Prepositional Phrase: A Hybrid Construction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311-2):

But a prepositional phrase is an odd sort of hybrid construction. It has a nominal group inside it, as a constituent, so it looks bigger than a group; and yet it is still not quite a clause. In English, this nominal group inside a prepositional phrase is no different from a nominal group functioning directly as a participant in a clause, and in principle every nominal group can occur in either context; e.g. the mighty ocean, participant in little drops of water make the mighty ocean, circumstance in I’ll sail across the mighty ocean. And if we focus attention on the nominal group in its relation to the overall process, it still seems to be some kind of participant: even in the sailing, the mighty ocean does play some part. But it is allowed in, as it were, only indirectly — through the intermediary of a preposition …

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Below’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

Thirdly, looked at from below, they [circumstances] are typically expressed not as nominal groups but as either adverbial groups or prepositional phrases — mostly the latter, since adverbial groups are largely confined to one type, those of Manner.

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Round About’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

… the second perspective, that from the clause itself: whereas participants function in the mood grammar as Subject or Complement, circumstances map onto Adjuncts; in other words, they have not got the potential of becoming Subjects, of taking over the modal responsibility for the clause as exchange.

Circumstances Viewed ‘From Above’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

As far as meaning is concerned, we used the expression ‘circumstances associated with’ or ‘attendant on the process’, referring to examples such as the location of an event in time or space, its manner, or its cause; and these notions of ‘when, where, how and why’ the thing happens provided the traditional explanation, by linking circumstances to the four WH– forms that were adverbs rather than nouns.

Continuity Between The Categories Of Participant And Circumstance

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 311):

There is thus a continuity between the categories of participant and circumstance; and the same continuity can be seen in the forms by which the two are realised. The distinction between participant and circumstance is probably relevant in all languages; but in some it is drawn relatively sharply, while in others it is shaded and blurred. We shall see … that it has become blurred in English, and for an interesting reason: it has been superseded by something else.

Circumstances & Clause Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310-1):

… typically, they [circumstances] occur freely in all types of process, with essentially the same significance wherever they occur. There are, of course, some combinations which are less likely, and some special interpretations. For example, circumstances of Matter are fairly common with ‘mental’ and ‘verbal’ clauses but quite rare with other process types, except for certain ‘behavioural’ clauses. And in an ‘attributive’ clause, Manner circumstances are fairly unusual, and circumstances of Place often carry a feature of time as well, e.g. I get hungry on the beach ‘when I am on the beach’.

Summary Of Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310, 311):

Table 5-27 gives a summary of the types of process that we have identified in the grammar of English, together with their general category meaning and the participants that are associated with each.

Meteorological Processes: Material Clauses Without Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 310):

This last type [construed as it + a verb in the ‘present in present’ tense] is unique in English, in that it has no participant in it.  The it serves the interpersonal function of Subject, like the there in an ‘existential’ clause, but has no function in transitivity — if you are told that it’s raining, you cannot ask What is? and the it cannot be theme–predicated (we cannot say it’s it that’s raining) or serve as an identified Theme or Rheme (we cannot say it is what’s raining/what’s raining is it). On the other hand the tense is clearly that of a ‘material’ process.  These clauses can be analysed as consisting of a single element, the Process; they are the limiting case of a ‘material’ process clause.

Meteorological Processes: Existential, Material & Relational

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309-10):

On this borderline between the ‘existential’ and the ‘material’ there is a special category of processes to do with the weather: meteorological processes like it’s raining, the wind’s blowing, there’s going to be a storm. Some are construed existentially, e.g. there was a storm/hurricane/breeze/gale/shower/blizzard. Some are construed as material events, e.g. the wind’s blowing, the sun’s shining, the clouds are coming down. Some are construed as relational attributives: it’s foggy/cloudy/misty/hot/humid/sunny/frosty; here the it can be interpreted as a Carrier, since it is possible to substitute the weather, the sky or the (time of) day. Finally, some are construed as it + a verb in the ‘present in present’ tense: it’s raining/hailing/snowing/freezing/pouring/drizzling/lightning/thundering.

Existent & Existential-Material Topology

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

The entity or event which is said to exist is labelled, simply, Existent.  In principle, there can ‘exist’ any kind of phenomenon that can be construed as a ‘thing’: person, object, institution, abstraction; 

but also any action or event, as in is there going to be a storm?, there was another robbery in the street. And here the ‘existential’ merges into the ‘material’ type of clause: there is little difference in meaning between ‘existential’ there was a robbery and ‘material: creative’ a robbery took place (note the present tense a robbery is taking place).

Existential Clause Complexes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Another common way of ‘locating’ the process in space–time is to follow it with a non-finite clause, e.g. there was an old woman tossed up in a basket, there’s someone waiting at the door, there’s a patient to see you; the two together form a clause complex.

Existential Clauses Without Subjects

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Frequently an ‘existential’ clause contains a distinct circumstantial element of time or place … If the circumstantial element is thematic, the Subject there may be omitted — but it will turn up if there is a tag: on the wall (there) was a Picasso painting, wasn’t there? …

Existential Clauses: Verbs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309, 310):

‘Existential’ clauses typically have the verb be; in this respect also they resemble ‘relational’ clauses. But the other verbs that commonly occur are mainly different from either the ‘attributive’ or the ‘identifying’: see Table 5-26. …

Existential 'There' vs Circumstantial 'There' [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 309):

Phonologically there is non-salient, and the vowel is often reduced to schwa (hence identical with the); it is thus distinct from the Adjunct there which is a circumstantial element. Contrast (i) existential there’s your father on the line, with reduced there [ðə] as Subject, and response Oh, is there?, and (ii) circumstantial relational there’s your father, with salient there [ðɛə] as Adjunct, and response Oh, is he? In (ii), but not in (i), there’s is in contrast with here’s.

Existential ‘There’: Experiential & Interpersonal Functions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 308):

The word there in such clauses is neither a participant nor a circumstance — it has no representational function in the transitivity structure of the clause; but it serves to indicate the feature of existence, and it is needed interpersonally as a Subject. Unlike participants and circumstances this existential there cannot be queried, theme–predicated or theme–identified …

Existential ‘There’: Textual Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 308):

Textually the Theme is just the feature of existence (there), allowing the addressee to prepare for something that is about to be introduced; and this something is presented as New information.

