Elements serve as component parts of figures. Three primary types of element may be differentiated according to the generalised categories of configurational roles: process, participant, and circumstance. In addition to these three, we need to recognise a fourth category of element, the relator; this is the element which forms figures into sequences.
What this brings out is that there are a small number of very general domains within this overall semantic space, which may be construed in different ways according to the status they are assigned within the figure. For example, there is one area that is concerned with the spatial orientation of the process. Construed as an outer circumstance, this appears as the position within which the process unfolds; construed as an inner circumstance, it means the direction towards which the process is oriented; construed as a participant, it shows up as receiver or recipient in the process. Thus this general motif is manifested in a form which corresponds to its ecological niche at that location. Note that the boundaries do not exactly coincide across the different bands of the helix; in any case, they are fuzzy, and they tend to become more fuzzy with increasing distance from the centre. Our characterisation here is inevitably somewhat overdeterminate. The outer circumstances, in turn, are typically agnate to clauses (e.g. while he was in LA, he sent a parcel); thus we could construe the same general relationships over again in the form of a sequence — grammatically, as one nexus in a clause complex.
The examples in Table 4(10) illustrate both the different degrees and the different kinds of involvement of elements falling outside the Process + Medium nucleus.
This type of circumstance relates to projection rather than expansion, and specifically to the projecting not the projected component Hence there is no agnate participant; instead, the Angle corresponds to the process of saying (grammatically, the projecting verbal clause in a 'locution' nexus) or the process of sensing (grammatically, the projecting mental clause in an 'idea' nexus). Thus according to the newspaper corresponds to the newspaper says; and to her students corresponds to her students think.
This category lies on the borderline of elaborating and extending: compare he spoke like an expert 'in the manner of', he spoke as an expert 'in the role of'. The analogous participant is that of Attribute in an ascriptive clause as in he was/seemed an expert, which is construed as elaborating; but the analogous sequence is an enhancing clause complex he spoke as if he was an expert.
Blogger Comments:
The 'elaborating' interpretation of Manner: comparison disappears if the analogous ascriptive clauses are instead:
The circumstance of Accompaniment does not correspond to any one particular participant role. Rather, it corresponds to an extending of the participant itself, by addition or variation: John came with Mary is agnate to both John and Mary came; Mary came without John is agnate to Mary but not John came; Mary came instead of John is agnate to not John but Mary came. Grammatically, the analogous type of participant is one represented by a nominal group complex.
The "degree of involvement", in the sense of how deeply some element is involved in actualising the process that is construed by the figure, can thus be represented as a cline: the difference appears not only between participants and circumstances as a whole, but also within each of these primary categories, so that there is a continuum from one to the other along this scale.
At the same time, and cutting across this cline of involvement, we find that — like the participants themselves — the circumstantial elements fall into distinct types according to their relationship to the Process + Medium nucleus. These types correspond to the four transphenomenal categories of logico-semantic relations that are now familiar: the circumstance is either a circumstance of projection or a circumstance of expansion and, if the latter, then either elaborating, extending or enhancing. If we combine the degree of involvement with the logico-semantic categories, we can represent the elements of a figure in the form of a helix (Figure 4-14).
The difference in the degree of involvement is also reflected in the extent to which an element is available for a critical role in the interpersonal metafunction. Prototypically, as we have noted, participants can be assigned the status of Subject, being made to carry the burden of the argument, whereas circumstances cannot. This distinction is however being obscured in Modern English, where although the prepositional phrase as a whole cannot function as Subject, the nominal group inside a prepositional phrase often can; e.g. the grass shouldn't be walked on.
Blogger Comments:
The obvious exceptions are circumstantial relational clauses, which are metaphorical.
Sometimes some entity can be construed in a figure either as a participant or as (an element in) a circumstance; in that case, construing it as participant means that it is being treated as more directly involved. Compare pairs of examples such as:
The pianist is more likely to escape unscathed as a circumstance than as a participant; likewise, the answer seems more impenetrable if guessed at than if guessed.
What is the status of these "macro circumstances"? They are really reduced or minor figures, functioning as elements inside other figures. The preposition is a kind of miniverb; the line between circumstances and figures is a very fuzzy one, and we often find agnate expressions where one is a prepositional phrase and the other a non-finite clause: cf. I washed it using sugar soap, she came accompanied by her children. The entity that occurs inside the macro circumstance is therefore already entering into a relationship with a reduced form of a process; its participation in the main process is thus mediated and oblique. We can thus contrast the different statuses of two entities where one is a direct participant and the other enters in circumstantially; e.g. this dictionary was published in two volumes, where this dictionary is Goal while two volumes enters into the publishing process indirectly in a circumstance of Role.
The different degrees of involvement are reflected in the way the figure, and its elements, are realised in the grammar of the clause. A participant is realised as a nominal group, and is typically placed next before or next after the verbal group realising the process. Circumstances typically occur further away from the process, and are of two distinct types. Type 1, simple circumstance, represents a quality; this type is realised as an adverbial group … . Type 2, macro circumstance, is realised as a prepositional phrase, which in turn consists of preposition + nominal group. The nominal group, as we have seen, construes an entity — something that could function directly as a participant Here however the entity is functioning only as a circumstantial element in the process: a location, or an instrument, or an accompanying entity, or so on (e.g. don't walk on the grass, I washed it with sugar soap, she came with her children); it enters into the clause by courtesy of the preposition, only indirectly so to speak.
