angle of the figure: ‘cats kill mice’; but it also accommodates the view from the angle of the participant: ‘animals that kill mice’. Here the figure in which cats participate as actors has been construed as if it was a property, so that the category of cats might be construed within the ideation base by means of the definition ‘cats are animals that kill mice’. … 

There is a general semogenic strategy at work here. We referred to ‘sequences’, ‘figures’ and ‘elements’ as three orders of complexity […] . The shift in perspective means that configurations of meanings that are of a particular order of complexity can be accessed through selection not only in their normal environment (within phenomena of the next higher order of complexity) but also within phenomena of lower orders of complexity. Through this semogenic strategy of opening up the possible domains of selection, a great deal of experiential complexity can be imported into the construal of a participant.

Eco-Functional Selection Is Inter-Axial

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94):

The network of selection is inter-axial in that it relates syntagmatic specifications to paradigmatic ones; it ‘cuts across’ the paradigmatic organisation of the ideation base, establishing correspondences between paradigmatic types through syntagmatic functions associated with them …

Eco-Functional Selections Are Bi-Directional

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94):

… functions associated with paradigmatic types constitute ‘structural properties’ by which these types are distinguished and […] selections provide further information about these properties. […] Conversely, semantic types which are selected are characterised by the functional environment in which they are selected.

Why Eco-Functional ‘Selection’ Rather Than ‘Preselection’?

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94):

Such selections have been referred to as “pre-selections”, but in order to avoid any connotations of temporal sequence, we prefer the term “selection” for such relations in the ideation base.

The Third Type Of Network Involved In The Organisation Of The Ideation Base: Eco-Functional Selection

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 94):

Taxonomic elaboration and meronymic extension form complementary networks of relations that together make up the paradigmatic organisation of the ideation base. They define, as we have noted, options in delicacy of categorisation and in delicacy of focus. The third type of network involved in the organisation of the ideation base which we identified above serves to relate paradigmatic organisation and syntagmatic organisation. Specifically, it relates syntagmatic functions or rôles associated with paradigmatic types to the paradigmatic types that can serve these functions. For example, the syntagmatic function ‘Senser’ is associated with the paradigmatic type ‘sensing’, and it is related to the paradigmatic type ‘conscious being’, since only participants of this subtype can serve as Sensers. […] We shall refer to such a network relations as eco-functional selection in order to indicate that they specify the syntagmatic environment of semantic types by showing them as selections for syntagmatic functions.