Aspects Of Experience Of Speech Events Lexicalised In Verbs Of Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

As the different types [of verbal process] in Table 5-25 illustrate, different aspects of our experience of speech events may be lexicalized in verbs of saying, including the speech function (e.g. ask, urge), the turn (e.g. reply, add), the medium (e.g. write), manner (e.g. enthuse, gush, rave) and the channel (e.g. email, phone). As technology is opening up new channels, new verbs are added to the resources of the ‘verbal’ lexicogrammar and are pressed into reporting or quoting service, e.g.:

‘Ruiz’s passing at 70 represents a tremendous loss for contemporary filmmaking,’ blogs Dave Kehr. 

He texted me back that Somer didn’t come home from school.

Targeting Verbal Processes: The Realisation Of The Source Of The Praise Or Blame

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

Targeted verbal clauses are closer to the Actor + Goal structure of a ‘material’ clause (cf. what he did to Krishan Kant was accuse him). The source of praise, blame, etc. is construed either as a circumstance or as an enhancing hypotactic clause (e.g. of conspiring with Bansi Lal ...; for showing it) — but not as a projection.

Targeting Verbal Processes And Projected Quotes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307n):

When verbs that serve in targeted verbal clauses occur in verbal clauses together with quotations, the participant construed as being addressed by the Sayer functions as Receiver rather than as Target: ‘Those are fine letters,’ I praised her.

Targeting Verbal Processes And Projected Reports

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

Verbs that accept a Target do not easily project reported speech; but some aspect of the Sayer’s words may be quoted in the representation of the Target, of a circumstance of Cause or Role, or of an enhancing clause of reason for the judgement:

In June, Gates praised ‘the unprecedented cooperation between the nations of the gulf.’ 

Charles C Jones’s 1883 The History of Georgia praised Zubly as ‘learned and eloquent, public spirited, and of marked ability’ and described his early career as ‘consistent and patriotic.’

Target: The Participant That Is Acted Upon Verbally

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 307):

The Target occurs only in a sub-type of ‘verbal’ clause; this function construes the entity that is targeted by the process of saying, which may be a person, an object or an

abstraction; e.g.

He also accused Krishan Kant of conspiring with Bansi Lal in destabilising the set-up in Haryana who, in turn, issued a press statement saying that Devi Lal was suffering from ‘hallucinations’. 

I think there are serious problems in her work traceable to the writer’s distance, or lack of it, from all this; but she is rightly praised at least for showing it. 

Rather than criticise my teaching ability, he actually praised it.

Here the Sayer is, as it were, acting verbally on another party, judging them positively or negatively (cf. Martin & White, 2005, on appraisal of the judgement type).

The Two Types Of Verbiage: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The two types of Verbiage are not sharply distinct; in between (a) tell me your experience and (b) tell me a story is something such as tell me the truth, where the truth could be interpreted either as (a) ‘the events as they happened’ or as (b) ‘a narrative that is factual’.

Verbiage As The Name Of The Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

[Verbiage] may be the name of the saying; for example a question in let me ask you a question, another word in now don’t you say another word! This type also occurs with very general verbs like give and make (as in ‘material’ clauses with Process + Scope), e.g. give the order, make a statement. The name of the saying includes speech functional categories such as question, statement, order, command – often with collocational constraints in relation to the lexical verb in the Process (ask + question, make + statement, give + order, issue + command, tell + lie) and generic categories such as story, fable, joke, report, summary. The name of a language can be construed as Verbiage, e.g. they were speaking Arabic; alternatively, this is construed circumstantially as Manner, e.g. they were speaking a few words in Arabic.

Verbal Processes That Project Proposals: Beneficiary

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306n):

Order, promise and other such processes can be construed with a Beneficiary.  With promise this Beneficiary is the Receiver of a ‘verbal’ clause, but with order this Beneficiary is more like the Client of a ‘material’ clause denoting the creation of goods or the performance of a service; for example: You felt alright on Friday ’cause you ordered yourself a nice big pizza (cf. you ordered a nice big pizza for yourself). Here the ‘Receiver’ would be represented like a circumstance: you ordered yourself a nice big pizza from the waiter.

Verbiage As The Content Of What Is Said

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

It may be the content of what is said; e.g. your family in But when people describe your family, they don’t talk about your nephews and nieces; … The Verbiage may construe the topic of what is said, as with describe your family above; as the following clause illustrates, this type of Verbiage is close in meaning to a circumstance of Matter (talk about your nephews and nieces). If the verbal process is one that projects goods-&-services rather than information, like order or promise, the Verbiage refers to these: e.g. a steak in I ordered a steak, those earrings in those earrings were promised to another customer.

Verbiage

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The Verbiage is the function that corresponds to what is said, representing it as a class of thing rather than a report or quote; e.g. what in What did you say?

Receiver: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

The Receiver is the one to whom the saying is directed … The Receiver may be Subject in a clause that is ‘receptive’ … The Receiver is realised by a nominal group typically denoting a conscious being (a potential speaker), a collective or an institution; the nominal group either occurs on its own or is marked by a preposition — almost always to but sometimes of.  The range of realisational possibilities depends on the lexical verb of the verbal group realising the Process …

Verbal Clauses: Distinctive Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

[Unlike ‘behavioural’ process clauses] ‘verbal’ process clauses do display distinctive patterns of their own. Besides being able to project … they accommodate three further participant functions in addition to the Sayer: (1) Receiver, (2) Verbiage, (3) Target. The first two of these are ‘oblique’ participants.

Behavioural Clauses: Not So Much A Distinct Process Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

… ‘behavioural’ process clauses are not so much a distinct type of process, but rather a cluster of small subtypes blending the material and the mental into a continuum …

Verbal Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 306):

In certain respects, ‘verbal’ clauses are thus like ‘behavioural’ ones, exhibiting certain characteristics of other process types — tense like ‘material’ or ‘relational’, ability to project like ‘mental’.

For Non-Conscious Sayers: Tense Like Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

However, the simple present also occurs in a more ‘relational’ sense of ‘expresses the opinion that’, as in She says she prefers cigarettes to fish.  And when the Sayer is realised by a nominal group denoting a symbol source other than a human speaker, the tense selection is more likely to be more like that of a ‘relational’ clause, as in the study says that such a diversified village structure produces a dualistic pattern of migration. Here the ‘present in’ is unlikely: the study is saying that ... would not occur.* While such clauses are still clearly ‘verbal’, they are closer to ‘relational’ clauses than are ‘verbal’ ones with a human speaker as Subject.

Blogger Comments:

* This is overstating the case, since the study is saying that ... could easily occur, especially in a spoken exchange where there is disagreement about what the study is saying.

