Cause: Reason, Purpose & Behalf

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 320-1, 322):

The circumstantial element of Cause construes the reason why the process is actualised. It includes not only Reason in the narrow sense of existing conditions leading to the actualisation of the process, but also Purpose in the sense of intended conditions for which the process is actualised (what has been called ‘final cause’). Both Reason and Purpose tend to be eventive (and are therefore commonly construed as clauses in a clause nexus); but there is another type of Cause that tends to denote a person — the circumstance of Behalf. …

The semantic relations of reason and purpose tend to be realised as separate clauses rather than as phrases within the clause;

Circumstance of Degree Vs Mood Adjunct Of Intensity [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 320):

Circumstances of Degree shade into mood Adjuncts of intensity. The difference between them can be seen in an example such as it almost destroyed the house:

(Degree) ‘it destroyed the house to a large extent’,
(Mood Ajunct) ‘it didn’t destroy the house’.

Circumstances of Degree construe the extent to which the process is actualised, and are thus agnate with lexical grading, as is seen particularly clearly in the lexicogrammar of emotion (cf. adore ‘love deeply’; detest ‘dislike intensely’). In contrast, Adjuncts of intensity assess the proposition – how close it comes to being actualised, and are thus agnate with other types of assessment and related to polarity.

Degree: Realisation & WH– Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 320):

Degree is typically expressed by an adverbial group with a general indication of degree … or with a collocationally more restricted adverb of degree … The collocationally restricted adverbs collocate with verbs serving as Process … Less commonly Degree may be expressed by a prepositional phrase, usually with to plus a nominal group with extent, degree as Thing and an intensifying adjective … as Epithet.  Degree expressions characterise the extent of the actualisation of the process and they often occur immediately before or immediately after the Process … [The interrogative is how much?.]

Comparison: Realisation & WH– Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 319-20):

Comparison is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with like or unlike, or an adverbial group of similarity or difference … The interrogative is what … like?.

Quality: Interpersonal & Textual Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 319):

… circumstances of Quality may also embody positive or negative interpersonal evaluations (e.g. the positively evaluated eloquently), and they may include comparative reference, as with that way, similarly, thus, thus contributing to cohesion in the text.

Quality: Realisation & WH– Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 319):

Quality is typically expressed by an adverbial group with an -ly adverb as Head; the interrogative forms is how? or how … ? plus an appropriate adverb.  Less commonly, Quality is realised by a prepositional phrase.  The general type is one where the preposition is in or with and the Head/Thing of the nominal group is the name of ‘manner’, either manner or way, or of a qualitative dimension such as speed, tone, skill, ease, difficulty, term; but phrasal expressions of Quality also include more specific types, such as specifications of the manner of movement.

Agent Vs Instrument [Diagnostic: Voice]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 319):

The line between agent and instrument is not always very sharp. … Nevertheless, there is a significant distinction in the grammar between manner and agency, so that a passive by phrase, if it could not remain unchanged in the corresponding active clause, is interpreted as a participant, not as a circumstance of Manner. This reflects the fact that semantically, whereas the instrument is not usually an inherent element in the process, the agent typically is — although less clearly so when the process is expressed in the passive.

Means: The Concepts Of Agency & Instrumentality

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 318-9):

… the category includes, in principle, the concepts of both agency and instrumentality. The instrument is not a distinct category in English grammar; it is simply a kind of means [as shown by voice agnates]. … The agent, however, although it is expressed as a prepositional phrase, typically functions as a participant in the clause [as shown by voice agnates].

Means: Realisation & WH– Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 318):

Means refers to the means whereby a process takes place; it is typically expressed by a prepositional phrase with the preposition by or with.  The interrogative forms are how? and what with?.

Manner: Means & Comparison Vs Quality & Degree

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 318):

Means is close to the participant rôle of Agent and Comparison is like a participant in a clause with the same type of process, whereas Quality and Degree are like features of the process itself. These differences in status are reflected in realisational tendencies: Means and Comparison tend to be realised by prepositional phrases, whereas Quality and [Degree] tend to be realised by adverbial groups.

Manner

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 318):

The circumstantial element of Manner construes the way in which the process is actualised. Manner comprises four subcategories: Means, Quality, Comparison, Degree …

Abstract Location Vs Other Circumstances [Diagnostic: WH– Probe]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 318):

Abstract space is the source of various expressions that serve as realisations of other types of circumstance such as Manner (e.g. walk on one’s legs, make wine out of grapes), Rôle (e.g. cut into cubes, translate from Spanish into English). It can be difficult to determine whether such an expression serves as an abstract Location or as a circumstance of another type. But probes involving Wh– items usually help us draw the line. For example, using the spatial where, we can say where the dollar rose was to its highest point in the past year, which indicates that to its highest point in the past year is a Location in abstract space rather than a circumstance of some other kind. In contrast, we cannot say where she talked was on the meaning of life, which indicates that on the meaning of life is not a Location in abstract space but rather a circumstance of another kind.

Abstract Space

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 317-8):

Space includes not only concrete space, but also abstract space. Abstract space covers a range of experiential domains that are construed on the model of space; … the construal of abstract space often involves a ‘material’ process of motion through space like come, go, bring, take. 

The abstractness is a feature of the clause as a whole, not just a single element; but the ‘clue’ to the abstract interpretation may be a single element or a combination of elements. 

• The Location itself may be an abstract one, as with … this brings us back to the purpose of this symposium …  

• the participant placed in relation to the Location may be an abstraction, as with … a great sadness came over him … or 

• the participant causing this participant to be placed in relation to the Location may be an abstraction as in where is all this taking us?

Location: Rest vs Motion

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 317):

Absolute vs Relative Location

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 317):

Definite vs Indefinite Extent And Location

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 317):

Parallels Between Temporal & Spatial Expressions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 316-7):

There are close parallels between temporal and spatial expressions, the most significant ones being the following.