As we have already noted, a figure consists of a process, participants involved in the process, and associated or attendant circumstances. Of these, the process can be seen as the organisational centre — the element that reflects the relative arrangements of the other parts in the configuration. These other parts (participants and circumstances) are more or less closely involved in the actualisation of the process. Broadly speaking, participants are directly involved in the process; circumstances are more peripherally attendant on it.
We have summarised the features of two participant roles, Goal and Range, which vary considerably in their degree of participanthood, lying as it were at the two ends of this continuum. We saw earlier that the Medium is the element that is most closely bonded to the Process, the two together forming the nucleus of the figure. Thus the highest degree of participanthood is that of whichever element, in each particular type of figure, is conflated with the generalised function of Medium; in the case of a figure of doing, this is the Goal, the element that is impacted (moved, changed, created or destroyed) by the Process.
At the other end of the cline are those elements whose status as participant is highly precarious, those which conflate with the generalised function of Range. These, as we have seen, are closely agnate to other types of figure, either those consisting of Process alone or those with Process + circumstantial element.
We can thus extend the continuum further, outside the status of participant altogether, into the realm of circumstances. In the next subsection we discuss the circumstantial roles; and we can order these also in terms of their degree of involvement in the process.
The Range element is not very likely to function as Subject in the clause: that is, to be entrusted with the interpersonal function of carrying the burden of the argument. This means that passive clauses with Range as Subject are very much rarer than those where Subject is Goal; and where they do occur, the participant that is functioning as Medium (Actor, Senser or Sayer) also tends to be of a generalised kind. Thus tennis is played by everyone is not uncommon, whereas tennis is played by Sharon is a highly marked construction.
Again, the category of Range/Attribute provides the limiting case. An Attribute can never serve as Subject in the clause.
… participants are located at some point along a scale of individuation, ranging from most generalised (e.g., diamonds are forever) to most individuated (e.g., Elizabeth's diamonds were stolen). The Range element tends towards the generalised end of the scale. This is especially the case with those of the elaborating type, where the Range usually represents a general class; and it is always the case if the figure is one of being, with Range as Attribute. For example:Peter plays tennis (cf. is a tennis-player)Peter plays the piano (cf. is a pianist)His opinion is not important (cf. does not matter)As a corollary to this, when some element that has functioned as Range is carried through the discourse, being picked up either by a lexical repetition or by a pronominal reference, it is more likely to be being picked up as a class, rather than as individuated:Sharon plays tennis at the same time every other day .... Tennis is a wonderful game, but tennis-players tend to be very obsessive.Peter spends a lot of time at the piano ... It is a difficult instrument.Hence a form of reference such as the following is somewhat improbable:Peter used to play the piano; but he sold it.
Blogger Comments:
Again, this assumes that the reference of the piano is usually homophoric. There is nothing improbable about the following instance, where the Range is individuated, not generalised, and acknowledged as such by pronominal reference:
We've always had a range of keyboard instruments. Peter used to play the piano, but he sold it.
Other examples of individuated Ranges, acknowledged as such by pronominal reference:
We climbed the mountain yesterday. It was very steep in places.
We are playing the match tomorrow. It'll be a war of attrition.
[The projected type of Range] is like [the enhancing] type in that in both types the agnate expression takes the form of a circumstantial element (grammatically, a prepositional phrase). But in the projected type the circumstance is one of Matter, whereas in the enhancing type it is typically one of Extent or Location. This corresponds in process type to the distinction between saying and sensing on the one hand and doing and being on the other.
Where the relation is one of projection, the Range represents the subject matter (either as a general term, e.g. issue, matter, or as the specific domain of the Process, e.g. politics, your holiday). As with enhancement, there is often an agnate circumstantial form.
… where the relation is enhancing, the Range specifies some entity that delimits the scope of the Process; here, therefore, there is often an agnate form where the scope is construed as a circumstantial element. For example:
… where the relation is elaborating, the Range simply restates the Process or else further specifies it in terms of its class, quality or quantity. Here, we often find related pairs of 'Process : Process + Range'; the latter may involve nominalising the process (a form of grammatical metaphor). Examples:
In type (3), being (more particularly, ascriptive being), the Range is the Attribute that is ascribed. This construction, Process + Range/Attribute, is much more common that the agnate form with Process only (that is, 'be + important' is the preferred model rather than 'matter'). The Process just embodies the category meaning of ascriptive being — 'be a member of' — and the Range carries the specific information about the experiential class. It is interesting to note that the ranged construction sorts out the ambiguity of the simple present tense between habitual (doing) and occupational (being): she dances/does a dance every night, she dances/is a dancer (by profession).
The Range is not some entity that is impacted by the Process; it either(i) expands the Process, or(ii) is projected by it.