For Conscious Sayers: Tense Like Material Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305, 305n):

The verb may be unaccented as in a ‘relational’ clause or accented as in a ‘material’ one. The tense is also in a sense intermediate between that of ‘material’ clauses and that of ‘relational’ ones. When the Sayer is realised by a nominal group denoting a conscious speaker, the tense selection may be like that of a ‘material’ clause, with the simple present indicating habit or generalisation (i.e. an extended ‘now’) and the present in present indicating the narrower period of time; and the present in past often indicates simultaneity, just as it does with ‘material’ clauses. … The present can alternate with the past in conversational narratives just as it can with ‘material’ clauses …

Verbs Of Saying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 305):

The Process of a ‘verbal’ clause is realised by a verbal group where the lexical verb is one of saying: see Table 5-25.

Reported Locutions: Speech Function

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 304):

The projected clause may be either (a) a proposition, realised by a finite clause, as in Mr Deshmukh said that some dissidents had met him and asked him whether they should vote according to their conscience or discretion; or (b) a proposal, realised by a perfective non-finite clause, as in Bush urges China to release crew; … The proposal may be expressed alternatively by a modulated finite clause: Yet somebody told me that I mustn’t repudiate my non-fiction …

The Phylogenesis Of Reported Locutions

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 304):

In Old English, the structure was he said/thought that: he was not hungry, with that as a demonstrative in the ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause ‘pointing’ to the clause representing the reported content of saying or sensing (see e.g. Hopper & Traugott, 1993). This demonstrative came to be reanalysed as a structural conjunction introducing the reported clause; but the reported clause itself remained outside the structure of the reporting clause – it has not been incorporated through downranking (in contrast with ‘fact’ clauses). Thus we would not expect to find such reported clauses serving as the Subject of a ‘receptive’ ‘verbal’ or ‘mental’ clause; for example, that he was not hungry was said/thought by him is highly unlikely.*

Blogger Comment:

* But note instances like It was said that Feynman played the bongos, where the projected clause looks like the embedded postposed Subject of was said.  Note also agnate instances like Feynman was said to have played the bongos.

Projected Clauses Vs Facts

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303-4):

The status of the reported and quoted clause is analogous to that of an ‘idea’ clause introduced by a ‘mental’ clause: it is … not rankshifted, and in this respect such clauses differ from rankshifted ‘fact’ clauses serving as the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.

The Functional Status Of Quoted And Reported Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303):

What about the function of … to keep quiet, it’s half past ten? In formal grammar what is said is treated as a ‘noun clause object of the verb say’, meaning a clause that is rankshifted by nominalisation. But functionally this clause is not rankshifted; it functions as the secondary clause in a ‘clause complex’, being either (a) directly quoted, as in (he said) ‘I’m hungry’, or (b) indirectly reported, as in (he said) he was hungry. This means that such sequences consist of two clauses. (Only the primary clause is a ‘verbal’ one, of course; the other may be a process type of any kind.)

Verbal Processes = Symbolic Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 303, 304):

‘Saying’ has to be interpreted in a rather broad sense; it covers any kind of symbolic exchange of meaning, like the notice tells you to keep quiet, or my watch says it’s half past ten. The grammatical function of … the notice, my watch is that of Sayer. 

… unlike ‘mental’ clauses, ‘verbal’ ones do not require a conscious participant. The Sayer can be anything that puts out a signal … In view of the nature of the ‘Sayer’, verbal processes might more appropriately be called ‘symbolic’ processes …

Behavioural Verbs Serving As Verbal Processes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

… while ‘behavioural’ clauses do not ‘project’ indirect speech or thought, they often appear in fictional narrative introducing direct speech, as a means of attaching a behavioural feature to the verbal process of ‘saying’.

Behavioural Processes: The Anomalous Verb ‘Watch’

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

The verb watch is anomalous: in I’m watching you, the tense suggests a behavioural process but the you appears as a participant, like the Phenomenon of a ‘mental’ clause.  Since this is restricted to watch, we can label this participant as Phenomenon, indicating the ‘mental’ analogue.

Behavioural Processes: Orientation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

Some [behavioural processes] also regularly feature a prepositional phrase with to, at or on: I’m talking to you, don’t look at me, fortune is smiling on us.  These are in origin circumstances of Place; in the behavioural context they express orientation, but we may continue to use that label.

Behavioural Processes: Associated Circumstances

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 302):

Certain types of circumstance are associated with behaviour[al] processes: those of Matter with [near mental and near verbal types] e.g. dreaming of you, grumbled about the food; Manner with the remainder, e.g. breathe deeply, sit up straight.

Examples Of Verbs Serving As Process In Behavioural Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301, 302):

The boundaries of behavioural processes are indeterminate; but we can recognise the kinds set out in Table 5-24 as typical.

Behavioural Processes: Agency & Range

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

Behavioural processes are almost always middle; the most typical pattern is a clause consisting of Behaver and process only, like Don’t breathe!, No one’s listening, He’s always grumbling. A common variant of these is that where the behaviour is dressed up as if it was a participant, like she sang a song, he gave a great yawn; this structure is typical in the everyday spoken language. The participant is analogous to the Scope of a ‘material’ clause (both being manifestations of the general function of Range); we shall call it Behaviour.

Behavioural Processes: Unmarked Present Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

The usual unmarked present tense for behavioural processes is present in present, like the material (e.g. you’re dreaming!); however, we also find a simple present in its unmarked sense (i.e. not meaning habitual), e.g. why do you laugh?, alongside why are you laughing? (with scarcely any difference between them), which suggests an affiliation with a mental.

Behavioural Processes: “Senser Doing”

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

The participant who is ‘behaving’, labelled Behaver, is typically a conscious being, like the Senser; the Process is grammatically more like one of ‘doing’.

Behavioural Processes: Why The Least Distinct Process Type

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 301):

These are processes of (typically human) physiological and psychological behaviour, like breathing, coughing, smiling, dreaming and staring. They are the least distinct of all the six process types because they have no clearly defined characteristics of their own; rather they are partly like the material and partly like the mental.

Three Subsidiary Process Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 300):

We can then go on to recognise three subsidiary process types, located at each of the boundaries: behavioural at the boundary between material and mental, verbal at the boundary between mental and relational, and existential at the boundary between relational and material.

The Three Principal Process Types: Material, Mental, Relational

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 300):

They are the principal types in that they are the cornerstones of the grammar in its guise as a theory of experience, they present three distinct kinds of structural configuration, and they account for the majority of all clauses in a text (‘material’ and ‘relational’ seem to be roughly balanced in frequency over the language as a whole, followed by ‘mental’, although the pattern varies considerably among different registers).