(i) … both incorporate the notions of extent and location … 

(ii) In both time and space, extent is measurable in standard units … 

(iii) In both time and space, both extent and location may be either definite or indefinite … 

(iv) In both temporal and spatial location, the location may be either absolute, or relative to the ‘here–and–now’; and if relative, may be either near or remote … 

(v) In both spatial and temporal location there is a distinction between rest and motion; and within motion, between motion towards and motion away from …

However, this spatio-temporal parallelism is far from complete; and in recent centuries the language seems to have been moving away from it.

Location: Structural Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 316):

The typical structure is an adverbial group or prepositional phrase … Note adverbial group/prepositional phrase complexes expressing spatial and temporal paths … Under certain conditions a temporal preposition may be left out …

Location: Source, Path & Destination

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 316):

Place includes not only static location in space, but also the source, path and destination of movement. Similarly, time includes not only static location in time, but also the temporal analogues of source, path and destination.

Location: Spatial Or Temporal [Diagnostic: Interrogative Probe]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 316):

Location construes the location of the unfolding of the process in space-time: the place where it unfolds or the time when it unfolds.  The general interrogatives of Location are where?, when?.

Extent Vs Scope [Diagnostics: Measure & Subject]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 316):

There is no very sharp line separating (circumstantial) expressions of Extent from (participant) expressions of Scope of the enhancing type; but there is a distinction between them: Extent is expressed in terms of some unit of measurement, like yards, laps, rounds, years, whereas Scope in terms other than measure units (contrast they walked five miles with they walked the streets); and being a participant, the Scope has the potential of being able to serve as Subject.

Extent: Frequency Vs Usuality [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 315-6):

In the temporals there is an additional category of ‘frequency’, how many times?. This is related to the interpersonal category of usuality, but it is not identical to it; usuality is a modal assessment referring to position on a scale between positive and negative (always/never), whereas frequency is the extent of the repetition of the process. The categories of extent and usuality may, however, work together, as in a narrative where habitude is established.

Extent: Interval

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 315):

The category of Extent includes ‘interval’, which has the corresponding question form how often?, in the sense of ‘at what intervals?’.

Extent: Structural Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 315):

The typical structure is a nominal group with quantifier, either definite,  e.g. five days, or indefinite, e.g. many miles, a long way; this occurs either with or without a preposition, the most usual preposition being for

Extent: Spatial Or Temporal [Diagnostic: Interrogative Probe]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 315):

Extent construes the extent of the unfolding of the process in space-time: the distance in space over which the process unfolds or the duration in time during which the process unfolds.  The interrogative forms for Extent are how far?, how long?, how many [measure units]?, how many times?.

Extent And Location

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 315):

The circumstantials of Extent and Location construe the unfolding of the process in space and time. They form a four-term set as shown in Table 5-29.

The Cline Of Enhancing Circumstances And Patterns Of Agnation

Halliday & Matthiesen (2014: 315):

The location of circumstances on this cline will determine patterns of agnation. For example, around (1), Process with lexically incorporated feature of manner: sway can be glossed as Process + Manner, ‘move slowly or rhythmically’, and wobble as ‘move unsteadily from side to side’; but around (2), Cause: because of his asthma is agnate with either a participant, e.g. asthma prevented Cam from sleeping or to an enhancing clause of cause, e.g. Cam could not sleep because he had asthma.

The Cline Of Enhancing Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 314-5):

These enhancing circumstances range on a cline

(1) from circumstances that are like a feature of the process construed circumstantially, e.g. unsteadily (Manner: quality) in … He paced forward unsteadily …

(2) to circumstances that are like indirect participants, e.g. because of his asthma (Cause: reason) in Cam could not sleep because of his asthma.

Enhancing Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 314):

Enhancing circumstances augment the configuration of process + participants through the specification of extent or location in time or space of the unfolding of the process, the manner of the unfolding of the process, the cause of the unfolding of the process, or the contingency of the unfolding of the process.

Circumstance As Minor Relational Or Verbal Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 314):

For the present discussion, what is important is the notion of ‘circumstance’ as a kind of additional minor process, subsidiary to the main one, but embodying some of the features of a relational or verbal process, and so introducing a further entity as an indirect participant in the clause.

Relating Circumstance Types To Process (& Logical) Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 312, 314):

We could illustrate the principles as follows:

(a) relational: circumstantial Jack was building a house ...

1. when? (‘it was during’) throughout the year Extent: duration
2. where? (‘it was at’) near the river Location: place
3. how? (‘it was by’) out of brick Manner: means
4. why? (‘it was for’) for his retirement Cause: purpose
5. under what conditions? despite his illness Contingency: concession

(b) relational: possessive Jack was building a house ...

6. who with? (‘he had’) with his daughters Accompaniment: comitation

(c) relational: intensive Jack was building a house ...

7. what as? (‘it was’) as a vacation home Rôle: guise 

The other two, Matter and Angle, can be related to verbal processes:

(d) verbal: Verbiage Jack told his friends

8. what about? (‘said ...’) about the sale Matter

(e) verbal: Sayer the price was good

9. says who? (‘... said’) according to Jack Angle: source

Relating Circumstance Types To Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 312):

But if we think of ‘circumstantiation’ as a general concept, in the context of the overall interpretation of transitivity as the grammar of experience, we can get a sense of the semantic space that is being constructed by these circumstantial elements. One way of doing this is to relate them to the various types of process that have been described above.

We are able to do this because a circumstantial element is itself, from this point of view, a process that has become parasitic on another process. Instead of standing on its own, it serves as an expansion of something else. Most circumstantials can be derived from the three types of relational process [i.e. intensive, possessive, circumstantial]; the largest group, not surprisingly, from that type of relational process for which we use the label ‘circumstantial’.

The Set Of Functions Construed As Circumstantial

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 312-4):

What, then, is the set of functions that is construed as circumstantial in the grammar of the clause as representation? We can start from time, place, cause and manner; but we need to realign them somewhat, to add to them, and to interpret them in relation to the process types as a whole. The list of circumstantial elements will then be as in Table 5-28.