Where the relationship is one of expansion, this take one of two forms: the Range either
(a) elaborates the Process in an objectified form, or(b) enhances it by delimiting its scope.¹⁴
¹⁴ The Range elaborates the Process, whereas the circumstantial element Rôle elaborates a participant in its particular participation in the process.
Like other participants Range is realised grammatically by a nominal group, but it does not participate in the process operationally: it does not bring about or act out the process, nor is it affected by it materially or mentally. It specifies the domain over which the process is actualised. For instance, if a process of walking ranges over Manhattan, it can be represented as Process + Range: They walked the streets of Manhattan. There are three respects in which the Range is not a prototypical participant:(I) its relationship to the Process,(II) its degree of individuation,III) its interpersonal potential.
Representatives of a class can be impacted (regardless of whether they are specific or non-specific at the point in the discourse at which they occur); but it is harder to impact the general class itself. Consequently, if the Goal is a general class rather than a set of specifiable representatives, it has a lower degree of participanthood. This appears iconically in the grammar in the limiting case of a clause where the Goal is simply that class of phenomenon that can serve as Goal of that particular type of figure: the grammar allows us to select 'goal-intransitive', which means that the Goal is simply not specified — for example:¹³he drinks heavily [alcohol]he eats all the time [food]they've gone to the hills to hunt [game]he buys and sells [any commodity]Such examples are typically either habitual (the process unfolds repeatedly) or durational (the process unfolds over time): this generalisation across time correlates with the generalisation across potential participants — both are ways of generalising from experience. In some special cases the generalisation of the Goal across a class of entities is shown by treating it as a mass, dispensing with the plural marker:They often shoot duck during the winter months.Such a Goal may even be incorporated into the Process, as in he is baby-sitting (and even who's baby-sitting me this evening?)', this is a restricted option with figures realised as ranking clauses, but not uncommon where the figure is used to qualify an element and is realised by a pre-modifying clause, e.g. a fun-loving colleague, a wood-burning stove.
¹³ Here, because of its generality, the Goal is predictable experientially. The Goal may of course be predictable textually, which is the reverse case: so specific at that point in the discourse that it can be anaphoricaliy presumed. Typically in such cases an explicit pronoun is used to refer back; but it can be omitted in certain registers, especially instructional ones such as recipes: when all the pancakes are made, garnish the dish and serve _ with cheese and egg sauce.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 167):
(i) Prepare the sauce according to your favourite recipe
(ii) Fry the aubergines for 5-10 minutesSkin the tomatoesHeat the ollve oilBoil the eggs hardBeat all the items togetherShape the lentil puree into cakes
There is a further contrast between Goal and Range in the degree of individuation that is typical of each. In the examples above, what is impacted is a specific representative of a class, or specific set of representatives; and this is typical of the degree of individuation of the Goal. Compare in this respect the contrast between move the piano, where the piano is Goal, and play the piano, where the piano is Range:
move the piano Process + Goal: specific representative of classplay the piano Process + Range: general class of instrument
Blogger Comments:
This assumes that the reference item the in play the piano is homophoric, but importantly, it can also be exophoric to the environment of the text, or endophoric to the text itself. In both these latter cases, the piano may be a specific representative of the class, like a Goal.
As we have seen, the Goal in the particularistic model corresponds to the Medium in the generalised model wherever the figure is one of doing to or doing with. The Goal is impacted in some way by its participation in the Process; the "impact" either (i) brings a participant into existence or else (ii) manipulates one that already exists.
(i) Prepare the sauce according to your favourite recipe
(ii) Fry the aubergines for 5-10 minutesSkin the tomatoesHeat the ollve oilBoil the eggs hardBeat all the items togetherShape the lentil puree into cakes
If the Goal is something that already exists, the result of the Process is to bring about some change — in its location, make-up, temperature, shape, &c.; and the result may be construed as a separate element, with the function Attribute (hard) or Rôle (into cakes).
These examples highlight the participant status of the Goal, showing the senses in which the Goal can be said to be impacted. There is no such impacting in the case of the Range.
We are using the term participanthood to suggest that the status of participant in the grammar is not absolute, but rather is a matter of degree. Among the various functional roles that the grammar construes as participants, we will discuss here two that are at opposite ends of the scale: Goal, which is has a clear status as prototypical participant, and Range, whose status as participant is much less clearly established.
While there is potential for variation, however, the variation is not arbitrary or random. The semantic system embodies certain general principles which guide the choice of one or other pattern of construal. These include:
process:(a) whether the process is non-actualised ('irrealis') or actualised ('realis');(b) how the process unfolds in time (its eventuation profile);participants & circumstances:(a) whether they are(i) general class,(ii) nonspecific representatives of a class or(iii) specific representatives;(b) how far, and in what ways, they are involved in the process.