Verbs Serving As 'Possession As Process'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 297):

Possession As A Circumstantial Relation [Language Typology]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 297):

In principle, possession can be thought of as another kind of circumstantial relation, which could be embodied in some such expression as ‘at Peter is a piano’, ‘the piano is with  Peter’. Many languages [e.g.Irish] typically indicate possession by circumstantials of this kind. The nearest English is the verb belong; compare the dialectal form is along o’me.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 296):

Some verbs combine the feature of possession with other semantic features; for example

• exclude ‘[negative] + have’,
• owe ‘have on behalf of another possessor’,
• deserve ‘ought to have’,
• lack ‘need to have’. 

(Most verbs meaning ‘come to have’, on the other hand, function as Process in ‘material’ clauses; for example get, receive, acquire — compare the tense forms in You deserve a medal. – I’m getting one.)

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 296):

In addition to possession in the usual sense of ‘owning’, this category includes abstract relationships of containment, involvement and the like.  Among the verbs commonly occurring in this function are include, involve, contain, comprise, consist of, provide.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 246):

Here the possession is encoded as a process, typically realised by the verb own as in Peter owns the piano. (Notice we do not normally say Peter has the piano, in the sense of ownership; have is not used as an identifying verb of possession.) The participants are possessor Peter and possessed the piano; in this case Peter is Token and the piano is Value.

Possessive Identifying Clauses: Possession As (Both) Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295-6):

Here the participants embody the notion of possession, one signifying property of the possessor, e.g. Peter’s, the other signifying the thing possessed, e.g. the piano. Thus in the piano is Peter’s, both the piano and Peter’s express ‘that which Peter possesses’, the relationship between them being simply one of identity. Note that here the piano is Token and Peter’s is Value.

Possessive Identifying Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, the possession takes the form of a relationship between two entities; and again this may be organised in two ways, with the relationship being expressed either

(a) as a feature of the participants, as in the piano is Peter’s, or

(b) as a feature of the process, as in Peter owns the piano.

Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

If the relationship of possession is construed as the Process, then two further possibilities arise. 

Either (1) the possessor is the Carrier and the possessed is the Attribute (we will call the thing possessed the ‘possessed’ rather than the ‘possession’, to avoid ambiguity; ‘possession’ refers to the relationship), as in Peter has a piano. Here piano-ownership is an attribute being ascribed to Peter. Verbs other than have combine the sense of possession with other features, e.g. lack ‘need to have’, boast ‘have as a positive feature’. 

Or (2) the possessed is the Carrier and the possessor is the Attribute, as in the piano belongs to Peter. Here Peter-ownership is an attribute being ascribed to the piano. Neither of the two, of course, is reversible; we do not say a piano is had by Peter, or Peter is belonged to by the piano.

Indeterminacy In Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

These are not, in fact, syntagmatically distinct from ‘identifying’ clauses; the clause the piano is Peter’s could be either ‘attributive’, ‘the piano is a member of the class of Peter’s possessions’ or ‘identifying’, ‘the piano is identified as belonging to Peter’. (Note that the reversed [form] Peter’s is the piano can only be ‘identifying’.)

Possessive Attributive Clauses: Possession As Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

If the relationship is construed as the Attribute, then it takes the form of a possessive nominal group e.g Peter's; the thing possessed is the Carrier and the possessor is the Attribute.

Possessive Attributive Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 295):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, the possessive relationship may again be construed either as attribute, e.g. Peter’s in the piano is Peter’s, or as process, e.g. has, belongs to in Peter has a piano, the piano belongs to Peter.

Possessive Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 294-5):

In the ‘possessive’ type, the relationship between the two terms is one of ownership; on entity possesses another … In addition to possession in the narrow sense of ‘owning’, the category of ‘possessive’ clauses also includes possession in a broader, more generalised sense — possession of body parts and other part–whole relations, containment, involvement and the like … Possession thus has to be interpreted quite broadly, in the sense of ‘extension’: one entity is construed as being extended by another. 

Just like ‘circumstantial’ clauses, ‘possessive’ ones are construed in both the ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’ modes.

Circumstantial Relational Clauses: Attributive Vs Identifying Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 293):

The line between ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’ modes is less clear in the ‘circumstantial’ than in the ‘intensive’ type of ‘relational’ clause. This is natural, since it is less obvious whether an expression such as on the mat designates a class (that has members — the class of things on the mat) or an identity (the thing that is identified by being on the mat). Nevertheless there is a distinction …

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses: Circumstance As Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 293):

In this type, it is not the participants that are the expression of time, place or other circumstantial features, but the Process. In examples such as the following the verbs take up, span, cross, cause are so to speak ‘circumstantial’ verbs: US bases take up almost one-fifth of the land of the cramped island; more than 50 years span her age and mine; Turtle Ridge would span maybe three blocks; this situation is apparently caused by anomalous low temperatures; … Circumstantial verbs encode the circumstance of time, place, accompaniment, manner, etc as a relationship between the participants … This means that in terms of the concept of grammatical metaphor … all clauses of this type are metaphorical.

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses: Circumstance As (Both) Participants

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

In this type, it is the participants — Identified and Identifier — that are circumstantial elements of time, place and so on. For example, in tomorrow is the tenth, tomorrow and the tenth are both time elements. Similarly in the best way to get there is by train, both the best way and by train express manner; in the real reason is that you’re scared, Identified and Identifier are both expressions of cause. The Token can be quite varied in grammatical class — a nominal group, an adverbial group, a prepositional phrase or an embedded clause, whereas the Value is often a nominal group with the name of a class of circumstance as Thing.

Circumstantial Identifying Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, the circumstance takes the form of a relationship between two entities; one entity being related to another by a feature of time or place or manner etc. As with the circumstantial attributive, this pattern may be organised semantically in one of two ways. The relationship is expressed either

(a) a feature of the participants, as in tomorrow is the tenth, or

(b) as a feature of the process, as in the fair takes up the whole day.

Circumstantial Attributive Process Vs Material Process [Diagnostic: Unmarked Tense & Participant Mobility]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 292):

Verbs serving in clauses with a circumstantial process are often derived from a basic use in ‘material’ clauses of motion … The unmarked present tense is the simple present … rather than the present in present of ‘material’ clauses … The Carrier is typically some immobile physical feature, whereas the Actor of a ‘material’ clause of motion is typically an animate being or a mobile entity. Because of the overlap of a large set of verbs, there will of course be cases that are indeterminate …

Process As Circumstantial vs Attribute As Circumstantial

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

In (b), therefore, the Process is circumstantial; whereas in (a) it is the Attribute that is circumstantial, the Process being the same as in the ‘intensive’ type.