Circumstantial Indirect Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 312):

We can make a contrast, then, between direct and indirect participants, using ‘indirect participant’ to refer to the status of a nominal group that is inside a prepositional phrase.  We have already seen that the participant rôles of (1) Client, Recipient and Receiver [i.e. Beneficiary] and (2) Scope, Behaviour and Verbiage [i.e. Range] are sometimes expressed ‘indirectly’ in this sense, as in gave money to the cashier, plays beautifully on the piano. The elements we are treating as ‘circumstantial’ are those in which the participant typically — and in many cases obligatorily — is indirect, being linked into the process via some preposition or other.

Prepositional Phrase: A Hybrid Construction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311-2):

But a prepositional phrase is an odd sort of hybrid construction. It has a nominal group inside it, as a constituent, so it looks bigger than a group; and yet it is still not quite a clause. In English, this nominal group inside a prepositional phrase is no different from a nominal group functioning directly as a participant in a clause, and in principle every nominal group can occur in either context; e.g. the mighty ocean, participant in little drops of water make the mighty ocean, circumstance in I’ll sail across the mighty ocean. And if we focus attention on the nominal group in its relation to the overall process, it still seems to be some kind of participant: even in the sailing, the mighty ocean does play some part. But it is allowed in, as it were, only indirectly — through the intermediary of a preposition …

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Below’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

Thirdly, looked at from below, they [circumstances] are typically expressed not as nominal groups but as either adverbial groups or prepositional phrases — mostly the latter, since adverbial groups are largely confined to one type, those of Manner.

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Round About’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

… the second perspective, that from the clause itself: whereas participants function in the mood grammar as Subject or Complement, circumstances map onto Adjuncts; in other words, they have not got the potential of becoming Subjects, of taking over the modal responsibility for the clause as exchange.

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Above’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

As far as meaning is concerned, we used the expression ‘circumstances associated with’ or ‘attendant on the process’, referring to examples such as the location of an event in time or space, its manner, or its cause; and these notions of ‘when, where, how and why’ the thing happens provided the traditional explanation, by linking circumstances to the four WH– forms that were adverbs rather than nouns.

Continuity Between The Categories Of Participant And Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

There is thus a continuity between the categories of participant and circumstance; and the same continuity can be seen in the forms by which the two are realised. The distinction between participant and circumstance is probably relevant in all languages; but in some it is drawn relatively sharply, while in others it is shaded and blurred. We shall see … that it has become blurred in English, and for an interesting reason: it has been superseded by something else.

Circumstances & Clause Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310-1):

… typically, they [circumstances] occur freely in all types of process, with essentially the same significance wherever they occur. There are, of course, some combinations which are less likely, and some special interpretations. For example, circumstances of Matter are fairly common with ‘mental’ and ‘verbal’ clauses but quite rare with other process types, except for certain ‘behavioural’ clauses. And in an ‘attributive’ clause, Manner circumstances are fairly unusual, and circumstances of Place often carry a feature of time as well, e.g. I get hungry on the beach ‘when I am on the beach’.

Summary Of Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310, 311):

Table 5-27 gives a summary of the types of process that we have identified in the grammar of English, together with their general category meaning and the participants that are associated with each.

Meteorological Processes: Material Clauses Without Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310):

This last type [construed as it + a verb in the ‘present in present’ tense] is unique in English, in that it has no participant in it.  The it serves the interpersonal function of Subject, like the there in an ‘existential’ clause, but has no function in transitivity — if you are told that it’s raining, you cannot ask What is? and the it cannot be theme–predicated (we cannot say it’s it that’s raining) or serve as an identified Theme or Rheme (we cannot say it is what’s raining/what’s raining is it). On the other hand the tense is clearly that of a ‘material’ process.  These clauses can be analysed as consisting of a single element, the Process; they are the limiting case of a ‘material’ process clause.

Meteorological Processes: Existential, Material & Relational

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309-10):

On this borderline between the ‘existential’ and the ‘material’ there is a special category of processes to do with the weather: meteorological processes like it’s raining, the wind’s blowing, there’s going to be a storm. Some are construed existentially, e.g. there was a storm/hurricane/breeze/gale/shower/blizzard. Some are construed as material events, e.g. the wind’s blowing, the sun’s shining, the clouds are coming down. Some are construed as relational attributives: it’s foggy/cloudy/misty/hot/humid/sunny/frosty; here the it can be interpreted as a Carrier, since it is possible to substitute the weather, the sky or the (time of) day. Finally, some are construed as it + a verb in the ‘present in present’ tense: it’s raining/hailing/snowing/freezing/pouring/drizzling/lightning/thundering.

Existent & Existential-Material Topology

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

The entity or event which is said to exist is labelled, simply, Existent.  In principle, there can ‘exist’ any kind of phenomenon that can be construed as a ‘thing’: person, object, institution, abstraction; 

but also any action or event, as in is there going to be a storm?, there was another robbery in the street. And here the ‘existential’ merges into the ‘material’ type of clause: there is little difference in meaning between ‘existential’ there was a robbery and ‘material: creative’ a robbery took place (note the present tense a robbery is taking place).

Existential Clause Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Another common way of ‘locating’ the process in space–time is to follow it with a non-finite clause, e.g. there was an old woman tossed up in a basket, there’s someone waiting at the door, there’s a patient to see you; the two together form a clause complex.

Existential Clauses Without Subjects

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Frequently an ‘existential’ clause contains a distinct circumstantial element of time or place … If the circumstantial element is thematic, the Subject there may be omitted — but it will turn up if there is a tag: on the wall (there) was a Picasso painting, wasn’t there? …

Existential Clauses: Verbs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309, 310):

‘Existential’ clauses typically have the verb be; in this respect also they resemble ‘relational’ clauses. But the other verbs that commonly occur are mainly different from either the ‘attributive’ or the ‘identifying’: see Table 5-26. …

Existential 'There' vs Circumstantial 'There' [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Phonologically there is non-salient, and the vowel is often reduced to schwa (hence identical with the); it is thus distinct from the Adjunct there which is a circumstantial element. Contrast (i) existential there’s your father on the line, with reduced there [ðə] as Subject, and response Oh, is there?, and (ii) circumstantial relational there’s your father, with salient there [ðɛə] as Adjunct, and response Oh, is he? In (ii), but not in (i), there’s is in contrast with here’s.