We shall take the notion of degree of participanthood as an example of the general principle that the phenomena of experience may be construed as having more, or less, independent status within the semantic system.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 165-6):
To cite just one example, the phenomenon of precipitation from clouds is typically construed in Italian as a figure with a process alone piove 'rains', in Akan as figure with process + one participant nsuo retø 'water + fall', and in one local variety of Cantonese as a figure with process + two participants tin lok sui 'sky + drop + water'. …
As the examples illustrate, there are numerous points at which the system allows for alternative semanticisations of the flux of experience. These may differ in the extent to which the 'quantum' of experience is analysed into separate components. There is a cline from unanalysed and continuous to analysed and discrete; from example, from 'it's raining' (one phenomenon) to 'the sky's dropping water' (a configuration of three phenomena): see Figure 4-13.
A figure embodies both analysis and synthesis of our experience of the world: an analysis into component parts, and a synthesis of these parts into a configuration. That is, process, participants and circumstances are separated out analytically and are thus given independent phenomenal statuses. This is a creative act of construal. The world is not seamless and amorphous; it is highly variable in the way it presents itself to us as experience — in its perceptual salience, physical impact and material & psychological benefit. But it is not "given" to us as an established order, we have to construe it. Not surprisingly, there is a great deal of variation in the way that different languages do this.
In the case of elaboration, both 'coming into being' and 'causing to be' can be construed either as forms of doing or as forms of being. However, in the case of extension and enhancement, there is no comparable multiplicity of perspectives: they can only be construed as forms of doing. Table 4(9) sets out the patterns for the three types of expansion.
In the simple constructed examples used above, we contrasted doing: happening with pure being; but being also includes 'coming into being', i.e. 'becoming'. In such cases doing and being both construe change leading up to an outcome, but they use different models: Process and Process + Range respectively, For example:
Here the first transition in the state of the lava is represented as doing: happening — Medium/Actor: 'lava' + Process: 'cool'. Coolness is construed as a process; consequently, it is something that is unfolding and which cannot readily be intensified. In contrast, the second transition is construed as being: becoming — Medium/Carrier: 'lava' + Process: 'become' + Range/ Attribute: Very hard*. Coolness is construed as a quality rather than as a process; consequently, it is something which can come into being — which can be attained. The second transition is more closely related to the third: 'it becomes very hard : igneous rock'.However, the two options in construing coolness, as process and as quality, are very close, which is shown by a parallel text associated with an accompanying picture of a volcano:Here the transition in hardness is construed as a process within a figure of doing rather than as a process + quality within a figure of being. Consequently, the hardness is not represented as an intensified "destination" coming into being. Further it can be construed as part of a complex process of cooling-&-hardening within a single figure, as indicated in the analysis above.
Doing and being thus focus on different phases of a quantum of change; but either can be extended in the direction of the other to indicate (with 'being') the source of change or (with 'doing') the outcome of change. When this happens, the wordings that realise a figure of doing and a figure of being may come to resemble one another. For example, take the two wordings he drove his car hot and he drove his friends crazy. They could both be interpreted as Agent + Process + Medium + Range to show them as related to his car drove hot and his friends were crazy respectively. But at the same time they are differentiated as doing versus being: Actor + Process + Goal + Attribute versus Attributor + Process + Carrier + Attribute. This shows that they are related respectively to he drove his car (without the Attribute) and to his friends were crazy (without the Attributor; but not to he drove his friends)', and explains why we get his car drove hot but not his friends drove crazy, and why his car drove hot is agnate with his car ran hot (and his car moved, rolled, travelled) as another kind of happening but his friends were crazy is agnate with his friends seemed crazy as another kind of being.
A good place to illustrate the complementarity of the two models of participation is in the area of doing and being. Here the two models also bring out the complementarity of doing and being as modes of construing a quantum of change in the flow of events. …Figure 4-12 brings the two models together to show (i) how they complement one another, the generalised one showing how doing and being are based on the same configuration of Agent + Medium + Range and the particularistic one showing how doing and being are different configurations of roles; and (ii) how doing and being serve as complementary perspectives on a quantum of change, construing it either as happening/coming into being or as outcome of happening/ being. …
The two models of participation that we have described in this section thus differ in degree of generality. The particularistic model construes figures into a small number of distinct types, sensing, saying, doing and being, with different participants in each; while the generalised model construes figures as all being alike, having a Process that is actualised through a Medium. These two models embody complementary perspectives on participation, the one transitive, the other ergative. Note that there is no necessary tie-up between the switch of perspective and the degree of generality: it is a feature of English that the generalised model is construed in ergative terms.
Figure 4-11 summarises the generalised participant roles in diagrammatic form. It shows Process and Medium as a complementarity — the Process is actualised through the Medium; and it represents the other participants as external to this nucleus, indicating the type of role relationship that obtains (x enhancing, + extending and = elaborating).
The Beneficiary role is more restricted: it occurs in certain subtypes of figures of doing as Recipient (e.g. they awarded her the Pulitzer Prize : they awarded the Pulitzer Prize to her) or Client (e.g. she designed them a vacation home : she designed a vacation home for them), in figures of saying as Receiver (e.g. they told her a story : they told a story to her) and in a couple of subtypes of figures of being (e.g. he made her a good husband).