Circumstance As Attributive Process: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

Here the Attribute is realised by a nominal group and the circumstantial relation is expressed by the lexical verb in the verbal group serving as Process … The verb expresses a circumstantial relation such as ‘be + matter’, ‘be + extent in time’, ‘be + extent in space’. Being attributive, these are non-reversible; there are no ‘receptive’ equivalents …

Circumstantial Attributive Vs Existential [Diagnostic: Mood Tag]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

However, note that clauses such as on the north wall …  hangs a Union Jack … are not ‘attributive’ but ‘existential’.  The thematically unmarked form of these clauses is that beginning with existential there: there is (hangs) a Union Jack on the north wall.  The prepositional phrase then appears initially as a marked Theme; in that case the existential feature may be left implicit, although the there may still be present and will appear in any case in the mood tag: on the north wall (there) is a Union Jack, isn’t there?.  In contrast, in a ‘circumstantial attributive’ clause, the Subject/Carrier is picked up in the mood tag: the sounds and smells of the ocean hang in the air — don’t they? …

Circumstantial Vs Intensive Attributes: Thematicity & Definiteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 291):

Unlike the Attribute of an ‘intensive’ clause, the Attribute of a ‘circumstantial’ one is frequently Theme in registers where the thematic status is rhetorically motivated … And unlike intensive Attributes, such circumstantial Attributes frequently have a ‘definite’ nominal group …

Attributive Clauses: Circumstantial Or Intensive [Diagnostic: Constituent Structure]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290n):

Ascriptive verbs of marked phase such as turn and look, were treated as ‘intensive’ even when they had a preposition after them: for example, caterpillars turn into butterflies, Penelope looked like an angel.  This reflects their constituent structure; cf what they turn into are butterflies (not what they turn is into butterflies), Penelope looked angelic.  But there is an overlap at this point, and these could also be interpreted as circumstantial.

Circumstance As Attribute: Realisation

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

Here the Attribute is realised (1) by a prepositional phrase, in which case the circumstantial relation is expressed by the preposition … and/or (2) by an adverbial group …

Circumstantial Attributive Clauses: Process Or Minor Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

In the ‘attributive’ mode, the circumstantial element is an attribute that is being ascribed to some entity … These take two forms:

(a) one in which the circumstance is construed in the form of the Attribute …

(b) the other in which the circumstantial relation is construed in the form of the Process …

In the first case, the circumstantial relation is construed as a minor process realised by a preposition; in the second, it is construed as a process realised by a verb …

Circumstantial Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

In the ‘circumstantial’ type, the relationship between the two terms is one of time, place, manner, cause, accompaniment, role, matter or angle. These are also manifested as circumstantial elements in the English clause.

Blogger Comment:

As manifestations of the 'fractal types', the relationship is one of 

• expansion

• enhancement (time, place, manner, cause),

• extension (accompaniment),

• elaboration (role), or

• projection (matter, angle).

The ‘As Participant’ Or ‘As Process’ Contrast In Intensive Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 290):

The contrast between ‘as participant’ and ‘as process’ is, as we have just noted, a grammatical one and in a sense it applies also to ‘intensive’ clauses. Thus we have for example:

the meaning of ‘kita:bun’ is ‘book’/ ‘kita:bun’ means ‘book’,
the name of his mother is Anna/ his mother is called Anna,
examples of amphibians are frogs, toads and salamanders/ amphibians are exemplified by frogs, toads and salamanders

But a special feature of the ‘intensive’ type is that the sense of ‘meaning’, ‘name’, ‘example’ and the like may be left implicit in the participant (for the reason, see Matthiessen, 1991a): ‘kita:bun’ is ‘book’, his mother is Anna.

Possession & Circumstantiation As Participant vs Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289-90):

With ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses, there is thus a systemic contrast between ‘possession/circumstantiation as participant’ and ‘possession/circumstantiation as process’. The contrast is a general one, construed in the grammatical zone of lexicogrammar rather than the lexical one; and just as with the ‘like’/‘please’ contrast in the grammar of ‘mental’ clauses, we often find lexical pairs manifesting the contrast such as be x’s/be owned, be like/resemble, be with/accompany, be in/inhabit, be around/surround, be opposite of/face, be about/concern – but just as in the mental case there may be gaps in the lexical paradigm.

The Rationâle For 'Possessive' And 'Circumstantial'

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

If all ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses had the intensive verb be as the Process, we could perhaps interpret them as subtypes of ‘intensive’ clauses – subtypes where possessor and possessed are related to one another and where circumstances are related to one another. Here the piano is Emily’s would be like our earlier example her name is Alice, where naming is construed as an aspect of one of the participants (cf. also the owner of the Piano is Emily). Under this interpretation a clause such as Emily has a piano would be the odd one out because here the sense of possession is construed in the process in the first instance (the verb have), not in (one of) the participants. 

However, Emily has a piano is not the odd one out; it exemplifies a regular option throughout for all ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses. This is the option of construing possession or circumstantiation as process. Thus alongside the piano is Emily’s, we have the piano is owned by Emily; and alongside Emily is like her mother, we have Emily resembles her mother. Here own means ‘be + possession’ and resemble means ‘be + like’.

Possessive And Circumstantial Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

The verb be can be used in all categories set out in Section 5.4.2 although have is the unmarked verb in ‘attributive’ clauses of possession (in standard English we say Emily has a piano rather than with Emily is a piano).  The variants of ‘possessive’ and ‘circumstantial’ clauses with be (and have) are analogous to ‘intensive’ clauses.  Thus Emily has a piano can be interpreted as ‘Emily is a member of the class of piano–owners’ and the meeting is on Friday as ‘the meeting is a member of the class of the class of events on Friday’.  Similarly, the piano is Emily’s can be interpreted as ‘the piano is identified as the one belonging to Emily’ and Friday is the best time as ‘Friday is identified as the best time’.