Existential ‘There’: Experiential & Interpersonal Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 308):

The word there in such clauses is neither a participant nor a circumstance — it has no representational function in the transitivity structure of the clause; but it serves to indicate the feature of existence, and it is needed interpersonally as a Subject. Unlike participants and circumstances this existential there cannot be queried, theme–predicated or theme–identified …

Existential ‘There’: Textual Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 308):

Textually the Theme is just the feature of existence (there), allowing the addressee to prepare for something that is about to be introduced; and this something is presented as New information.

Aspects Of Experience Of Speech Events Lexicalised In Verbs Of Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

As the different types [of verbal process] in Table 5-25 illustrate, different aspects of our experience of speech events may be lexicalized in verbs of saying, including the speech function (e.g. ask, urge), the turn (e.g. reply, add), the medium (e.g. write), manner (e.g. enthuse, gush, rave) and the channel (e.g. email, phone). As technology is opening up new channels, new verbs are added to the resources of the ‘verbal’ lexicogrammar and are pressed into reporting or quoting service, e.g.:

‘Ruiz’s passing at 70 represents a tremendous loss for contemporary filmmaking,’ blogs Dave Kehr. 

He texted me back that Somer didn’t come home from school.

Targeting Verbal Processes: The Realisation Of The Source Of The Praise Or Blame

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

Targeted verbal clauses are closer to the Actor + Goal structure of a ‘material’ clause (cf. what he did to Krishan Kant was accuse him). The source of praise, blame, etc. is construed either as a circumstance or as an enhancing hypotactic clause (e.g. of conspiring with Bansi Lal ...; for showing it) — but not as a projection.

Targeting Verbal Processes And Projected Quotes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307n):

When verbs that serve in targeted verbal clauses occur in verbal clauses together with quotations, the participant construed as being addressed by the Sayer functions as Receiver rather than as Target: ‘Those are fine letters,’ I praised her.

Targeting Verbal Processes And Projected Reports

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

Verbs that accept a Target do not easily project reported speech; but some aspect of the Sayer’s words may be quoted in the representation of the Target, of a circumstance of Cause or Role, or of an enhancing clause of reason for the judgement:

In June, Gates praised ‘the unprecedented cooperation between the nations of the gulf.’ 

Charles C Jones’s 1883 The History of Georgia praised Zubly as ‘learned and eloquent, public spirited, and of marked ability’ and described his early career as ‘consistent and patriotic.’

Target: The Participant That Is Acted Upon Verbally

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

The Target occurs only in a sub-type of ‘verbal’ clause; this function construes the entity that is targeted by the process of saying, which may be a person, an object or an

abstraction; e.g.

He also accused Krishan Kant of conspiring with Bansi Lal in destabilising the set-up in Haryana who, in turn, issued a press statement saying that Devi Lal was suffering from ‘hallucinations’. 

I think there are serious problems in her work traceable to the writer’s distance, or lack of it, from all this; but she is rightly praised at least for showing it. 

Rather than criticise my teaching ability, he actually praised it.

Here the Sayer is, as it were, acting verbally on another party, judging them positively or negatively (cf. Martin & White, 2005, on appraisal of the judgement type).

The Two Types Of Verbiage: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The two types of Verbiage are not sharply distinct; in between (a) tell me your experience and (b) tell me a story is something such as tell me the truth, where the truth could be interpreted either as (a) ‘the events as they happened’ or as (b) ‘a narrative that is factual’.

Verbiage As The Name Of The Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

[Verbiage] may be the name of the saying; for example a question in let me ask you a question, another word in now don’t you say another word! This type also occurs with very general verbs like give and make (as in ‘material’ clauses with Process + Scope), e.g. give the order, make a statement. The name of the saying includes speech functional categories such as question, statement, order, command – often with collocational constraints in relation to the lexical verb in the Process (ask + question, make + statement, give + order, issue + command, tell + lie) and generic categories such as story, fable, joke, report, summary. The name of a language can be construed as Verbiage, e.g. they were speaking Arabic; alternatively, this is construed circumstantially as Manner, e.g. they were speaking a few words in Arabic.

Verbal Processes That Project Proposals: Beneficiary

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306n):

Order, promise and other such processes can be construed with a Beneficiary.  With promise this Beneficiary is the Receiver of a ‘verbal’ clause, but with order this Beneficiary is more like the Client of a ‘material’ clause denoting the creation of goods or the performance of a service; for example: You felt alright on Friday ’cause you ordered yourself a nice big pizza (cf. you ordered a nice big pizza for yourself). Here the ‘Receiver’ would be represented like a circumstance: you ordered yourself a nice big pizza from the waiter.

Verbiage As The Content Of What Is Said

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

It may be the content of what is said; e.g. your family in But when people describe your family, they don’t talk about your nephews and nieces; … The Verbiage may construe the topic of what is said, as with describe your family above; as the following clause illustrates, this type of Verbiage is close in meaning to a circumstance of Matter (talk about your nephews and nieces). If the verbal process is one that projects goods-&-services rather than information, like order or promise, the Verbiage refers to these: e.g. a steak in I ordered a steak, those earrings in those earrings were promised to another customer.

Verbiage

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The Verbiage is the function that corresponds to what is said, representing it as a class of thing rather than a report or quote; e.g. what in What did you say?