The Range role is quite pervasive, as indicated in Figure 4-7 and Table 4(8) above; it can occur in all types of figure that are construed as self-agentive, and also in certain figures of being that are construed as other-agentive. The Range construes the range or domain of the actualisation of the Process, with reference to taxonomic scope (as in play : play tennis/'volley ball), spatial scope (as in climb : climb mountains/hills), etc.
Blogger Comments:
To be clear, these are assigned figures of being — those with an Attributor (ascriptive) or Assigner (identifying).
As Figure 4-7 above shows, the generalised participant roles of Medium and Agent correspond to different sets of roles in the particularistic model — one or more for each type of figure. For example, in a figure of saying the Medium corresponds to the Sayer, whereas in a figure of sensing it corresponds to the Senser. We summarise the correspondences in Table 4(8), where the generalised participant roles are represented in columns.
Note that, for encoding identifying figures, Agent corresponds to Token, and Medium to Value. This is because, in all identifying figures, Medium corresponds to Identified, and Identified conflates with Token in decoding figures (as in the table), but conflates with Value in encoding figures (not shown in the table). See Figure 4-7.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156):
In the grammar therefore the Medium appears as an obligatory element — the only element that has this status in the clause. This does not mean that we will find a nominal reflex of the Medium made explicit in the syntagm of every clause; there are various ways in which the Medium may be present as a cryptotypic feature rather than as an overt form. Nevertheless its presence is required in some guise or other; and this distinguishes the Medium from all other participants in the figure.
Blogger Comments:
For example, the use of the 'medio-passive' in mental and targeting verbal clauses:
you were seen, you were accused
and in impersonal projection nexuses:
it was thought…, it was said… .
Semantically, the nucleus construes the centre of gravity of a figure, the focal point around which the system of figures is organised. When we describe the Medium as "actualising" the Process, we are really saying that the unfolding is constituted by the fusion of the two together — there can be no Process without an element through which this process is translated from the virtual to the actual.
The manner of performance of a process may vary, in which case it is the Medium by which it is typically determined. This may be a major variation in the mode of actualisation, for example 'open + door, open + account, open + eye' where the process is respectively mechanical, verbal or physiological; or simply a minor difference in the means that is employed, e.g. "brush + teeth, brush + clothes'. Some examples:
In many cases, the difference in the manner of performance is the basis of a lexically codified taxonomic distinction; for example:
In the taxonomy of figures, the nature of the Medium is more criterial than that of any other participant or circumstance. For instance, if we consider processes such as 'strew, spill, pour, sprinkle', it is the Medium, not the Agent which enables us to differentiate among them (cf. sprinkle + salt, spill/ pour + water, coffee; strew + flowers); similarly with 'bend, straighten, flatten; melt, freeze, evaporate, condense; crack, break, shatter' and so on.
Of all the participants, the Medium is the most restricted in terms of the range of phenomena that may function in that role. We can see this in relation to the general types of figure:
We can also see this in relation to more delicately specified subtypes such as:
In other words, whatever the type of figure, the participant that is most closely bonded with the Process is the one that takes on the generalised role of Medium; it is this that is in a relation of mutual expectancy with the Process. This is not to say that only horses can neigh, but rather than anything that neighs is thereby endowed with horse-hood.
Blogger Comments:
Clearly, the Medium of a 'shine' figure is not limited to 'heavenly body', but includes artificial light sources and phenomena with reflective surfaces, such as black shoes.
The model thus construes a nuclear figure consisting of a process unfolding through the medium of a participant. This then makes it possible to construe a further variable: namely, the causal origin of this unfolding. The Medium's actualisation of the Process may be construed as being brought about by a further participant — the Agent: see Figure 4-10. If the figure is construed with an Agent, it is other-agentive; if it is construed without an Agent, it is self-agentive.
Medium and Process form the nucleus of the whole figure — that part of the figure which is essential to the complementarity of unfolding and persisting (cf. Figure 4-3 above). The participant functioning as Medium may be affected in various different ways, depending on the particular domain — the 'trace' may b[e] physical, mental, and so on; but the status of Medium generalises across these domains.
The particularistic model, then, comprises a set of submodels: (i) impacting, (ii) conscious processing, (iii) symbolic processing, (iv) relational ordering. The model that generalises across these various domains of experience is different from any one of these particular submodels. It sets up one central participant that is common to all processes. This is the participant through which the process comes to be actualised. We refer to it as the Medium: see Figure 4-9.
Semantically, the Medium is the participant through which the process is actualised. It is in the combination of Medium + Process that we find the complementarity we spoke of earlier between the temporal unfolding (the Process) and the atemporal persistence (the Medium).
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 153):
What we find, if we try to take in the picture as a whole, is a kind of focussed model in which the essentially human processes of consciousness [sensing], and the prototypically human processes of symbolic action [saying], constitute the experiential centre; while the two other types of figure, that of doing on the one hand and of being on the other, lie on opposite sides of this centre: the one (doing) lying towards the pole of the concrete, with the experience construed as 'this impacts on that', the other (being) lying towards the pole of the abstract, with the experience construed as 'this is related to that'.