‘Circumstantial’ and ‘Possessive’ Relational Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 289):

These two types also come in two modes of being, ‘attributive’ and ‘identifying’. We can thus recognise the following series of proportions:

intensive            Emily is a poet :                            attributive
                          Emily is the poet ::                       identifying 

possessive          Emily has a piano :                        attributive
                          the piano is Emily’s ::                   identifying 

circumstantial    the meeting is on Friday :              attributive
                         the time of the meeting is Friday   identifying

Assigned Attributive Clauses vs Creative Material Clauses [Diagnostics]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 288-9):

We may note that there is a type of clause that is agnate to those with verbs of appearance in which the Carrier is construed on the model of a circumstance of Means (of the subtype ‘material’) marked by of or out of; for example:

‘It makes a mockery of the slogan which many of them use, “To Protect and Serve”,’ he said.

I mean, I think she’s made an absolute fool of herself. 

No one’s gonna make a fool out of me

These relational clauses resemble creative material ones with a circumstance of Means such as you could make fortune out of any one of your loves. However, in such material clauses the circumstance of Means can be left out: you could make a fortune, whereas the Carrier/Means cannot be left out of an assigned relational clause: we cannot say she’s made an absolute fool without of herself. Creative verbs other than make can serve as the Process, e.g. create, produce, develop. Further, there is a receptive option with such material clauses, e.g. a fortune could be made (by you) out of any of your loves, but there is no receptive version of assigned relational clauses of this type: an absolute fool has been made (by her) of herself is odd.

Assignment

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 288):

Both ‘identifying’ and ‘attributive’ clauses of the ‘intensive’ kind have the option of assignment: they may be configured with a third participant representing the entity assigning the relationship of identity [or] attribution … In the case of ‘identifying’ clauses, this is the Assigner; in the case of ‘attributing’, this is the Attributor.  In a ‘receptive’ clause, this participant may be left implicit …

Identifying Mode: Naming & Defining Vs Calling

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287-8):

Most problematic of all are clauses of naming and defining, which lie exactly at the crossover point between the the two types of ‘identifying’ clause … Naming and defining are linguistic exercises, in which the word is Token and its meaning is Value. In calling, on the other hand, it is the name that is the Value.

Adjectival Attribute <-> Nominal Attribute <-> Value

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

Nominal Attributes are closer to Values than adjectival ones; and these, in turn, are very close to the ‘is an example of’ type of ‘identifying’ clause, like those missiles constitute a threat to our security.

Attribute As An Instance Of A Class

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

And on the other hand we often interpret an Attribute not just as an instance of a class but in some sense the value of the entity it carries, e.g. Pat is a millionaire.

Blogger Comment:

The incoherence here arises from Matthiessen's mistaken rewording of Halliday (1994: 129):

And on the other hand we often interpret an Attribute not just as an instance of a class but in some sense the value of the entity that carries it, e.g. Pat is a millionaire.

The Continuity From Attribution To Decoding Identity

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 287):

The continuity becomes clearer when we set up as Value/Identifier something that is explicitly worded as membership of a class, using the expression ‘one of ...’

Pat                             is            one of the richest people I know
Identified/Token                       Identifier/Value

Blogger Comment:

Note that, viewed 'from above', an attributive relation obtains between the Head (Carrier) — one — and the Postmodifier (Attribute) — the richest people I know — of the nominal group serving as Identifier/Value.

Attributive <–> Decoding <–> Encoding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 286):

… the [decoding] type of ‘identifying’ clause where the Identifier is the Value (that is, the identity is given by function) is intermediate between the attributive and the other [encoding] type of ‘identifying’, the one where the Identifier is the Token (identity is given by form):

Pat is rich                      Attribute               attributive
Pat is the richest           Identifier/Value     decoding
the richest is Pat           Identifier/Token    encoding

Classifying vs Identifying

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 286):

So for example

my brother                 is       tall
Carrier = member                Attribute = class

means ‘my brother belongs to the class of people who are tall’. This specifies one of his attributes; but it does not serve to identify him – there are other tall people besides. The only means of identifying something by assigning it to a class is to make that a class of one. But if the one-member class is at the same level of abstraction as its member, we have a tautology: my brother is my brother.

Carrier & Attribute Differ In Generality Not Abstraction

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 286):

In attribution, some entity is being said to have an attribute. This means that it is being assigned to a class, and the two elements that enter into this relation, the attribute and the entity that ‘carries’ it, thus differ in generality (the one includes the other) but are at the same level of abstraction [unlike Token and Value].

Blogger Comments:

Note that this also, therefore, characterises the difference between instantiation (attribution/generality) and stratification (identity/abstraction).  Language is more general than register; context is more abstract than language.  This is the fundamental theoretical reason why register ≠ context.

Thematic Equatives

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 285):

Note that in a thematic equative, the nominalisation is always the Value.

Intensive Identifying Clauses: Sub-Types

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 284-5):

Equation … Equivalence … Rôle–play … Naming … Definition … Symbolisation (including glossing and translation) … Exemplification … Demonstration …

Encoding vs Decoding Clauses In Logogenesis

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 283-4):

Identifying clauses of different coding orientations make distinct and complementary contributions in the development of text. Thus ‘encoding’ clauses serve as a resource for presenting the steps in the organisation of a text …  In contrast, ‘decoding’ clauses can be used as a strategy for interpreting phenomena that have been observed …

Token Vs Value [Diagnostic: Voice & Subject]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 282-3):

With a verb other than be it is clear which is Token and which is Value, since … this can be determined by the voice: if the clause is ‘operative’, the Subject is Token, whereas if the clause is ‘receptive’, the Subject is Value. … With the verb be one cannot tell whether the clause is ‘operative’ or ‘receptive’; the best strategy for analysing these is to substitute some other verb, such as represent, and see which voice is chosen.

Receptive Voice: Purpose

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 282):

The reason for choosing the ‘receptive’ in English is to get the desired texture, in terms of Theme–Rheme and Given–New; in particular it avoids marked information focus (which carries an additional semantic feature of contrast).

Identifying Mode: Operative Vs Receptive Voice

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 280):

It is this directionality that determines the voice of the clause – whether it is ‘operative’ or ‘receptive’; and in order to explain this we need to operate with Token and Value as structural functions. … In other words, ‘identifying’ clauses select for voice; they have an ‘operative’ and a ‘receptive’ variant. The difference is entirely systematic, once we recognise the structure of Token and Value: the ‘operative’ voice is the one in which the Subject is also the Token (just as, in a ‘material’ clause, the ‘operative’ is the variant in which the Subject is also the Actor).

Identifying Mode: Decoding Vs Encoding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 279-80):

… either the Token is ‘decoded’

or else the Value is ‘encoded’.

If the Token is construed as Identified and the Value as Identifier, the clause is a decoding one …

if the Value is construed as Identified and the Token as Identifier, the clause is an encoding one …

In other words, the identity either decodes the Token by reference to the Value

or it encodes the Value by reference to the Token.