Receiver: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The Receiver is the one to whom the saying is directed … The Receiver may be Subject in a clause that is ‘receptive’ … The Receiver is realised by a nominal group typically denoting a conscious being (a potential speaker), a collective or an institution; the nominal group either occurs on its own or is marked by a preposition — almost always to but sometimes of.  The range of realisational possibilities depends on the lexical verb of the verbal group realising the Process …

Verbal Clauses: Distinctive Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

[Unlike ‘behavioural’ process clauses] ‘verbal’ process clauses do display distinctive patterns of their own. Besides being able to project … they accommodate three further participant functions in addition to the Sayer: (1) Receiver, (2) Verbiage, (3) Target. The first two of these are ‘oblique’ participants.

Behavioural Clauses: Not So Much A Distinct Process Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

… ‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum …

Verbal Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

In certain respects, ‘verbal’ clauses are thus like ‘behavioural’ ones, exhibiting certain characteristics of other process types — tense like ‘material’ or ‘relational’, ability to project like ‘mental’.

For Non-Conscious Sayers: Tense Like Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

However, the simple present also occurs in a more ‘relational’ sense of ‘expresses the opinion that’, as in She says she prefers cigarettes to fish.  And when the Sayer is realised by a nominal group denoting a symbol source other than a human speaker, the tense selection is more likely to be more like that of a ‘relational’ clause, as in the study says that such a diversified village structure produces a dualistic pattern of migration. Here the ‘present in’ is unlikely: the study is saying that ... would not occur.* While such clauses are still clearly ‘verbal’, they are closer to ‘relational’ clauses than are ‘verbal’ ones with a human speaker as Subject.

Blogger Comments:

* This is overstating the case, since the study is saying that ... could easily occur, especially in a spoken exchange where there is disagreement about what the study is saying.

For Conscious Sayers: Tense Like Material Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305, 305n):

The verb may be unaccented as in a ‘relational’ clause or accented as in a ‘material’ one. The tense is also in a sense intermediate between that of ‘material’ clauses and that of ‘relational’ ones. When the Sayer is realised by a nominal group denoting a conscious speaker, the tense selection may be like that of a ‘material’ clause, with the simple present indicating habit or generalisation (i.e. an extended ‘now’) and the present in present indicating the narrower period of time; and the present in past often indicates simultaneity, just as it does with ‘material’ clauses. … The present can alternate with the past in conversational narratives just as it can with ‘material’ clauses …

Verbs Of Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

The Process of a ‘verbal’ clause is realised by a verbal group where the lexical verb is one of saying: see Table 5-25.

Reported Locutions: Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 304):

The projected clause may be either (a) a proposition, realised by a finite clause, as in Mr Deshmukh said that some dissidents had met him and asked him whether they should vote according to their conscience or discretion; or (b) a proposal, realised by a perfective non-finite clause, as in Bush urges China to release crew; … The proposal may be expressed alternatively by a modulated finite clause: Yet somebody told me that I mustn’t repudiate my non-fiction …

The Phylogenesis Of Reported Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 304):

In Old English, the structure was he said/thought that: he was not hungry, with that as a demonstrative in the ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause ‘pointing’ to the clause representing the reported content of saying or sensing (see e.g. Hopper & Traugott, 1993). This demonstrative came to be reanalysed as a structural conjunction introducing the reported clause; but the reported clause itself remained outside the structure of the reporting clause – it has not been incorporated through downranking (in contrast with ‘fact’ clauses). Thus we would not expect to find such reported clauses serving as the Subject of a ‘receptive’ ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause; for example, that he was not hungry was said/thought by him is highly unlikely.*

Blogger Comment:

* But note instances like It was said that Feynman played the bongos, where the projected clause looks like the embedded postposed Subject of was said.  Note also agnate instances like Feynman was said to have played the bongos.

Projected Clauses Vs Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303-4):

The status of the reported and quoted clause is analogous to that of an ‘idea’ clause introduced by a ‘mental’ clause: it is … not rankshifted, and in this respect such clauses differ from rankshifted ‘fact’ clauses serving as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.

The Functional Status Of Quoted And Reported Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303):

What about the function of … to keep quiet, it’s half past ten? In formal grammar what is said is treated as a ‘noun clause object of the verb say’, meaning a clause that is rankshifted by nominalisation. But functionally this clause is not rankshifted; it functions as the secondary clause in a ‘clause complex’, being either (a) directly quoted, as in (he said) ‘I’m hungry’, or (b) indirectly reported, as in (he said) he was hungry. This means that such sequences consist of two clauses. (Only the primary clause is a ‘verbal’ one, of course; the other may be a process type of any kind.)

Verbal Processes = Symbolic Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303, 304):

‘Saying’ has to be interpreted in a rather broad sense; it covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning, like the notice tells you to keep quiet, or my watch says it’s half past ten. The grammatical function of … the notice, my watch is that of Sayer. 

… unlike ‘mental’ clauses, ‘verbal’ ones do not require a conscious participant. The Sayer can be anything that puts out a signal … In view of the nature of the ‘Sayer’, verbal processes might more appropriately be called ‘symbolic’ processes …

Behavioural Verbs Serving As Verbal Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

… while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.

Behavioural Processes: The Anomalous Verb ‘Watch’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.  Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the ‘mental’ analogue.

Behavioural Processes: Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

Some [behavioural processes] also regularly feature a prepositional phrase with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us.  These are in origin circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation, but we may continue to use that label.

Behavioural Processes: Associated Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

Certain types of circumstance are associated with behaviour[al] processes: those of Matter with [near mental and near verbal types] e.g. dreaming of you, grumbled about the food; Manner with the remainder, e.g. breathe deeply, sit up straight.

Examples Of Verbs Serving As Process In Behavioural Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301, 302):

The boundaries of behavioural processes are indeterminate; but we can recognise the kinds set out in Table 5-24 as typical.

Behavioural Processes: Agency & Range

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

Behavioural processes are almost always middle; the most typical pattern is a clause consisting of Behaver and process only, like Don’t breathe!, No one’s listening, He’s always grumbling. A common variant of these is that where the behaviour is dressed up as if it was a participant, like she sang a song, he gave a great yawn; this structure is typical in the everyday spoken language. The participant is analogous to the Scope of a ‘material’ clause (both being manifestations of the general function of Range); we shall call it Behaviour.