But these "impacting" figures of sensing and saying are only submotifs within these two overall types. The general motif of figures of sensing is 'conscious processing'; that of figures of saying is 'symbolic processing'. And in figures of being, where we might characterise the general motif as 'relational ordering', there is no trace of a submotif of impacting at all.
In figures of saying, the Sayer is the symbolic source: prototypically human, but not necessarily so (e.g. the instructions tell you to switch it off first). The Process is symbolic; but here too there is a subtype of figures of saying that imparts a similar sense of action and impact, those where the Sayer 'does something to' another participant by means of a verbal process, as in Don't blame the messenger, Everybody praised her courage. We refer to this participant as the Target; and again we may note a partial analogy with figures of doing (though only partial — for example, such figures cannot take a resultative Attribute or other representation of the outcome).
Sensing is clearly modelled as a process of human consciousness, with the Senser as a human being — so much so that merely coming to occupy that role is sufficient to endow the participant in question with human-like consciousness. The Phenomenon, on the other hand, is given a somewhat ambivalent status: in one of its guises (as in Do you like those colours?) it seems to be just a part of the environment; but in its other guise (as in Do those colours please you?) it seems to be playing a more active role.Why does it give this impression? Partly no doubt because of the agnate form Are you pleased by those colours? where the Phenomenon those colours is brought in indirectly, like an instrument or means. But this is part of a larger syndrome whereby, on the one hand, there are other related 'sensing' figures like How do those colours strike you?, where the verb strike suggests a fairly violent kind of action; and on the other hand, the prototypical form of a 'doing' figure seems quite analogous to these, as in Were those boys hitting you? (with those boys as Actor, you as Goal).
Blogger Comments:
Is it really the case that if we think or say the octopus can obviously see the crab, we are endowing the octopus — or any animal with sensory organs — with human-like consciousness?
The 'doing' figure is based prototypically on a schema we might refer to as "action and impact". There is always an Actor, the participant that performs the Process; and in an example such as the boys were jumping, the Process stops there — that is all there is to it. But in examples such as the boys were throwing stones, or the stones hit the wall the Actor's performance of the Process extends beyond, so as to 'impact' on another participant — this is the one known as the Goal (see Figure 4-8).
In the typical case (the "active voice", in grammatical terminology), the clause unfolds iconically, reflecting the movement of the impact from Actor to Goal.⁶ And, as we saw above, the latter may then be followed by representation of the outcome of the impact — a resultative Attribute (he knocked it flat), a circumstance of Role (he cut it into cubes), or a circumstance of Location (he threw it into the corner).⁶ This iconicity is, however, easily overridden by the textual metafunction, which has its own mode of iconic realisation.
In the limiting case, there is only one participant, the Existent; but generally there are two participants, the one being related by the process to the other. They may be being related by ascription, as Attribute to Carrier; or by identification, a rather complex relationship involving two pairs of participant roles: Identifier and Identified, and Token and Value. These latter intersect with each other, so there are two possible role combinations:(i) Identified/Token and Identifier/Value ['decoding'];(ii) Identifier/Token and Identified/Value ['encoding'].
Here there is one participant, the Actor, that performs the process in question; and this process may then impact upon another participant, the Goal (or may result in bringing the Goal into (material) existence). Other participants that may be present are the Beneficiary, the one that derives "benefit" from the process; and the Scope, the one that defines the domain over which the process extends.
Blogger Comments:
Strictly speaking, 'Beneficiary' is a participant of the generalised model. Its counterparts in the particularistic model, for doing figures, are Client and Recipient.
Here one participant, the Sayer, is involved as the originator of a process of symbolic (semiotic) activity, or "saying". There may be another participant the Receiver, whose role is that of 'decoding' what is said. What is said may itself be construed as a further participant, the Verbiage; or else it may be projected as another figure [locution] within the same sequence. Finally, there may be a participant functioning as Target of the saying process.
Here there is one participant, the Senser, who is construed as a conscious being engaged in "inert" conscious processing ("sensing", as distinct from conscious processing as a form of active behaviour). This may involve another participant, the Phenomenon, which enters into the consciousness of the Senser (or is brought into (mental) existence by the Senser's conscious processing). Alternatively, the Senser's conscious processing may project another figure [idea] within the same sequence.
In what we are calling its "particularist" modelling the grammar is categorising experience for us (or we are categorising experience through our grammar) by construing a small number of different types of figure, differentiated according to what kind of process is taking place and what kinds of participant are involved — in what relationships to each other and to the process.What is the principle on which the grammar categorises experience? In the most general terms, as we have seen, the principle is that all phenomena can be interpreted as falling within a small number of broad experiential domains:
- those happening "inside", within the realm of our own consciousness;
- those happening "outside", in the perceptual world that lies around us;
- those that are not kinds of happening at all, but rather kinds of being and of relating to something else.
We have referred to these as, respectively:(1) figures of sensing — or, more inclusively (since 'languaging' is treated as a distinct phenomenal realm), (1) figures of sensing and(2) figures of saying;(3) figures of doing — or, more explicitly (since the word 'doing' might suggest intentionality), figures of doing & happening;(4) figures of being — or, more accurately (since 'having' is construed as a kind of relative 'being'), figures of being & having.Each of these types of figure has its own special character, as revealed by the way it is organised in the lexicogrammar. We are not attempting to spell out here the grammatical features by which they are differentiated. But we shall characterise them briefly in semantic terms with reference to the forms of participation involved.