Identifying Mode: Direction Of Coding

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 279):

Every ‘identifying’ clause faces either one way or the other: the structure is either Identified/Token ^ Identifier/Value [decoding] … or Identified/Value ^ Identifier/Token [encoding].

Token & Value

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 279):

In any ‘identifying’ clause, the two halves refer to the same thing; but the clause is not a tautology, so there must be some difference between them. This difference can be characterised as a stratal one of ‘expression’ and ‘content’; or, in terms of their generalised labels in the grammar, of Token and Value — and either can be used to identify the other.

Identifier & New [Contra Fawcett]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 279):

For the present discussion, we shall take it that the Identifier always carries the tonic prominence. This is not, in fact, true; it is the typical pattern, since it is the identity that is likely to be new information, but there is a marked option whereby the Identified is construed as the New. (Note therefore that Identified–Identifier cannot simply be explained as Given–New in an ‘identifying’ clause [as Fawcett maintains]; not surprisingly, since the former are experiential functions whereas the latter are textual.)

Identifying Vs Attributive Mode [Diagnostic: Reversibility]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 278):

These [‘identifying’] clauses are reversible. All verbs except the neutral be and the phased become, remain (and those with following prepositions like as in act as) have passive forms … Clauses with be reverse without change in the form of the verb and without marking the non-Subject participant …

Attributive Vs Identifying Mode: Interrogative Probe

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 278):

The interrogative probe for such [‘identifying’] clauses is which?, who?, which/who…as? (or what? if the choice is open–ended) …

Identifying Mode: Lexical Verb

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 278):

The lexical verb of the verbal group realising the [identifying] Process is one from the ‘equative’ classes.

Identifying Mode: In/Definiteness

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 277-8):

The nominal group realising the function of Identifier is typically definite: it has a common noun as Head, with the or other specific determiner as Deictic, or else a proper noun or pronoun. The only form with adjective as head is the superlative ….

Identifying Vs Attributive Mode

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 277):

Class membership [attribution] does not serve to identify … One way of looking at the ‘identifying’ clause would be to say that here we are narrowing down the class in question to a class of one … only one member in the class, a single instance.

Some Of The Uses Of Identifying Clauses In The Construction Of Knowledge

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 277):

… establishing uniqueness, glossing (technical) names, and interpreting evidence. …

Such clauses are important because they represent a strategy for expanding the naming resources of a language, in both everyday discourse and technical or scientific discourse. They underpin dictionary definitions, where the Process is often absent from the structure …

Identified And Identifier

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 276):

In the ‘identifying’ mode, some thing has an identity assigned to it. What this means is that one entity is being used to identify another: ‘x is identified by a’, or ‘a serves to define the identity of x’. Structurally we label the x–element, that which is to be identified, as the Identified, and the a–element, that which serves as identity, as the Identifier.

Material Attributive Clauses & Material Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 276):

Within the other major domain of attribution, the ‘material’ domain, we find an analogous situation where Attribute denotes a material quality equivalent to the Process of a ‘material’ clause, and may be formed as a participle from a material process verb; for example, 

they said that our disk was corrupted when it arrived … 

In addition, while ‘material’ clauses are typically construed with the present-in-present, ‘relational’ ones are construed with the simple present. Thus [sic] has to be interpreted as ‘material’ – market research is being conducted this week; and our disk was being corrupted (when it arrived) would be ‘material’ rather than ‘relational’.

Fact As Cause In Attributive Clause

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275-6):

No doubt because of this overlap, the situation regarding the status of ‘facts’ is also blurred. In principle, if a second figure comes into the picture representing the source or origin of the mental condition, it appears as ‘fact’ with a ‘mental’ clause but as ‘cause’ with a ‘relational’ one; for example:

(mental) it distresses me/I regret + that you failed
It distresses him that women ask him, to this day, to remove his dark glasses so that they can witness the marvel of his magical peepers.
(relational) I’m very distressed + because you failed
Well, I’m still afraid of him ’cause he’s bitten me.

But ‘relational attributive’ clauses with Attributes of this kind, agnate to the Process of a ‘mental’ clause, are regularly construed with ‘fact’ clauses:

(relational) I’m very distressed/it’s a great pity + that you failed
I am extremely distressed that these unfounded allegations should then have been leaked to newspapers.

The Attribute has become, in effect, a metaphorical expression of the Process of a ‘mental’ clause, and can be accompanied by a clause that is projected.

Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses: Indeterminacy

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275, 275n): 

But these four criteria do not always coincide, and not every instance can be clearly assigned to one category or the other. ¹ … 

¹ Thus we find clauses where the participial form of the mental process verb is submodified but where the Phenomenon is also present in the form it takes in a ‘receptive’ clause; for example: she was very intrigued by alternative ideas; I was very depressed by some feedback I was getting.

Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses: Clause Structure

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275):

In clause structure, a ‘mental’ clause typically has (and always can have) both Senser and Phenomenon; whereas in the ‘attributive’, such other entities can only appear circumstantially as Cause or Matter (agnate to Phenomenon) or Angle (agnate to Senser).

Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses: Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275):

As far as tense is concerned, since a quality is typically the outcome of a preceding event, the same phenomenon will appear in present tense if represented as an Attribute but in past tense if represented as a Process in a ‘mental’ clause: for example, he’s frightened (present) is likely to be ‘relational attributive’, with the agnate ‘mental’ clause being (past in present) he’s been frightened.

Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses: Marked Phase

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275):

As noted above, attributive verbs other than be, namely those of marked phase, occur in ‘attributive’ clauses; e.g. it seems encouraging, you look pleased. These would not occur in this way in a ‘mental’ clause; we could not say you look enjoying (it), it seems delighting (you).

Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses: Submodifiers

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 275):

Submodifiers like so, very, too go with nominal groups but not with verbal groups: we can say I was very afraid of it but not I very feared it; you’re not too keen on it but not you don’t too want it. All the words listed in Sensing as Attribute and as Process as ‘adjective/participle’, glad, sorry, worrying, frightening, etc., readily accept these submodifying items; hence a clause featuring be + worrying, frightening etc. is likely to be ‘relational’ rather than ‘mental’.