Behavioural Processes: Unmarked Present Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

The usual unmarked present tense for behavioural processes is present in present, like the material (e.g. you’re dreaming!); however, we also find a simple present in its unmarked sense (i.e. not meaning habitual), e.g. why do you laugh?, alongside why are you laughing? (with scarcely any difference between them), which suggests an affiliation with a mental.

Behavioural Processes: “Senser Doing”

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

The participant who is ‘behaving’, labelled Behaver, is typically a conscious being, like the Senser; the Process is grammatically more like one of ‘doing’.

Behavioural Processes: Why The Least Distinct Process Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

These are processes of (typically human) physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, coughing, smiling, dreaming and staring. They are the least distinct of all the six process types because they have no clearly defined characteristics of their own; rather they are partly like the material and partly like the mental.

Three Subsidiary Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 300):

We can then go on to recognise three subsidiary process types, located at each of the boundaries: behavioural at the boundary between material and mental, verbal at the boundary between mental and relational, and existential at the boundary between relational and material.

The Three Principal Process Types: Material, Mental, Relational

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 300):

They are the principal types in that they are the cornerstones of the grammar in its guise as a theory of experience, they present three distinct kinds of structural configuration, and they account for the majority of all clauses in a text (‘material’ and ‘relational’ seem to be roughly balanced in frequency over the language as a whole, followed by ‘mental’, although the pattern varies considerably among different registers).

Verbs Serving As 'Possession As Process'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 297):

Possession As A Circumstantial Relation [Language Typology]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 297):

In principle, possession can be thought of as another kind of circumstantial relation, which could be embodied in some such expression as ‘at Peter is a piano’, ‘the piano is with  Peter’. Many languages [e.g.Irish] typically indicate possession by circumstantials of this kind. The nearest English is the verb belong; compare the dialectal form is along o’me.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 296):

Some verbs combine the feature of possession with other semantic features; for example

• exclude ‘[negative] + have’,
• owe ‘have on behalf of another possessor’,
• deserve ‘ought to have’,
• lack ‘need to have’. 

(Most verbs meaning ‘come to have’, on the other hand, function as Process in ‘material’ clauses; for example get, receive, acquire — compare the tense forms in You deserve a medal. – I’m getting one.)

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 296):

In addition to possession in the usual sense of ‘owning’, this category includes abstract relationships of containment, involvement and the like.  Among the verbs commonly occurring in this function are include, involve, contain, comprise, consist of, provide.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 246):

Here the possession is encoded as a process, typically realised by the verb own as in Peter owns the piano. (Notice we do not normally say Peter has the piano, in the sense of ownership; have is not used as an identifying verb of possession.) The participants are possessor Peter and possessed the piano; in this case Peter is Token and the piano is Value.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As (Both) Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295-6):

Here the participants embody the notion of possession, one signifying property of the possessor, e.g. Peter’s, the other signifying the thing possessed, e.g. the piano. Thus in the piano is Peter’s, both the piano and Peter’s express ‘that which Peter possesses’, the relationship between them being simply one of identity. Note that here the piano is Token and Peter’s is Value.

Possessive Identifying Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, the possession takes the form of a relationship between two entities; and again this may be organised in two ways, with the relationship being expressed either

(a) as a feature of the participants, as in the piano is Peter’s, or

(b) as a feature of the process, as in Peter owns the piano.

Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

If the relationship of possession is construed as the Process, then two further possibilities arise. 

Either (1) the possessor is the Carrier and the possessed is the Attribute (we will call the thing possessed the ‘possessed’ rather than the ‘possession’, to avoid ambiguity; ‘possession’ refers to the relationship), as in Peter has a piano. Here piano-ownership is an attribute being ascribed to Peter. Verbs other than have combine the sense of possession with other features, e.g. lack ‘need to have’, boast ‘have as a positive feature’. 

Or (2) the possessed is the Carrier and the possessor is the Attribute, as in the piano belongs to Peter. Here Peter-ownership is an attribute being ascribed to the piano. Neither of the two, of course, is reversible; we do not say a piano is had by Peter, or Peter is belonged to by the piano.

Indeterminacy In Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

These are not, in fact, syntagmatically distinct from ‘identifying’ clauses; the clause the piano is Peter’s could be either ‘attributive’, ‘the piano is a member of the class of Peter’s possessions’ or ‘identifying’, ‘the piano is identified as belonging to Peter’. (Note that the reversed [form] Peter’s is the piano can only be ‘identifying’.)

Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

If the relationship is construed as the Attribute, then it takes the form of a possessive nominal group e.g Peter's; the thing possessed is the Carrier and the possessor is the Attribute.

Possessive Attributive Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, the possessive relationship may again be construed either as attribute, e.g. Peter’s in the piano is Peter’s, or as process, e.g. has, belongs to in Peter has a piano, the piano belongs to Peter.

Possessive Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 294-5):

In the ‘possessive’ type, the relationship between the two terms is one of ownership; on entity possesses another … In addition to possession in the narrow sense of ‘owning’, the category of ‘possessive’ clauses also includes possession in a broader, more generalised sense — possession of body parts and other part–whole relations, containment, involvement and the like … Possession thus has to be interpreted quite broadly, in the sense of ‘extension’: one entity is construed as being extended by another. 

Just like ‘circumstantial’ clauses, ‘possessive’ ones are construed in both the ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’ modes.

Circumstantial Relational Clauses: Attributive Vs Identifying Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 293):

The line between ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’ modes is less clear in the ‘circumstantial’ than in the ‘intensive’ type of ‘relational’ clause. This is natural, since it is less obvious whether an expression such as on the mat designates a class (that has members — the class of things on the mat) or an identity (the thing that is identified by being on the mat). Nevertheless there is a distinction …

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses: Circumstance As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 293):

In this type, it is not the participants that are the expression of time, place or other circumstantial features, but the Process. In examples such as the following the verbs take up, span, cross, cause are so to speak ‘circumstantial’ verbs: US bases take up almost one-fifth of the land of the cramped island; more than 50 years span her age and mine; Turtle Ridge would span maybe three blocks; this situation is apparently caused by anomalous low temperatures; … Circumstantial verbs encode the circumstance of time, place, accompaniment, manner, etc as a relationship between the participants … This means that in terms of the concept of grammatical metaphor … all clauses of this type are metaphorical.