So far we have explored figures in terms of how they categorise experience into particular types or domains, showing how this typology extends in delicacy. The next step is to specify what modes of participant interaction the semantic system of figures engenders. There are two models of participation-in-process embodied in the semantic system of English —(i) One is particularistic: it diversifies our experience of participant interaction into four domains — doing, sensing, saying and being.(ii) The other is generalised it unifies our experience of participant interaction across the different domains.The system thus strikes a balance in the construal of figures between unity and diversity — between differentiating one aspect of experience from another and generalising over the whole. These constitute distinct but complementary perspectives: see Figure 4-7.
We have seen that figures of being, other than the existential, may be elaborative (intensive), extending (possessive) or enhancing (circumstantial). This enables us to recognisedfurther subcategories of doing according to the nature of the figure being brought about: see Table 4(7).
Notice that in some cases the outcome is embodied in the clause by which the figure is realised; for example in middle variants of the doing & happening type (the outcome of John ran is 'John + run'), and in clause with resultative elements (Attribute, Role) such as I'll boil the eggs hard (outcome: 'eggs + be + hard'), Let's appoint Fred timekeeper (outcome: Fred + be + timekeeper').
As pointed out earlier, doing is a process of change involving time and energy. Such change implies an outcome; the outcome may be of various kinds, but it is always such that it can be construed as another figure. We can therefore examine what kind of figure emerges as the outcome of the one under investigation.(1) If the process is creative, the outcome is that some entity comes into existence: such a figure may be construed as a doing with effectum, as in he baked a cake; but it may be simply a creative happening such as icicles formed. In either case the outcoming figure is one of being (more specifically, existing):he baked a cake outcome: 'there exists a cake'icicles formed outcome: 'there exist icicles'(2) If the process is dispositive, the outcome is more variable; it may be either (i) a figure of doing (more specifically, doing [to]/happening), or (ii) a figure of being (more specifically, being [at]/having):(i) the cat chased the mouse outcome: 'the mouse ran'
(ii) the boys mended the roof outcome: 'the roof was whole'John gave his sister a violin outcome: 'John's sister had a violin'
The subtypes that have been generally recognised in grammar are
(1) intransitive/transitive;(2) within intransitive, action/event; and(3) within transitive, effectum/affectum.
The first is the distinction between doings that involve only a doer (intransitive: John ran) and those that also involve something 'done to' (transitive: Mary threw the ball, realised respectively as Actor + Process, Actor + Process + Goal.
The second is that between an intentional act by an animate (typically human) being (John ran) and an unintentional action or inanimate event (John fell; rain fell).
The third is the distinction between a Goal that 'exists' prior to the doing of the deed (affectum: Mary threw the ball) and one that is brought into existence by the doing (effectum: Jack built a house).
We shall use this distinction, referred to as dispositive/creative, to explain figures of doing in terms of their outcome in other figures.
Throughout the history of the study of language, in all the major traditions, grammarians and philosophers have focussed primarily on figures of doing. Certain subtypes have been fairly well explored: usually those having some special structural feature, such as figures involving transfer of possession ('giving') where there is an additional participant role (Beneficiary, recognised in traditional grammar as indirect or dative object). And figures of doing in their very simplest form (John ran, Mary threw the ball) have remained for more than two millennia as the foundation of the theory of transitivity. But there has been little attempt at a systematic treatment of the total range of material clauses with their intersecting features and subtypes. Here we shall refer to three major distinctions that have traditionally been recognised; and then take one further step … bringing together figures of doing and being.
Thus enhancing figures may be used to construe arrangements or orderings in space or time, such as chronologies, maps or structures. For example, the following extract from an account of the structure of skeletal muscles construes locations through enhancing figures:The fibrous connective tissue proteins within the tendons continue in an irregular arrangement around the muscle to form a sheath known as the epimysium (epi = above; my = muscle). Connective tissue from this outer sheath extends into the body of the muscle, subdividing it into columns, or fascicles (e.g., the "strings" in stringy meat) . Each of these fascicles is thus surrounded by its own connective tissue sheath, known as the porimysium (peri = around).Enhancing figures construing temporal and causal ordering play an important role in constructing knowledge in a metaphorical mode, as the following example illustrates:The divergence of impulses from the spinal cord to the ganglia, and the convergence of impulses within the ganglia, usually results in the mass activation of almost all of the postganglionic fibres.
One participant enhances another along a circumstantial dimension of time, space, cause, condition and the like. Table 4(6) illustrates the categories of time and cause.
Elaboration and extension are agnate, one with the other; they offer alternative modes of construal, often with very little apparent difference. Thus we may find both(1)Elaborating 'Man' is +male, + adult & + human ;'Man' is a male, adult & human being(2)Extending 'Man' consists of +male, + adult & + human :'Man' has the features +male, +adult & +humanBut if we technicalise these alternatives, they do constitute significantly different approaches to the interpretation of meaning. In this book and elsewhere in systemic-functional work, elaborating interpretations tend to be taken further than in many other approaches: this means emphasising realisation, delicacy, and identities across metafunctions to supplement the traditional emphasis on constituency and composition.