4 Criteria For Distinguishing Mental And Attributive Clauses

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 274, 275, 275n):

There is overlap here between ‘mental’ and ‘relational’ clauses, and some clauses such as I was scared, could be interpreted either way. There are four main indicators: (1) submodification; (2) marked phase; (3) tense; and (4) clause structure. …

But these four criteria do not always coincide, and not every instance can be clearly assigned to one category or the other.¹

¹ Thus we find clauses where the participial form of the mental process verb is submodified but where the Phenomenon is also present in the form it takes in a ‘receptive’ clause; for example: she was very intrigued by alternative ideas; I was very depressed by some feedback I was getting.

Semiotic Domain Of Attribution: Qualities Of Sensing

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 273-4):

Within the semiotic domain of attribution, there is one variety of ‘attributive’ clause in which the Attribute denotes a quality of sensing equivalent to the Process of a ‘mental’ clause. … ‘Relational’ clauses with a quality of sensing fall into two types: those which match the like [‘emanating’] type of ‘mental’ clause, with Carrier equivalent to Senser; and those which match the please [‘impinging’] type of ‘mental’ clause, with Carrier equivalent to Phenomenon. … many of the Attributes are evaluative in nature; this type of clause is an important grammatical strategy in the enactment of appraisal.

Blogger Comment:

For example, from Yes, Minister

Jim Hacker:                      I'm a curious person.               [Carrier equivalent to Senser]
Sir Humphrey Appleby:     You certainly are, Minister.     [Carrier equivalent to Phenomenon]

Michæl Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1925-2018)

When you read a book, you hold another's mind in your hands.
 — James Burke

Attribute Types In The Semiotic Domain

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 273):

Domain Of Attribution: Material Or Semiotic

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 272-3):

… ‘relational’ clauses may construe both ‘outer experience’ [material] and inner experience [mental]. So both these modes of experience are included within the domains of attribution of an ‘attributive’ clause; but these domains transcend the two modes. In particular, ‘inner experience’ is generalised to include not only subjective sensations but also attributes that are construed as objective properties of macrothings [acts] and metathings [facts] … The general contrast in domains of attribution is thus not that of material vs mental but rather ‘material’ vs ‘semiotic’. The attributes assigned to the carrier in an ‘attributive’ clause are either material ones or semiotic ones, and the ‘thing’ serving as carrier has to be of the same order as the attribute.   Thus with true as Attribute, the Carrier has to be a metathing – represented by a fact clause … or by it, that, this referring to a fact …

Inceptive Attribution: Collocation Patterns

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 272):

Clauses of ‘inceptive’ attribution are subject to collocational patterns between Process: verb and Attribute: adjective; for example go + mad, run + dry, turn + sour, fall + ill. And the collocational pattern may also involve the Head noun of the nominal group serving as Carrier, as with Process: run + Attribute: dry, where the Carrier includes a noun such as well, lake, river, sea, water supply, tap; blood bank; mouth

Time Phased Attribution: Tense

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 272):

In the case of ‘time phase’, in particular ‘inceptive’, the tense may be like that of ‘material’ clauses rather than like that of ‘relational’ ones; … That is, coming into being is construed on the same model as activities as far as time is concerned; but it is still construed as a configuration of being, with Carrier (the scope of European trade) + Process (was becoming) + Attribute (oceanic and worldwide). If the Attribute is an ‘entity’ rather than a ‘quality’, the nominal group realising it may be marked by the preposition into; alongside ‘become’ + nominal group, we thus have ‘turn’, ‘grow’ + into + nominal group…

Phase Of Attribution: Neutral Or Phased

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271-2):

Like other processes, processes of attribution unfold through time. In the unmarked case, the phase of the unfolding is left unspecified (‘neutral’); alternatively, the phase is marked as either (1) ‘time phase’ – ‘inceptive’ (e.g. become, go, grow, turn) or ‘durative’ (e.g. keep, remain) or (2) ‘reality phase’ – ‘apparent’ (e.g. seem, appear), ‘perceptive’ (e.g. look, sound, taste) or realised (e.g. prove, turn out)…

Qualitative Process With Attribute

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271n):

The verbs reek, drip and ooze are used in the sense of ‘be [over-]ful’ or ‘have [too] much of’ (shading into the ‘possessive’ area); but they always seem to be configured with a nominal group, introduced by a preposition in the case of drip and reek, and this element can be interpreted as Attribute: it certainly reeks to me of sexual exploitation; … It drips with press agentry; Greenoak’s book drips with bird lore like no other; she oozes self-confidence; … it lacks substance and oozes mediocrity.

Quality Attribution: Qualitative Verbs

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Verbs of this kind include  

• matter, count ‘be important’ … 
• suffice ‘be enough’, 
• abound ‘be plentiful; 
• figure ‘make sense’; 
• differ, vary ‘be different, varied’; 
• hurt, ache ‘be painful’; 
• dominate ‘be dominant’, 
• apply ‘be relevant’ … 
• do ‘be acceptable, enough’ … 
• remain ‘be + still’, 
• stink, smell, reek … ‘be smelly’ … 

and a number of verbs of negative appraisal, some of them abstract versions of ‘be + smelly’, for example stink, suck …

Quality Attribution: Qualitative Process

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Within ‘quality’ attribution, there is a further option: a small number of qualities may be construed as a qualitative Process rather than as a qualitative Attribute. Thus, alongside will it be enough? we have will it suffice?. (Alternatively, we can interpret such clauses as having a conflation of Process and Attribute.)

Common Circumstance Types With Mental Qualitative Attributes

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 271):

Certain circumstances are common with particular types of attribution. For example, circumstances of Cause, Matter and Angle are common with ‘mental’ qualities as Attribute

• [Cause:] I did get angry with him;
• [Matter:] so I think we have to be a bit sensible about what we are doing;
• [Angle:] it’s all Greek to me;

Qualifier Of Epithet/Head vs Circumstance [Diagnostic]

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 270-1):

These may be difficult to differentiate from circumstantial elements in the transitivity structure of the clause. To differentiate them in analysis, we can apply textual probes: in principle, being an element of the clause, a circumstance is subject to all the different textual statuses brought about by theme, theme predication and theme identification.

Thus with it in so you have to be beautiful with it is a circumstance (of Accompaniment), if we interpret the clause to mean ‘so you and it [silver] have to be beautiful together’, since it can be Theme (so with it you have to be beautiful rather than so it you have to be beautiful with) and predicated Theme (so it is with it that you have to be beautiful rather than so it is it that you have to be beautiful with). 

In contrast, a Qualifier cannot on its own be given a textual status in the clause since it is a constituent of a nominal group, not of the clause; so it can only be thematic together with the rest of the nominal group that it is part of. …

However, there is a considerable degree of indeterminacy in this area …