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses: Circumstance As (Both) Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

In this type, it is the participants — Identified and Identifier — that are circumstantial elements of time, place and so on. For example, in tomorrow is the tenth, tomorrow and the tenth are both time elements. Similarly in the best way to get there is by train, both the best way and by train express manner; in the real reason is that you’re scared, Identified and Identifier are both expressions of cause. The Token can be quite varied in grammatical class — a nominal group, an adverbial group, a prepositional phrase or an embedded clause, whereas the Value is often a nominal group with the name of a class of circumstance as Thing.

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, the circumstance takes the form of a relationship between two entities; one entity being related to another by a feature of time or place or manner etc. As with the circumstantial attributive, this pattern may be organised semantically in one of two ways. The relationship is expressed either

(a) a feature of the participants, as in tomorrow is the tenth, or

(b) as a feature of the process, as in the fair takes up the whole day.

Circumstantial Attributive Process Vs Material Process [Diagnostic: Unmarked Tense & Participant Mobility]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

Verbs serving in clauses with a circumstantial process are often derived from a basic use in ‘material’ clauses of motion … The unmarked present tense is the simple present … rather than the present in present of ‘material’ clauses … The Carrier is typically some immobile physical feature, whereas the Actor of a ‘material’ clause of motion is typically an animate being or a mobile entity. Because of the overlap of a large set of verbs, there will of course be cases that are indeterminate …

Process As Circumstantial vs Attribute As Circumstantial

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

In (b), therefore, the Process is circumstantial; whereas in (a) it is the Attribute that is circumstantial, the Process being the same as in the ‘intensive’ type.

Circumstance As Attributive Process: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

Here the Attribute is realised by a nominal group and the circumstantial relation is expressed by the lexical verb in the verbal group serving as Process … The verb expresses a circumstantial relation such as ‘be + matter’, ‘be + extent in time’, ‘be + extent in space’. Being attributive, these are non-reversible; there are no ‘receptive’ equivalents …

Circumstantial Attributive Vs Existential [Diagnostic: Mood Tag]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

However, note that clauses such as on the north wall …  hangs a Union Jack … are not ‘attributive’ but ‘existential’.  The thematically unmarked form of these clauses is that beginning with existential there: there is (hangs) a Union Jack on the north wall.  The prepositional phrase then appears initially as a marked Theme; in that case the existential feature may be left implicit, although the there may still be present and will appear in any case in the mood tag: on the north wall (there) is a Union Jack, isn’t there?.  In contrast, in a ‘circumstantial attributive’ clause, the Subject/Carrier is picked up in the mood tag: the sounds and smells of the ocean hang in the air — don’t they? …

Circumstantial Vs Intensive Attributes: Thematicity & Definiteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

Unlike the Attribute of an ‘intensive’ clause, the Attribute of a ‘circumstantial’ one is frequently Theme in registers where the thematic status is rhetorically motivated … And unlike intensive Attributes, such circumstantial Attributes frequently have a ‘definite’ nominal group …

Attributive Clauses: Circumstantial Or Intensive [Diagnostic: Constituent Structure]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290n):

Ascriptive verbs of marked phase such as turn and look, were treated as ‘intensive’ even when they had a preposition after them: for example, caterpillars turn into butterflies, Penelope looked like an angel.  This reflects their constituent structure; cf what they turn into are butterflies (not what they turn is into butterflies), Penelope looked angelic.  But there is an overlap at this point, and these could also be interpreted as circumstantial.

Circumstance As Attribute: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

Here the Attribute is realised (1) by a prepositional phrase, in which case the circumstantial relation is expressed by the preposition … and/or (2) by an adverbial group …

Circumstantial Attributive Clauses: Process Or Minor Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, the circumstantial element is an attribute that is being ascribed to some entity … These take two forms:

(a) one in which the circumstance is construed in the form of the Attribute …

(b) the other in which the circumstantial relation is construed in the form of the Process …

In the first case, the circumstantial relation is construed as a minor process realised by a preposition; in the second, it is construed as a process realised by a verb …

Circumstantial Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

In the ‘circumstantial’ type, the relationship between the two terms is one of time, place, manner, cause, accompaniment, role, matter or angle. These are also manifested as circumstantial elements in the English clause.

Blogger Comment:

As manifestations of the 'fractal types', the relationship is one of 

• expansion

• enhancement (time, place, manner, cause),

• extension (accompaniment),

• elaboration (role), or

• projection (matter, angle).

The ‘As Participant’ Or ‘As Process’ Contrast In Intensive Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

The contrast between ‘as participant’ and ‘as process’ is, as we have just noted, a grammatical one and in a sense it applies also to ‘intensive’ clauses. Thus we have for example:

the meaning of ‘kita:bun’ is ‘book’/ ‘kita:bun’ means ‘book’,
the name of his mother is Anna/ his mother is called Anna,
examples of amphibians are frogs, toads and salamanders/ amphibians are exemplified by frogs, toads and salamanders

But a special feature of the ‘intensive’ type is that the sense of ‘meaning’, ‘name’, ‘example’ and the like may be left implicit in the participant (for the reason, see Matthiessen, 1991a): ‘kita:bun’ is ‘book’, his mother is Anna.

Possession & Circumstantiation As Participant vs Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289-90):

With ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses, there is thus a systemic contrast between ‘possession/circumstantiation as participant’ and ‘possession/circumstantiation as process’. The contrast is a general one, construed in the grammatical zone of lexicogrammar rather than the lexical one; and just as with the ‘like’/‘please’ contrast in the grammar of ‘mental’ clauses, we often find lexical pairs manifesting the contrast such as be x’s/be owned, be like/resemble, be with/accompany, be in/inhabit, be around/surround, be opposite of/face, be about/concern – but just as in the mental case there may be gaps in the lexical paradigm.