Extending figures can thus be used to construe meronymic taxonomies. In other words, they are (among other things) a theory of constituency, semantic composition, and other meronymic relations in language; so they can be used to create further relationships of the same kind. For example, the following paragraph establishes a meronymic taxonomy for sentences in Hawaiian:
Sentences are sequences bordered by periods, question marks, or exclamation points. In Hawaiian they can be thought of as simple, verbless, or complex. The most common simple sentence consists of verb phrase ± noun phrase(s). Verb phrases contain verbs as their heads; verbs are defined on the basis of potential occurrence with the particles marking aspect, especially ua (perfective aspect) . Noun phrases contain nouns or substitutes for nouns; these are names of persons or places, or are defined on the basis of potential occurrence after the article ka/ke (definite), or the preposition ma 'at'.
One participant extends another in a relation of composition, possession or association. As with elaboration, there is also the intersecting variable of identity or membership: see Table 4(5).
Elaborating figures can thus be used to construe hyponymic taxonomies. In other words, they are, among other things, a theory of the systemic organisation of the meaning potential itself; and, by virtue of this fact, they can be used to elaborate it further. For example:
The fuels of the body are carbohydrates, fats and proteins. These are taken In the diet. They are found mainly In cereal grains, vegetable oils, meat, fish and dairy products. Carbohydrates are the principal source of energy in most diets. […] Fats make up the second largest source of energy in most diets. […]
One participant elaborates another one along the dimensions of delicacy, realisation, or instantiation. In other words, the elaboration sets up a relationship either of generality (delicacy), of abstraction (realisation), or of token to type (instantiation): see Table 4(4). There is another variable whereby elaboration involves either identity or membership along the dimension in question.
Figures of being & having construe relations between participants. They construe the same overall range of relations as expanding sequences, and the basic subtypes also correspond to the subcategories of expansion, viz. elaboration, extension, and enhancement. Once we recognise that the semantic system construes phenomena according to trans-phenomenal (fractal) principles, it will seem natural that figures of being & having construe relations in such a way that they resonate with the semantic types manifested in expanding sequences. They do not construe an arbitrarily different theory of relations. In a figure of being & having, one participant may thus elaborate, extend, or enhance another one.
Blogger Comments:
Strictly speaking, though categorised as enhancement in this context, matter, is actually a relation of projection, not enhancement.
As always in language, the picture that emerges from a consideration of a multiplicity of properties is far from simple; it is multifaceted. But it is possible to bring out certain salient features of the system of sensing as suggested in Figure 4-6.
Emotion seems to be closer to quality-ascription than to a prototypical process; it arises from, but does not create, projections. In contrast, perception is essentially closer to behavioural processes. Cognition and desideration are different from both in that they can project (i.e., bring the content of consciousness into existence), can stand for modalities, and are not in general like either behaviour or ascription; they may be interpreted as the most central classes of sensing. Cognition is arguably closer to perception than desideration is — there are certain cross-overs like see in the sense of 'understand' alongside its basic sense of visual perception, and both can be construed in an active mode as processes of behaviour.
Finally, when the different types of sensing are construed metaphorically as things, they are reified in different ways. Perception, cognition and desideration are reified as bounded, i.e. countable things, such as sight(s), thought(s), plan(s), whereas emotions are reified as unbounded things, i.e. masses, such as anger, fear, frustration.⁵ That is, emotion is construed as boundless — like physical resources such as water, air, iron and oil (cf. Halliday, 1990). Indeed, one can see from Lakoff & Kovecses's (1987) discussion of the cognitive model of anger in American English that a number of the metaphors for anger construe it as concrete mass (e.g. as a fluid contained in the body: He was filled with anger, She couldn't contain her joy, She was brimming with rage). In being construed as unbounded mass, emotions are again more like qualities (cf. the unbounded strength, height, heaviness, redness).
⁵ A few processes of cognition are also unbounded, e.g. knowledge, realisation, understanding.
Related to the possibility of construing emotion as an Attribute is the possibility of scaling or intensifying emotive processes: many qualities can be intensified. We find sets of processes differentiated essentially according to degree of intensity — scare : terrify, horrify; and emotive processes can be intensified by means of adverbs of degree such as much, greatly, deeply. These options are also open to some cognitive and desiderative processes, although not to perceptive ones; but intensification is an essentially emotive characteristic.
With many processes of emotion, there is an alternative construal of the emotion as a quality that can be ascribed as an Attribute to a Carrier in a relational clause; and this alternative exists for both the 'like' type and the 'please' type. Thus I'm afraid of snakes is an ascriptive alternative to the mental I fear snakes; similarly, in the other direction, snakes are scary and snakes scare me. This relational type of alternative exists for some cognitive and desiderative processes, but it is much more productive with emotive ones. Analogous attributes in the domain of perception seem always to involve potentiality (visible, audible);