The Rationâle For 'Possessive' And 'Circumstantial'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

If all ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses had the intensive verb be as the Process, we could perhaps interpret them as subtypes of ‘intensive’ clauses – subtypes where possessor and possessed are related to one another and where circumstances are related to one another. Here the piano is Emily’s would be like our earlier example her name is Alice, where naming is construed as an aspect of one of the participants (cf. also the owner of the Piano is Emily). Under this interpretation a clause such as Emily has a piano would be the odd one out because here the sense of possession is construed in the process in the first instance (the verb have), not in (one of) the participants. 

However, Emily has a piano is not the odd one out; it exemplifies a regular option throughout for all ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses. This is the option of construing possession or circumstantiation as process. Thus alongside the piano is Emily’s, we have the piano is owned by Emily; and alongside Emily is like her mother, we have Emily resembles her mother. Here own means ‘be + possession’ and resemble means ‘be + like’.

Possessive And Circumstantial Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

The verb be can be used in all categories set out in Section 5.4.2 although have is the unmarked verb in ‘attributive’ clauses of possession (in standard English we say Emily has a piano rather than with Emily is a piano).  The variants of ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses with be (and have) are analogous to ‘intensive’ clauses.  Thus Emily has a piano can be interpreted as ‘Emily is a member of the class of piano–owners’ and the meeting is on Friday as ‘the meeting is a member of the class of the class of events on Friday’.  Similarly, the piano is Emily’s can be interpreted as ‘the piano is identified as the one belonging to Emily’ and Friday is the best time as ‘Friday is identified as the best time’.

‘Circumstantial’ and ‘Possessive’ Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

These two types also come in two modes of being, ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’. We can thus recognise the following series of proportions:

intensive            Emily is a poet :                            attributive
                          Emily is the poet ::                       identifying 

possessive          Emily has a piano :                        attributive
                          the piano is Emily’s ::                   identifying 

circumstantial    the meeting is on Friday :              attributive
                         the time of the meeting is Friday   identifying

Assigned Attributive Clauses vs Creative Material Clauses [Diagnostics]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 288-9):

We may note that there is a type of clause that is agnate to those with verbs of appearance in which the Carrier is construed on the model of a circumstance of Means (of the subtype ‘material’) marked by of or out of; for example:

‘It makes a mockery of the slogan which many of them use, “To Protect and Serve”,’ he said.

I mean, I think she’s made an absolute fool of herself. 

No one’s gonna make a fool out of me

These relational clauses resemble creative material ones with a circumstance of Means such as you could make fortune out of any one of your loves. However, in such material clauses the circumstance of Means can be left out: you could make a fortune, whereas the Carrier/Means cannot be left out of an assigned relational clause: we cannot say she’s made an absolute fool without of herself. Creative verbs other than make can serve as the Process, e.g. create, produce, develop. Further, there is a receptive option with such material clauses, e.g. a fortune could be made (by you) out of any of your loves, but there is no receptive version of assigned relational clauses of this type: an absolute fool has been made (by her) of herself is odd.

Assignment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 288):

Both ‘identifying’ and ‘attributive’ clauses of the ‘intensive’ kind have the option of assignment: they may be configured with a third participant representing the entity assigning the relationship of identity [or] attribution … In the case of ‘identifying’ clauses, this is the Assigner; in the case of ‘attributing’, this is the Attributor.  In a ‘receptive’ clause, this participant may be left implicit …

Identifying Mode: Naming & Defining Vs Calling

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287-8):

Most problematic of all are clauses of naming and defining, which lie exactly at the crossover point between the the two types of ‘identifying’ clause … Naming and defining are linguistic exercises, in which the word is Token and its meaning is Value. In calling, on the other hand, it is the name that is the Value.

Adjectival Attribute <-> Nominal Attribute <-> Value

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

Nominal Attributes are closer to Values than adjectival ones; and these, in turn, are very close to the ‘is an example of’ type of ‘identifying’ clause, like those missiles constitute a threat to our security.

Attribute As An Instance Of A Class

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

And on the other hand we often interpret an Attribute not just as an instance of a class but in some sense the value of the entity it carries, e.g. Pat is a millionaire.

Blogger Comment:

The incoherence here arises from Matthiessen's mistaken rewording of Halliday (1994: 129):

And on the other hand we often interpret an Attribute not just as an instance of a class but in some sense the value of the entity that carries it, e.g. Pat is a millionaire.

The Continuity From Attribution To Decoding Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

The continuity becomes clearer when we set up as Value/Identifier something that is explicitly worded as membership of a class, using the expression ‘one of ...’

Pat                             is            one of the richest people I know
Identified/Token                       Identifier/Value

Blogger Comment:

Note that, viewed 'from above', an attributive relation obtains between the Head (Carrier) — one — and the Postmodifier (Attribute) — the richest people I know — of the nominal group serving as Identifier/Value.

Attributive <–> Decoding <–> Encoding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 286):

… the [decoding] type of ‘identifying’ clause where the Identifier is the Value (that is, the identity is given by function) is intermediate between the attributive and the other [encoding] type of ‘identifying’, the one where the Identifier is the Token (identity is given by form):

Pat is rich                      Attribute               attributive
Pat is the richest           Identifier/Value     decoding
the richest is Pat           Identifier/Token    encoding

Classifying vs Identifying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 286):

So for example

my brother                 is       tall
Carrier = member                Attribute = class

means ‘my brother belongs to the class of people who are tall’. This specifies one of his attributes; but it does not serve to identify him – there are other tall people besides. The only means of identifying something by assigning it to a class is to make that a class of one. But if the one-member class is at the same level of abstraction as its member, we have a tautology: my brother is my brother.